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Fakir Chand Seth v. Dambarudhar Bania .

Orissa High Court
Mar 25, 1986
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (P.C. Misra, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff appealed against the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Bhawanipatna in Money Suit No. 33/73. The suit sought recovery of money advanced under a document executed on 19-1-1972 (referred to as Ext. 2). The plaintiff's pleaded case was that on 19-1-72 he advanced Rs. 15,000 to the defendant as an advance for the supply of 350 bags of paddy (at specified rates) to be delivered by 28-2-72, and that the defendant executed Ext. 2 recording these terms. The plaintiff alleged non-supply and non-refund despite demands; he also averred that he was not a regular money-lender and that the transaction was solitary. The suit claimed recovery of the advance and interest (12% p.a. as pleaded). The defendant denied execution of Ext. 2 and receipt of any advance, denied sending letters acknowledging receipt, and alternatively pleaded that Ext. 2 was unenforceable because the plaintiff lacked a licence under the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965 (and further that the plaintiff was a regular money-lender without licence). The trial court framed issues and found (inter alia) that Ext. 2 was genuine and that Rs. 15,000 was advanced, but that Ext. 2 was an unlawful agreement under the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965 and void under Section 23 of the Contract Act; consequently the trial court held the amount not recoverable and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed and, during argument, abandoned a challenge to the trial court's finding that Ext. 2 was void and instead relied on restitutionary and equitable remedies under Sections 65 and 70 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to restitution/refund of the consideration advanced under Ext. 2 by invoking Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 where Ext. 2 was held to be void (on the basis that the plaintiff did not know at the time of contracting that the agreement was forbidden by law).
  2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to compensation or restoration under Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 on the basis of equitable principles (prevention of unjust enrichment), given that the defendant accepted the money non-gratuitously and enjoyed its benefit.
  3. As an alternative raised by appellant's counsel, whether Ext. 2 could be construed as a promissory note within the meaning of Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • At trial: The plaintiff alleged he advanced Rs. 15,000 on 19-1-72 for supply of specified quantity of paddy under Ext. 2 and sought refund with interest when the defendant failed to supply or refund.
  • On appeal: Although the appellant originally challenged the trial court's finding of voidness, during argument he abandoned that challenge and proceeded on the basis that Ext. 2 was void; he contended the plaintiff was nonetheless entitled to restitution/compensation under Sections 65 and 70 of the Contract Act.
  • Alternative argument (raised but not pressed in detail due to the primary conclusion): Ext. 2 could be construed as a promissory note, creating an independent obligation to repay with interest (the Court observed Ext. 2 did not satisfy Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act).

Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • Denied execution of Ext. 2 and denied receipt of any advance; denied sending letters acknowledging receipt or undertaking to repay.
  • Pleaded that the plaintiff, lacking a licence under the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965, could not lawfully purchase paddy in wholesale quantities; accordingly Ext. 2 was illegal/void and unenforceable under that statutory scheme and Section 23 of the Contract Act.
  • Alternatively contended the plaintiff was a regular money-lender without licence under the Orissa Money Lenders Act and therefore could not recover principal or interest.
  • Relied upon a Bombay High Court decision (Bhaskarrao Buty v. Smt. Saru Jadhaorao) to argue that ignorance of a statutory prohibition cannot be a defence and that knowledge of illegality should be imputed to the parties.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kulu Collieries Ltd. v. Jharkhand Mines Ltd., AIR 1974 SC 1892 Clarifies scope of Section 65: distinguishes an agreement "discovered to be void" (void ab initio but discovery may be subsequent) from a contract that "becomes void" (originally enforceable but later becomes void); S.65 allows restitution where the party did not know agreement to be unenforceable when entered into. The court relied on this Supreme Court exposition to hold that S.65 can apply where the agreement was void ab initio provided the plaintiff did not know of the illegality at the time of contracting; applied to allow restitution to the plaintiff who had no pleading/proof of prior knowledge of illegality.
Bhaskarrao Buty v. Smt. Saru Jadhaorao, AIR 1978 Bom 322 (Bombay Single Judge) Held that knowledge of illegality flowing from a statutory provision should be imputed to the parties; ignorance of a statutory provision cannot be a defence (authority cited by respondent). The appellate court rejected this decision as not consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Kulu Collieries (AIR 1974 SC 1892) and declined to accept it as laying down the correct law for the present purposes.
Sivaramakrishniah v. Narhari Rao, AIR 1960 Andh Pra 186 Explains that S.65 applies only where invalidity was discovered subsequent to making of the contract and cannot be used by parties who knew the illegality from the beginning; S.65 enables restoration to an innocent party not in pari delicto. The court cited and approved this principle, using it to support the conclusion that S.65 applies when the plaintiff entered into the agreement bona fide and without knowledge of the statutory prohibition.
Lakhiram v. Brajal, AIR 1974 Ori 49 Applied the principle that S.65 applies where a contract is void from inception but the plaintiff entered it bona fide and later discovery showed it void (case involved West Bengal Food Grains Licensing Order). The court relied on this Orissa High Court authority to support the proposition that restitution under S.65 is available to an innocent party when contracts are void under food/paddy licensing regimes.
Mulamchand v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1968 SC 1218 Authority for invocation of Section 70: S.70 can provide a remedy based on equitable principles where something is done or delivered and accepted to the benefit of another, even though the underlying contract is void. The court cited this Supreme Court authority to support the application of S.70 in the present facts, concluding that equitable restitution/unjust enrichment principles justify refund to the plaintiff.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a structured manner:

  1. Treatment of trial findings: The trial court's findings that Ext. 2 was genuine and that Rs. 15,000 was advanced were accepted on appeal (the defendant's denial was discarded and not challenged on appeal).
  2. Voidness of Ext. 2 under statutory regime: Applying the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965 (which defined "dealer" and "wholesale quantity" and required a licence to act as a dealer), the court agreed with the trial court that Ext. 2 was an agreement forbidden by law because the plaintiff had no licence; therefore Ext. 2 was unenforceable and void under Section 23 of the Contract Act.
  3. Legal question isolated: Given the voidness of Ext. 2, the single question for decision was whether the plaintiff could recover the consideration he had advanced under Sections 65 and 70 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
  4. Analysis of Section 65: The court analyzed definitions in the Contract Act and the text of S.65, stressing the distinction between an agreement "discovered to be void" (which may be void ab initio but unknown to the parties at the time) and a "contract becoming void" (originally enforceable). The court applied the Supreme Court's ruling in Kulu Collieries (AIR 1974 SC 1892) to hold that S.65 may apply to agreements void from the outset if a party entered into the agreement without knowledge of its illegality. The court noted there was no pleading or proof that the plaintiff knew at the time of execution that the agreement violated the Orissa Order; thus S.65 could afford restitution.
  5. Analysis of Section 70: The court explained S.70 embodies equitable restitution to prevent unjust enrichment where one person lawfully does something (or delivers something) for another non-gratuitously and the other enjoys the benefit. The court observed that S.70 is not based on contract but on a lawful relationship arising by acceptance and enjoyment of a benefit. Here, the defendant voluntarily accepted Rs. 15,000 non-gratuitously and undertook performance; therefore S.70 could operate to require restitution/compensation.
  6. Interaction of S.65 and S.70: The court concluded that both Sections are available as remedies in appropriate cases — S.65 in cases of agreements discovered to be void when the claimant lacked knowledge of illegality, and S.70 to prevent unjust enrichment where a benefit was accepted and enjoyed. On the facts, the plaintiff was entitled to restitution under these equitable and statutory principles.
  7. Rejection of conflicting authority: The court explicitly declined to follow the Bombay single-judge decision (Bhaskarrao Buty), which imputed statutory-knowledge to parties; instead it followed the Supreme Court authorities cited which allow restitution to an innocent party.
  8. Promissory note argument: The court treated the appellant's alternative contention that Ext. 2 was a promissory note briefly and observed that Ext. 2 did not comply with Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act; the point therefore needed no further discussion in view of the restitutionary conclusion.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned trial court were set aside and the suit was decreed in full with costs throughout. The plaintiff was held entitled to refund of the amount advanced under Ext. 2 together with interest for illegal detention thereof (as claimed).

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the plaintiff recovers the sum he advanced (Rs. 15,000 as found at trial) with interest for illegal detention and is awarded costs; the trial court's dismissal is reversed.
  • The court applied established principles (Sections 65 and 70 of the Contract Act and relevant Supreme Court and High Court authorities) to permit restitution to a party who entered into an agreement which was void under a statutory licensing regime, where that party did not have knowledge of the illegality at the time of entering into the agreement.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal principle; it applies and affirms existing authorities (notably Kulu Collieries AIR 1974 SC 1892 and related decisions) to the facts before it. No broader novel precedent is claimed beyond the application of those principles to the facts of this case.

Judge concurring: B.K. Behera, J. agreed with the judgment. Appeal allowed.

Show all summary ...

P.C Misra, J.:— The plaintiff is in appeal against the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Bhawanipatna in Money Suit No. 33/73 wherein he had prayed for recovery of Rs. 17,815/- including interest due on an agreement executed by the defendant on 19-1-1972.

2. The plaintiff's case is that on 19-1-72 he advanced a sum of Rs. 15,000/- to the defendant for supply of paddy in evidence whereof the defendant executed a document (Ext. 2) incorporating the terms agreed to between the parties. It was stipulated therein that the defendant is to supply 350 bags of paddy at the rate of Rs. 43/- per bag of fine paddy and at the rate of Rs. 45/- per bag of superfine paddy by 28-2-72 and after the said supply the defendant was to take return of the document executed by him. The plaintiff's case is that the defendant neither supplied the paddy nor refunded the advance money to the plaintiff in spite of several demands though the defendant had sent two letters to him requesting for time to settle up the matter. The plaintiff has alleged that he is not a regular money-lender and the aforesaid transaction was a solitary one in which he had advanced money for purchase of paddy as aforesaid. The suit has been filed for recovery of the aforesaid amount of Rs. 15,000/- which the plaintiff had advanced to the defendant and also for interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum.

3. The defendant in his written statement denied the plaint allegations denying the execution of any document on 19-1-72 in favour of the plaintiff and also denying to have received any amount whatsoever as advance. He also denied to have sent any letter acknowledging the receipt of the aforesaid amount nor did he ever undertake to repay the same as alleged in the plaint. A plea has been taken by the defendant that the plaintiff not being a licensed dealer, he could not legally purchase huge amounts of paddy as per the stipulations of Ext. 2. It is, therefore, contended that Ext. 2 being a contract for sale and purchase of paddy, the same was illegal and void being opposed to law as it would amount to procurement of paddy without a valid licence for which the said document is unenforceable in law and the amount said to have been advanced by him is not legally recoverable. The defendant also takes the plea that the plaintiff is a regular money lender and he having no money-lending licence, the principal as well as interest thereof cannot be recovered by him in the suit.

4. The learned Subordinate Judge having framed necessary issues which arise out of the pleadings recorded the following findings:

(i) The document (Ext. 2) is genuine under which the plaintiff had advanced a sum of Rs. 15,000/- to the defendant.

(ii) Ext. 2 is an agreement for procurement of paddy for which the plaintiff had no valid licence. It, therefore, follows that Ext. 2 is not a lawful agreement as it defeats the provisions of Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965.

(iii) The consideration for such a void agreement being also illegal, neither the contract is enforceable in law nor the amount advanced thereunder is recoverable through court.

(iv) The plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under Ss. 65 or 70 of the Indian Contract Act.

(v) The plaintiff is not a money-lender in regular course of business and the suit is not hit by the provision of the Orissa Money Lenders Act.

(vi) Ext. 2 being void in law the suit for recovery of the amount advanced thereunder is not maintainable and hence the same is liable to be dismissed.

5. Though in the grounds of appeal the plaintiff-appellant had challenged the findings of the learned trial court and urged that Ext. 2 is not a void contract, during the course of argument the said ground was abandoned and the learned counsel for the appellant proceeded assuming the said finding to be correct in law and contended that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief claimed in the suit under Ss. 65 and 70 of the Contract Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). Going through the relevant documents and the evidence in the suit, we are also of the view that the said finding of the learned Subordinate Judge is not assailable. Under the provisions of the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965 which was in force on the date of the suit transaction, “Dealer” was defined as any person who purchases sells or stores any wholesale quantity of rice or paddy or rice and paddy taken together. “Wholesale quantity” was defined to be five quintals inside the State of Orissa excluding the border area. The said Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order prohibits any person to act as a dealer except under and in accordance with a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing authority. Under Ext. 2 the plaintiff advanced a sum of Rs. 15,000/- to the defendant for supply of paddy at the stipulated rate for which the plaintiff evidently had no licence issued under Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965. The plea taken by the plaintiff at the trial that he was to purchase paddy on behalf of Janata Rice Mill as its commission agent has been factually disbelieved by the learned trial court with which we agree. Besides, “purchase in wholesale quantity” as defined in the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965 includes purchase on one's own behalf or on behalf of another or as a commission, agent. Thus the plaintiff would still be a dealer, even if his aforesaid plea of purchase by commission agent is accepted. We would, therefore, proceed on the basis that Ext. 2 was hit by the provisions of Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965 which means that such an agreement was forbidden by law and the agreement is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of law. In other words Ext. 2 was an unenforceable agreement and, therefore, void under S. 23 of the Contract Act.

6. The defendant's plea of total denial of the execution of Ext. 2 and advancement of money thereunder having been discarded by the learned-trial court, against which there has been no cross-objection nor challenge during the course of argument, the same shall be taken to be final in between the parties. It, therefore, follows that the plaintiff had advanced and the defendant had accepted a sum of Rs. 15,000/- on 19-1-72 for supply of 350 bags of paddy at the stipulated rate by the defendant to the plaintiff. As has been already stated this agreement was void u/s. 23 of the Act and was not enforceable by either of the parties. The only question which requires determination in this appeal is as to whether the plaintiff would be entitled to refund of the said consideration money under Ss. 65 and 70 of the Act.

7. Sections 65 and 70 of the Act, 1872 are in the following words:

S. 65: When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it.”

S. 70: Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered.”

Section 65 deals both with ‘agreement’ and ‘Contract’. S. 2(e) of the Act defines an ‘agreement’ as every promise or every set of promises forming the consideration for each other. Cl. (h) of the said Section provides that an agreement enforceable by law is a contract. S. 65 of the Act, therefore, deals with (a) agreements which are enforceable by law and (b) agreements not so enforceable. By cl. (g) of the said Section an agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void. This is not a case where the agreement (Ex. 2) becomes subsequently void. The words “when a contract becomes void” in S. 65 of the Act pre-suppose the enforceability of the contract at the inception on the date of its execution which became illegal thereafter. It is, therefore, required to be seen as to whether S. 65 of the Act would embrace an agreement which was void ab initio. Any agreement which is ab initio void may fall under the description “contract discovered to be void” within the meaning of S. 65 of the Act, if it was not known to the parties that it was void at the time when it was entered into. S. 65 provides for restitution of any advantage received under a contract or agreement, where the agreement is discovered to be void, or where the contract becomes void.

8. Section 70 of the Act enables the court to do substantial justice where a person lawfully does anything for another person or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, by directing the latter to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered. In order that S. 70 of the Act would apply, the necessary conditions are that: (1) a person should lawfully do something for another person or deliver something to him, (ii) in doing so he must not act gratuitously, and (iii) the person for whom it is done must have enjoyed the benefit thereof. S. 70 of the Act is not founded on contract but embodies the equitable principles of restitution and prevention of unjust enrichment.

It has, therefore, to be examined in this case as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to restitution of the money which he advanced under the void contract (Ext. 2) applying S. 65 of the Act and if he is entitled to the same relief u/s. 70 of the Act.

9. In the case of Kulu Collieries Ltd. v. Jharkhand Mines Ltd. reported in AIR 1974 SC 1892 the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly defined the scope of Section 65 of the Act in the following words:

“The section makes a distinction between an agreement and a contract. According to S. 2 of the Contract Act an agreement which is enforceable by law is a contract and an agreement which is not enforceable by law is said to be void. Therefore, when the earlier part of the section speaks of an agreement being discovered to be void it means that the agreement is not enforceable and is, therefore, not a contract. It means that it was void. It may be that the parties or one of the parties to the agreement may not have, when they entered into the agreement, known that the agreement was in law not enforceable. They might have come to know later that the agreement was not enforceable. The second part of the section refers to a contract becoming void. That refers to a case where an agreement which, was originally enforceable and was, therefore, a contract becomes void due to subsequent happenings. In both these cases any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore such advantage, or to make compensation for it to the person from whom he received it.”

This, however, does not mean that S. 65 of the Act can be taken advantage of by the parties who knew from the beginning that the agreement was void. If the plaintiff had entered into an agreement under the belief that it was a legally enforceable agreement without the knowledge that the same was forbidden by law, he can claim restitution or compensation under the said Section. In this case there has been no pleading or proof that the plaintiff on the date of execution of Ext. 2 was aware that the agreement in question was in violation of law, namely the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965. It would, therefore, be a case where the agreement was not known to the plaintiff to be one in violation of law and, which was subsequently discovered to be void.

10. In a single Judge decision of Bombay High Court reported in AIR 1978 Bom 322, Bhaskarrao Buty v. Smt. Saru Jadhaorao cited on behalf of the respondent it has been held that the knowledge of an illegality where the illegality flows from operation of the law has to be imputed to a party, because ignorance of a statutory provision cannot be set up as a defence. In that case, foodgrain was given to the defendant on loan which was in contravention of cl. 10 of Maharashtra Scheduled Foodgrains (Stocks, Declaration and Procurement and Disposal, Acquisition, Transport and Price Control) Order, 1966. The learned court held that the knowledge of illegality of the transaction must be imputed to the parties for which the Court should not render any assistance to the plaintiff for realisation of the loan advanced by the plaintiff. We are not prepared to accept the said decision as laying the correct law as it is not consistent with the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in AIR 1974 SC 1892 (supra).

In a decision reported in AIR 1960 Andh Pra, 186 Sivaramakrishniah v. Narhari Rao, it was held:—

“In order to invoke S. 65 the invalidity of the contract or agreement should be discovered subsequent to the making of it. This cannot be taken advantage of by parties who knew from the beginning the illegality thereof. It only applies to a case where one of the parties enters into an agreement under the belief that it was a legal agreement, i.e without the knowledge that the agreement is forbidden by law or opposed to public policy and as such illegal. The effect of S. 65 is that, in such a situation, it enables a person not in pari delicto to claim restoration since it is not based on an illegal contract but dissociated from it. That is permissible by reason of the section because the action is not founded on dealings which are contaminated by illegality. The party is only seeking to be restored to the status quo ante. S. 65 also does not recognise the distinction between a contract being illegal by reason of its being opposed to public policy or morality or a contract void for other reasons. Even agreements, the performance of which is attended with penal consequences, are not outside the scope of S. 65. At the same time, Courts will not render assistance to persons who induce innocent parties to enter into contracts of that nature by playing fraud on them to retain the benefit which they obtained by their wrong”.

The aforesaid principle was approved by the Supreme Court in the case reported in AIR 1974 SC 1892 (supra). In a decision of this Court reported in AIR 1974 Ori 49, Lakhiram v. Brajal relying on the aforesaid decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court and some others, it was held that S. 65 of the Act applies where the contract is void from its inception but the parties or at least the plaintiff enters into it bona fide and the contract is later discovered to be void. In that case the transactions were found to be hit by the provisions of West Bengal Food Grains Licensing Order.

The other decisions cited at the Bar reiterating the same position need not be noticed. In such circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to be restored to his former position.

11. That apart, the provisions of S. 70 of the Act which is based on the principles of equity can be invoked. From the language of S. 70, it is apparent that where a claim for compensation is made by one person against another under S. 70 of the Act, it is not on the basis of any subsisting contract between the parties. It is on the basis that something was done by the party for another or that something has been delivered by him which was accepted by the latter to his benefit, for which the law imposes the liability on such party benefited by the transaction, to make compensation or to restore the things so done or delivered to him notwithstanding the fact that the contract was void vide AIR 1968 SC 1218, Mulamchand v. State of Madhya Pradesh. In another decision of the Supreme Court their Lordships observed that between the person claiming compensation and the person against whom it is claimed, some lawful relationship must subsist, but the said lawful relationship arises not because the party claiming compensation has done something for the party against whom the compensation is claimed, but because what has been done by the former has been accepted and enjoyed by the latter. In the present case the plaintiff had advanced a sum of Rs. 15,000/- to the defendant under Ext. 2 for supply of paddy which the defendant had voluntarily accepted undertaking to perform the stipulated work by a particular date. We have held that performance of the said work i.e supply of the quantity of paddy mentioned in Ext. 2 without a valid licence was illegal and, therefore, the agreement under Ext. 2 was void. The amount of money advanced under Ext. 2 was evidently not gratuitous. Acceptance of the said amount by the defendant implies a corresponding liability on the part of the defendant for return of the money in the event, the performance of the work was not possible because of the prohibition by law. It is to meet such situations and to provide remedies, in such cases, principles of equity have been embodied in S. 70 of the Act to prevent unjust enrichment or unjust benefit. We, would, therefore, conclude that the plaintiff shall be entitled to refund of the amount advanced under Ext. 2, to the defendant, together with interest for illegal detention thereof as claimed.

12. Learned counsel for the appellant advanced an alternative argument that Ext. 2 can be construed as a promissory note under which the defendant incurred the liability to pay back the amount with interest. In view of our conclusion as stated earlier, this point need not be discussed at length. We may, however, observe that Ext. 2 does not comply with the requirements of S. 4 of the Negotiable Instrument Act so as to be construed as a promissory note.

13. In the result, the appeal succeeds. The judgment and the decree passed by the learned trial court impunged in this appeal are set aside and the suit is decreed in full with costs throughout.

B.K Behera, J.:— 14. I agree.

Appeal allowed.