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Jagir Singh v. Dheru
Factual and Procedural Background
Jagir Singh (appellant) appointed Nathu as his mukhtar-i-am (general attorney) on 15-10-1937. Jagir Singh left for Singapore in 1937 and returned in January 1951. Nathu died on 25-5-1945 without rendering accounts for moneys realised by him on behalf of the appellant during the appellant's absence. The appellant requested Dheru and others, the legal representatives of Nathu, to render accounts and deliver documents relating to his property; they refused. The appellant instituted the present suit against the legal representatives on 1-5-1951. The defendants raised a preliminary objection based on limitation.
Procedurally: The trial Court held Article 120 (residuary six-year rule) applied and entered a preliminary decree for the plaintiff. On appeal the District Judge agreed that Article 120 applied. The preliminary decree was later set aside on other grounds and the matter remanded for framing further issues on merits. The defendants then preferred an appeal which a Single Judge of this Court allowed, taking the view that Article 89 of the Limitation Act applied to suits against the legal representatives of an agent and that the suit (instituted more than three years after the agent's death) was barred by limitation. The appellant filed this Letters Patent Appeal; the only point argued on this appeal is whether Article 89 of the Limitation Act governs the suit.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Article 89 of the Limitation Act applies to a suit by a principal for movable property received by an agent and not accounted for where the suit is brought against the legal representatives of a deceased agent.
- If Article 89 applies, whether the present suit (instituted on 1-5-1951, after the agent's death on 25-5-1945) is barred by limitation under the three-year period specified in Article 89.
- Whether the term "agent" in Article 89 should be read to exclude the legal representatives of a deceased agent (i.e., whether a suit against legal representatives falls under Article 89 or only under the residuary Article 120).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The word "agent" in Article 89 does not include the legal representatives of a deceased agent; therefore Article 89 does not apply to a suit brought against the legal representatives.
- If the legislature intended to include legal representatives within "agent", it would have done so explicitly in Section 2 (definitions), as it did for terms such as "applicant", "plaintiff" and "defendant".
Respondents' / Defendants' Arguments
- The suit is governed by Article 89 of the Limitation Act (three-year period for actions by a principal against his agent for movable property received and not accounted for), and because it was instituted more than three years after the agent's death (which terminated the agency), it is barred by limitation.
- Implicit in the respondents' position is reliance on the definitions and precedents that treat legal representatives as persons from or through whom a defendant derives liability (see Section 2(4) of the Limitation Act).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Nobin Chandra Barua v. Chandra Madhab Barua, AIR 1916 PC 148 | Held that Article 89 applies to a suit for accounts brought by the legal representatives of a deceased principal. | Cited as authority that Article 89 has been applied to suits involving legal representatives of a deceased principal, supporting inclusion of legal representatives within the Article's scope. |
| Mohendra Nath v. Jadu Nath, 8 Ind Cas 684 | Decision treating Article 89 as applicable to suits by/legal representatives in account cases (Calcutta High Court line of decisions). | Relied on as part of a line of Calcutta High Court decisions holding Article 89 applicable to legal representatives. |
| Sarashibala Dasi v. Chuni Lal Ghosh, AIR 1922 Cal 53 | Calcutta High Court decision treating Article 89 as applicable in suits involving legal representatives. | Used to show precedent from the Calcutta High Court supporting application of Article 89 to legal representatives. |
| Bikram Kishore v. Jadab Chandra, AIR 1935 Cal 817 | Calcutta decision reaffirming that omission of "legal representatives" in description does not exclude them from Article 89. | Invoked as supporting the proposition that Article 89 applies to suits against legal representatives. |
| Kumuda Charan Bala v. Asutosh Chattopadhyaya, 16 Ind Cas 742 | A contrary view by the Calcutta High Court that Article 89 is not applicable to suits brought against legal representatives. | Noted as a contrary authority; the Court treated it as considered and distinguished in subsequent decisions. |
| Appa Rao v. Subba Rao, AIR 1927 Mad 157 | Madras High Court decision rejecting the contention that omission of "legal representatives" in Article 89 excludes them; referred to Arunachelam Chetty. | Adopted as confirming that omission of wording does not prevent Article 89 applying to suits against legal representatives; cited approvingly by this Court. |
| Arunachelam Chetty v. Raman Chetty, 27 Ind Cas 807 (AIR 1915 Mad 596) | Authority relied on in Appa Rao to support inclusion of legal representatives within the relevant Article despite omission of words. | Referenced as supporting precedent for including legal representatives within the scope of articles like Article 89. |
| Deorao Zolba v. Laxmansingh Bania, AIR 1943 Nag 227 | Applied Section 2(4) of the Limitation Act to include legal representatives within the meaning of "defendant" and held Article 89 applicable in a suit for accounts against legal representatives. | Relied upon as the latest decision supporting the Court's view that Article 89 applies to suits against legal representatives, using Section 2(4) as textual support. |
| Girraj Singh v. Raghubir Kunwar, ILR 31 All 429 | Held (in its facts) that Article 89 did not apply to the suit against legal representatives; case distinguished on its facts. | Considered and distinguished by the Court; treated as not controlling given factual differences and subsequent decisions. |
| Chand Mai v. Kalian Mal, 96 Pun Re 1886 | Punjab Chief Court decision where suit was within three years of agent's death; discussion included Article 62 and Article 120. | Referred to and discussed; Court noted the decision did not rest on excluding Article 89 and concluded it was not helpful to the appellant's case. |
| Mt. Fatma v. Mt. Imtiazi Jan, 1 Pun Re 1912 | Pleas about prior demand/refusal under Article 89 were considered; refusal must be express as per that decision. | Referred to for the proposition that an express refusal to render accounts is necessary to invoke the demand/refusal limb of Article 89; used to explain factual differences in some earlier cases. |
| Gurudas Pyne v. Ramnarain Sahu, ILR 10 Cal 860 | Decision under the Limitation Act 1871 where corresponding article had different wording (limitation ran from date "when the account was demanded and refused"). | Noted as an earlier decision under a differently worded statute and therefore of limited relevance to the question under the later Limitation Act provisions. |
| Prem Das v. Charan Das, AIR 1929 Lah 362 | Authority indicating the general trend that suits for accounts may lie against representatives and that the burden of proof lies on plaintiff to prove items. | Used to support the proposition that suits for accounts against legal representatives are competent and that the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing items. |
| Girjabai v. Narayan Rao, AIR 1925 Bom 148 | Another decision indicating the competency of suits for accounts against representatives and evidentiary burden. | Relied on as part of a consistent trend of decisions supporting competency of suits against representatives for accounts. |
| Lal Singh v. Jiwan Ram, AIR 1928 Nag 256 | Decision consistent with the view that suits for accounts will lie against representatives, subject to proof requirements. | Invoked to demonstrate the general trend of opinion referred to by the Court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by accepting the undisputed factual premise that this is a suit by a principal for movable property received by his agent and not accounted for. By Section 201 of the Contract Act the agency terminated on the agent's death (25-5-1945), which gave rise to a cause of action and therefore was the relevant starting point for limitation if Article 89 applies.
The pivotal question was textual and purposive: does the word "agent" in Article 89 include the legal representatives of a deceased agent so that a suit against those representatives falls within Article 89 (three years), or does omission of express mention require that such suits fall under the residuary Article 120 (six years)?
The Court rejected the appellant's argument that the omission of an express definition in Section 2 to include legal representatives for the term "agent" required that legal representatives be excluded. The reasoning advanced by the Court included:
- Section 2(4)'s explanatory definition of "defendant" (includes any person from or through whom a defendant derives his liability) supports reading the provisions to include legal representatives where the law recognises succession of liabilities and rights.
- The statutory context and the manner in which other terms (like "plaintiff" and "defendant") are treated shows that omission of words in the description column does not necessarily exclude legal representatives; in many Articles omission would lead to absurd results if taken to exclude successors.
- The Limitation Act makes no separate provision for suits by or against legal representatives; thus it is reasonable to treat suits by or against legal representatives as falling within provisions applicable to their predecessors or successors where the underlying right or obligation subsists.
- Practical considerations: to accept the appellant's construction would mean every suit by or against legal representatives would automatically fall under the residuary Article 120 — an outcome the Court found unacceptable.
- Analogy and symmetry: if Article 89 applies to suits by legal representatives of a deceased principal (as held by Privy Council and later decisions), then by parity it should apply to suits by a principal against legal representatives of a deceased agent.
- Where an agent dies after termination of the agency, the limitation starts from the date of termination and death does not create a fresh cause of action; there is no reason to treat the converse situation (agency terminating by death) differently when the suit is against representatives.
The Court considered and distinguished several contrary authorities (for example, decisions like Girraj Singh) and placed weight on a line of authorities (including decisions of the Calcutta High Court, the Privy Council, the Madras High Court and the Nagpur decision Deorao Zolba) that support reading Article 89 as applicable to suits against legal representatives. In particular, Deorao Zolba applied Section 2(4) to include legal representatives as persons through whom a defendant derives liability.
The Court also addressed (and declined) a late-submitted objection that suits for accounts were not competent against representatives: no such objection had been taken in earlier Courts and, in any event, the prevailing view is that such suits are competent with the plaintiff bearing the burden of proof for each item asserted to have been realised and not accounted for.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court concluded that Article 89 of the Limitation Act applies to suits by a principal against the legal representatives of a deceased agent for movable property received by the agent and not accounted for. Applying that Article, the cause of action arose on the agent's death (25-5-1945) and the suit instituted on 1-5-1951 was out of time. For these reasons, the Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed.
APPEAL DISMISSED (with costs).
Implications: The direct effect is that the Single Judge's conclusion that Article 89 applies (and that the present suit is barred by limitation) is upheld. The opinion does not purport to establish a new principle beyond affirming the application of Article 89 to suits against legal representatives of an agent and noting the evidentiary burden borne by the plaintiff in such suits; the Court relied on an existing line of authorities to reach its conclusion.
G.L Chopra, J.:— The only point involved in this Letters Patent Appeal is one of limitation. The facts which are not disputed before us are these:
2. Jagir Singh appellant appointed one Nathu his ‘mukhtar-i-am’ (general attorney), on 15-10-1937. Leaving Nathu to in an ace his affairs and look after his property in India, Jagir Singh appellant proceeded to Singapore in 1937. He returned from there in January 1951. Nathu, his attorney, had died on 25-5-1945, without rendering accounts for the moneys realised by him on behalf of the appellant in his absence. The appellant asked Dheru and others; respondents, the legal representatives of Nathu, to render accounts and to deliver the documents relating to his property. This having been refused the present suit for the said purpose was instituted against the legal-representatives on 1-5-1951. A preliminary objection with regard to limitation was-raised by the defendants.
3. It was contended that the suit was governed by Article 89, Limitation Act and the same having been instituted more than three years after Nathu's death, when the agency terminated, was barred by time. The trial Court decided the issue against the defendants, holding that the suit was governed by Article 120, and passed a preliminary decree in favour of the plaintiff. On appeal by the defendants, the District Judge agreed with the finding that Article 120 applied and that the suit was within time.
4. However, the preliminary decree was set aside on some other grounds and the case remanded for fresh decision after framing of further issues on merits. The defendants preferred a second appeal which was heard and accepted by a learned Single Judge of this Court. The learned Judge is of the view that the suit, though not brought against the agent but against his legal-representatives, is covered by Article 89 and having been instituted more than three years after the termination of the agency on the agent's death was barred by time. This is an appeal by the plaintiff under the Letters Patent.
5. The only question that has to be determined is whether the case is governed by Article 89; of Sell. I of the Limitation Act. If it is, the suit would certainly be barred by time; for the limitation of three years under the Article began to-run on the death of Nathu on 25-5-1945, when, the agency terminated. On the other hand, if the Article does not apply, the suit would be governed by the residuary rule of limitation of six years-under Article 120 and would be well within time. Article 89 of the Limitation Act says—
Description of suit. Period of Limitation. Time from which period begins to run. By a principal against his agent for moveable property received by the latter and not accounted for. Three years. When the account is, during the continuance of the agency, demanded and refused or, where no such demand is made, when the agency terminates.
6. The present is certainly a suit by a principal for moveable property received by the agent and not accounted for. By virtue of the provisions of Section 201 of the Contract Act, the agency terminated on the death of the agent and that gave rise to a cause of action to the plaintiff and would be the starting, point of limitation under the Article. The only point that remains to be seen is whether the present suit by the principal can be regarded as one “against his agent”.
7. According to the appellant the term “agent” used in the Article does not include legal-representatives of a deceased agent and, therefore, the Article is inapplicable. The argument is that if that where the intention of the legislature, it would have been so declared in S. 2 relating to “definitions”, as it has done in the case of “applicant”, “plaintiff”, and “defendant”.
8. In section 2(4) “defendant” is laid down to-include any person from or through whom a defendant derives his liability to be sued. Similarly, “applicant” and “plaintiff” are declared to include any person from or through whom he derives his right to apply or sue. To me the contention appears to be without force.
9. The explanatory definitions of the particular terms in S. 2 afford no indication that “agent” in Article 89 was not intended to include the legal representatives of a deceased agent. Context of the provisions where the terms “plaintiff” and “defendant” occur shows that the explanation was absolutely necessary; otherwise the provisions would have led to absurd results.
10. For instance, S. 14 provides that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting another civil proceeding shall under the specified circumstances, be excluded. The benefit is not to be denied to the plaintiff if the prior proceeding was prosecuted by a predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff.
11. Under Articles 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96 and 114 of the First Schedule, limitation begins to run when the particular fact giving rise to the cause of action becomes known to the plaintiff. The explanation was necessary for the purpose of impressing that knowledge of that fact of the person from or through whom the plaintiff derives his right to sue would also give a start to the period of limitation. No such explanation was needed in the present case.
12. It is not the case of a predecessor-in-interest but is one of a successor-in-interest. The successor is generally liable to the obligations and responsibilities incurred by the person he succeeds, at least to the extent of the assets to which he has succeeded. He should, therefore, be deemed to be included in the provision with respect to his predecessor-in-interest. The definition of “defendant” in sub-s. (4) of S. 2 rather lends support to this intention of the legislature.
13. The intention is to be judged from all the provisions of a statute taken together and anomalous results have always to be avoided. The Limitation Act does nowhere make any separate provision for a suit by or against the legal repre sentatives of a person entitled to any right or subject to any obligation. That ought to be taken to be included in the provisions with respect to the latter, if under the law the right or obligation subsists and the suit by or against the legal representatives is competent.
14. To accept the appellant's contention would mean that every suit by or against the legal representative would fall under the residuary Article 120. The proposition cannot be readily accepted. Undoubtedly, a suit for accounts brought against an agent can be continued against his legal representative after his death and it would still be governed by Article 89.
15. Again, if an agent dies after the termination of the agency and a suit for accounts is brought against his legal representative, the limitation will be counted from the date when the agency terminated; the death of the agent will not furnish any fresh cause of action against the legal representative. There seems to be no reasons why the matters should be different when the agency terminates on the agent's death and the suit is brought against the legal representative.
16. If “agent” in Article 89 were not to include legal representatives of a deceased agent, the Article would also have no application to a suit of the description mentioned in the Article brought by the legal representatives of a deceased “principal”. Article 89 was held to be applicable in such a case by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Nobin Chandra Barua v. Chandra Madhab Barua, AIR 1916 PC 148 (A).
17. A suit for accounts brought by the legal representatives of a deceased principal was held to be governed by Article 89 and not to fall under the residuary Article 120 in a number of decisions of the Calcutta High Court, Mohendra Nath v. Jadu Nath, 8 Ind Cas 684 (B); Sarashibala Dasi v. Chuni Lal Ghosh, AIR 1922 Cal 53 (C); and Bikram Kishore v. Jadab Chandra, AIR 1935 Cal 817 (D). A contrary view that Article 89 is not applicable to a suit brought not against the agent but his representatives had, however, been taken by the same Court in Kumuda Charan Bala v. Asutosh Chattopadhyaya, 16 Ind Cas 742 (E).
18. The reasons for arriving at this conclusion in the case were considered in a decision of the Madras High Court in Appa Rao v. Subba Rao, AIR 1927 Mad 157 (F), and it was observed—
“It was faintly suggested on the authority of the case in 16 Ind Cas 742 (Cal) (E), that as legal representatives are not mentioned in Article 89, that article can have no application to a suit like the present. That in my view is distinctly overruled by the case in Arunachelam Chetty v. Raman Chetty, 27 Ind Cas 807 : (AIR 1915 Mad 596) (G), and it is pointed out by Mr. Varadachariar that there are many articles which would be reduced to absurdity if this contention were applied to them, for instance Articles 78 and 79.
19. The column under which these articles appear is headed ‘description of suit’. To my mind the omission of any mention of legal representatives in the words under ‘description of suit’ does not mean that the article is not intended to apply to a suit against the legal representatives in order to let in Article 120.”
20. This view was accepted as the correct view and followed in AIR 1935 Cal 817 (D), and it was reiterated that the omission of any mention of legal representatives in the words under “description of suit” in Article 89 does not mean that the article is not intended to apply to a suit against the legal representatives.
21. Suits by the payee or acceptor of a bill of exchange against the drawer and by surety against the principal debtor or co-surety are provided for in Articles 78, 79 and Articles 81, 82 of the 1st Schedule of the Limitation Act. Similar provisions are also made in a number of other Articles. In all these, it is difficult to believe that legal representatives of either party were not intended to be included and the suit by or against them is to be governed only by the residuary Article 120.
22. The latest decision on the point referred to at the bar is Deorao Zolba v. Laxmansingh Bania, AIR 1943 Nag 227 (H). This was a suit for accounts brought by the principal against the legal representatives of his deceased agent. The suit was instituted more than three years after the agent's death. The Courts below following the rule laid down in Girraj Singh v. Raghubir Kunwar, ILR 31 All 429 (I), had rejected the suggestion that Article 89 was applicable. Bose, J., did not find favour with this view and observed—
“That however overlooks the definition of ‘defendant’ given in Section 2(4) of the Limitation Act, which is in these words ‘Defendant’ includes any person from or through whom a defendant derives his liability to be sued. Applying that definition here, it is clear that Article 89 would apply assuming that this is a case of agency.”
23. The decisions relied upon by Mr. K.C.J Nayar, learned counsel for the appellant, have all been considered and distinguished or dissented from in most of the cases referred to above. The earlier decision of the Punjab Chief Court on the point is Chand Mai v. Kalian Mal, 96 Pun Re 1886 (J). In this case, the plaintiff sued on the allegations that one Sais Mal who was his agent and as such agent held his (plaintiff's) property for which he was accountable, died on 24-12-1880 without accounting, that the balance on that date in plaintiff's favour stood at Rs. 3,700/- and that the defendant, his son, was in possession of the property of the deceased Sais Mal.
24. The plaintiff also desired that an account might be taken of the amount recoverable by him and a decree be made for that amount in his favour. The suit was instituted on 14-12-1883. As regards the objection on the ground of limitation, it was held:
“The suit having been brought within three years from the date of the agent's death was within time, whether it was governed by Article 62 of the 2nd Schedule of the Limitation Act, being a suit for money received by the defendant in the suit to the use of the plaintiff, the date of such receipt being certainly within three years of suit, as the money was not received by defendant till after the death of S.M or whether Article 120 applied, in which case the suit was undoubtedly within time.”
25. Reference to Article 89 was also made and with respect to it Plowden, J., no doubt observed that the terms of the Article show it to be inapplicable to a case where the agency is terminated by death. However, the decision did not rest on the point. The learned Judge concluded the objection regarding limitation with the observation:
“There remains the question of limitation, I think it is clear that whatever provision of the Limitation Act applies to this suit, it is not barred by time, being within three years from the date of the agent's death.”
26. In another case of the Punjab Chief Court, Mt. Fatma v. Mt. Imtiazi Jan, 1 Pun Re 1912 (K), also the suit for accounts against legal representatives was instituted within three years of the agent's death. The plea taken up by the defendants was that the accounts were demanded and refused by the agent during the pendency of the agency and, therefore, the suit was barred under Article 89.
27. The plea was rejected on the ground that refusal of an agent to render accounts mentioned in Article 89 must be an express refusal on a definite date and not merely a virtual refusal to be inferred from the omission or failure on his part to fulfil a promise made by him to render the account to the principal, in answer to a demand by the latter, and that no such refusal was proved in the case. Article 120 was found to be applicable on the basis of the decision in 96 Pun Re 1886 (J).
28. Gurudas Pyne v. Ramnarain Sahu, ILR 10 Cal 860 (L), is a case decided under the Limitation Act of 1871. The corresponding Article 90 of that Act was differently worded and the time therein ran from the date “when the account was demanded and refused”. The Article did not contain any provision with respect to the start of limitation on the termination of the agency, in case no such demand was made.
29. Moreover, as already noticed, the later decisions of the Calcutta High Court have taken the contrary view that Article 89 is the appropriate Article applicable in such cases.
30. The last decision relied upon by Mr. Nayar is ILR 31 All 429 (I). This was a suit against the legal-representatives to recover the money from time to time withdrawn by the deceased agent from the chest of his principal's estate and placed in the chest of his own estate, without adjusting the same in the accounts.
31. Properly construed, the suit was not for accounts but one for recovery of a specified sum of money. An earlier suit brought against the agent ended in a compromise, the fresh suit against the legal-representatives was instituted because of the violation of the terms of the compromise. In view of the peculiar facts of the case, Article 120 was held to be applicable and the suggestion of the defendants that either of the Articles 57 or 62 or 89 applied was turned down.
32. Application of Article 89 was ruled out simply by saying, without giving any reasons, that the defendants were not and never were the agents of the plaintiff.
33. It is thus clear that none of these cases is really helpful to the appellant. On the other hand, there are a number of decisions which support my view that Article 89 applies to suits for accounts not only between the principal and the agent but also between their legal representatives.
34. Lastly, it was faintly submitted that a suit for accounts was not competent against the representatives of the agent. No such objection on behalf of the defendants was taken in any of the Courts below, it cannot be raised for the first time in this appeal. In fact, it has throughout been admitted that the present is a suit of the description given in column (1) of Article 89, except that the suit is not against the agent but against his legal representatives.
35. Moreover, the general trend of opinion now is that a suit for accounts will lie against the representatives of the agent with the difference that the burden of proof will be upon the plaintiff to establish the case. The plaintiff in such a case must prove that each item was actually realised by the agent and that it was not accounted for or paid to the principal. Prem Das v. Charan Das, AIR 1929 Lah 362 (M) : AIR 1927 Mad 157 (F); Girjabai v. Narayan Rao, AIR 1925 Bom 148 (N) and Lal Singh v. Jiwan Ram, AIR 1928 Nag 256 (O). For all these reasons I do not see any force in this appeal and would, therefore, dismiss it with costs.
A.N Bhandari, C.J:— I agree.
H.G.P
36. Appeal dismissed.
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