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Dinamani Debi v. Paramananda Choudhury And Another Opp Parties.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, as plaintiff, filed O.S No. 20/102 of 1974/69 seeking declaration of title and recovery of possession of certain suit lands. The suit lands originally belonged to defendant No. 1, who allegedly sold them to the petitioner by a registered sale deed dated 26-6-1967 for Rs. 2,000/-. The plaintiff alleged partial payment of Rs. 1,500/- was made in presence of the Sub-Registrar, with the balance Rs. 500/- to be paid at endorsement of the registration ticket, which defendant No. 1 received later but failed to endorse or deliver possession. Defendant No. 1, in collusion with defendant No. 2, executed a nominal sale deed in favor of defendant No. 2 to defraud the plaintiff. Defendant No. 1 did not contest, while defendant No. 2 claimed an earlier agreement for sale in his favor and disputed the plaintiff's title despite admitting the sale deed.
The Trial Court decreed the plaintiff's suit after holding that the agreement in favor of defendant No. 2 was neither genuine nor valid. On appeal by defendant No. 2, the lower appellate Court set aside the Trial Court's decision and remanded the suit for fresh disposal after framing two new issues, allowing parties to adduce evidence on those issues. The present Civil Revision challenges this order of remand.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an appeal lies against the order of remand passed under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code.
- Whether the Civil Revision against the order of remand is maintainable.
Arguments of the Parties
Opposite Party No. 2's Arguments
- Relied on the Bench decision in Sardar Bauri Bisoyi v. Smt. Surekha Sahuani (I.L.R 1974 Cuttack 1433) to contend that the order of remand was appealable and hence the Civil Revision was not maintainable.
Petitioner's Arguments
- Challenged the correctness of the Bench decision relied upon by opposite party No. 2, disputing the appealability of the order of remand.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sardar Bauri Bisoyi v. Smt. Surekha Sahuani (I.L.R 1974 Cuttack 1433) | Held that an order of remand under section 151 CPC was appealable as it amounted to a decree reversing the Trial Court's decree. | The Court doubted the correctness of this precedent and ultimately disagreed with its view, holding the order of remand is not a decree and hence not appealable. |
| Bhairab Ghandra v. Kali Eumari (A.I.R 1923 Cal. 606) | Supported the proposition that an order of remand could be treated as a decree and hence appealable. | Referenced as part of the reasoning in Bisoyi's case but later distinguished and not followed by the present Court. |
| Mahammad Ali v. Kararn Ali (A.I.R 1935 Cal. 134) | Similar to Bhairab Ghandra, held an order of remand can be appealable as a decree. | Not approved by the present Court; considered contrary to statutory provisions. |
| Narahari Mohanti v. Ghanashyam Bal (A.I.R 1963 Orissa 186) | Held no appeal lies against an order under section 151 CPC but revisional remedy is available. | Followed by the Court to support the maintainability of Civil Revision and non-appealability of remand orders. |
| Baisnab v. Parma (A.I.R 1964 Orissa 156) | Same principle as above regarding revisional remedy and non-appealability. | Accepted by the Court as part of the consistent view. |
| Banthu Kisan v. Duhhi Kisani (39 1973 C.L.T 39) | Supported the view that orders under section 151 CPC are not appealable. | Relied upon by the Court in forming its conclusion. |
| Raghunandan Singh v. Jadunandan Singh (A.I.R 1918 Pat. 505) | Supported the non-appealability of orders under inherent powers. | Followed as binding precedent. |
| Parmanand Kumar v. Bhon Lohar (A.I.R 1926 Pat. 457) | Dissenting view against appealability of remand orders under inherent powers. | Considered binding and persuasive by the Court, supporting the non-appealability position. |
| Banka, Behari Deb v. Birendra Nath Dutta (A.I.R 1927 Cal. 850) | Rejected the appealability of remand orders which did not finally decide any question in dispute. | Approved and followed by the Court as good law. |
| Mahammad Ali Fakir v. Karam Ali Taluqdar | Held appeal to High Court permissible against remand orders under Order 43, rule 1 CPC. | Distinguished and rejected by the Court as contrary to section 104 CPC. |
| Bameswar Rai v. Haralth Lal Sahu (A.I.R 1942 Pat. 226) | Established binding precedent from Patna High Court on appealability issues. | Relied upon to support the Court's conclusion on non-appealability and maintainability of revision. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined whether the order of remand passed under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code amounts to a decree that is appealable. It noted that an appeal is strictly a creature of statute and is only permissible when expressly provided by law. Section 104 CPC enumerates orders from which appeal lies, and an order under section 151 CPC is not included.
The Court distinguished the impugned order from a decree, emphasizing that a decree is a formal adjudication conclusively determining the rights of parties on matters in controversy. Here, the appellate Court's remand order did not finally decide any substantive issues but left the suit for fresh adjudication by the Trial Court. The mere setting aside of the Trial Court's decree does not convert the remand order into a decree.
The Court critically analyzed the precedent in Sardar Bauri Bisoyi v. Smt. Surekha Sahuani and other Calcutta High Court decisions which treated such remand orders as decree and appealable. It found these decisions to be obiter and not binding, especially in light of contrary binding precedents from the Patna High Court and other High Courts which uniformly held that no appeal lies against orders under section 151 CPC but that revisional jurisdiction is available.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the order of remand is not appealable and that the Civil Revision against it is maintainable. The Court thus set aside the contrary view expressed in Bisoyi's case and directed the Civil Revision to be placed before the learned Single Judge for disposal on merits.
Holding and Implications
The Court held that no appeal lies against an order of remand passed under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code unless such order amounts to a decree, which the impugned order does not.
The Court further held that a Civil Revision is maintainable against such an order of remand. This decision overrules the earlier obiter view in Sardar Bauri Bisoyi v. Smt. Surekha Sahuani and clarifies the non-appealability of remand orders under inherent powers.
The direct effect of this ruling is that parties cannot challenge remand orders by way of appeal but must resort to revisional applications. No new precedent beyond the clarification of appealability and revision jurisdiction is created.
P.K Mohanti, J.:— This Civil Revision is directed against an order of remand passed under section 151, Civil Procedure Code When it was placed before a learned Single Judge, the opposite party No. 2 (defendant No. 2) contended, on the authority of a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sardar Bauri Bisoyi v. Smt. Surekha Sahuani . I.L.R 1974 Cuttack 1433., that the order of remand was appealable and the Civil Revision was not maintainable. Counsel for the petitioner having challenged the correctness of the Bench decision, the learned Single Judge directed that the case may be placed before a learned Bench for a decision on the question of maintainability of the Civil Revision. Thereafter, the Civil Revision was placed before a Division Bench which referred it to a Full Bench as the correctness of the Bench decision was doubted.
2. The facts giving rise to this Civil Revision, in a nutshell, are asunder:
The petitioner as plaintiff brought O.S No. 20/102 of 1974/69 for declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of the suit lands on the allegation that the suit lands originally belonged to opposite party No. 1 (defendant No. 1) who sold the same to the plaintiff (petitioner) by a registered sale deed dated 26-6-1967 for a consideration of Rs. 2,000/-. It was alleged that out of the total consideration, a sum of Rs. 1,500/- was received by the defendant No. 1 from the plaintiff in presence of the Sub-Registrar and it was agreed between them that the balance consideration of Rs. 500/-. would be paid at the time of endorsement of the registration ticket. Thereafter, the defendant No. 1 received the balance consideration of Rs. 500/- on 25-8.1967 and promised to endorse the registration ticket and to deliver possession of the suit lands in favour of the plaintiff, but he failed to do so despite repeated demands. It was further alleged that defendant No. 1 in collusion with defendant No. 2 had executed a nominal sale deed in faour of the latter with a view to defraud the plaintiff and hence the plaintiff was compelled to come to Court.
3. Defendant No. 1 did not enter contest. Defendant No. 2 resisted the suit on the allegation that defendant No. 1 had executed an agreement for sale in his favour on 4.6.1967 for a consideration of Rs. 1,500/- and had received Rs. 1,300/- from him towards part consideration and delivered possession of the suit lands promising to execute the sale deed in his favour within a month after receiving the balance consideration of Rs. 200/-. Thereafter, defendant No. 1 executed a sale deed in favour of defendant No. 2 on 18-3-1968 on receipt of Rs. 200/-. While admitting the execution of the sale deed by defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff, the defendant No. 2 disputed the passing of title thereunder. The Trial Court decided all the nine issues framed in the suit and came to hold that the agreement of sale in favour of defendant No. 2 by defendant No. 1 was neither genuine nor valid and that the sale deed Ext. 1 executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff was not to defeat the contract of sale (Ext. B). Accordingly, it decreed the plaintiff's suit.
4. On appeal by defendant No. 2, the lower appellate Court by its judgment dated 2-12-1976 set aside the decision of the Trial Court and remanded the suit for fresh disposal after framing two new issues and allowed the parties to adduce evidence on those two issues. The Civil Revision is directed against the aforesaid order of remand.
5. The question for consideration is whether an appeal lies against the aforesaid order of remand and whether the Civil Revision is incompetent.
6. In Bisoyi's case, the Division Bench held that the order of remand came within the ambit of Order 41, rule 23, Civil Procedure Code. Yet, it was observed:
“Even otherwise, if this order of remand is treated as one made in exercise of the inherent powers of the Court, that order so made would be a decree which reversed the decree of the Trial Court and deprived defendant No. 8 of the valuable right he had acquired thereunder. The Second Appeal was, therefore, competent under section 96, Civil Procedure Code read with section 100 thereof.”
7. For this conclusion reliance was placed on two decisions of the Calcutta High Court reported in Bhairab Ghandra v. Kali Eumari . A.I.R 1923 Cal. 606., and Mahammad Ali v. Kararn Ali . A.I.R 1935 Cal. 134..
8. In the instant case, Order, 41, rule 23, Civil Procedure Code would not apply as the suit was decreed by the Trial Court on merits and it was not disposed of on a preliminary point, rule 25 of Order 41 is also not attractable in this case. As the impugned order of remand was made prior to the coming into force of rule 23-A of Order 41 inserted by the Amending Act of 1976, it is referable to section 151, Civil Procedure Code. It may be pointed out that after the coming into force of the amended rule 23-A, the question of ordering a remand in the exercise of inherent powers under section 151, Civil Procedure Code would not arise.
9. section 104, Civil Procedure Code provides for right of appeal against orders specified therein. That section provides:
“An appeal shall lie from the following orders and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any law for the time being in force, from no other orders.”
An order under section 151, Civil Procedure Code does not come within the ambit of section 104, Civil Procedure Code. In view ot the plain language used in this section, no scope is left for raising any controversy on a question of right of appeal against an order under section 151, Civil Procedure Code. An appeal is always a creature of Statute and it is only when an order has been expressly made appealable by the Code that the appeal would lie. The Court's jurisdiction to entertain an appeal is founded upon the express provisions of law. It is, therefore, obvious that if an order is passed under section 151, Civil Procedure Code no appeal lies under Order 43, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code.
10. The question of the appealability of an order of remand under section 151, Civil Procedure Code was the subject-matter of decision by this Court as well as by other High Courts and the consensus of opinion is that no appeal lies against the order but a revisional application can be filed before the High Court against such an order. The cases which have taken such view are : Narahari Mohanti v. Ghanashyam Bal . A.I.R 1963 Orissa 186., Baisnab v. Parma . A.I.R 1964 Orissa 156., Banthu Kisan v. Duhhi Kisani . 39 1973 C.L.T 39. Raghunandan Singh v. Jadunandan Singh . A.I.R 1918 Pat. 505., Parmanand Kumar v. Bhon Lohar . A.I.R 1926 Pat. 457., Ohaudhary Chandrika Prasad Singh v. Mithu Bai . A.I.R 1927 Pat. 296., Mst. Bibi Qamrun v. Mohammadali Sabir . A.I.R 1952 Pat. 437., Trustees of Religious Public Trust of Salam Jamadar's Mosque v. Vaghri Sana Ratna . A.I.R 1972 Guj. 162., Mrigendra Kumar Majumdar v. Sidheshwar Shit . A.I.R 1966 Cal. 310., Kalipada Dinda v. Kartick Ghandra Hait . A.I.R 1977 Cal. 3., Haji Muzahir Ali v. Lachman Prasad . A.I.R 1954 All. 559., Jindu v. State . A.I.R 1914 H.P 61., and Madholal v. Bridhichand . A.I.R 1951 Raj. 58., We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the above cases.
11. An order of remand under section 151. Civil Procedure Code is appealable only when it amounts to a decree. Where the order of remand merely sets aside the decree of the Trial Court and does not itself decide any of the points raised for determination and does not determine the rights of the parties with regard to any of the matters in controversy in the suit, it cannot amount to a decree and must be treated as an order. The mere fact that the order reverses the decree of the Trial Court and deprives a party of the valuable right it had acquired there, under would not make an order of remand a “decree”, unless that order itself determines any of the points arising for determination in regard to the matters in controversy in the suit.
12. Now the question arises whether a decision such as the impugned one is a decree or not. The definition of “decree” indicates that it must be a formal expression of an adjudication conclusively determining the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. There may be cases where the appellate Court itself decides finally certain aspects in dispute and thus passes a decree but in regard to certain other matters it directs the Trial Court to reach final determination. In such cases, the decision of the appellate Court amounting to a decree may be appealable. That, however, is not the case here. The impugned order clearly indicates that it is not a decree. The appellate Court, in passing the order of remand, did not conclusively determine anything on the merits of any of the disputes between the parties and left the entire matter for decision to the trial Court. The mere fact that the decree of the trial Court has been set aside would not thus make the order of remand a decree and appealable as such. To state otherwise, there is no final adjudication by the appellate Court of the rights of the parties by the order of remand. Therefore, it cannot be treated as a decree. The order indicates that pursuant to the remand, the Trial Court must proceed to determine the suit. Thus, the determination of the suit is yet to come and that depends upon the adjudication by the trial Court. Such adjudication consequent on the remand would result in the decree. In such circumstances, a second appeal could not lie to this Court. The only remedy which was open to the petitioner was to approach this Court by a revisional application. With very great respect to the learned Judges, we are unable to agree with the view expressed in Sardar Bauri Bisoyi v. (Smt) Surekha Sahuani.
13. In that case, reliance was placed on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Bhairab Chandra Dutt v. Kali Kumar Dutt, where the order of remand had been made under section 151, Civil Procedure Code directing a retrial of the suit and their Lordships held that the order so made was a decree and an appeal was, consequently competent, not as an appeal from order under Order 43, rule 1, sub-rule (u), but as an appeal from a decree under section 96 of the Code read with section 100. This decision was considered by a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Permanand Kumar v. Bhon Lohar. Their Lordships dissented from the view expressed in the Calcutta case and observed:
“With very great respect to the learned Judges, I am unable to agree with the view taken by them. I fail to understand how an order of remand under the inherent power of the Court can be treated as a decree unless the order can be brought within the definition of “decree” as given in the Code of Civil Procedure;
………………………………………
14. A Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Banka, Behari Deb v. Birendra Nath Dutta . A.I.R 1927 Cal. 850., examined the maintainability of an appeal for assailing an order of remand not deciding finally any question in dispute, referred to several earlier authorities of the Court and did not approve of the ratio in Bhairab Chandra Dutta's case. Several subsequent Calcutta cases have followed the view in Banka Behari Deb's case.
15. In the case of Mahammad Ali Fakir v. Karam Ali Taluqdar, their Lordships held that although the provisions of Order 41, rule 23 might not strictly apply where the Court on appeal has remanded the suit to the first Court which has been asked to determine finally the suit by the order of remand, an appeal to the High Court is permissible under the provisions of Order 43, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code It appears to us that the proposition is contrary to the express terms of section 104, Civil Procedure Code which categorically provides that except in the cases provided for in the Code, (i.e in Order 43) no order is appealable. Since the right of appeal is a creature of Statute, there was no scope for the view taken in Mahammad Ali v. Karam Ali. At any rate, the two Calcutta cases relied upon in Bisoyi's case have not only been not approved and followed in the Calcutta High Court and thus had lost their precedent value but run counter to the law laid down by the Patna High Court in a series of cases. On the basis of the principle indicated in the case of Bameswar Rai v. Haralth Lal Sahu . A.I.R 1942 Pat. 226., the decisions of the Patna High Court are binding on this Court and a Division Bench should ordinarily have felt bound by the settled Patnt view. We may point out that the impugned view in Bisoyi's case was not material for the disposal of the case and was said only by way of obiter. Even Mr. Pal appearing for the opposite parties who could have succeeded in defeating the proceeding by supporting the impugned view did not seek to stand on it and conceded that the legal position was otherwise.
16. In the premises aforesaid, we conclude that no appeal lies against the order of remand and that the Civil Revision is maintainable. The Civil Revision may now be placed before the learned Single Judge for disposal on merits.
R.N Misra, J.:— I agree.
K.B Panda, J.:— I agree.
17. Ordered accordingly.
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