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Mt. Sheodeni Kuer v. Umashankar Prasad Sahi .
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Kanhaiya Singh, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
Jamuna Prasad Sahi died leaving two sons, Ramashankar Sahi and Umashankar Sahi. In 1942 Ramashankar executed a usufructuary mortgage bond dated 21 December 1942 (exhibit C) in favour of his brother Umashankar in respect of 3 kathas Udhurs of land for a consideration of Rs. 50. In 1943 Ramashankar executed a registered sale deed in favour of Srimati Dulhin Radha Devi (wife of Umashankar), conveying 3 bighas 14 kathas 13½ dhurs of kasht land (described as the lands he was possessed of) for a consideration of Rs. 500 (exhibit A). Out of that consideration the vendee retained Rs. 50 for redemption of the mortgage (exhibit C). The sale deed recited that Ramashankar had settled elsewhere three years earlier and wished to purchase lands nearer his new residence.
Ramashankar died in 1949, leaving Sheodeni Kuer, his widow. On 20 December 1951 Sheodeni Kuer (as pauper plaintiff) sued Umashankar and his wife for partition of the disputed properties, alleging that her husband and Umashankar constituted an undivided Hindu family and that the suit properties were joint family properties; she claimed rights under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937. In the alternative she claimed maintenance of Rs. 900 per annum and arrears of Rs. 2,000. She alleged that the mortgage bond and the sale deed had been procured fraudulently and were spurious.
The defendants denied jointness, alleged the brothers had been separate in mess, business and property, and maintained that exhibits A and C were genuine and for consideration. The trial court (Additional Subordinate Judge) held the brothers were separate, upheld the validity of the mortgage and sale deed, and dismissed the suit. The widow appealed against that decree.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Ramashankar (the deceased husband of the plaintiff) and Umashankar (defendant No. 1) were separate persons or were in a state of Hindu joint family (i.e., whether jointness existed).
- Whether the plaintiff (the widow) was entitled to maintenance from the defendants, and specifically whether her claim could be enforced against the transferee under section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act.
- Whether the usufructuary mortgage (exhibit C) and the sale deed (exhibit A) were genuine, valid and binding on the plaintiff, including the subsidiary question whether they had been procured by fraud.
- Whether, on the recitals in the sale deed that certain lands had been given to the mother for maintenance and one bigha would revert on her death, the plaintiff could claim one bigha (a pleading/relief and evidentiary question).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaintiff alleged that her husband and Umashankar were members of an undivided Hindu family and that on his death her husband died in a state of jointness; therefore she was entitled to partition of the joint family properties under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937.
- In the alternative she claimed maintenance at Rs. 900 per annum and Rs. 2,000 as arrears.
- She alleged that in her absence the defendants procured the usufructuary mortgage bond and the sale deed from her husband by fraud, and that these documents were spurious and not binding upon her.
- Plaintiff's counsel invoked section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act as the foundation for enforcing a right to maintenance against a transferee (i.e., that a right to maintenance may be enforced against a transferee who had notice or where the transfer was gratuitous).
Defendants' Arguments
- The defendants denied that a joint Hindu family existed; they asserted that the two brothers were separate in mess, business and property.
- They contended that the usufructuary mortgage (exhibit C) and the sale deed (exhibit A) were genuine, valid, executed for consideration and binding on the plaintiff.
- They denied any liability to maintain the plaintiff. Specifically, it was urged (as reflected in the judgment) that the sale was for consideration, and there was no proof that the transferee (the wife of defendant No.1) had notice of any right of the plaintiff to maintenance; further, the sale deed stated that the wife purchased with her own money and there was no evidence she was benami.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mst. Satwati v. (name partially given in opinion) Shanker, AIR 1955 All 4 (Full Bench) | Authority for the proposition that a widow's right to maintenance is a personal right against the husband and does not create a charge on the husband's property unless a charge has been created by court order or proper deed. | The court relied on this Full Bench decision to support the view that a widow has no charge on her husband's property simply by virtue of marriage; if the husband transferred property in his lifetime, the widow cannot claim against the transferee unless a charge existed. |
| Dattatraya v. Tulsabai, AIR 1943 Bom 412 | Illustrates a situation where the right to maintenance could be enforced against the transferee because the transfer occurred after the death of the person from whom maintenance derived (i.e., the property was possessed at the time of death). | The court distinguished that case on its facts: there the father had died and the widow could claim maintenance from profits of fields transferred after his death; the present case was not analogous because here the transfer was by the husband in his lifetime for consideration. |
| Mahesh Prasad v. Mt. Mundar, AIR 1951 All 141 (Full Bench) | Discussed the relevance (or lack) of section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act to cases where the right to maintenance is personal and not a charge on property. | The court observed that this Full Bench's view that section 39 was not relevant to similar factual circumstances supported the conclusion that section 39 need not be further considered in the present case. |
| Dan Kuer v. Sarla Devi, AIR 1947 PC 8 (Privy Council) | Example where maintenance had been made a charge on certain properties (so enforcement against transferee was possible under those facts). | The court held this decision to be inapplicable because in Dan Kuer maintenance had been made a charge on property, unlike the present case. |
| Radhabai v. Gopal, AIR 1944 Bom 50 | Case discussing a wife's claim for maintenance from her husband in his lifetime (i.e., a different factual context). | The court found the decision distinguishable and inapplicable because it did not consider the widow's right to claim from properties transferred by the husband in his lifetime for consideration. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in stages. The principal factual and legal determinations were:
- Jointness / Separation: The court examined oral evidence and earlier statements of Ramashankar and the mutual transactions between the brothers. The judge concluded that the evidence, including the defendants' witnesses and Ramashankar's earlier statements, "establish beyond any shadow of doubt that both the brothers were separate," and accordingly held they were not in a state of jointness.
- Validity of Exhibits A and C: The trial court had found the usufructuary mortgage (exhibit C) and the sale deed (exhibit A) to be genuine, valid and for consideration. The appellate court accepted the trial court's factual findings on separation and, on that basis, accepted that the documents were binding and not impeachable on the record before the court.
- Maintenance and Section 39, Transfer of Property Act: The court analysed section 39, which the opinion reproduces. The judge explained the statutory scheme: where a third person has a right to receive maintenance from the profits of immovable property, that right may be enforced against a transferee only if the transferee had notice or if the transfer was gratuitous; the right cannot be enforced against a transferee for consideration without notice.
- Application of s.39 to the facts: The sale was for consideration and therefore not gratuitous; the onus was on the plaintiff to prove that defendant No.2 (the transferee) had notice of the plaintiff's right to maintenance. The court found no allegation or proof that defendant No.1 was the real transferee and that defendant No.2 was benami; the sale deed stated she purchased with her own money. The judge refused to impute the knowledge of defendant No.1 to his wife and concluded the plaintiff failed to prove notice. On that ground alone the claim under section 39 could not be enforced against defendant No.2.
- Applicability of s.39 at all: The court further reasoned that section 39 applies only where the right is to receive maintenance "from the profits of immoveable property." The right of a wife (or widow) to maintenance against her husband is a personal right and not necessarily a charge on particular property unless a charge was created by court order or proper deed. Consequently, where the wife's right is personal and not a charge on specific property, s.39 does not apply. The court relied on the Allahabad Full Bench authority and text (Mulla) to support this position.
- Distinguishing authorities relied on by plaintiff: The court examined cases cited by counsel and distinguished them on facts: Dattatraya (Bombay) involved transfers after the death of the person from whom maintenance was due and so was different; Mahesh Prasad (Allahabad FB) and Dan Kuer (Privy Council) were held not to bear on the present facts; Radhabai v. Gopal (Bombay) concerned maintenance in the husband's lifetime and not a widow's claim against transferees after the husband's lifetime.
- Claim regarding 2 bighas given to mother: The sale deed contained a recital that both brothers had given 2 bighas to their mother for maintenance and that 1 bigha (the deceased husband's share) would revert to him on her death. The court noted that no claim for that 1 bigha had been pleaded in the plaint; the judge allowed the plaintiff's counsel time and liberty to amend to claim that 1 bigha and to produce particulars, but the plaintiff failed to provide description, location or evidence as to disposition and possession. The court therefore refused to entertain that claim on mere recital.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED
Holding (core rulings):
- The brothers Ramashankar and Umashankar were found to have been separate (not in jointness).
- The usufructuary mortgage (exhibit C) and the sale deed (exhibit A) were held to be genuine, valid and for consideration; the plaintiff's claim that they were spurious or procured by fraud was not accepted on the record.
- The plaintiff was not entitled to maintenance from the defendants under section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act because (a) the sale was for consideration and there was no proof the transferee had notice of the plaintiff's right, and (b) section 39 is inapplicable where the maintenance is a personal right against the husband and not a charge on specific property.
- The ancillary contention (claim to 1 bigha from the 2 bighas given to the mother) could not be entertained because it was not pleaded with particulars and no evidence was produced; the court gave opportunity to amend and present particulars but the plaintiff failed to do so.
Implications:
- The trial court's decision dismissing the suit was affirmed and the appeal was dismissed with costs.
- Practically, the plaintiff receives no partition, no maintenance, and no recovery of the alleged 1 bigha on the present record.
- The court did not purport to lay down a novel general rule beyond applying established principles: it emphasised the distinction between a personal right of maintenance (which does not automatically create a charge on property) and a right to maintenance enforceable against transferees under section 39 when the statutory conditions (notice or gratuitous transfer) are satisfied.
This summary is limited to and derived exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No facts or legal conclusions beyond those contained in the opinion have been added.
Kanhaiya Singh, J.:— Jamuna Prasad Sahi, resident of Mauza Sandha, died leaving him surviving two sons, Ramashankar Sahi and Umashankar Sahi. In 1942 Ramashankar executed a usufructuary mortgage bond dated 21st December, 1942 (exhibit C) in favour of his brother, Umashankar, in respect of 3 kathas Udhurs of land for a consideration of Rs. 50/-. There is a (recital in this bond that after the death of their tamer the two brothers Ramashankar and Umashankar, separated in all respects and are still separate. In 1943 Ramashankar executed in favour of Srimati Dulhin Radha Devi, wife of his brother Umashankar, a registered sale deed conveying to her 3 bighas 14 kathas 13½ dhurs of kasht land i.e, an the lands he was possessed of, for a consideration of Rs. 500/- (Vide exhibit A). Out of the consideration, the vendee retained with herself Rs. 50/- for redemption of the aforesaid mortgage (exhibit C). The reason for the sale, as recited therein, was that three years before, Ramashankar had settled in mauza Bahur Chapra, his father-in-law's place and wanted to purchase lands there, as he felt considerable difficulty in cultivating those lands from a long distance.
2. Ramashankar died in 1949, leaving behind him Sheodeni Kuer, his widow. The present suit was brought by her in forma pauperis on 20th December, 1951, against Umashankar and his wife, Srimati Dulhin Radha Devi, for partition of the disputed properties, on the allegations that her husband and Umashankar (defendant No. 1) constituted an undivided Hindu family, that her husband died in a state of jointness with his brother, that the suit properties constituted joint family properties and that she was entitled to a partition of her husband's share therein under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937. In the alternative, she claimed maintenance at the rate of Rs. 900 per annum and also Rs. 2000 on account of arrears of maintenance. She averred that in her absence the defendants procured from her husband a usufructuary mortgage bond and a sale deed fraudulently, by practising fraud on him and that they (sic) were spurious deeds, not binding upon her. Defendant No. 1 and his wife filed separate written statements, raising however, common defence. They denied jointness of the family and alleged that the plaintiff's husband and defendant No. 1 were separate in mess, business and property, that one had no concern with the other and that the usufructuary mortgage bond and the sale deed were genuine, valid and for consideration and binding upon the plaintiff. They further denied liability to maintain the plaintiff.
3. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge held that the two brothers, Ramshankar and Umashankar, were separate and that the usufructuary mortgage bond (exhibit C) and the sale deed (exhibit A) were genuine, valid and for consideration and that the plaintiff was not entitled to maintenance. He accordingly dismissed the suit. From that decree and Judgment the present appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff.
4. The first and important question for consideration is whether the plaintiffs husband and defendant No. 1 were separate.
(After discussion of evidence His Lordship proceeded:)
5. Thus, the oral evidence of the defendants' witnesses, supported by the earlier statements of Ramshankar Sahi, and the mutual transactions between them establish beyond any shadow of doubt that both the brothers were separate, and I hold accordingly.
6. As to the claim for maintenance, it is undeniable that the widow of a separated brother is not entitled to claim maintenance from her husband's brother. Mr. Mukfterji urged that her claim for maintenance was founded upon the provisions of section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act. This section provides as follows:
“Where a third person has a right to receive maintenance, or a provision for advancement or marriage, from the profits of immoveable property, and such property is transferred, the right may be enforced against the transferee, if he has notice (sic) thereof or if the transfer is gratuitous; but not against a transferee for consideration and without notice of the right, nor against such property in his hands.”
7. This section is intended to protect persons who are entitled to receive maintenance from the profits of any immoveable property. But the right to receive maintenance under section 39 is available only when the transferee had notice thereof or if the transfer is gratuitous. This right cannot be enforced against a transferee for consideration and without notice of the right, nor against such property in his hands. In the instant case, the sale was not gratuitous; it was for adequate consideration. But the onus was clearly on the plaintiff to prove that defendant No. 2 had notice of her right to receive maintenance. It is urged that as the plaintiff's husband and the husband of defendant No. 2 were full-brothers, defendant No. 2 is expected to know that the plaintiff was entitled to receive maintenance from the properties transferred to her. I am unable to accede to this argument. The knowledge of defendant No. 1 cannot be appropriately attributed to his wife also. It will be observed that there is no allegation, much less proof, that defendant No. 1 was the real transferee and defendant No. 2, his wife, was his benamidar. On the contrary, it is stated in the sale dead itself that she was purchasing the property with her own money. In these circumstances, the knowledge of defendant No. 2 of the plaintiff's right to receive maintenance cannot be inferred from the fact that her husband and the plaintiffs husband were fun-brothers. In my opinion, the plaintiff has miserably failed to establish that defendant No. 2 was aware of her right to maintenance. Accordingly, the right of the plaintiff to receive maintenance under this section, if any, cannot be enforced against defendant No. 2, the transferee, as she was a transferee for consideration and had no notice of such right. On this ground alone, the plaintiffs claim to maintenance must be disallowed.
8. Apart from this, section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application in the instant case. The right envisaged in this section is a right to receive maintenance “from the profits of immoveable property”. Where, therefore, the right to maintenance is a right maintainable against the person personally, and not in virtue of his holding any property, this section does not come Into play. Thus, between a husband and a wife the right to maintenance arises because of the personal relationship created by the marriage, and the right of the wife to receive maintenance is not restricted to the profits of immoveable property. As between them, this right may be enforced, irrespective of the possession by her husband of any property, and, therefore, such a case does not fall under section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act, simply because there is no right to receive maintenance from the profits of any immoveable property. It is a personal right, which ceased on the death of the husband. The view I have expressed above receives support from the decision of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Mst. Satwati v. ??? Shanker, AIR 1955 All 4 (FB). Their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court have laid down that though on marriage a husband becomes both legally and morally bound to maintain his wife and to provide her with a suitable place of residence according to his status and circumstances, it is the personal right against the husband and the widow has got no charge on any property belonging to the husband if a charge has not been created either by a Court of law or under a proper deed executed by the husband, and, therefore, where the husband has transferred a property in his lifetime, his widow cannot claim that she has a right to reside in the house as against the transferee. As stated in Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law, Twelfth Edition, page 721, a Hindu widow is debarred from impeaching alienations of joint family property made in her husband's lifetime. The reason is that when her right of maintenance comes into existence (that is to say on her husband's death) she takes that right in the property as it stands at the time of her husband's death.
9. Mr. Mukharji relied upon a Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Dattatraya v. Tulsabai, AIR 1943 Bom 412. In this case, the joint family consisted of a father, mother and a son. The father died leaving behind him his widow and son. After the death of the father the son sold four fields which they were possessed of at the time of the father's death. This case, therefore, is clearly distinguishable, and the mother will be entitled to receive maintenance from the profits of the four fields in the hands of the transferee. It is not a case where the family consisted of husband and wife and the properties were transferred by the husband himself. To vary the facts of the present case if the plaintiffs husband and defendant No. 1 had been joint and her husband died in a state of jointness and on his death defendant No. 1 transferred the joint family properties, the plaintiff would undoubtedly be entitled to claim maintenance from defendant No. 1 and his transferees, because in such a case she had a right to receive maintenance from the profits of the immovable properties, in which her husband also had an interest.
10. He also referred to a decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Mahesh Prasad v. Mt. Mundar, AIR 1951 All 141 (FB). This case has no application at all, as their Lordships themselves have observed that section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act is not relevant to this case and need not be considered any further. The decision of the Privy Council in Dan Kuer v. Sarla Devi, AIR 1947 PC 8, cited by him, also has no bearing on the facts of this case, because in that case the maintenance had been made a charge on certain properties.
11. The last case relied upon by Mr. Mukharji is the case of Radhabai v. Gopal, AIR 1944 Bom 50. The decision of this case cannot be stretched beyond the facts involved therein. It was a case in which a wife claimed maintenance from the husband in his lifetime. They were not considering the right of the widow to claim maintenance from the properties transferred by the husband in his life-time for valuable consideration. Therefore this case also has no application. Not a single case has been cited which is in direct conflict with the view I have ventured to express above.
12. Thus, taking any view of the case, the plaintiff is not entitled to claim maintenance from the defendants. It appears from the sale deed (exhibit A) that both the brothers had given 2 bighas of land to their mother for maintenance, and it is further stipulated by the sale deed that on the death of the mother 1 bigha, which represents the share of the plaintiff's husband, would revert to him. On this recital, Mr. Mukharji founded an argument that in any case the plaintiff was entitled to get back 1 bigha of land. No such claim was laid in the plaint. There is no evidence as to what became of those 2 bighas after the death of their mother. In fact, we gave Mr. Mukharji time to find out the specifications of those 2 bighas and also gave him liberty to amend the plaint, claiming 1 bigha out of those 2 bighas. In spite of his having ample time, his client could not give the description and location of those lands and how they have been dealt with and in whose possession they are. In absence of evidence and pleading, this claim cannot be entertained at this stage, merely on the recitals in the sale deed. Therefore, this contention also has no force and must be overruled. It follows that there is no merit in this appeal which must be dismissed with costs.
S.N.P Singh, J.:— I agree.
KF/K.S.B
13. Appeal dismissed.
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