- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Messrs Bawa Electric Radio Service v. Smt. Sham Kaur And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
This regular second appeal was filed by the tenant (the appellant). The central factual matrix, as presented in the opinion, is as follows:
- The disputed shop in Bhatinda City was owned by Shri Piare Lal (defendant-respondent No. 3), who had mortgaged it to Shri Kanhaiya Lal (defendant-respondent No. 1) by a registered mortgage deed dated 18 December 1959 (Exhibit P.9) that recited the mortgage was with possession and permitted the mortgagee either to live in the house or to lease it out.
- The parties disputed whether the mortgagee had actually been delivered possession after a later additional mortgage amount was raised; however, when the mortgagee let the property to the appellant on 4 January 1964 it was admittedly lying vacant. The appellant paid three months' advance rent to the mortgagee (receipt Exhibit D.34) and executed a rent note the same day in favour of the mortgagee (Exhibit D.4), which the mortgagor attested as a witness.
- The mortgagor (Shri Piare Lal) maintained that he had continued in possession up to November 1963 and had kept some built-in furniture and fittings in the shop; on the date the lease was granted by the mortgagee he sold these fittings to the appellant (receipt Exhibit D.1). He also reserved the right to build on the first floor even during continuance of the tenancy and had signed the rent note as an attesting witness.
- Shri Piare Lal later sold the shop to Smt. Sham Kaur (plaintiff-respondent) by registered sale deed dated 19 December 1967 (Exhibit P.1). Smt. Sham Kaur instituted a suit for possession by redemption of the property and impleaded the appellant as a defendant, raising the question whether the appellant (tenant under the lease granted by the mortgagee) would be liable to be dispossessed upon execution of the redemption decree.
- The two Courts below had found that the rents paid by the appellant were not being shared between the mortgagor and the mortgagee and concluded that the lease did not survive redemption. This second appeal challenges those conclusions and related legal questions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a lease of a shop granted by a mortgagee in possession of mortgaged property would be binding on the mortgagor after the property has been redeemed.
- Whether the attestation of the rent note by the mortgagor (the owner) makes any difference to the legal effect of such a lease (i.e., whether attestation amounts to consent that binds the mortgagor after redemption).
- Whether the appellant enjoys protection as a tenant under the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act and under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act against the owner-mortgagor or a purchaser from the mortgagor (here, Smt. Sham Kaur).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as stated in the opinion)
- The lease granted by the mortgagee should be binding on the mortgagor (and anyone deriving title from him) even after redemption because the lease was validly granted by the mortgagee in possession.
- The attestation of the rent note by the mortgagor implies his consent to the lease and therefore supports the proposition that the lease should survive redemption.
- The appellant claimed protection as a tenant under the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act and under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
- Reliance was placed on a Division Bench ruling (Habib Seth v. Kashi Nath) to contend that section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act is not confined to agricultural tenancies and can apply to urban/commercial property.
Mortgagor / Owner's Position (as stated or inferred from the opinion)
- The mortgagor asserted he had continued in possession up to November 1963; during the period the property lay vacant (about two months) possession was to be presumed to be that of the mortgagee in accordance with the mortgage terms.
- The mortgagor had not fully cleared out the shop by the time the lease was granted and had reserved a right to build on the first floor; he attested the rent note possibly for that reason (i.e., as an attesting witness while reserving other rights).
- Evidence was adduced (but ultimately disbelieved by the Courts below) that the mortgagor was receiving a share of the rent paid by the appellant, a contention relied upon by the appellant to argue that the mortgagor had effectively consented to continuation of the lease beyond redemption.
Plaintiff-Respondent (purchaser) — Smt. Sham Kaur
- Smt. Sham Kaur purchased the shop from the mortgagor by registered deed (Exhibit P.1) and sued for possession by redemption; her right to redeem (as purchaser from the owner-mortgagor) was challenged in the Courts below but was not seriously disputed before this Court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| The All India Film Corporation v. Raja Gyan Nath, 1970 72 P.L.R. 578 | Establishes the general proposition that a mortgagee's interest (and any derivative title such as a lease created by the mortgagee) is co-terminus with the mortgagee's interest; on redemption the mortgagee's title ends and derivative titles ordinarily end with it. Also discusses section 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act and the limited application of section 76(a) to agricultural management. | The Court relied on this ruling to support the proposition that a general written permission to the mortgagee to lease does not by itself imply concurrence by the mortgagor to an extension of the lease beyond redemption; the lease ordinarily ends with redemption. |
| Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain Singh, 1952 S.C.R. 775 | Supports the proposition that derivative title created by a mortgagee (e.g., a tenancy) ordinarily terminates when the mortgagee's interest is extinguished on redemption. | Referenced by the Court as supporting authority for the general principle that a lessee deriving title from a mortgagee cannot claim rights beyond the mortgagee's interest unless the mortgagor concurs. |
| Assaram v. Mst. Ram Kali, 1958 S.C.R. 986 | Also cited as authority for the proposition that leases created by a mortgagee are co-terminus with the mortgagee's interest and ordinarily terminate on redemption. | Cited alongside other Supreme Court rulings to reinforce the legal proposition applied by the Court. |
| Schalmal Parasram v. Smt. Ratnabai, 1972 R.C.R. 203 | Affirms the All India Film Corporation ruling: where a lease is found to have come to an end with the mortgagee's interest, there is no tenancy to protect under a special statute such as the Rent Restriction Act. | Used to support the conclusion that, if the lease ended with redemption, the tenant cannot claim protection under the Rent Restriction Act. |
| Habib Seth v. Kashi Nath, 1969 R.C.R. 65 | Division Bench ruling relied upon by the appellant to argue that section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act is not necessarily confined to agricultural tenancies; that case was remanded to determine whether the lease was a "prudent act". | The Court noted the appellant's reliance on this case but observed the final outcome in that case was not stated; it was distinguished from the instant facts and did not alter the Court's conclusion from binding Supreme Court precedents. |
| Rashtaria Bartan Bhandar v. Hari Kishan Kasera, 1966 Cur. L.J. 395 | Division Bench consideration which enunciated three exceptions to the general rule and held that the exception created by section 76(a) was confined to leases of agricultural land; different considerations apply to urban property. | Relied upon to support the view that section 76(a) is ordinarily applied to agricultural land and has seldom been extended to urban property; cited in distinguishing the appellant's argument based on section 76(a). |
| Jagan Nath v. Mittar Sain, 1969 71 P.L.R. 606 | Full Bench consideration of the subject matter relating to the application of the general principles and exceptions in similar disputes. | Cited as further judicial consideration of the topic; used to show that the point had been the subject of detailed consideration by other benches of the Court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by applying established legal principles to the facts found by the Courts below and to the documentary record before it. The analysis as stated in the opinion can be summarized in the following steps:
- The attestation of the rent note by the mortgagor was recognized as implying some consent, but the precise legal effect of that attestation depends upon the parties' true intentions as shown by the surrounding circumstances. Attestation alone does not fix the scope of consent.
- The mortgage deed conferred on the mortgagee the right either to enjoy possession himself or to transfer the enjoyment of possession (i.e., to lease). Ordinarily, however, any lease granted by a mortgagee in possession is co-terminus with the mortgagee's interest; when the mortgagee's interest ends (for example, by redemption), the derivative title of the lessee ordinarily comes to an end as well.
- By attesting the rent note, the mortgagor could have consented to the normal lease term that the mortgagee was entitled to grant (a term ordinarily lasting up to the date of redemption). The attestation did not, without more, demonstrate consent to an enlargement of the mortgagee's rights so as to bind the mortgagor after redemption.
- The Court examined evidence adduced to show that the mortgagor had been receiving a share of the rent (an argument made to infer broader consent). The two Courts below had disbelieved that evidence and the mortgagee's rent receipts (Exhibits D.5 to D.34) were shown to have been issued by the mortgagee. The appellate Court found no reason to disturb the factual finding of the Courts below that rents were not shared between the mortgagor and the mortgagee.
- The Court relied on Supreme Court authority (notably The All India Film Corporation v. Raja Gyan Nath and earlier decisions cited therein) to reaffirm the general legal proposition that a lessee deriving title from a mortgagee cannot ordinarily claim rights beyond the mortgagee's interest unless the mortgagor has specifically concurred in creating a relationship that survives redemption.
- The Court addressed the contention based on section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act and the protection under the Rent Restriction Act. It observed (following the Supreme Court) that the exception under section 76(a) typically applies to the management of agricultural land and has rarely been extended to urban properties; where the lease has terminated with the mortgagee's interest, there is no tenancy to which the special statute would extend protection.
- The Court considered other High Court decisions cited by the appellant (including Habib Seth v. Kashi Nath and subsequent division/full bench rulings) but concluded that they did not displace the binding propositions derived from the Supreme Court precedents relied upon.
- On the combined legal and factual material, the Court found that the appellant failed to prove the mortgagor's express concurrence to extend the lease beyond redemption; therefore the lease did not bind the mortgagor (or his purchaser) after redemption.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED
Direct consequences for the parties (as ordered in the opinion):
- The appellant's second appeal fails and is dismissed.
- There is no order as to costs (explicitly stated because of the complicated questions of law involved).
- The appellant was granted two months' time to vacate the shop.
The Court based its decision on application of established Supreme Court and High Court authorities; the opinion does not state that it was laying down a new precedent distinct from those authorities it relied upon.
C.G Suri, J.:— The question of law involved in this regular second appeal filed by the tenant is whether the lease of a shop granted by a mortgagee in possession of the mortgaged property would be binding on the mortgagor after the redemption of the property and whether the attestation of the rent note by the mortgagor would make any difference to the proposition of law involved.
2. The shop in dispute is situated in an important commercial locality of Bhatinda City. Its owner Shri Piare Lal defendant-respondent No. 3 had mortgaged it with Shri Kanhaiya Lal defendant-respondent No. 1 and the registered mortgage deed, copy Exhibit P. 9, dated 18th December, 1959 recites that the mortgage is with possession and that mortgagee could either live in the house or lease it out. Some additional mortgage amount was raised on the property on a later date and the parties were not agreed as to whether the mortgagee had actually been delivered possession of the shop after the mortgage. This would not, however seem to make any material difference to the ultimate decision of the suit because when the property was let out to the appellant on 4th January, 1964 by the mortgagee Shri Kanhaiya Lal, it was admittedly lying vacant and the advance rent for three months was paid to him by the appellant vide the receipt, Exhibit D. 34. The appellant had executed the rent note, Exhibit D. 4, dated 4th January, 1964 the same day in favour of Shri Kanhaiya Lal mortgagee.
3. The mortgagor's own case is that he had continued in possession of the property up to November, 1963 and during the period of about two months that the property remained lying vacant, the possession was to be presumed to be of the mortgagee in accordance with the terms and conditions of the mortgage. It may, however, appear apparent that the mortgagor had not completely cleared out of the shop up to the date of the grant of the lease in appellants flour and that he was keeping some built in furniture and fittings inside the shop. This furniture and fittings he had sold to the appellant for a sum of Rs. 700/- on the date of the grant of the lease by the mortgagee. The appellant had issued the receipt, Exhibit D. 1, dated 4th January, 1964 for the price of the furniture etc., in favour of the mortgagor Shri Piare Lal the same day. Shri Piare Lal had reserved to himself the right to built on the first floor of the shop even during the continuance of the tenancy and this may appear to have been the reason why he had signed the rent note. Exhibit D. 4, dated 4th January, 1964 as an attesting witness.
4. Shri Piare Lal sold the shop in dispute to Smt. Sham Kaur plaintiff-respondent by the registered sale deed, Exhibit P. 1, dated 19th December, 1967. Smt. Sham Kaur filed this suit for possession by redemption of the property. As she had impleaded the appellant as a defendant in the case, the question arose whether the appellant would be liable to be dispossessed in execution of her redemption decree. The plaintiffs right to redeem the property had been challenged in the two Courts below but it is not seriously argued by Shri Aggarwal, the learned counsel for the appellant in this Court, that Smt. Sham Kaur has the right to redeem as she has purchased the shop from the owner-mortgagor. Shri Aggarwal's main argument is that as the lease in appellant's favour by the mortgagee, the lease would be binding on the owner-mortgagor or anyone deriving title from him even after the property has been redeemed. The appellant, therefore, claims protection as a tenant under the provisions of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act and section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act not only against the owner-mortgagor but also against Smt. Sham Kaur plaintiff who has purchased the property from him.
5. I agree with Shri Aggarwal that the attestation of the rent-note by the owner mortgagor would imply that he had given his consent to something but what exactly he had consented to would depend upon the intentions of the parties which can be gathered from the attending circumstances. The mortgage in Kanaiya Lal's favour was with possession he had been given the right either to enjoy the possession-himself or to transfer the enjoyment of that right to some one else by granting a lease Ordinarily, this lease could last only during the period that the mortgagee's interest subsisted in the property and as soon as this mortgage was extinguished by redemption or otherwise, the right of the lessee who derived title from the mortgagee was supposed to come to an end. By the attestation of the rent note, the mortgagor could have given his consent to the grant of the lease for the normal period which was supposed to last up to the date of redemption of the property. The mortgagee had been given the right to lease out the property for this normal term and the mortgagor's attestation of the rent note could imply that he had agreed only to the exercise of this normal right by the mortgagee. We have hardly any reason for believing, however, that by attesting the rent note, the mortgagor had given his consent to an enlargement of the mortgagee's normal rights to transfer the enjoyment of possession of the mortgaged property to someone for as long as he could have himself enjoyed the possession. Some evidence had been examined that the mortgagor was getting a share out of the rent that the appellant was paying to the mortgagee from month to month. It is argued that from this circumstance, we could presume that the lease was a prudent act and that the mortgagor had agreed that the lease could continue even after the redemption of the property. Both the Courts below have disbelieved the evidence with regard to the sharing of the rent by the mortgagor and the rent receipts. Exhibits D. 5 to D. 34, were being issued throughout by the mortgagee. I have, therefore, no reason to disturb the finding of fact of the two Courts below that the rents paid by the appellant were not being shared between the mortgagor and the mortgagee.
6. A similar situation may appear to have arisen in a case that went up to the Supreme Court. In The All India Film Corporation v. Raja Gyan Nath . 1970 72 P.L.R 578., the mortgagor had given it in writing that the mortgagee was entitled to remain in possession himself or could give the property on lease to anyone else and that the mortgagor would have no objection. Relying on two earlier rulings of the Supreme Court, the Hon'ble Judges were pleased to observe as follows:—
“A general proposition of law is that no parson can confer on another a better title than he himself has. A mortgage is a transfer of an interest in specific immovable property for the purpose of securing repayment of a loan. A mortgagees interest lasts only as long as the mortgagee has not been paid off. Therefore on redemption of the mortgage the title of the mortgagee comes to an end. A derivative title from him must ordinarily come to an end with the termination of the mortgagee's title. The mortgagee by creating a tenancy becomes the lessor of the property but his interest as lessor is co-terminus with his mortgagee interest. Section 111(c) of the Transfer of Property Act provides that a lease of immovable property determines where the interest of the lessor in the property terminates on or his power to dispose of the same, extends only to the happening of any event by the happening of such event. The duration of the mortgagee's interest determines his position as the lessor. The relationship of lessor and lessee cannot subsist beyond the mortgagees's interest unless the relationship is agreed, to by the mortgagor or a fresh relationship is recreated. This the mortgagor or the person succeeding to the mortgagor's interest may elect to do. But if he does not, the lessee cannot claim any rights beyond the term of his original lessor's interest. These propositions are well-understood and find support in two rulings of this Court in Mahabir Gope v. Harbans Narain Singh, 1952 S.C.R 775 and Assaram v. Mst. Ram Kali, 1958 S.C.R 986.”
7. In spite of the written consent of the mortgagor, the lease was found not to extend beyond the date of redemption of the property. While dealing with the appellant's contention that section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act provided an exception to the principles of law enunciated above, the Hon'ble Judges were pleased to observed that the exception applied ordinarily to the management of agricultural lands and had seldom been extended to urban properties: so as to the it up in the hands of the lessee or to confer on them rights under special statutes. It was, however, mentioned that there could again be an exception to this. The lease could continue to bind the mortgagor or persons deriving interest from him if the mortgagor had concurred in granting a lease of this type. No concurrence to the grant of the lease beyond the date of redemption was presumed from the general permission given in writing to the mortgages to lease out the property. The mortgagor's concurrence has, therefore, to be specific to the continuance of the lease after the date of redemption.
8. Shri Aggarwal argues that in All India Film Corporation's case, the lease was found to have been an imprudent act and that was why it was not held binding on the mortgagor. This does not appear to have been the only reason given for dismissing the tenant's appeal. It has been made clear further in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the judgment that the lease was found to have come to an end with the mortgagee's interest in the property independently of the question whether the lease was or was not a prudent act.
9. While dealing with the argument that the appellant had the protection of the Rent Restriction Act, the Hon'ble Judges observed that the answer to this question would depend on whether it could be said that there was a tenancy to protect. As the Hon'ble Judges has found that the lease had come to an end with the mortgagee's interest in the property, there was no question of the tenants enjoying any protection under the special statute. This ruling was followed by the Supreme Court in Schalmal Parasram v. Smt. Ratnabai . 1972 R.C.R 203..
10. Shri Aggarwal then relied on a Division Bench ruling of the Allahabad High Court in Habib Seth v. Kashi Nath . 1969 R.C.R 65., in support of his argument that there is nothing in the language of section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act which may suggest that the exception is confined only to agricultural tenancies and that it could not be applied to leases of urban or commercial property. That case had been remanded to the lower Courts to find out whether the lease was or was not a prudent act. It is not known what was the final decision in that case. Even otherwise, the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court had clearly observed in All India Film Corporation's case (supra) that the principles of section 76(a) of the Transfer of Property Act ordinarily applied to the management of agricultural lands and that these had been seldom applied in the case of urban property. The subject matter of the dispute in that case was a cinema building which was apparently a commercial property besides being situated in the urban area of Jullundur City. This aspect of the controversy has further been considered by a Division Bench of our Court in Rashtaria Bartan Bhandar v. Hari Kishan Kasera . 1966 Cur. L.J 395., and by a Full Bench in Jagan Nath v. Mittar Sain . 1969 71 P.L.R 606.. In the Division Bench ruling, three exceptions to the general rule have been enunciated. The exception created by section 76(a) was found to be confined to leases of agricultural land only. It was clearly observed that different considerations apply in the matter of grant of leases of agricultural land when compared with cases of urban property. The protection against eviction afforded by the Rent Restriction Act was not given to a tenant of urban immovable property where the lease had been granted by a mortgagee whose interest in the property had been extinguished by redemption.
11. The appellant has failed to prove the mortgagor's express concurrence to the extension of the lease beyond the date of redemption. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed. There is no order as to costs in view of the complicated questions of law involved. The appellant is granted two months' time to vacate the shop.
12. Appeal dismissed.
Alert