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Guri Behera And Others Petitioners. v. Divisional Railway Manager, East Coast Railway And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion (As Reported)
Factual and Procedural Background
These writ petitions were filed by fathers of children who died (three children) and one child who was severely injured in a railway accident near the unmanned level crossing at Mangalajodi (Katia Sahi), Khurda district. The petitions seek (a) compensation for death or injury and (b) a writ of mandamus directing the railway authorities to take appropriate safety measures at the unmanned level crossing to avoid future accidents.
The accident occurred on 5.8.2006 at about 2:30 p.m. Four children were on or near the railway tracks; a Puri-Ahmedabad Express struck them on one track while the children were looking at a goods/DMU train on the other track. Three children died on the spot; one female child (petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 3214 of 2010) sustained severe injuries and was later assessed by the District Medical Board as having 85% permanent physical disability.
Multiple petitions arising out of the same accident were heard together and a common judgment was delivered. The petitioners alleged the crossing was unmanned, busy, and had a history of accidents (Annexure listing 24 prior accidents), and that despite complaints the railway had not appointed a guard, installed gates, or taken sufficient precautionary measures.
The railway (opposite parties) filed a common counter-affidavit denying negligence, asserting that the level crossing was equipped with prescribed signage and speed breakers, complied with visibility norms, did not qualify for manning as per Railway Board guidelines, that the Train Vehicle Unit was less than 6000, and that the accident occurred about 100 metres away from the level crossing due to trespass and violation of section 147 of the Railways Act, 1989.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the writ petitions are maintainable in law?
- Whether the accident occurred on account of negligence on the part of the railway administration by not providing sufficient protection at the level crossing and without deploying guard or putting check gate as required under section 18 of the Railways Act, 1989?
- Whether, on account of not providing safeguard to the level crossing by the railway administration, the petitioners are entitled to compensation as claimed?
- What relief/order should be granted?
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The level crossing at Mangalajodi is unmanned, busy, and used daily by villagers and thousands of other persons; it lacked gates, guards or adequate safeguards despite many prior accidents (Annexure listing 24 accidents).
- Railway authorities had knowledge of repeated accidents and failed to take adequate precautionary measures (no gate, guard or other obstruction) despite complaints.
- The children were minors and were looking at a goods train on one track; because of noise they did not hear or notice the Puri-Ahmedabad Express on the other track and the accident occurred through no fault of the children.
- Statutory provisions (section 11, section 18 of the Railways Act, 1989) empower/require the Railways to execute works and provide gates, chains or similar fittings at level crossings for convenient running of trains and safety of persons crossing lines.
- No inquiry report under sections 114/115 (after notice under section 113) was produced; if produced it would have disclosed negligence by the Railways.
- Reliance on precedents: the petitioners invoked (among others) Swaranlata Barua, N.K. V Bros., Rudul Sah and other cases to support the view that writ jurisdiction can be used to award compensation where State functionaries are negligent and to justify awarding compensation akin to that provided by section 124 (and the Rules) which fixes Rs. 4,00,000 as no-fault liability for a passenger.
Opposite Parties' Arguments (Railways)
- The writ petitions are not maintainable as they involve disputed questions of fact that are not determinable in writ jurisdiction.
- No fault can be attributed to the Railways; the unmanned level crossing complied with Indian Railways Permanent Way Manual requirements (Stop Board, Caution Board, Speed Breaker Board, Speed Breakers) and had clear visibility both sides.
- The crossing did not qualify to be manned as per Railway Board guidelines; Train Vehicle Unit was less than 6000 and visibility was not restricted (less than 800 metres restriction not engaged).
- The accident occurred approximately 100 metres away from the unmanned level crossing while the children were trespassing on the up line (violation of section 147 of the Railways Act) and were ignorant of the approaching express train; internal inquiries attributed the mishap to carelessness of guardians/children.
- Reliance on cases (e.g., Union of India v. United India Insurance Co.; Sajeeda Begum) and statutory text to argue there is no absolute statutory obligation to fence the entire railway or man every crossing under section 18; serious disputes of fact preclude relief in writ jurisdiction. Also raised limitation objection for W.P.(C) No. 3214 of 2010 (filed in 2010 for a 2006 incident).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Swaranlata Barua v. Union of India, 1958-65 ACJ 365 (Assam) | Obligation of railway administration to give adequate warning to the public when a train passes over a thoroughfare; duty implied/inherent in railway functions. | The court relied on this decision to support the view that railways have an obligation (not necessarily solely statutory) to give adequate warning and that had the railway taken precautions (gates/obstruction) the accident could have been avoided. |
| N.K. V Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal, 1980 ACJ 435 (SC) | Judicial approach in accident/compensation matters: courts/trials should not be defeated by technicalities; inferences and equitable considerations in favor of victims (quoted passage on presumption/res ipsa loquitur and need for adequate compensation). | The court extracted and relied upon the passage to stress that courts should not succumb to technicalities, may draw reasonable inferences, and should ensure adequate compensation; this supported the court's adverse inference and liberal approach to awarding compensation. |
| Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141 : AIR 1983 SC 1086 | In appropriate cases courts discharging constitutional duties can order payment of money as compensation consequent upon deprivation of fundamental rights (life/liberty); State must repair damage by its officers. | The court invoked Rudul Sah to justify exercising writ jurisdiction (Article 226) to award monetary compensation for deprivation of the fundamental right to life through state/agency negligence. |
| Kalawati v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1988 ACJ 780 (HP) | High Court may grant damages in writ proceedings for injuries arising from negligence of State authorities. | Used as supporting authority that writ courts can award compensation for negligence of State bodies; helped the court conclude it could award damages against the railway administration. |
| Seemu v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board, 1994 ACJ 623 (HP) | Writ court's power to award damages for injuries due to negligence of State authorities (Electricity Board example). | Reinforced the principle that writ jurisdiction can extend to compensation for negligence by statutory authorities; supported court's power to award monetary relief. |
| Kumari v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1992 ACJ 283 (SC) | Article 226 jurisdiction can be invoked to award compensation where victims suffered due to negligence of State/functionaries (Supreme Court overruling High Court refusal in a child-fall case). | Cited to confirm Supreme Court authority that writ jurisdiction may be used to award compensation for negligence where appropriate; court relied on this to uphold its jurisdiction to grant compensation. |
| Parikhita Behera v. Divisional Railway Manager, South Eastern Railway, 1998 ACJ 1019 (Orissa) | High Court's view that Articles 226 and 227 can be invoked and compensation awarded if there is deliberate negligence by statutory authorities such as the railway administration. | This court cited its own prior view to support awarding compensation against the railway where deliberate negligence is found. |
| Union of India v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 1998 ACJ 342 (SC) | Authority cited by the Railways to contend limits of liability/interpretation of statutory duties (as relied upon by opposite parties). | The court considered this authority in the context of the Railways' contention that there is no absolute statutory obligation to fence every crossing; however, the court ultimately drew an adverse inference against the Railways for non-production of inquiry report under section 113. |
| Sajeeda Begum v. Divisional Railway Manager (Safety), S.E. Railway, 2006 ACJ 1494 (Orissa) | Cited by the Railways to support limited statutory obligations under section 18 and to contest attribution of negligence. | The court considered this case in assessing the Railways' contentions about statutory duties but found the statutory wording and the non-production of mandated inquiry supported the petitioners. |
| S.D.O., Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. v. Timudu Oram, 2006 ACJ 10 (SC) | Cited by the Railways (through their counsel) for the proposition that disputed factual questions may preclude relief in certain constitutional proceedings. | The court acknowledged the contention but, based on statutory obligations and adverse inference from non-production of reports, held the writ petitions were maintainable and decided factual responsibility against the Railways. |
| Priya Vasant Kalgutkar v. Murad Shaikh, 2009 ACJ 2665 (SC) | Discusses assessment of compensation in motor accident cases (section 163-A and Second Schedule) and structured/formulaic approaches; referred to determine appropriate compensation for minors and injured persons by analogy. | The court referred to Priya Vasant Kalgutkar (and authorities cited therein such as Lata Wadhwa) to guide assessment of compensation for minors and for applying comparative reasoning to fix awards in this railway-accident context. |
| Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, 2001 ACJ 1735 (SC) | Classification of awards for children in different age groups and principles for fixing compensation for minors (as referred in Priya Vasant Kalgutkar). | Used by the court (through Priya Vasant Kalgutkar) to justify the approach taken in fixing compensation amounts for the deceased children and to consider future prospects and appropriate multipliers/conventional figures. |
| Taff Vale Railway Company v. Jenkins, (1913) AC 1 | Referenced in the context of determining just compensation and judicial approaches to approximating damages where precise material is lacking. | Referred (via discussion in Priya Vasant Kalgutkar/Lata Wadhwa) to support the court's approach in approximating compensation where direct material for exact calculation may be lacking. |
| K. Narasimha Murthy v. Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2004 ACJ 1109 (Karnataka) | Surveyed authorities on assessment of damages (both pecuniary and non-pecuniary) and extracted principles from leading authorities for personal injury compensation. | The court relied on the legal principles and excerpts collected in K. Narasimha Murthy (including many English authorities) to frame its reasoning on heads of damage and to quantify awards in this case. |
| Admiralty Commissioners v. S.S. Valeria, (1922) 2 AC 242 | Principle that damages should as far as money can do so put the sufferer in the position he would have been but for the wrong. | Quoted through K. Narasimha Murthy to support the general approach to assessment of damages; influenced the court's reasoning on full and adequate compensation. |
| Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., (1880) 5 AC 25 | Damages aim to approximate sum which puts injured person as nearly as possible in same position as if wrong had not occurred. | Quoted and used as part of the canonical approach to assessment of damages for personal injury; supported court's emphasis on substantial, not token, awards. |
| H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard, 1958-65 ACJ 504 (HL) | Damages for bodily injury are to be reasonable and substantial; comparability and moderation in approach. | Cited for the principle that awards should be reasonable and comparable across similar injuries; influenced the court's award figures and reasoning about uniformity. |
| Ward(s) v. James, (1965) 1 All ER 563 | Three principles for personal injury awards: assessability, uniformity, predictability. | Invoked to underline the need for a principled approach to quantify compensation for injury and death in this case. |
| Basavaraj v. Shekhar, 1987 ACJ 1022 (Karnataka) | Injury compensation should give a fair monetary equivalent where original position cannot be restored. | Cited to support the basic compensatory aims applied by this court in assessing pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses. |
| Perry v. Cleaver, 1969 ACJ 363 (HL) | Compensation is difficult but monetary assessment is the only practical method. | Used to justify awarding monetary compensation for loss of amenities and pain and suffering in personal injury cases. |
| Phillips v. South Western Railway Co., (1874) 4 QBD 406 | Damages should be assessed with reasonable common sense; plaintiff must be given full fair compensation. | Quoted to support the court's approach that compensation should be just and complete to the extent money can achieve it. |
| Fowler v. Grace, (1970) 114 Sol Jo 193; (1969) 3 All ER 1528 | Authorities on assessment of damages (referenced among other English authorities). | Referred to as part of the canon of decisions guiding assessment of personal injury damages; contributed to court's multi-headed assessment approach. |
| Fair v. London and North Western Rly. Co., (1869) 21 LT 326 | Distinction between pecuniary loss and loss of amenities; jury to consider both heads. | Quoted to emphasize that courts must take into account both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses in personal injury assessments. |
| Ruston v. National Coal Board, (1953) 1 All ER 314 | Courts should ensure damages are adequate for injury suffered. | Adopted as support for the court's mandate to give adequate compensation rather than token awards. |
| Baker v. Willoughby, 1970 ACJ 259 (HL) | Statement that compensation is for loss suffered as a consequence of injury (loss of amenities, earning capacity, etc.). | Cited to reinforce the conceptual basis for compensation focused on consequential losses rather than the physical injury alone. |
| McGregor on Damages (14th Edn.) | Authoritative text summarizing heads of damages and principles of assessment in personal injury cases. | Used by the court (via K. Narasimha Murthy and other citations) to list and confirm the heads of damage (pain and suffering, loss of amenities, loss of earnings, medical expenses) to be considered. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in structured steps, grounded in statutory provisions and case law cited in the petition and counter-affidavits:
- Statutory duty under section 18 of the Railways Act, 1989: The court interpreted section 18 as imposing a statutory obligation on the railway administration to provide sufficient safeguards at level crossings (for example, by putting check gates and keeping them closed when trains are due to pass). The court observed that if the railway had taken such precautions (gates, obstructions or other notice), the accident could have been avoided.
- Inquiry under section 113 and non-production of inquiry reports: The petitioners had given notice under section 113 of the Railways Act. The court noted that the railway authorities should have conducted inquiry under sections 114/115 and produced such reports. Because those reports were not produced, the court drew an adverse inference against the Railways and concluded there was negligence in not taking sufficient precautionary measures (posting guard or keeping gate closed) at the level crossing.
- Rejection of Railway's factual defenses: The court rejected the Railways' contentions that (a) the accident was due to trespass/violation of section 147 by the children and guardians, and (b) the accident occurred away from the unmanned level crossing and the crossing complied with norms. The court concluded that non-compliance with statutory obligations and non-production of inquiry justified holding the Railways responsible.
- Maintainability of writ petitions: On the question of maintainability, the court held the writ petitions were maintainable in law. The court relied on precedents (including Rudul Sah, Kumari, Parikhita Behera, and related decisions) to confirm that writ jurisdiction can be exercised to award compensation where constitutional rights (life/liberty) are affected by negligence of State authorities.
- Quantum of compensation — legal foundations: The court considered section 124 of the Railways Act, 1989 and the Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990 which fix a no-fault liability of Rs. 4,00,000 for a passenger who dies in a railway accident. The court also surveyed decisions and principles from motor-accident and personal-injury jurisprudence (Priya Vasant Kalgutkar, Lata Wadhwa, K. Narasimha Murthy and numerous English authorities) to determine appropriate heads and quantum for victims who were non-passengers or injured at level crossings.
-
Application to facts — awards: The court recorded the undisputed facts: three children died and one suffered an 85% permanent disability. Taking into account the statutory provision (section 124), the rule provisions, precedents on compensation for minors and injured persons, and the permanent disability of the injured petitioner, the court fixed compensation amounts as follows:
- Rs. 3,50,000 to the legal representatives of each deceased child (the court noted the statutory Rs. 4,00,000 for passengers but awarded Rs. 3,50,000 in the circumstances and reasoning referenced).
- Rs. 5,00,000 to the injured petitioner (Guri Behera) for permanent disability (85% as certified) taking into account pain, loss of amenities, lifelong impairment and need for assistance and treatment.
- Interest and disbursement: The court directed payment of interest at 7% per annum on the awarded amounts from the date of the claim made with the opposite parties until realization. The awarded amounts with interest were to be computed and disbursed within four weeks from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the judgment.
- In reaching the above conclusions, the court relied on prior authorities emphasizing that compensation should be adequate and not token, should take into account pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses, and that writ courts can award monetary relief when constitutional rights are infringed through state/negligent acts.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
Writ petitions allowed in part. The court held the writ petitions were maintainable, found negligence on the part of the railway administration for failing to take sufficient precautionary measures at the level crossing (and drew an adverse inference from the non-production of statutory inquiry reports), and awarded monetary compensation.
Orders made (direct effects on the parties):
- Rs. 3,50,000 awarded to the legal representatives of each of the three deceased children.
- Rs. 5,00,000 awarded to the injured petitioner (Guri Behera) for permanent disability (85% as certified by District Medical Board).
- Interest at the rate of 7% per annum on the compensation amounts from the date of the claim made with the opposite parties until realization.
- The amounts (with interest) to be computed and disbursed within four weeks from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the judgment.
Implications:
The immediate consequence is monetary relief to the petitioners and a finding of negligence against the railway administration in this set of facts. The court applied existing statutory provisions and established precedents to reach its conclusions. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel principle beyond applying and synthesizing prior case law and statutory duties to the facts; it enforces that writ jurisdiction can be used to award compensation where State functionaries (including railway administration) are found negligent and where statutory inquiries and safeguards have not been complied with.
This summary is strictly based on the content of the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion text has been added.
V. Gopala Gowda, C.J:— These writ petitions have been filed by the fathers of the deceased children who died on account of railway accident claiming compensation and praying for issuance of writ of mandamus against the opposite parties to take appropriate steps at the unmanned level crossing near Mangalajodi (Katia Sahi) so that future accidents can be avoided and to pay compensation to each of the petitioners to the tune of Rs. 4,00,000, which is the minimum liability of the railway authority to a passenger as per section 124 of the Railways Act, 1989.
2. All these writ petitions have been listed together as the facts and reliefs sought for are common and they arise out of the same accident. Therefore, they are heard together and disposed of by this common judgment. The brief facts as have been narrated in the above writ petitions with a view to find out as to whether the petitioners are entitled to reliefs as prayed for and to appreciate the legal contentions raised are as follows:
On 5.8.2006 at about 2.30 p.m the petitioner [in W.P (C) No. 3214 of 2010] along with other three children was going through the Mangalajodi (Katia Sahi) level crossing in between Kalupadaghat and Bhusandpur in the district of Khurda, when Puri-Ahmedabad Express came from another track and dashed against four children. In the said accident, three children expired on the spot and the petitioner in W.P (C) No. 3214 of 2010 sustained severe injuries to her person. The petitioner in W.P (C) No. 3214 of 2010 appeared before District Medical Board, Khurda for determination of percentage of disability. The Medical Board assessed the disability at 85 per cent as per Annexure 1.
3. It is the case of the petitioners in all the writ petitions that while the aforesaid children were crossing the level crossing, which is an unmanned level crossing, as their houses are situated on both sides of the railway line and railway line has been constructed in the middle of the village Mangalajodi, the accident occurred. Besides the villagers of Mangalajodi, everyday about thousands of people are going through the said unmanned level crossing to either side. The said level crossing is a busy level crossing without having any check gate and guard, due to which several accidents had occurred there in the past. Annexure 2 is the particulars of 24 accidents which had occurred in the past. In spite of several complaints by the public, the railway authorities have neither appointed a guard nor put a check gate nor taken sufficient precautionary measures to avoid frequent accidents, for which number of accidents have occurred in the past, which is within the knowledge of the railway authorities. The petitioners in W.P (C) No. 1456 of 2008 have lost their daughter Kamini Behera in the said accident, whose age was 12 years and she was studying in class VII. After the said accident, the railway police and other railway authorities conducted their inquiries and found that accident occurred while the said children were standing on the railway line and were looking at the goods train. Against the said accident, an U.D case was registered in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Khurda, copies of the said F.I.R, final report and original certified copies of the inquest report and post-mortem report, dead body challan of Kamini Behera and final report in U.D.G.R Case No. 86 of 2006 are annexed herewith as Annexures 3 to 7. There was also coverage of the said accident in the local dailies, i.e, The Samaja and The Sambad dated 6.8.2006, photocopies of which are annexed as Annexure 8 series. The father of Guri Behera along with his brother Ram Behera whose only daughter had expired, filed a joint petition before the Divisional Railway Manager claiming suitable compensation by their letter dated 17.10.2006, but till date the railway authorities have not intimated the petitioners either by rejecting or granting compensation to them. The copy of the said letter is filed herewith as Annexure 9.
4. It is the further case of the petitioners that all the children were minor and while they were passing through the railway track they stopped when they found the goods train was passing on a track. Due to the sound of goods train they could not hear the sound of other train and for that they could not be conscious about Puri-Ahmedabad Express, which was coming on other track and caused accident for no fault of the children. In the final form it has been stated that when the 4 children were looking at the goods train standing on the line being the inhabitants of the nearby village, they faced the accident by another train, i.e, Puri-Ahmedabad Express. Under section 11 of the Railways Act, 1989 the Central Government is empowered to execute all necessary works for convenient running of the trains in the country. Under section 18 of the Railways Act, 1989 that corresponds to section 13 of the Railways Act, 1890 for the said convenient running of the train the authorities may construct suitable gates, chains, bars, etc. at the level crossing. The aim and object of the legislation is to protect the living beings who are supposed to be affected by the running of the trains and for that Parliament authorises the railway authorities to work in a responsible manner with a view to see that the persons who will be crossing the railway lines either to reach residences or other places shall not be affected. The Railways would work in crossing a footway on level, as to the mode of working their railway, as to the rate of speed, and signalling and whistling and other ordinary precautions in the working of a railway to do everything which is reasonably necessary to secure the safety of persons who have to cross the railway track by means of the footway.
5. It is the further case of the petitioners that a level crossing is, on the one hand, a dangerous spot in view of the possible movement of trains and, on the other hand, it is an invitation to the passers-by crossing the railway line through the said level crossing. This is a public level crossing and not merely one by private accommodation. Therefore, it is stated by them that it is the legal duty of the Railways to assure the reasonable safety. The most obvious way of doing it is to provide gates or chain barriers or to post a watchman who should close the same shortly before train passes. But, failure to do so is not by itself an act of negligence provided that the Railways had taken other steps sufficient in those circumstances to caution effectively a passerby of average alertness or prudence. It is stated that at a reasonable distance of either side prominently written boards can be fixed asking the road users to be aware of trains passing through railway tracks. If the train in either side is visible from near the caution-board or within a short distance of crossing, this should be sufficient because a diligent road user could look round and see the train. On the other hand, if there is bend in the track or there are trees and bushes in between or the road on the either side of crossing is very far below, the level of the railway tracks or for any other similar reasons the railway track is not visible beyond a short distance, then even the certain boards are useless. In the present case the railway track was not visible from the spot of accident for which the accident occurred on the fateful day. The accident occurred at the particular level crossing is not for the first time, but on a number of occasions accidents had occurred due to the aforesaid reasons.
6. Petitioners placed reliance upon the decision of Assam High Court in Swaranlata Barua v. Union of India, 1958-65 ACJ 365 (Assam), wherein it is held by the said High Court that there is an obligation on the part of the railway company or administration to ensure that whenever a trainpasses over a thoroughfare adequate warning should be given to the public of the passing of the train at the time they pass, so that accident may be avoided. The said duty need not necessarily be a statutory duty. It is implied and inherent in the functions to be discharged by the railway administration in the matter of running their railways. It is not disputed that had the railway administration taken the precautionary measure either by putting a railway gate for keeping it closed at the time the train was due to pass or putting some other obstruction which could have prevented the public from passing over the level crossing that would be the information and notice to the public that the train will pass through the railway track, then accident of this kind that had happened in this case would not have occurred.
7. It is the further case of the petitioners that soon after such accident occurred, after receiving notice under section 113 as per the Railways Act, 1989 an inquiry must have been conducted under section 114 or 115 of the Railways Act, 1989. If such report could have been called for by the competent authority of the Railways, the same would have disclosed the negligence on the part of railway authorities, which had resulted in the accident.
8. It is the further case of the petitioners that due to negligence of the railway authorities the accident occurred and three innocent children had died. Therefore, the railway administration should have come forward to compensate the petitioners for their irreparable loss suffered on account of the death of their children. Further, it is stated that the road traffic accidents special courts and special provisions have been created by the legislature to help the distressed people who have become victims by granting just and reasonable compensation. In the present case, small children have expired due to train accident, but in the circumstance, had it been by a road accident, the parents would have been granted with the compensation under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.
9. The petitioners placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in N.K V Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal, 1980 ACJ 435 (SC), wherein it is observed that road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and the drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there.
10. The petitioners further placed reliance upon section 124 of the Railways Act read with the Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990, whereunder no fault liability of the passenger who expires in a railway accident has been fixed at Rs. 4,00,000. The said facility should also be extended to the accident victims who lost lives or became disabled on account of the railway accident at the level crossing due to the negligence of the railway administration, particularly when level crossing is a place where the public are allowed to cross the railway track.
11. Reliance has also been placed on Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141 : AIR 1983 SC 1086, wherein the Apex Court observed that in appropriate cases, the court discharging constitutional duties can pass orders of payment of money in the nature of compensation consequent upon deprivation of a fundamental right to life and liberty of a petitioner as State must repair the damage done by its officers to the petitioner's right.
12. The learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the decision in Kalawati v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1988 ACJ 780 (HP) and also in the case of Seemu v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board, 1994 ACJ 623 (HP), wherein the aforesaid High Court ruled that the writ court can grant relief to the petitioners claiming damages for the injuries arising out of the accident occurred due to the negligence of the State authorities like the Electricity Board. In the case of Kumari v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1992 ACJ 283 (SC), the Apex Court overruling the decision of the High Court of Tamil Nadu observed that the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be invoked by the Writ Court for awarding compensation to a victim, who suffered due to negligence of the State or its functionaries. In that case a six years' old child had fallen in the uncovered sewerage tank. The High Court refused to entertain the claim of compensation in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, but the Supreme Court directed the State to pay compensation. In the case of Parikhita Behera v. Divisional Railway Manager, South Eastern Railway, 1998 ACJ 1019 (Orissa), this court also took the same view that jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution can be invoked and direction for payment of compensation can be awarded in favour of the claimants, if there was deliberate act of negligence on the part of the statutory authorities, namely, the railway administration.
13. Therefore, it is pleaded by the petitioners' counsel that the accident occurred on account of the negligence on the part of the railway authorities for not putting gates, bars and not appointing watchman on that unmanned level crossing and not taking sufficient precautionary measures. The accident occurred due to deliberate act of negligence on the part of the railway administration. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to compensation claimed in these writ petitions.
14. A common counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the opposite parties. It is stated therein that the writ petitions are not maintainable both on facts and in law as they involve disputed questions of facts, which cannot be adjudicated by this court in writ jurisdiction.
15. It is further stated that writ is not maintainable in law, as no fault can be attributed to the Railways for the alleged death and injury caused to the children due to the said accident. Certain background facts of the case are stated briefly in the counter, which are as follows:
Howrah-Visakhapatnam main line runs in between two locations of a single village, named Mangalajodi under the Tangi Police Station situated in Khurda district of Orissa. There is an unmanned level crossing existing at KM 494/27-29 in the up direction and 494/30-28 in down direction for movement of the villagers from one side to the other. As per the provisions contained in Indian Railways Permanent Way Manual, the said unmanned level crossing has been provided with (1) Stop Board, (2) Caution Board, (3) Speed Breaker Board, (4) Speed Breakers. The said level crossing also complies with clear visibility towards both sides. The said level crossing till date does not qualify for manning as yet as per the latest Railway Board Guidelines. The copy of the said guidelines is annexed to the counter as Annexure A/1.
16. It is stated that the Train Vehicle Unit in respect of the level crossing is less than 6000 and there is also no restricted visibility from both the sides, i.e, less than 800 metres for the road users. The level crossing is equipped with all kinds of safety provisions as per the norms of the railway administration. Without using level crossing for passage at random railway lines elsewhere is being trespassed for which the said unfortunate incident has occurred. On 5.10.2006 down train No. 208-B/KIT-BBS DMU passenger train left Kaluparaghat Station at 1529 hours and train No. 8403 Puri-Adi Express left Bhusandpur Station at 1530 hours. While DMU passenger train was passing over down line near Mangalajodi village under Tangi Police Station of Khurda District, four children aged 8, 6, 5 and 3 years respectively were standing on the up line railway track which is about 100 metres away from the level crossing, the same parallel train Puri-Ahmedabad Express dashed the children on the up line track for which three children died on the spot and one female child of three years escaped narrowly injured. In this connection, Divisional Transportation Inspector (Planning), East Coast Railway, Khurda Road conducted an inquiry and submitted his report, which reveals that the mishap took place due to the carelessness of the guardians in allowing their children to trespass the railway track at KM 495/1 violating the provisions of section 147 of Railways Act, 1989. Hence the railway administration is in no way responsible for this tragic incident and it is not liable to pay compensation as claimed by them and, therefore, this court need not award compensation. The sketch of level crossing at the site of accident is annexed as Annexure B/1.
17. It is further stated that on investigation it came to light that on 5.8.2006 all the four children were standing in up line track shouting and gesticulating towards the running of the down train DMU 208.B. They were ignorant of running of up train No. 8403 Express and also failed to attend the continuous whistling and the sound of the express train due to whistling and running sound of down train No. 208.B DMU to which they were looking to. Besides, it was not safe to stop the high speed train running over the section to avoid the accident which might invite another major mishap. The fact finding is annexed as Annexure C/1.
18. Further, it is stated that there being violation of section 147 of the Railways Act, 1989, the railway administration cannot be held responsible for the said mishap. The allegation of the petitioners that the incident occurred due to unmanned level crossing is not correct. It is reiterated that the accident has occurred at a distance of about 100 metres towards Visakhapatnam end from the existing unmanned level crossing which is equipped with all the safety measures as per the railway norms. It is also stated that the unfortunate incident took place due to carelessness of the children and their guardian/petitioners for trespassing the railway track in violation of section 147 of the Railways Act.
19. Learned counsel for the opposite parties placing reliance on Union of India v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 1998 ACJ 342 (SC) and Sajeeda Begum v. Divisional Railway Manager (Safety), S.E Railway, 2006 ACJ 1494 (Orissa), contended that under section 18 of the Railways Act there is no statutory obligation on the part of the railway administration to fence throughout the railway line including the level crossings unless the Central Government so requires them to do. There are serious questions of disputed facts including the place of incident as well as respective negligence, the case does not merit consideration under Article 266 of the Constitution of India in view of the fact that in the present case the level crossing does not qualify to be a manned onenor the accident has occurred at the level crossing. Therefore, the learned counsel would urge that the negligence cannot be attributed to the railway administration for the said unfortunate incident. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the decision in S.D.O, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. v. Timudu Oram, 2006 ACJ 10 (SC) and contended insofar as W.P (C) No. 3214 of 2010 is concerned, the same is grossly barred by limitation as the same has been filed in the year 2010 whereas the alleged incident occurred in the year 2006.
20. With reference to the aforesaid rival legal contentions raised at the Bar, the questions that fall for consideration by this court are as follows:
(i) Whether the writ petitions are maintainable in law?
(ii) Whether the accident occurred on account of negligence on the part of the railway administration by not providing sufficient protection at the level crossing and without deploying guard or putting check gate as required under section 18 of the Railways Act, 1989?
(iii) Whether on account of not providing safeguard to the level crossing by the railway administration, the petitioners are entitled to compensation as claimed?
(iv) What order?
21. To answer the above points, we have carefully examined the facts and rival legal contentions urged in the above writ petitions. As can be seen from the provisions of section 18 of the Railways Act, 1989, the railway administration has the statutory obligation to provide sufficient safeguards to the level crossing by putting railway check gate and keeping it closed at the time when train is due to pass at the level crossing area. In the instant case, had the railway administration taken the precautionary measure either by putting a railway gate and keeping it closed at the time the train was due to pass, or put up some other obstruction which could prevent the public from passing over the level crossing giving them information and notice of the approaching train, the accident of the kind that had happened in this case could have been avoided. After receiving notice under section 113 from the petitioners as per the Railways Act, 1989, an inquiry must have been conducted by the railway authorities under sections 114 and 115 of the Railways Act, 1989. If such report would have been produced, then it could have disclosed whether there is negligence on the part of the railway administration on account of which the accident took place resulting in death of three poor children and severe injury to a minor girl. Therefore, the said inquiry report as required under section 113 of the Railways Act having not been produced, this court draws an adverse inference against the Railways that there is negligence on the part of the railway administration in not taking sufficient precautionary measures by posting guard or keeping the railway gate closed at the time while the train was due to pass through that level crossing. Non-compliance with the aforesaid statutory obligations by the railway administration, we reject the contentions urged by learned counsel for the Railways that there are serious questions of disputed facts and due to carelessness on the part of the children and their guardians the alleged accident occurred on the fateful day resulting in death of three poor children and severe injury to the minor girl. For the above reasons, we hold that the writ petitions are maintainable in law. Further, the Apex Court in N.K.V Bros. (P) Ltd. case, 1980 ACJ 435 (SC), upon which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners made certain observations, the relevant portion of which is extracted as hereunder:
“(3) Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate noctumally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasizing this aspect because we are often distressed by the transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their neighbour. Indeed, the State must seriously consider no fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parsimony practised by Tribunals. We must remember that judicial Tribur nals are State organs and Article 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for State relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in the disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of Tribunals and the High Courts should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard.”
22. Further, the High Court of Assam in Swaranlata Barua's case, 1958-65 ACJ 365 (Assam), has held that there is an obligation on the part of the railway administration to ensure that whenever a railway passes over a thoroughfare adequate warning should be given to the public about passing of the train at the time they pass so that accidents may be avoided. This duty need not necessarily be a statutory duty. It iis implied and inherent in the functions to be discharged by the railway administration in the matter of running their railways. It is not disputed that had the railway administration taken the precaution of either putting up of a railway gate and keeping it closed at the time the train was due to pass or put up some other obstruction which could prevent the public from passing over the level crossing giving them information and notice of the approaching train, the accident of the kind that happened in this case could not have happened.
23. Having answered point Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the petitioners, and against the railway administration, we are required to answer point No. 3 with regard to compensation in favour of the petitioners with the following reliefs.
24. Under section 124 of the Railways Act read with the Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990, the no fault liability of the passenger who expires in a railway accident has been fixed at Rs. 4,00,000. In the instant case, the victims lost their lives or became disabled in the said accident due to negligenceon the part of the railway administration in putting gates at the level crossing or public are allowed to cross the railway line without providing precautionary measures as indicated above. Further, the Supreme Court in Rudul Sah's case, (1983) 4 SCC 141 : AIR 1983 SC 1086, observed that in appropriate cases, the court discharging constitutional duties can pass orders for payment of money in the nature of compensation. Consequent upon deprivation of the fundamental right to life and liberty of a petitioner the State must repair the damage done by its officers to the petitioner's right.
25. Further, in Kalawati's case, 1988 ACJ 780 (HP) and in Seemu's case, 1994 ACJ 623 (HP), the High Court of Himachal Pradesh ruled that writ court can grant relief to the petitioners claiming damages for the injuries arising out of negligence of the State authorities like the Electricity Board. In Kumari's case, 1992 ACJ 283 (SC), the Supreme Court overruling the decision of the High Court of Tamil Nadu observed that the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoked for awarding compensation to a victim, who suffered due to negligence of the State or its functionaries. The same view has been taken by this court in Parikhita Behera's case, 1998 ACJ 1019 (Orissa), wherein it is observed that jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution can be invoked and direction for payment of compensation can be given if there is deliberate act of negligence on the part of the railway administration.
26. In this regard, the undisputed fact is that in the said accident three children died and one sustained severe injuries. Under section 124 of the Railways Act read with the Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990, no fault liability of the passenger who expires in a railway accident has been fixed at Rs. 4,00,000. The same amount can be awarded to the petitioners for the reason that there cannot be any discrimination between passenger and non-passenger who died in railway accident.
27. It will be useful to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Priya Vasant Kalgutkar v. Murad Shaikh, 2009 ACJ 2665 (SC), wherein the Supreme Court considered the case of a minor aged 9 years who met with an accident and suffered 10 per cent permanent disability and after examining the provisions under section 163-A and Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, observed that the compensation for injuries suffered by a person in a motor vehicle accident can be determined either on the basis of actual damages suffered or upon application of structured formula. In the said judgment at para 7, the Supreme Court has referred to the case of Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, 2001 ACJ 1735 (SC). In the said case, compensation awarded in respect of the minor children was divided into two groups, i.e, the first group between the age group of 5 and 10 years and the second group between the age group of 10 and 15 years. In the case of children between the age group of 5 and 10 years, a uniform sum of Rs. 50,000 has been held to be payable by way of compensation, to which the conventional figure of Rs. 25,000 is to be added and as such to the heirs of the 14 children, a consolidated sum of Rs. 75,000 each has been awarded. So far as the children in the age group of 10 to 15 years are concerned, there are 10 such children who died on the fateful day and having found their contribution to the family at Rs. 12,000 per annum, multiplier of 11 has been applied, particularly, depending upon the age of father and then the conventional compensation of Rs. 25,000 has been added to each case and consequently, the heirs of each of the deceased above 10 years of agehas been granted compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,57,000. After referring to the case of Taff Vale Railway Company v. Jenkins, (1913) AC 1, it has been observed that in the case of Lata Wadhwa (supra) no iota of material was produced to enable the learned Judge to arrive at a just compensation in such case. Therefore, he determined the same on an approximation on the basis of the submission of the learned senior counsel appearing for TISCO that compensation determined for the children of all the age groups could be doubled, as in his view also, the determination made is grossly inadequate. On the basis of the said submission made in the said case it was directed that the compensation amount for the children between the age group of 5 and 10 years should be three times. In other words, it should be Rs. 1,50,000, to which the conventional figure of Rs. 50,000 should be added and thus the total amount in each case would be Rs. 2,00,000. Insofar as children between the age group of 10 and 15 years are concerned, they are all students of cjass VI to X and are children of employees of TISCO. Having regard to the facts of the said case, the contribution of Rs. 12,000 per annum was on the lower side and, therefore, the contribution should be Rs. 24,000 and instead of 11 multiplier, the appropriate multiplier would be 15, which is worked out to Rs. 3,60,000 to which an additional sum of Rs. 50,000 has to be added, thus making the total amount payable at Rs. 4,10,000 for each of the claimants of the aforesaid deceased children. Keeping the aforesaid criteria followed in awarding the compensation in view, though section 124 of the Railways Act, 1989 read with the Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990 provides for a compensation for no fault liability to the passenger who expires in railway accident of Rs. 4,00,000, considering the facts situation of the case and keeping in view the future prospect of the deceased children and prospective loss of future earnings which would have benefited the parents, we deem it appropriate to award Rs. 3,50,000 to the legal representatives of each one of the deceased children.
28. In the instant case, the disability certificate (Annexure 1) dated 1.9.2008 issued in favour of petitioner, Guri Behera, in W.P (C) No. 3214 of 2010 by the District Medical Board of Khurda discloses that petitioner Guri Behera sustained ‘traumatic bronchial plexus injury (Rt) causing placid paralysis of (Rt) hand’ on her person. It is further certified that she suffers from 85 per cent permanent physical disability. In this view of the matter, petitioner throughout her life has to suffer. More so, placid paralysis of right hand indicates that she requires assistance throughout her life and she has to suffer from mental agony as she has lost ability of using right hand. There will be loss of enjoyment of her marital status on account of such disability. She has lost amenity of using her right hand on account of which she will be suffering from mental agony and she requires continuous medical treatment. She will not be in a position to use her right hand for doing any work even for taking bath. Taking all these aforesaid aspects into consideration, the petitioner-claimant is entitled to compensation of Rs. 5,00,000 under the aforesaid heads. However in case of death, compensation of Rs. 4,00,000 from all heads to each of the claimant petitioners would be just and proper. It is worthwhile to extract the relevant paras from the judgment of Karnataka High Court in the case of K. Narasimha Murthy v. Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2004 ACJ 1109 (Karnataka), wherein the Division Bench in an appeal preferred by the claimant under section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 succinctly laid down the legal principle after extractingthe relevant paras from the decision of the cases in Admiralty Comrs. v. S.S Valeria, (1922) 2 AC 242; Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., (1880) 5 AC 25; H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard, 1958-65 ACJ 504 (HL, England); Ward v. James, (1965) 1 All ER 563; Basavaraj v. Shekhar, 1987 ACJ 1022 (Karnataka); Perry v. Cleaver, 1969 ACJ 363 (HL, England); Phillips v. South Western Railway Co., (1874) 4 QBD 406; Fowler v. Grace, (1970) 114 Sol Jo 193; and (1969) 3 All ER 1528; and referring to McGregor on Damages, 14th Edn. in support of our conclusion for determination of the compensation for personal injury both for pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses in favour of the injured petitioners, which reads as under:
“(18) Viscount Dunedin in Admiralty Comrs v. S.S Valeria, (1922) 2 AC 242, has observed thus:
‘The true method of expression, I think, is that in calculating damages you are to consider what is the pecuniary consideration which will make good to the sufferer, as far as money can do so, the loss which he has suffered as the natural result of the wrong done to him.’
(19) Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., (1880) 5 AC 25, has observed thus:
‘Where any injury is to be compensated by damages, in settling the sum of money to be given…you should as nearly as possible get at that sum of money which will put the person who has been injured … in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong.’
(21) Lord Morris in his memorable speech in H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard, 1958-65 ACJ 504 (HL, England), pointed out this aspect in the following words:
‘Money may be awarded so that something tangible may be procured to replace something else of like nature which has been destroyed or lost. But the money cannot renew a physical frame that has been battered and shattered. All the Judges and courts can do is to award sums which must be regarded as giving reasonable compensation. In the process there must be the endeavour to secure some uniformity in the general method of approach. By common assent awards must be reasonable and must be assessed with moderation. Furthermore, it is eminently desirable that so far as possible comparable injuries should be compensated by comparable awards.’
(22) In the above case, their Lordships of the House of Lords observed that the bodily injury is to be treated as a deprivation which entitles plaintiff to the damage and that the amount of damages varies according to the gravity of the injury. Their Lordships emphasised that in personal injury cases the courts should not award merely token damages but they should grant substantial amount which could be regarded as adequate compensation.
(23) In Wards v. James, (1965) 1 All ER 563, speaking for the Court of Appeal in England, Lord Denning while dealing with the question of awarding compensation for personal injury laid down three basic principles:
‘Firstly, assessability: In cases of grave injury, where the body is wrecked or brain destroyed, it is very difficult to assess a fair compensation in money, so difficult that the award must basically be a conventional figure, derived fromexperience or from awards in comparable cases. Secondly, uniformity: There should be some measure of uniformity in awards so that similar decisions may be given in similar cases, otherwise, there will be great dissatisfaction in the community and much criticism of the administration of justice. Thirdly, predictability. Parties should be able to predict with some measure of accuracy the sum which is likely to be awarded in a particular case, for by this means cases can be settled peaceably and not brought to court, a thing very much to the public good.’
(25) In Basavaraj v. Shekhar, 1987 ACJ 1022 (Karnataka), a Division Bench of this court held:
‘If the original position cannot be restored — as indeed in personal injury or fatal accident cases it cannot obviously be — the law must endeavour to give a fair equivalent in money, so far as money can be an equivalent and so ‘make good’ the damage.’
(26) Therefore, the general principle which should govern the assessment of damages in personal injury cases is that the court should award to injured person such a sum of money as will put him in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the injuries. But, it is manifest that no award of money can possibly compensate an injured man and renew a shattered human frame.
(27) Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gesi in Perry v. Cleaver, 1969 ACJ 363 (HL, England), said:
‘To compensate in money for pain and for physical consequences is invariably difficult but…no other process can be devised than that of making a monetary assessment.’
(28) The necessity that the damages should be full and adequate was stressed by the Court of Queen's Bench in Fair v. London and North Western Rly. Co., (1869) 21 LT 326. In Ruston v. National Coal Board, (1953) 1 All ER 314, Singleton, L.J said;
‘Every member of this court is anxious to do all he can to ensure that the damages are adequate for the injury suffered, so far as there can be compensation for an injury, and to help the parties and others to arrive at a fair and just figure.’
(29) Field, J. in Phillips v. South Western Railway Co., (1874) 4 QBD 406, held:
‘You cannot put the plaintiff back again into his original position, but you must bring your reasonable common sense to bear, and you must always recollect that this is the only occasion on which compensation can be given. The plaintiff can never sue again for it. You have, therefore, now to give him compensation, once and for all. He has done no wrong; he has suffered a wrong at the hands of the defendants and you must take care to give him full fair compensation for that which he has suffered.’
(33) It is well settled principle that in granting compensation for personal injury, the injured has to be compensated (i) for pain and suffering; (2) for loss of amenities; (3) shortened expectation of life, if any; (4) loss of earnings or loss of earning capacity or in some cases for both; and (5) medical treatment and other special damages. In personal injury actions the two main elements are the personal loss and pecuniary loss.
Chief Justice Cockburn in Fair v. London and North Western Rly. Co., (1869) 21 LT 326, distinguished the above two aspects thus:
‘In assessing the compensation the jury should take into account two things, first, the pecuniary loss the plaintiff sustains by the accident; secondly, the injury he sustains in his person, or his physical capacity of enjoying life. When they come to the consideration of the pecuniary loss they have to take into account not only his present loss, but his incapacity to earn a future improved income.’
(34) McGregor on Damages, 14th Edn., para 1157, referring to the heads of damages in personal injury actions states:
‘The person physically injured may recover both for his pecuniary losses and his non-pecuniary losses. Of these the pecuniary losses themselves comprise two separate items, viz., the loss of earnings and other gains which the plaintiff would have made had he not been injured and the medical and other expenses to which he is put as a result of the injury, and the courts have subdivided the non-pecuniary losses into three categories, viz., pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life and loss of expectation of life.’
(35) Besides, the court is well advised to remember that the measure of damages in all these cases ‘should be such as to enable even a tortfeasor to say that he had amply atoned for his misadventure’. The observation of Lord Devlin that the proper approach to the problem or to adopt a test as to what contemporary society would deem to be a fair sum, such as would allow the wrongdoer to ‘hold up his head among his neighbours and say with their approval that he has done the fair thing is quite apposite to be kept in mind by the court in assessing compensation in personal injury cases.’
(42) Lord Reid in Baker v. Willoughby, 1970 ACJ 259 (HL, England) said:
‘A man is not compensated for the physical injury; he is compensated for the loss which he suffers as a result of that injury. His loss is not in having a stiff leg; it is in his inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those amenities which depend on freedom of movement and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned’…”
29. In view of the above, each of the claimants is entitled to compensation for death of his child in the accident. Hence non-grant of compensation to the claimant-petitioner by the railway administration is not sustainable in law. Hence we answer the point No. 3 in affirmative by awarding compensation of Rs. 3,50,000 to each one of the petitioners whose child died in the railway accident and Rs. 5,00,000 to the injured-claimant. The petitioners are also entitled to interest at the rate of 7 per cent per annum on the compensation amount from the date of the claim made with the opposite parties till realization. The same shall be computed and disbursed to the claimant-petitioners within 4 weeks from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this judgment.
30. The writ petitions are allowed to the aforesaid extent. Writ petition allowed.
31. Petitions allowed.
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