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Md. Imram And Others v. Mohd. Zafar Momin And Others

Patna High Court
Apr 18, 1972
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (the appellants in this second appeal) sued for recovery of compensation money totalling Rs. 4,290 (Rs. 4,050 plus interest of Rs. 240) awarded in respect of acquisition of certain lands by the State of Bihar under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The plaintiffs alleged that several plots, including plots Nos. 2259 and 2260 (together measuring about 4 kathas and 1 dhur), belonged to them but that the awards in the acquisition proceedings had been made in the names of the defendants, who had no interest in the land.

The plaintiffs filed a petition before the Land Acquisition Officer (stating that the awards were wrongly prepared in the defendants' names). According to the plaintiffs, the Land Acquisition Officer did not refer the dispute for determination by a court under the Act but instead directed the parties to agitate their rights in the Civil Court. Consequently the plaintiffs instituted the present civil suit seeking recovery of the compensation.

The defendants filed written statements claiming title to the acquired properties and averring that notices under Sections 9 and 12 of the Land Acquisition Act were duly served and no objection was raised by the plaintiffs. The two courts below reached concurrent findings that the plaintiffs (not the defendants) had title to the suit properties; that finding was not challenged in this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs had knowledge of the land acquisition proceedings (specifically whether they received notices under Section 9 and/or Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act) in respect of the acquired plots.
  2. Whether, having (or not having) such knowledge, the plaintiffs were precluded from obtaining relief in an ordinary civil court to recover compensation awarded in the acquisition proceedings, or whether they were required to pursue remedies under the Land Acquisition Act (including reference proceedings under Section 18) before seeking relief in a civil suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The plaintiffs asserted that plots 2259 and 2260 belonged to them and that no notice had been given to them in the land acquisition proceedings; accordingly the awards in favour of the defendants were wrongly prepared.
  • The plaintiffs petitioned the Land Acquisition Officer complaining that awards had been wrongly made in the defendants' names, but the Officer directed them to the Civil Court rather than referring the dispute to the District Judge (or court under the Act).

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The defendants claimed title to the properties and contended that notices under Sections 9 and 12 of the Act had been duly served on persons representing the plaintiffs (specifically that notices had been received by Mohd. Saghir and Mohd. Nasir).
  • On that basis the defendants argued that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief in the civil suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Birendra Nath Banerjee v. Mritunjoy Boy, AIR 1962 Cal 275 Where a person is served with notice under Section 9 (as a person believed to be interested) it is his duty to raise objections before the Collector; if he does not do so the Collector's award is final and conclusive between the Collector and persons interested; the special jurisdiction (Section 18) ousts ordinary civil court jurisdiction when a person has been alerted by the notices under Sections 9 and 12(2). The court set out and summarized this approach as one of two competing lines of authority concerning when ordinary civil remedies are excluded by the Act.
Shri Deo Sansthan Chinchwad v. Chintaman Dharnidhar Deo, AIR 1962 Bom 214 Unless a claimant's right has been adjudicated under the Act or the claimant had notice of the proceedings and failed to assert/prosecute the claim under the Act, the claimant is entitled to file a civil suit to recover his share from the person who received the compensation. The court identified this as the correct approach and adopted it: civil courts are not completely excluded; a person with knowledge who failed to prosecute before the Collector may nevertheless sue in a civil court unless the dispute was already adjudicated under the Act.
Harish Chandra v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC 1500 The starting point of limitation for filing an application for reference (where the person was not present before the Collector or not served with the Section 12 notice) is the date of his knowledge. The court relied on this authority to explain that limitation for a Section 18 reference runs from the date of the claimant's knowledge, supporting the proposition that knowledge is the relevant trigger for statutory limitation.
Dr. G. H. Grant v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237 The Collector is not authorised to finally adjudicate conflicting rights of persons interested in compensation; Section 30 power to refer disputes as to apportionment is discretionary (Collector may but is not bound to refer). The court cited this case to support the proposition that if the Collector does not refer a dispute, an aggrieved person may institute a civil suit; the discretionary nature of Section 30 was relied upon.
Grant's case (as cited), AIR 1966 SC 287 (supra) (as referred in the opinion) Referenced for the proposition (in the opinion) that there is no limitation for filing a particular kind of application for reference in the circumstances discussed. The opinion refers to this authority when observing that there was no limitation for filing the application before the Land Acquisition Officer in the plaintiffs' circumstances (as stated in the opinion).
T.B. Ramchandra Rao v. A.N.S. Ramchandra Rao, AIR 1922 PC 80 When rights in respect of compensation have been determined by a court under the Land Acquisition Act (or its predecessor), the same questions cannot be reopened in a separate civil suit owing to res judicata; separate procedures under the Act and ordinary litigation are distinct, but a prior court decision under the Act is final between the parties on that point. The court used this decision to explain the operation of res judicata — that if a dispute has been raised and decided under the Act, the same dispute cannot be relitigated in a civil suit.
Judicial Committee decision referred to as "8 Indian Appeals page 90" (decision under Act X of 1870) Court considered provisions analogous to those under the Land Acquisition Act concerning apportionment and a proviso preserving liability of recipients to pay a person lawfully entitled; decision addressed whether the proviso allowed civil suit where the Act's machinery had not been invoked. The opinion relies on this decision to illustrate that where a dispute has been raised and decided under the Act the matter cannot be separately litigated; but the proviso does not exclude civil remedies where the Act's machinery has not adjudicated the dispute.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two connected strands: a factual determination about notice/knowledge and a legal examination of the interaction between the remedies under the Land Acquisition Act and ordinary civil proceedings.

Factual analysis of notice/knowledge

  • The courts below had found that the plaintiffs had received the notices in question. This Court examined the documentary evidence.
    • Exhibit B (notice under Section 9 addressed to Sahma Darzi) was held by the trial court (via a clerk's reading) and the appellate court to bear the signature of Mohd. Saghir (read as Saghir Ahmad). This Court found the record did not indicate the signature of Saghir Ahmad on Exhibit B and noted that the courts below, not conversant with Urdu script, had relied on available assistance. The Court observed that the plaintiffs' case included that Saghir Ahmad did not know how to write and the plaint bore a thumb impression rather than his signature. On this basis the Court concluded that the finding that the plaintiffs received notice under Section 9 was vitiated by misreading and non-consideration of material on the record.
    • Exhibit B(1) (bearing a signature alleged to be Mohd. Nasir's) and Exhibit 3 (a petition dated 27 November 1961 filed by the plaintiffs before the Land Acquisition Officer) supported the appellate court's finding that the plaintiffs were aware of the notice of acquisition in respect of plot No. 2259. That conclusion was treated as a conclusion of fact which could stand in second appeal. However, Exhibit 3 did not indicate awareness prior to the issue of the Section 12 notice or prior to the awards; it indicated knowledge only after the Section 12 notice/award stage. The Court also found no material showing knowledge of any pending proceeding regarding plot No. 2260.

Legal analysis of remedies and jurisdiction

  • The Court reviewed the statutory scheme (Sections 9, 11, 12, 18, 26, 30, 31 and the third proviso to Section 31(2)) and competing case law representing two approaches: (a) the Calcutta view (Birendra Nath Banerjee) emphasising the finality of the Collector's award between Collector and persons interested when notice under Section 9/12 is given and the special remedy under Section 18 ousts civil jurisdiction once those notices alert the person; and (b) the Bombay view (Shri Deo Sansthan) holding that unless a claim has been adjudicated under the Act or the claimant had notice and failed to pursue the statutory remedy, the claimant can sue in a civil court.
  • The Court stressed several legal points drawn from statute and precedent:
    • The Collector cannot finally adjudicate conflicting rights among persons interested — that dispute as to apportionment or entitlement may be referred to a court (Section 30), but the Collector's power to refer is discretionary.
    • The third proviso to Section 31(2) explicitly preserves the liability of any person who has received compensation to pay it to the person lawfully entitled to it.
    • Limitation for filing an application for reference under Section 18, where a person was not present before the Collector or not served with Section 12 notice, runs from the person's date of knowledge (as held in Harish Chandra).
    • If a dispute has been raised and finally decided by a court under the Act, res judicata will bar re-litigation of the same issue in a civil suit; but absence of such adjudication does not automatically oust the jurisdiction of civil courts.
  • Applying those principles to the facts:
    • The Court concluded that the finding that the plaintiffs had been served with notice under Section 9 was vitiated, but the finding that they had knowledge after the award (in relation to plot No. 2259) was not vitiated.
    • Because the Collector's power to refer disputes is discretionary and the third proviso to Section 31(2) preserves the liability of recipients of compensation to pay those lawfully entitled, the Court held that the existence of the Land Acquisition Act's special machinery does not completely exclude the civil court's jurisdiction to determine competing claims to compensation where the dispute has not been adjudicated under the Act.
    • The plaintiffs had applied to the Land Acquisition Officer for reference; the Officer declined to refer and directed the parties to the civil court. In those circumstances the Court considered the civil suit to be maintainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The judgments and decrees of the courts below were set aside and the plaintiffs' suit was decreed.
  • The plaintiffs were awarded a decree for Rs. 4,290 with future interest at 6% per annum and were also awarded costs.
  • The Court clarified that on the facts before it the plaintiffs were entitled to recover compensation: if the Court's view of law were incorrect, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to recover for plot No. 2259 (where they had knowledge after the award), but in any event they would be entitled to recover compensation in respect of plot No. 2260 because there was no material showing knowledge of any pending proceeding regarding that plot.

Broader implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • The Land Acquisition Act does not completely exclude the jurisdiction of civil courts to determine disputes between competing claimants to compensation; if the dispute has not been raised and finally determined under the Act, the claimant may pursue ordinary civil remedies to recover compensation from a person who has wrongfully received it.
  • If a dispute has been raised and finally decided under the Act's machinery, the decision will operate as res judicata and preclude re-litigation of the same issue in a civil suit.
  • The Collector's discretion under Section 30 and the third proviso to Section 31(2) are important safeguards that leave open civil remedies in appropriate circumstances.

Result announced in the opinion: "Appeal allowed."

Show all summary ...

1. The plaintiff's art the appellants in this second appeal. The suit was brought by the plaintiffs for recovery of Rs. 4050 along with interest of Rs. 240, being the amount of compensation awarded in respect of acquisition of certain lands by the State of Bihar under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, hereinafter to be called ‘the Act’ The case of the plaintiffs was that a number of plots, including plots 2259 and 2260 (measuring about 4 kathas and 1 dhur), belonged to the plaintiff. The last two plots mentioned above were acquired by the State of Bihar under the provisions of the Act in the land acquisition proceedings no notice was given to the plaintiffs. However, coming to know of the awards in favour of the defendants, the plaintiffs filed a petition before the Land Acquisition Officer, Darbhanga stating that the awards had been wrongly prepared in the names of the defendants party who had no interest in the land. It was further stated in the petition that the Land Acquisition Officer instead of referring the dispute to the District Judge directed the parties to have their rights, agitated in the Civil Court. The plaintiffs, therefore, filed the suit for the main reliefs as stated above.

2. Written statements were filed filed the defendants first party as also by the defendants second party. We are mainly concerned with the written statement of file defendants first party. These defendants claimed that they had title to the properties which were subject-matter of Acquisition. They further averred that notice under Sections 9 and 12 of the Act “was duly served” and no objection was raised by the plaintiffs. It was, therefore Stated that the plaintiffs were not entitled to get any relief in the suit.

3. I have not; while giving the case of the parties, given details as to how file contesting parties claimed that they had title to the properties which were subject-matter of acquisition. This I have done because the concurrent finding of the two courts below is that the plaintiffs and not the defendants had title to the suit properties. This finding was not challenged in this court on behalf of the respondents. As such, in this appeal we have to proceed on the basis that the plaintiffs were able to establish that prior to the acquisition by the State of Bihar they had title to plots 2259 and 2260.

4. The main contest in this appeal has centred round the point whether the plaintiffs had knowledge of the land acquisition proceedings, and, whether, in the circumstances of the case, they were entitled to get any relief in the Civil Court.

5. Both the courts below have Came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs had knowledge of the land acquisition, proceedings and in spite of that knowledge they had not preferred any objection to the decision of the Collector awarding the compensation money to the defendants first party. They have further come to the conclusion that in view of this finding the plaintiffs were not entitled in law to claim in the suit that they were entitled to recover the compensation awarded front the defendants first party.

6. It may be necessary to state more facts than have come out during the course of the trial and on which either of the parties relied. According to the defendants (which case is not made out in the written statements he clear terms), notice in respect of acquisition of plot No. 2259 was issued under Section 9 or the Act to Sahma Darzl this notice is said to have been received by one of the plaintiffs, namely, Mohd. Saghir. Notice again in lespect of this plot to Sahma Dand was farced under Section 12(2) of the Act which notice was received by Mohd. Nasir, one of the plaintiffs. An application was filed before the Land Acquisition Officer in which it had been stated that notice was issued in respect of plot No. 2259 but no notice was issued in respect of plot No. 2260. It was further stated that the notice shows an area of 85 decimals (16 dhurs). The dispute in this case is whether the notices under Sections 9 and 12 of the Act were received by Mohd. Sagir and Mohd. Nasir. The courts below, as already indicated, have come to the finding that they were so received by the two persons mentioned above. Learned counsel for the appellants has challenged this finding of the courts below as being vitiated in law. This aspect I propose to consider in the next paragraph.

7. So far as Exhibit B is concerned, it is a notice issued under Section 9 of the Act addressed to Sahma Darzi and is said to have been received fay Mohd. Sagir. The trial Court came to this conclusion as the Munsif got the writing alleged to be that of Mohd. Sagir read by a clerk of his court who read the signature as Saghir Ahmad. The appellate Court affirmed this conclusion without specifically indicating the reasons why it accepted it to be so. The records, however, do not indicate the signature of Saghir Ahmad at all on Exhibit B. The courts below being not conversant with Urdu Script dependent on the assistance available in the courts below. Knowing the script as I do, I do not think that it is possible to read the signature as that of Saghir Ahmad. Moreover, the case of the plaintiffs is that Saghir Ahmad does not know how to write. The plaint also, in this case, does not bear any signature of Saghir Ahmad; instead there is his thumb impression. This aspect of the case also has not been considered by the courts below. It is clear therefore, that the conclusion arrived at by the courts below is vitiated on account of non-consideration of the materials on the record and misreading of Exhibit B.

8. So far as the signature of Mohd. Nazir on Exhibit B(1) is concerned, the conclusion of the lower appellate court that the notice aforesaid contains the signature of Mohd. Nasir is based on two considerations, namely, that Mohd. Nasir, although one of thejplaintiffis, has not denied his signature on Exhibit B (1). Secondly, a petition dated the 27th of November, 1961, filed by the plaintiffs before the Land Acquisition Officer shows that the plaintiffs were aware of the fact that the notice of acquisition had been issued in respect of plot No. 2259. This conclusion is a conclusion on a question of fact, and, whether right or wrong, cannot be upset in a second appeal, based: as it is on consideration which the court was entitled to refer to for the purpose of its conclusion. One thing, however, has to be made clear, namely that there is no statement in Exhibit 3 which will indicate that the plaintiffs were aware of the proceeding prior to the issue of notice under Section 12. In other words, Exhibit 3 does not indicate, either explicitly or even by necessary implication, that the plaintiffs had knowledge of the proceedings prior to the awards which and been given in the land acquisition case. On the basis of Exhibits B (1) and 3 conclusion could be arrived at that the plaintiffs had knowledge of the land acquisition proceeding after the issue of the notice under Section 12 of the Act. The result of the above discussion is that the finding of the courts below that the plaintiffs had received notice under Section 9 is vitiated. But the finding that they had knowledge of the issue of notice after the award under Section 12 of the Act is not vitiated by any error of law. It will also be observed that there is no material on the record on the basis of which a conclusion was possible that the plaintiffs were aware of any proceeding in respect of plot No. 2260. Exhibit B (1) mentions only one plot, namely, plot No. 2259 Exhibit 3 specifically states that there was no notice issued even in respect of plot No. 2260. The courts below have not tried to appreciate that what had to be considered 1 was whether the plaintiffs had notice or knowledge of the proceeding in respect of both the plots or that they and knowledge regarding one plot only. As already indicated, there is no material on the basis of which it could be held that there was knowledge of any pending proceeding regarding plot No. 2260.

9. In so far as the power of the civil court to grant relief to a plaintiff, where he claims to be entitled to compensation awarded in favour of a wrong person, is concerned, two lines of decision are to be found. One of them is represented by the case of Birendra Nath Banerjee v. Mritunjoy Boy, reported in AIR 1962 Cal 275 and the other by the case of Shri Deo Sansthan Chinchwad v. Chintaman Dharnidhar Deo* reported in AIR 1962 Bom 214. I may briefly indicate the two approaches before discussions as to what, in my view, is the correct law and to apply it to the facts of the present case. The view taken in Birendra Naths case may be summarised in the words of Banerjee, J. as follows:—

“In our opinion a person who has been served with a notice under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act as a person believed to be interested in the land, is not entitled to avoid the enquiry as to claims, to be made by the Collector under Section 11 of the Act. It is his duty, at that stage, to raise objection, if any, as to measurement compensation and apportionment if he does not do so the award made by the Collector shall be final and conclusive evidence as between the Collector and the persons interested whether they appeared before the Collector or not, of the true are and the value of the land and the apportionment of the compensation amongst persons interested. This finality, however, is subject to certain other provisions in the Act to which we shall presently refer Under Section 12(2) of the Act the Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as were not present personally or by their representatives, when the award was made. Section 18 of the Act provides that any person aggrieved by the Collector award may apply for a reference to court within the special period of limitation provided in the section. If he does not do so, it may be reasonable to hold that he does not become entitled to aspire for the same remedy by filing a civil suit. It is in that sense that it can be said that the special Jurisdiction created under Section 18, on the Act ousts the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts. But if a person is not even served with a notice under Section 9 of the Act and for that reason fails to prefer his claim or objection before the Collector and on whom there is no notice served under Section 12(2) of the Act and for that reason fails to apply for a reference within the statutory period it cannot be said that the special remedy under the Act being thus lost, such a person cannot seek his remedy in the ordinary court of law. The liability to resort to the special jurisdiction only arises when a person is alerted by the appeal notices provided for in the Act, namely, notices under Sections 9 and 12(2).”

10. The Bombay High Court, however, was of the view:—

“Unless, therefore, the claim of such a person, who is lawfully entitled to a share in the compensation money, is already adjudicated upon under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act or such person having had notice of such proceedings, appears therein and fails to assert and prosecute his claim to a share in accordance with the provisions of that Act; he would be entitled to file a suit to recover his share from the person who may have received the whole or any part of the compensation amount awarded under the Act”

11. Having pointed out the divergent approaches stated above, it may be necessary now to briefly examine some of the provisions of the Act. Section 9 not only enjoins issue of public notice but also requires that notice should be issued to all persons known or believed to be interested. Section 11 contemplates enquiry and award by the Collector. In this the Collector has, amongst other things, to apportion the compensation money to the persons known or believed to be interested the land. This has to be done after the enquiry into the objections (if any) of any person interested. As already mentioned, the award is to be given under Section 11. This has to be followed by a notice of the award to such persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made. Section 12 makes the award (subject to exceptions provided in the Act) final and conclusive in respect of matters stated therein. Section 18 states that any person interested who has not accepted the award may require a reference to be made by the Collector for the determination of the court [the court here means a court as defined in Section 3(d) of the Act] This reference is not confined only to the amount of compensation payable out may also relate to apportionment of compensation among the persons interested, limitation is provided for an application requiring the Collector to make the reference. This is six weeks from the receipt of notice from the Collector under Section 12 or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever expires first on a reference being made to the court, the court is to give an award, in conformity with the provisions of the Act, which award is deemed to be a decree of the court. Section 30 relates to the power of the court in respect of disputes as to apportionment the section states that when the amount of compensation has been settled under Section 11, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment, the Collector may refer such a dispute to the decision of the court the expression may in the section has been judicially interpreted to be discretionary and not mandatory. The Collector has also to deposit the amount of the compensation money in court in the circumstances mentioned in S. 31. Third proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Section 31 is or particular importance in this case and may, therefore, be quoted:

“Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto.”

12. The award made by the Judge under Section 26 of the Act is subject to appeal as provided in Section 54 of the Act.

13. I have mentioned these provisions to indicate that there are elaborate provisions in the Act in respect of matters mentioned above, but it is no longer in dispute that the powers exercisable by the Collector under Section 18(1) are distinct from the powers exercised under Section 30 of the Act. What is also clear is that “the Collector is not authorised to decide finally the conflicting rights of the parties interested in the amount of compensation: He is primarily concerned with the acquisition of land”: It is also now beyond any controversy that the award is only conclusive between the Collector and the persons interested and not among the persons interested. The power of Collector does not extend to finally adjudicate upon the title to compensation (see AIR 1966 SC 237 (Dr. G.H Grant v. State of Bihar)). It is true that so far as the determination of the amount of compensation or the right of persons interested in the compensation, so as to bind the Collector is concerned recourse must be had to the procedure prescribed under the Act. This, in my view, is irrespective of the fact whether a person who claims to be interested has been served with a notice under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act. Even if he does not have such a notice he has to proceed and obtain relief under the provisions of the Act by filing an application for reference under Section 18 of the Act. That there would be no difficulty in getting the matter referred to the court is clear from the fact that the starting point of Limitation for filing an application for reference, where the person is not present before the Collector or has not been served with the notice under Section 12, is the date of his knowledge. This has been so held in AIR 1961 SC 1500 (Harish Chandra v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer). The question, however which has to be considered is whether the knowledge of the land acquisition proceeding after the award, and in the absence of knowledge at previous stage precludes a claimant from agitating his right to get compensation from a person who has wrongfully received the same by instituting a civil suit. In my view, he has such a right in spite of his knowledge of the award and although no action has been taken by him for reference to the court. It will be useful in this context to bear in mind that if a dispute is raised before the Collector after the award as to who is the person entitled to compensation, the Collector has a discretion to refer such a dispute to the court he is not bound to do so, as was observed in Grants case, AIR 1966 SC 237—

“Exercise of the power under Section 30 to refer the dispute relating to apportionment or as to the persons to whom it is payable is, it is true, discretionary: the Collector may, but is not bound to exorcise that power.”

14. It is obvious, therefore, that where no reference has been made by the Collector, an aggrieved person is entitled to institute a suit I do not see any reason why such a person should be entitled to bring a suit but a person who has not tried to invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the Collector should be barred from filing a suit for appropriate relief. This also must be so in view of the third proviso to Section 31(2) of the Act. The language used there is clear and explicit. It states that nothing contained in Section 31 shall affect the liability of any person who has received whole or part of compensation, to pay the same to a person who is lawfully entitled to the same. The entire scheme of the Act indicates that although a forum has been provided for raising of dispute as to apportionment which could be settled and finally determined by the court, yet it could not be said that if no such dispute had been raised, the party is precluded from raising the dispute in a civil Court If, however, a dispute is raised and decided, that decision in such a dispute would, on the general principles of res judicata, be a bar to obtaining relief in a subsequent suit in other words, it is not that the jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred so far as settlement of disputes of the parties claiming to be interested in the compensation money is concerned, but what has to be clearly understood is that if such a dispute is raised and decided by the “Court” under the Act, such a decision will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit. This, therefore, means that the Land Acquisition Act does not contemplate the complete exclusion of Civil Courts in respect of determination of dispute between contesting claimants to the compensation money.

15. The view that I have expressed finds support from two decisions of the judicial committee. In 8 Indian Appeals page 90 there was a determination of the question regarding apportionment by the court under the provisions of Act X or 1870. The determination became final thereafter in a separate suit the question of apportionment of compensation awarded in a land acquisition proceeding was raised. Sections 88, 89 and 40 of that Act were considered. Section 88 of the Act laid down that when the amount of compensation had been settled, any dispute arising as to apportionment of compensation had to be referred to the decision of the court (Here reference was mandatory). Section 89 authorised the court to decide the proportions in which the persons interested were entitled to share such amount it also provided for appeal. Section 40 required the Collector to make payment of compensation according to the award or in case of an appeal under Section 89 according to the decision on such appeal. This section contained a proviso which is in similar terms to the third proviso of Section 81(2). The proviso was “nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person entitled thereto. It was contended on the basis of this proviso that the plaintiff was entitled to seek adjudication as to the right to compensation in the Civil Court the judicial committee decided that this was not the effect of the proviso. The effect of this decision, in my view, is that if a dispute has been raised and decided by the court under the machinery provided under the Land Acquisition Act the same dispute cannot be raised and decided in a separate Civil Suit but we have to see what is the basis of this exclusion. This will be clarified by the next case that I propose to notice, namely, the case of T.B Ramchandra Rao v. A.N.S Ramchandra Rao, AIR 1922 PC 80. In this case also there was a determination of the rights of the parties in respect of compensation by the court under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act thereafter a suit was filed in which the questions raised and decided before the court under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act were sought to be again raised. The Judicial Committee observed as follows:—

“…… Under the Land Acquisition Act there are two perfectly separate and distinct forms of procedure contemplated. The first is that necessary for firing the amount of the compensation and this is described as being an award.”

“When once the award as to the amount has become final, all questions as to fixing of compensation are then at an end. The duty of the Collector in case of dispute as to the relative rights of the persons, together entitled to the money, is to place the money under the control of the court, and the parties then can proceed to litigate in the ordinary way to determine what their right and title to the property may be. That is exactly what occurred in the present case….”

16. Their Lordships, however, in that case held that since a clear decision upon the point in dispute in the civil suit had already been adjudicated upon by the court it could not be reopened. This their Lordships did by clarifying the position in respect of res judicata, stating that the Principle which prevents the same case being twice litigated is of general application and is not limited by the specific words of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus their Lordships refused to grant relief to the plaintiff not because a suit was not entertainable because of existence of an exclusive machinery under the Act, but on the ground that there being a previous decision by the court in a proceeding. Under the Act, the same point could not be re-agitated on the general principles of res judicata.

17. The view I have expressed finds supports from the observation of Shah, J. (as he then was) in Grant's case, AIR 1966 SC 237, although the point under consideration in that case was not similar to one under consideration in this case. It was observed:

“… The Collector has no power to finally adjudicate upon the title to compensation: that dispute has to be decided either in a reference under Section 18 or under Section so or in a separate suit…”

18. I am thus of the view that the decision in AIR 1962 Bom 214 lays down the correct law, the ratio whereof has already been quoted by me in paragraph 10 of this judgment I may state that some other decisions were also cited at the Bar, but I have referred to only those which I have found to be more directly appropriate.

19. The question involved may be examined from another point of view. The plaintiffs filed an application before the Land Acquisition Officer (exercising powers of the Collector) for a reference of the dispute to the court there is no limitation for filing such an appeal (See Grant's case, AIR 1966 SC 287 (supra)). The Land Acquisition Officer in exercise of his discretionary power refused to make reference and directed the parties to ventilate their grievance in the civil court. In the circumstances it is plain that the civil suit filed by the plaintiffs could not be said to be barred.

20. I am thus of the view that on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the suit by the plaintiffs was maintainable and they were entitled to the reliefs claimed in the suit.

21. I would like to make it cleat that if my view of law is not correct then in that case the plaintiffs would not be entitled to claim recovery of the amount of compensation awarded in respect of plot No. 2259. But, in any event, they would be entitled to recover the compensation in respect of plot No. 2260, as I have already indicated that there is no material on the record on the basis of which it could be held that the plaintiffs had notice or knowledge of any pending land acquisition proceeding regarding this plot. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside and the suit of the plaintiffs is decreed. They would be entitled to a decree of Rs. 4,290 with future interest at 6% per annum. They would also entitled to the costs.

22. Appeal allowed.