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Padia Patra And Others v. The State .
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from convictions returned by the Sessions Court concerning a violent incident on 15-2-1964 over disputed Nayabadi land (referred to as Dhipa Kiari) in village Surupatala, Champua P.S., Keonjhar district. The prosecution's case was that some accused, having gone to plough the disputed land, were resisted by Purandar (the deceased) and Dasarathi (P.W.4), who sat armed on the ridge of the disputed kiari to prevent forcible entry. A large group of accused allegedly then attacked Purandar and Dasarathi; Purandar was killed on the spot and Dasarathi suffered grievous injuries.
Criminal findings at trial (as set out in the opinion) included: Padia Patra convicted under section 302 I.P.C. and sentenced to life imprisonment; Mahichandra Patra and Muruli Patra convicted under section 326 I.P.C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years each; all three convicted under section 148 (noted in the text as "1481. P.C") but no separate sentence awarded under that section; several other accused convicted under 325/149 I.P.C. (indicated as an obvious mistake for 326/149 I.P.C.) and sentenced to one year R.I.; convictions under section 147 I.P.C. were recorded but with no separate sentence. All accused had been charged under section 302/149 I.P.C., and the learned Sessions Judge in the body of his judgment held that accused 2 to 8 were not guilty under that charge but did not pass a final order acquitting them on that count.
On appeal, Misra, J. reviewed the facts, evidence (including the post-mortem and P.W. testimony), and legal issues — especially whether the accused were protected by the right of private defence and whether they were liable as members of an unlawful assembly with a common object to commit murder. The appellate court dismissed the appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the accused were protected by the right of private defence (of person or property) in relation to the events of 15-2-1964.
- Whether the physical fight and fatal assault began on the disputed Dhipa Kiari (i.e., whether the accused began ploughing Dhipa Kiari and were obstructed there), as contended by the prosecution, or whether the accused were merely passing through to plough another field, as contended by the defence.
- Whether the accused constituted an unlawful assembly with the common object of committing murder, making them liable under section 302/149 I.P.C.
- Procedural: whether the Sessions Judge's apparent hesitation or failure to finally acquit accused 2 to 8 on section 302/149 affected the correctness of the convictions on related counts and the appropriate appellate remedy.
Arguments of the Parties
Defence Arguments
- The accused claimed a right of private defence of person and/or property — asserting that the Nayabadi land belonged to the family and that each branch had possession of different portions following a family partition; therefore they had lawful rights to be on the land.
- Some accused said they were only passing through the Dhipa Kiari to plough Mangulu's land and had not intended to plough Dhipa Kiari itself.
- There were divergent accounts among accused of how many kiaris had been ploughed on 14-2-64 (some said seven, some five, Mahichandra admitted four).
- Specific accused (Padia, Murali, Mahichandra) admitted acts of violence but asserted those acts were in exercise of the right of private defence — e.g., Padia stated the deceased attacked him with an axe and that he used his spear in private defence.
Prosecution Arguments
- The prosecution maintained that accused went to plough Dhipa Kiari, that Purandar and Dasarathi (P.W.4) resisted entry while armed, and that the accused, outnumbering the victims, gave a signal (conch-shell, shouts) and attacked indiscriminately.
- Prosecution relied on eyewitness testimony (notably P.Ws.2 and 4 and the Sarpanch P.W.8) and physical evidence (weapons and arrows recovered partly from Dhipa Kiari) to show the attack started when accused began ploughing Dhipa Kiari and that the accused's attack was the initiating aggression.
- Prosecution pointed to medical evidence (P.W.3) that Purandar died due to ante-mortem injuries to chest and head and that P.W.4 suffered grievous injuries.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| AIR 1964 Orissa 262 — State of Orissa v. Chakradhar Behera | Burden on accused to prove circumstances bringing the case within general exceptions (Ss.96–106 IPC) is analogous to civil preponderance of probabilities; accused need not prove by positive evidence and may rely on overall record. | Court endorsed this view and applied it to require that, on the whole evidence, the accused must show it is probable their private-defence version is true before relying on the general exception. |
| 1963-29 Cut LT 245 — Kelu v. State | Where land is merely lying fallow, immediate injury to property is unlikely; accused should resort to public authorities and cannot claim right of private defence of property if harm is not immediate. | Adopted to conclude that because the disputed land was fallow and no immediate danger to property was shown, the accused could not claim private defence of property and should have sought public protection. |
| 1963-29 Cut LT 383 : 1964 (1) Cri LJ 117 — Picharu Bhati v. State of Orissa | When there is a free fight between two armed parties, members of each party are liable for offences unless protected by right of private defence; mutual unlawful assemblies do not justify retaliation. | Relied upon to support the proposition that both parties are responsible for the acts of their members in an armed fight and that the accused cannot escape liability simply because the other side was also armed. |
| (1908) ILR 35 Cal 368 — Kabiruddin v. Emperor | When both parties are armed and prepared for battle, and it is not shown they acted within legal limits of private defence, it is immaterial who first attacked; right of private defence is not available to those who court an attack. | Applied to reinforce that persons who go out expecting or intending to be attacked and who arm themselves cannot later claim private defence; helps to reject defence's claim where accused prepared for confrontation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in distinct factual and legal steps, constrained to the evidence and authorities cited in the opinion:
- Findings of primary fact: the appellate court found satisfactory evidence that (a) Dhipa Kiari was in possession of Purandar (deceased) and Dasarathi (P.W.4) in 1963 and they had grown and reaped the crop; (b) the disputed land was lying fallow at the time of the occurrence; (c) some accused had cultivated parts of the land on 14-2-64; and (d) on 15-2-64 accused went with ploughs and, upon entry into Dhipa Kiari, P.W.4 obstructed them while armed; accused (eight in number) then gave shouts, a conch-shell was blown, and the accused indiscriminately assaulted P.W.4 and the deceased, resulting in death and grievous injuries (paras 10–16 and 18–26 in the opinion).
- Evaluation of competing accounts: the court rejected the defence version that the accused were only passing through the Dhipa Kiari to plough Mangulu's land; it found credible the prosecution testimony (P.Ws.2, 4 and the Sarpanch P.W.8) that the accused had started ploughing the Dhipa Kiari and were obstructed there (paras 11–15).
- Medical and corroborative evidence: the post-mortem (P.W.3) showed ante-mortem injuries to chest and head causing death, and P.W.4 had grievous injuries; the recovery of weapons largely from Murali's land and some arrows from Dhipa Kiari were addressed by the court and found not inconsistent with the prosecution case given the confusion of the attack (paras 12–13 and 8).
- Legal framework on private defence and burden of proof: the court summarized the statutory scheme (Ss.96–106 IPC) and section 105 of the Evidence Act, observing the burden on the accused to establish a general exception by showing a preponderance of probabilities (paras 16–18). It expressly endorsed Chakradhar Behera (AIR 1964 Orissa 262) on this point (para 17).
- Application of precedent and law to facts: relying on Kelu v. State and the statutory provisions, the court reasoned that because the land was fallow and there was time to seek public authority, there was no right of private defence of property. Even if accused had prior possession, seeing the deceased and P.W.4 armed and seated meant there was no immediate danger to justify private defence. The court therefore held the defence of private defence (both of person and property) was not available to the accused (paras 19–21, 33–36).
- Rejection of argument that opposing party's lack of private-defence rights vests such rights in accused: the court explained that even if the deceased and P.W.4 lacked a right of private defence of property (because they had armed themselves in advance), that does not confer a right of private defence on the accused — the accused remain responsible for their acts and can only be excused if they themselves establish private defence (paras 21–22, 34–36).
- Unlawful assembly and common object: the court reviewed the circumstances (prior determination to plough forcibly, fetch of weapons from village before entering, number of participants, shouts and conch-shell signal, and the indiscriminate assault) and concluded that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit murder if necessary; it held the Sessions Judge's conclusion that accused 2–8 were not liable under sec. 302/149 was legally untenable (paras 42–43).
- Limit on appellate action regarding section 302/149: notwithstanding the court's view that the Sessions Judge's position was erroneous, the appellate court noted that because the State had filed no appeal, the question of convicting the accused under section 302/149 I.P.C. did not arise (para 43).
Holding and Implications
Final Holding: The appeal fails and is DISMISSED (paras 28, 29, 31).
Implications and consequences:
- The appellate court upheld the trial convictions as legally supported on the basis that the accused had no right of private defence under the circumstances; therefore the sentences imposed by the Sessions Court stand as described in the factual background portion of the opinion.
- The court found the Sessions Judge's view that accused 2 to 8 were not liable under section 302/149 I.P.C. to be erroneous, but because the State did not appeal, the appellate court did not proceed to convict the accused under section 302/149 itself (para 43).
- The opinion applies established principles relating to the burden on an accused to prove general exceptions (private defence), the limits of private defence where public protection was available, and the doctrine of common object for unlawful assemblies — but the court did not purport to lay down a novel legal precedent beyond applying and endorsing existing authorities cited in the judgment.
Note: This summary is strictly confined to the material and statements contained in the provided opinion. No facts, arguments, or legal conclusions have been added beyond what the opinion itself discloses.
Misra, J.:— Padia Patra has been convicted under S. 302, I.P.C and sentenced to imprisonment for life. Mahichandra Patra and Muruli Patra have been convicted u/s. 326 I.P.C and each has been sentenced to R.I for two years. All the three have been convicted u/s. 1481. P.C but no separate sentence has been awarded under this section. The rest of the accused persons have been convicted u/s. 325/149 I.P.C obviously a mistake for 326/149 I.P.C and each has been sentenced to R.I for one year. They were further convicted u/s. 147 I.P.C but no separate sentence has been passed under this section. All of them have been charged u/s. 302/149 I.P.C Though in the body of the judgment the learned Sessions Judge was of opinion that accused 2 to 8 were not guilty under this charge, he did not pass any final order acquitting them of this charge.
2. One Jaya Patra had two wives. Through the first wife, he had a son Badu the father of Chandra Mohan (P.W 1) Through the second wife, he had five sons, Hiranya, Baida. Sidheswar Pravakar and Mangulu deceased) Muruli (accused-2). Paresawar (accused-3) and Mahichandra (accused-4) are the sons of Sidheswai Chakra (accused-6) and Kubera (accused-7) are the sons of Pravakar Padia (accused 1) is the son of accused-8 Hiranya acquired 9.62 acres of Nayabadi land at Bandhatala Chak in village Surupatala within the jurisdiction of Champua P.S in the district of Keonjhar Prosecution case is that as he was serving under the T.I.S Co. he allowed his brothers to cultivate the said land. He retired from service in 1962 and resided in the village Naturally he asked his brothers and nephews to give up possession of the land 8 kiarais of the land, which are the disputed land according to the prosecution, were cultivated by Purandar and Dasarathi in 1963 Before 1963 the said kiarais were in possession of Chakra and Kubera. The crop of the year 1963 grown on the said land by Purandar and Dasarathi was harvested by them. The mother of Kubera had filed a complaint against Purandar and Dasarathi before the Gram Punchayat no action was taken there. On 14-2-64 some of the accused persons cultivated 4 kiarais out of the disputed land it resulted in a quarrel between the parties
3. In the morning of 15-2-64 (the date of occurrence), Mahichandra Pareswar and Kubera and Chakra started for the field with ploughs. Purandar and Dasarathi went to the field being armed with bows and arrows apprehending that the accused might plough the disputed land. On the spot they found Pareswar. Chakra, Kubera, Mahichandra, Haladhar and Nabina (a labourer of theirs) ploughing the field of Murali which was his selif-acquired land and contiguous to the disputed land. Both of them sat armed on the ridge of “Dhipa Kiari” (mark 8 in the spot map) waiting to resist entry of the accused into the disputed land. Padia and Murali were sitting on the ridge of Murali's land with bows and arrows. Thereafter Jema (mother of Padia) and Jamuna (P.W 7) and the mother of the deceased) came there and quarrelled with each other. Jema and Jamuna are sisters. Manguli arrived on the spot with a conch shell. Jema and Jamuna left the place after the quarrel was over. Padia and Chakra went to the village and brought some weapons. Padia brought a spear and a lathi and Chakra a bow and arrows. Kishore Chandra (P.W 2). The Sarpanch arrived on the spot. Jamuna again came back after requesting P.W 1 (the padhan of the village) to come to the spot to prevent troubles which she apprehended
4. The accused finished ??? the land of Murali. Thereafter Pareswar and Chakra went to Dhipa Kiari with two ploughs and started ploughing them. P.W 4 obstructed the ploughing by standing in their front. Pareswar shouted and Mangulu blew the conch-shell. Other accused persons came running towards P.W 4 with bows and arrows shouting “kill them, kill them” Both the parties aimed arrows at each other an arrow shot by Mahichandra, pierced into the right leg of Dasarathi. P.W 4 pulled it out from his leg and walked two to three steps with difficulty in a bending posture. Murali struck a blow on his head Chalra threw a big clod of earth on his back When he fell down. Pareswar gave a blow on his head with an axe. He became senseless Purandar ran away out of fear and sought protection from P.W 8. The accused, however, dragged him to some distance and assaulted him. He fell down. When he was trying to get up. Padia pierced a spear into his chest. Purandar walked a distance of about 50 cubits with some difficulty and fell down dead Accused left the spot.
5. Before the Committing Court the accused denied the occurrence. In the Sessions Court, they took the plea that though the Nayabadi lands were acquired in the name of Hiranya, those belonged to the entire family and each branch was in separate possession of different portions in a family partition long ago. The accused admitted that P.W 4 and the deceased cultivated and harvested the crop of the year 1963 from the 8 kiaris of the disputed land which were being previously possessed by Chakra and Kubera With regard to the story as to how many out of the 8 kiaris were cultivated by the accused on 14-2-64, divergent versions were presented by different accused Some said 7 kiaris had been cultivated and some others stated that 5 kiaris were ploughed Mahichandra however, admitted that only 4 kiaris were ploughed on that day. They admitted the occurrence on 15-2-64 but gave a different version of the same as follows:
6. Mahichandra, Pareswar, Kubera Chakra and Haladhar were ploughing the land of Murali in the morning of 10-2-1964. At that time they found P.W 4 and the deceased coming with bows and arrows, dagger, knife and axes. Then Padia and Murali went to the village and brought spear, lathi, bows and arrows. Chakra did not go to bring weapons. After ploughing the land Murali Pareswar and Chakra started for ploughing the Nayabadi field which was in possession of Mongulu. They admitted that they passed through the Dhipa Kiari with ploughs only to reach Manguli's land and denied the fact that they ploughed the Dhipa Kiari. While passing through the Dhipa Kiari with their ploughs they were obstructed by the deceased and P.W 4 who shot arrows towards them. The accused came back to the land of Murali. Mahichandra and Haladhar shot arrows at the deceased and P.W 4. One of the arrows hit the right leg of P.W 4. P.W 4 attempted to strike Murali with an axe. Tc protect himself Murali gave a lathi blow on the fecad of Dasarathi. Chakra did not throw any clod of earth on the back of P.W 4. Pareswar did not assault P.W 4 on his head with an axe.
7. Padia stated that the deceased attempted to attack him with an axe. He prevented the first blow. When again the deceased raised the axe, he used his spear which struck the chest of the deceased. Thus Padia admitted to have killed the deceased but took to the plea of right of private defence Murali and Mahichandra also admitted to have caused grievous hurt to P.W 4 in exercise of their right of private defence. Other accused persons denied having dragged and assaulted the deceased.
8. It was not disputed before the learned Sessions Judge that the deceased died on the spot and that P.W 4 received grievous hurt as a result of the attack of different accused persons
The doctor (P.W 3) held the post-mortem examination of the deceased and examined P.W 4. In his opinion. The deceased died due to shock and hemorrhage resulting from the injuries on the chest and head. The injuries were ante-mortem P.W 4 had a punctured wound behind the right ankle above the heel and a lacerated would on the back part of the left parietal region. Both the injuries were grievous. It is not disputed before us that the deceased died as a result of the injuries caused on him by the accused party and that P.W 4 received grievous injuries during the occurrence.
9. Most of the facts are admitted. The points of difference between the two versions which lie in a narrow compass are—
(i) Which party started attack first? and (ii) Whether the fight between the two parties started over the ploughing of Dhipa Kiari, or while some of the accused were passing through it to plough the land of Mangulu?
10. There is satisfactory evidence that after finishing ploughing of Manguli's land, some of the accused started ploughing the Dhipa Kiari. P.Ws 2 and 4 speak about it. Even the Sarpanch (P.W 8) who appears to have some leaning towards the accused and was declared hostile, supports the prosecution version. He deposes
“When the accused persons began ploughing the fields which were in possession of Chakra and Kubera, I saw Dasarathi obstructing by standing in front of the bullocks….
11. There were only two furrow marks on the field of Kubera when the assault began.”
12. Mr. Kanungo contended that not only the dead body of Purandar but almost all the weapons were found on the land of Murali, and, as such. The fight cannot be said to have started on Dhipa Kiari. There is no force in this contention. An armed mob of 8 persons on the side of the accused attacked P.W 4 and the deceased just at one end of Dhipa Kiari when some of the accused started ploughing. In the welter of confusion that followed the deceased and P.W 4 ran away to save their lives. The recovery of most of the weapons and the dead body from the land of Murali is not inconsistent with the prosecution case Some arrows were also recovered from Dhipa Kiari itself at places marked 20 to 24 on the spot map on the aforesaid evidence, conclusion is irresistible that the fight started when the ploughing of Dhipa Kiari was obstructed. The defence plea that some of the accused were passing through the Dhipa Kiari only to plough the land of Mangulu is not acceptable.
13. Prosecution also has fully established through the evidence of P.Ws 2 and 4 that when P.W 4 obstructed ploughing of Dhipa Kiari, some of the accused gave a shout. Mangulu blew a conch-shell and thereafter the accused attacked P.W 4 and the deceased indiscriminately. The deceased and P.W 4 also used their arrows; but on account of assault by the accused, their shots were aimless and ineffective. This explains the absence of injury on the accused. The defence version of the story, as narrated in paragraph 3 supra, is not acceptable on the evidence of P.Ws 2 and 4 and the broad circumstances and probabilities. The accused outnumbered the prosecution party and mercilessly attacked P.W 4 and the deceased
14. Thus on the two controversial questions of fact. The prosecution case has been satisfactorily established and the defence case is not acceptable.
15. On the admitted facts of the case, and on the aforesaid two findings resolving the points of difference, all the conclusions of fact may be summarised for a true appreciation of the argument advanced by Mr. Kanungo that the accused committed no offence and were protected by right of private defence of property and person
(i) Dhipa Kiari was in the possession of the deceased and P.W 4 in 1963 They had grown and reaped the crop
(ii) The land was lying fallow and had not been ploughed until the date of occurrence.
(iii) On 14-2-64, some of the accused cultivated three kiaris out of disputed 8 kiaris of land (see the evidence of I.O.P.W 10 and the finding of the Learned Sessions Judge.)
(iv) In the morning of 15-2-64, some of the accused first went with ploughs towards the disputed land Apprehending that the accused would take forcible possession of the disputed land, Purandar and Dasarathi went to the field fully armed and determined to resist forcible possession by the accused.
(v) On arrival at the spot, they found some of the accused cultivating the land of Murali. They did not use their arms so long as the ploughing of Murali's land continued. They sat on the ridge of Dhipa Kiari with the object of resisting forcible entry into it by the accused.
(vi) The moment some of the accused entered into the Dhipa Kiari and started ploughing P.W 4 obstructed being fully armed
(vii) Accused were eight in number. Some of them shouted. Mangulu blew a conch-shell as a signal to his co-accused for attack. They indiscriminate assaulted P.W 4 and the deceased as narrated in para 2 supra.
(viii) P.W 4 and the deceased used their arrows in course of the occurrence. The arrows, however, did not strike any of the accused. As the accused started the attack first. The arrows shot by the deceased and P.W 4 were aimless and ineffective.
(ix) In course of the occurrence, Padia pierced the deceased with a spear and some other accused assaulted him, as already narrated. As a result the deceased died on the spot and P.W 4 received grievous injuries.
16. On the aforesaid findings the question or consideration is whether the accused had any right of private defence. This right has been dealt with in Ss. 96 to 106. I.P.C in Chapter IV under the caption “General Exceptions.” Under section 105 of the Evidence Act. The burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the general exceptions in the Indian Penal Code is upon the accused and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. In AIR 1964 Orissa 262 State of Orissa Chakradhar Behera a Bench of this Court observed
“It is however well settled that the burden of the accused is not of the same nature as one on the prosecution to establish the existence of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The nature of the burden on the accused to bring its case within the general exceptions is analogous to that resting on the plaintiff in civil case. The juristic principle in Civil matter is that preponderance of probability is the basis of success it is also well accepted that the accused need not prove the general exception by adducing positive evidence. The same can be established through prosecution evidence also. If from the entire evidence on record it is probable that the defence version may be true, they are entitled to a verdict in their favour even the truth of the version might not have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.”
17. We endorse the aforesaid view.
18. Section 96, I.P.C enacts that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the rights of private defence. S. 97, I.P.C provides that every person has a right of private defence of person and property subject to the restrictions contained in Sec. 99, I.P.C, which enumerates acts against which there is no right of private defence. The third clause to section 99 says that there is no right of private defence in case in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities.
19. In this case. The accused were not in possession of Dhipa Kiari, and, therefore, they had no right of private defence of property. That apart. The land itself was lying fallow and there was no apprehension of any danger to the property, if the accused had taken recourse to the protection of public authorities without taking the law into their hands. In 1963-29 Cut LT 245 Kelu v. State, this Court observed:
“If the land was merely lying fallow, an argument might be advanced some force that no immediate injury could be caused to the property and protection of public authorities should have been resorted to. The crucial test in a case of this nature is whether the harm committed by the offender is immediate or not. The concept will vary according to the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down to determine the character of the harm. On this test. The accused should have resorted to the protection of the public authorities and cannot claim any right of private defence either of person by of property”
20. The same conclusion emerges even if the accused were in prior possession of Dhipa Kiari. Before they started ploughing the Dhipa Kiari they saw that the deceased and P.W 4 were sitting on its ridge fully armed and determined to resist forcible possession by the accused. The land being fallow without any crop, there was no immediate apprehension of danger to the property or to the person. There was also no apprehension of danger to person of the accused as was manifest from the conduct of P.W 4 and the deceased. They did not use their arms until their rights in the property were interfered with.
21. Mr. Kanungo very seriously contended that the deceased and P.W 4 had no right of private defence of property, and, as such. The accused committed no offence. The argument is fallacious, and if I may say so with respect, is born of confusion of thought. It must be conceded that P.W 4 and the deceased had no right of private defence of property or person in fact, before they started from the village, they apprehended that the accused would forcibly plough the land in their possession Accordingly they went armed to resist forcible entry on the very reasoning that the land was lying fallow and there was no crop on it there was no immediate apprehension of danger to that property. They should have resorted to the protection of the public authorities. Under the third clause to S. 99, they had no right of private defence. If in course of the occurrence P.W 4 and Purandar if alive had committed any offence, they were liable to be convicted as they had no right of private defence.
22. Non-existence of right of private defence in P.W 4 and the deceased does not confer a right of private defence on the accused. Accused are responsible for their own acts. The acts done by them amount to various offences. Those acts would cease to be offences in the eye of law u/s. 96 I.P.C only if the accused are protected by right of private defence.
23. When there is a free fight between two parties, which are armed and determined to fight. The members of each party are liable for the offences committed by them unless any of the parties is protected by the right of private defence. In 1963-29 Cut LT 383 : (1964 (1) Cri LJ 117), Picharu Bhati v. State of Orissa, this Court observed.
“Even it. The complainant's party had constituted an unlawful assembly. The accused would have no valid defence in saying that they would also constitute an unlawful assembly by way of retaliation. When there is a free fight between two parties, each constitutes an unlawful assembly.”
24. In (1908) ILR 35 Cal 368 Kabiruddin v. Emperor their Lordships observed:
“When both parties are armed and prepared for battle and it is not shown that they were acting within the legal limits of right of private defence, it does not matter who was the first to attack.”
25. It lays down that a right of private defence cannot be pleaded by persons, who expecting to be attacked, go out of their way to court an attack. It represents the correct view. The Calcutta decision has been distinguished on facts in many subsequent decisions but has never been dissented from.
26. To sum up. The accused had no right of private defence of property or person. If P.W 4 and Purandar (if alive) had committed any offence and had been prosecuted, they would have also no right of private defence. Each party is responsible for its own acts.
27. On the conclusion that the accused had no right of private defence, their conviction is well founded. We cannot, however, part with the case without making an observation that the view of the learned Sessions Judge that accused 2 to 8 were not liable to be convicted u/s. 302/149, I.P.C is erroneous. This court had repeatedly observed that the common object of the unlawful assembly can be collected from the nature of assembly, arms used by them and the behaviour of the assembly at or before the scene of occurrence. The common object is an inference of fact to be deduced from the facts and circumstances of each case. The commission of overt acts is certainly an evidence of fact that the accused was the member of an unlawful assembly, but the converse is not true. In other words, cannot be contended that if there is no proof of commission of certain overt act by the accused, he is not a member of the unlawful assembly (see 1963-29 C.L.T 245 and 29 Cut LT 383 : (1964 (1) Cri LJ 117).
28. In this case. The accused went determined from before to forcibly plough the disputed land. While ploughing the land of Murali, they clearly noticed that P.W 4 and the deceased had come armed and were prepared to resist their forcible possession by use of arms, if necessary. Before making entry into the Dhipa Kiari, two of the accused went to village and brought deadly weapons. It is only thereafter that they started ploughing Dhipa Kiari. When resistance was offered by P.W 4, some of the accused gave shouts, another blew the conch-shell giving clarion call for a pitched battle and thereafter they indiscriminately assaulted P.W 4 and the deceased. In the aforesaid circumstances. The common object of the unlawful assembly was clearly to commit murder, if necessary. We are of opinion that the view of the learned Sessions Judge is legally untenable. As the State has filed no appeal, question of convicting the accused under section 302/149 I.P.C does not arise.
29. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed.
30. Ahmad, C.J:— I agree.
BJ/VSB/D.V.C
31. Appeal dismissed.
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