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Muralidhar Marwari v. Lalit Mohan Sahu And Others

Orissa High Court
Oct 10, 1961
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal by defendant No. 1 challenges the order dated 5-2-1960 of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Sambalpur, which confirmed the judgment of the Munsif of Deogarh dated 5-8-1957 in Title Suit No. 13 of 1956. The underlying dispute concerns competing claims of title and possession in respect of rooms on plot No. 1368, Khata No. 296 in Deogarh town.

Key factual points set out in the opinion:

  • On 27-9-1949 (Ex. 1) Kunjabehari Majhi (defendant No. 3) executed a registered sale deed selling the suit rooms and plot to the original plaintiff (Dasarathi Sahu) for Rs. 1,200 and gave formal delivery of possession by asking defendants 1 and 2 (monthly tenants) to pay rent to the plaintiff.
  • Defendant No. 1 alleged an earlier agreement dated 20-8-1949 (Ex. D) with defendant No. 3 for the sale of the same property for Rs. 1,000, with Rs. 300 paid as advance; he claimed he was authorised to continue in possession and thus protected under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • Dispute over mutation led the mutation officer to direct parties to civil court. The plaintiff sued for declaration of title and ejectment; an earlier suit (Title Suit No. 9 of 1950) was withdrawn in the High Court (S.A. No. 43 of 1954) where the plaintiff was allowed to withdraw but directed to pay defendants’ costs.
  • In the present suit (filed 11-4-1956) the Munsif and the lower appellate court found Ex. D to be antedated (executed on 27-9-1949), that there was no prior contract or part performance in favour of defendant No. 1, and that the plaintiff was a purchaser for consideration without notice; both courts therefore decreed the plaintiff's claim for possession and title. Defendant No. 1 appealed to the High Court, which dismissed the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff's fresh suit (filed after withdrawal in S.A. No. 43 of 1954) was maintainable in the absence of an express leave in the High Court order permitting a fresh suit.
  2. Whether the plaintiff was constructively charged with notice of defendant No. 1’s title or equities under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act (i.e., whether the plaintiff should have inquired about the nature of defendant No. 1’s possession because defendants 1 and 2 were in actual possession).
  3. Whether there was a prior binding agreement between defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3 (Ex. D) sufficiently proved by part performance or delivery of possession so as to protect defendant No. 1 under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Defendant No. 1) — Contentions relied on in the appeal

  • The suit was not maintainable because the High Court order in S.A. No. 43 of 1954 permitted only withdrawal and did not expressly grant leave to file a fresh suit; therefore the plaintiff lacked authority to file the present suit.
  • The plaintiff had constructive notice of defendant No. 1's possession (relying on Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act and related authorities) because defendants 1 and 2 were in actual possession as tenants and the plaintiff should have inquired into the nature of that possession.
  • There existed a prior contract between defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3 dated 20-8-1949 (Ex. D); part consideration had been paid and possession was delivered in pursuance of that contract, so defendant No. 1 was protected by Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.

Respondent / Plaintiff and other factual positions

  • The plaintiff relied on the registered sale deed dated 27-9-1949 (Ex. 1), asserted formal delivery of possession, and applied for mutation of his name; defendants 1 and 2 had agreed to pay rent to the plaintiff as tenants.
  • Defendant No. 3 (appearing as a witness for the plaintiff) repudiated the existence of an agreement dated 20-8-1949 and stated that Ex. D was in fact executed on 27-9-1949 and was antedated to 20-8-1949.
  • The courts below found the plaintiff to be a purchaser for consideration without notice of any prior contract between defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mt. Deoki v. Jwala Prasad, AIR 1928 All 679 Withdrawal of appeal is not equivalent to a decree confirming the decision appealed from. The Court held the facts of Mt. Deoki were different and the authority had no application to the present case; the appellant's reliance on it was rejected.
Khudi Rai v. Lalo Rai, AIR 1926 Pat 259 Where a plaintiff's petition to withdraw with liberty to file a fresh suit is granted, the order should be read with the petition and will be construed as granting leave to file a fresh suit. The Court relied on this authority to conclude that the High Court order permitting withdrawal (when read with the application) effectively allowed the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit; this supported maintainability of the present suit.
Golam Mohammad v. Shibendra Pada, ILR 35 Cal 990 Distinction between unconditional withdrawal (Order XXXIII R.1(1)) and withdrawal with liberty to bring a fresh suit (Order XXIII R.1(2)); leave is required for the latter. Followed as supporting authority for reading withdrawal-with-liberty applications and the applicable rules of Civil Procedure; used to explain why omission in the formal order did not defeat the liberty sought.
Balchand v. Bulaki, AIR 1929 Pat 284 Where the property is in the possession of another person, a purchaser is bound to make enquiries from that person and is bound by the equities which the party in possession may have. The appellant relied on this case to argue constructive notice; the Court considered it but treated it in light of subsequent limiting authorities and found it distinguishable on the facts.
Daniels v. Davison (1809) 16 Ves 249 The doctrine that a purchaser may be bound to enquire and be charged with equities arising from a person in possession (an "extreme" English case often not extended). The decision was discussed as an extreme authority; the Court noted that Indian authorities have warned against extending this doctrine and relied instead on later Indian Full Bench authority limiting its scope.
Hari Charan v. Kaula Rai, AIR 1917 Pat 478 (Full Bench) Limits the application of Daniels v. Davison; mere occupation of part of the property by a person does not necessarily constitute constructive notice of an unrelated agreement to a purchaser of the whole. Treated as a controlling precedent on the notice issue; the Court applied it as a "complete answer" to the appellant's contention that the plaintiff had constructive notice of defendant No. 1's alleged agreement.
Panny v. Watts (1849) 1 Mac & G. 150 Expresses doubt whether mere occupation by a person is notice of an agreement not connected with his occupation. Referenced in the Court's discussion (via Full Bench authority) to support the limited reach of the doctrine of constructive notice.
Sashirekhamma v. Garbham Suramma, 17 Cut LT 62 : AIR 1952 Orissa 163 Mere continuance of possession is not enough to charge a transferee with notice of a prior agreement; change in character of possession (to that of a vendee by part performance) must be proved and the subsequent transferee must have notice. The Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that defendant No. 1's continuing possession as a tenant did not impute notice to the plaintiff and did not make defendant No. 1 a vendee in part performance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed each of the appellant's contentions in turn and explained the legal reasoning based on statutory provisions, facts found by the courts below, and relevant authorities.

First contention — Maintainability (leave to file fresh suit):

  • The Court observed that before the lower appellate Court it was conceded that deposit of costs directed by the High Court was not a condition precedent to filing the present suit, and that the lower appellate Court's record showed costs had been deposited during the pendency of the suit.
  • The appellant relied on Mt. Deoki (All.) but the Court found that case inapplicable on its facts.
  • The Court applied the principle in Khudi Rai v. Lalo Rai and the related discussion of Order XXIII (withdrawal with liberty) to hold that an order permitting withdrawal, read with the plaintiff's petition which sought liberty to file a fresh suit, ought to be construed as granting the permission sought. Accordingly, the omission of explicit words in the formal High Court order did not defeat the plaintiff's liberty to institute a fresh suit.

Second contention — Constructive notice under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act:

  • The appellant argued that because defendants 1 and 2 were in actual possession, the plaintiff was deemed to have notice unless he made enquiries; the Court set out the relevant statutory text (Section 3 and Explanation II) that a person acquiring property is deemed to have notice of the title of any person who is in actual possession.
  • The Court surveyed authorities (Balchand and the English case Daniels v. Davison) invoked to support an expansive doctrine of constructive notice but relied upon the Full Bench decision in Hari Charan v. Kaula Rai which cautioned against extending Daniels beyond its narrow circumstances.
  • Given that defendant No. 1 was admitted to be in possession only of a portion of the suit property as a monthly tenant, and the plaintiff had no reason to believe that the possession was other than tenancy, the Court held the Full Bench authority to be dispositive: the plaintiff was not constructively charged with notice of any separate agreement between defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3.

Third contention — Prior contract and protection under Section 53-A (part performance):

  • Both courts below made concurrent factual findings that Ex. D was antedated (though executed on 27-9-1949), that there was no prior contract antecedent to the registered sale (Ex. 1), and that there was no part performance or delivery of possession in furtherance of any earlier contract.
  • The High Court treated those concurrent findings of fact as sufficient to dispose of the appellant's contention: there was no prior binding contract and no evidential basis that defendant No. 1 was in possession as a vendee in part performance.
  • The Court also relied on Sashirekhamma v. Garbham Suramma to emphasize that mere continuance of possession as a tenant does not charge a subsequent transferee with notice of an earlier agreement; a demonstrable change in the character of possession and notice to the transferee must be proved.
  • On these factual and legal bases, the Court rejected the contention that defendant No. 1 was protected under Section 53-A.

The Court therefore concluded that there was no merit in the appeal: the points about maintainability, notice, and part performance all failed for the reasons given (procedural reading of the High Court order, limited scope of constructive notice doctrines, and concurrent factual findings negating a prior contract and part performance).

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The second appeal is DISMISSED (the opinion states "Appeal dismissed" and records that the appeal is dismissed with costs).

Implications:

  • The dismissal upholds the concurrent findings and the decree in favour of the plaintiff made by the courts below — namely, declaration of the plaintiff's title and direction for recovery of possession through the court.
  • The plaintiff's suit was found to be maintainable despite the formal wording of the earlier High Court order, because the withdrawal-with-liberty application must be read with the petition (Khudi Rai principle) and the costs directed by the High Court were deposited during the pendency of the suit.
  • The Court reaffirmed the limited scope of constructive notice where a person occupies only part of the property as a tenant (relying on the Full Bench authority in Hari Charan), and confirmed that mere continuance of possession by a person does not by itself convert that possession into part performance giving rise to equities enforceable against a purchaser for consideration without notice (citing Sashirekhamma).
  • No new legal principle or broad precedent was authored by the Court; the judgment applies existing authorities and affirms the factual findings of the courts below to resolve the dispute between the parties.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Appeal dismissed." (Costs awarded against appellant as indicated in the judgment.)

Show all summary ...

1. This appeal is by defendant No. 1 directed against an order dated 5-2-1960 passed by Sri B.K Misra, Additional Subordinate Judge, Sambalpur, in Tide Appeal No. 7 of 1960, confirming an order dated 5-8-1957 of Sri K.C Kar, Munsif of Deogarh in Tide suit No. 13 of 1956. Respondents 1 to 3 are the legal representatives of the original plaintiff Dasarathi Sahu who died after the judgment in the lower appellate Court. This is a suit for declaration of plaintiff's tide and recovery of possession in respect of house property situate in the Deogarh town in the Ex-State of Bamra. Kunjabehari Majhi, defendant No. 3, owned some rooms standing on plot No. 1368 in Khata No. 296 with an area O. 19 in mouza Deogarh. By a registered sale deed dated 27-9-1949 (Ex. 1) he sold the suit rooms and the saidi plot to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 1200/- and gave formal delivery of possession by asking defendants 1 and 2, who were occupying different portions of the said houses as monthly tenants, to pay the rent therefor to the plaintiff. Defendants 1 and 2 consented to the arrangement and agreed to pay to the plaintiff the same monthly rent as was settled between them and the original landlord, defendant No. 3.

2. Thereafter the plaintiff filed an application for mutation of his name. At that stage defendant No. 1 objected to such mutation and contended that there was a previous agreement dated 20-8-1949 (Ex. D) between him and defendant No. 31 whereby the latter agreed to sell the very same property for a sum of Rs. 1000/- and received Rs. 300/- as part consideration and in furtherance of the contract defendant No. 3 asked defendant No. 1 to continue in possession of the house and directed defendant No. 2 to pay his portion of the rent to defendant No. 1. Thus according to defendant No. 1, he was protected under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. In view of this controversy, the Mutation Officer could not decide in whose favour the mutation had to be made and directed the parties to go to the Civil Court.

3. Thereafter the plaintiff issued registered notices to defendants 1 and 2 to vacate the house and to pay arrears of rent, but they having failed to do so the plaintiff filed; Title Suit No. 9 of 1950 in the court of the Munsif of Bamra against defendants 1 and 2 and the present defendant No. 3 was also made a party in that suit. The plaintiff was unsuccessful both in the trial court as well as in the lower appellate court whereafter he filed Second Appeal No. 43 of 1954 in the High Court. At the time of hearing of that second appeal, the plaintiff put in an application for permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit. The application was disposed of in the following terms by the High Court:

“4. Both the lower courts came to the conclusion that the defendants 1 and 2 took possession of the house in pursuance of the agreement and as the suit was filed only on the basis of the existence of a tenancy and court-fee also was paid accordingly they could not decide the question of title of the respective parties.

5. When the appeal came up before me for hearing, Mr. G.B Mohanty, the learned counsel for the appellant, conceded that he could not contend that the plaintiff's tide be found and possession given to him, and therefore, wanted permission to withdraw the suit with the liberty to file a fresh one. Mr. G.K Misra the learned counsel for the respondents has no objection. The appellant is allowed to withdraw the suit, but he is directed to pay the costs of defendants 1 and 2 incurred by them in all the three courts”.

4. Thereafter the present suit was filed on 11-4-1956 by the plaintiff for declaration of title in respect of the suit property and for ejectment of defendants 1 and 2 and for recovery of possession.

5. The present suit is contested by defendant No. 1 alone who resisted the claim of the plaintiff on the ground that the suit was not maintainable without the deposit of the costs as directed by the High Court in S.A No. 43 of 1954. Here also defendant No. 1 took the plea that defendant No. 3 entered into an agreement with him on 20-8-49 (Ex. D) agreeing to sell the very property for a sum of Rs. 1000/- and received a sura of Rs. 300/- by way of advancement and in part performance of the agreement authorised him to continue in possession and directed defendant No. 2 to pay rent to him. Accordingly he urged that he was protected under the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.

6. Defendant No. 3, who appeared as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, repudiated the contention of defendant No. 1 and said that no agreement was made with him on 20-8-1949 but in fact an agreement was taken from him on the evening of 27-9-49 after the registration of Ex. 1. He contended that this agreement Ex. D though executed on 27-9-1949 was ante-dated as 20-8-1949 at the persuasion of Banarsilal the brother of defendant No. 1.

7. Both the Courts below came to the concurrent finding that the agreement Ex. D was not executed on 20-8-1949 but was executed on 27-9-1949 and was antedated as 20-8-1949 and that there was no delivery of possession of the suit property or any part performance of the said contract they further found that the plaintiff was a purchaser for consideration without any notice of any previous contract between defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3. Thus they declared possession in favour of the plaintiff and directed recovery of possession through court, and decreed the plaintiff's suit in full. It is against this decision the present second appeal has been filed.

8. Mr. Asok Das, learned counsel for the appellant, raised the following contentions:

(i) that the suit is not maintainable as no leave has been granted by the High Court in S.A 43 of 1954 authorising the plaintiff to file a fresh suit but the plaintiff was directed only to withdraw the suit:

(ii) that the plaintiff is deemed to have notice of the possession of defendant No. 1 within the meaning of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act:

(iii) that there having been a previous contract between defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3, a part consideration money having been received and possession having been delivered in pursuance of the contract dated 20-8-1949, defendant No. 1 is protected by the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, particularly when the plaintiff had notice of such a contract.

9. I will now take up the first contention. It appears, it was conceded before the lower appellate Court that the deposit of costs by the plaintiff as directed by the High Court in S.A 43 of 1954 was not a condition precedent to the filing, of the present suit Moreover it appears from the order of the lower appellate Court that the costs have been deposited during the pendency of the suit. It was argued that since the order of the High Court in S.A No. 43 of 1954 only permitted to withdrawal of the suit but did not expressly grant leave to the plaintiff to file a fresh suit, the present suit is not maintainable.

10. In support of his contention Mr. Das relied upon a decision reported in Mt. Deoki v. Jwala Prasad, AIR 1928 All 679. The facts of that case-are quite different and all that was laid down by their Lordships in that case is that granting of permission to withdraw an appeal is not a decree confirming the decision appealed from. The Allahabad decision has, therefore, no application to the present case. From the order of the High Court in S.A 43 of 1954 it appears that the plaintiff made an application to withdraw the suit with liberty, to file a fresh suit to which the learned counsel for the respondent-defendant had no objection. But instead of mentioning anything specifically about the filing of a fresh suit, his Lordship simply ordered that the appellant-plaintiff was allowed to withdraw the suit but he was directed to pay the costs of the defendant etc.

11. In this connection, a decision reported in Khudi Rai v. Lalo Rai, AIR 1926 Pat 259 may be seen, which is a direct authority on the point in that case their Lordships held:

“Where an application is made by a plaintiff to withdraw from a suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit on which an order is passed giving the; permission to withdraw from the suit although nothing is said in the order as to the plaintiffs-liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action, that order ought to be read along with the petition and construed as granting permission to file a fresh suit”

12. Their Lordships followed a decision reported in Golam Mohammad v. Shibendra Pada, ILR 35 Cal 990. The provisions of order XXXIII, R. 1(1) of the CPC, give the plaintiff the liberty to ‘withdraw from a suit unconditionally for any reason whatsoever. In such a case no leave or order is necessary from the Court and the plaintiff need’ act assign any reason for such unconditional withdrawal. But the provisions of Order XXIII, Rule 1(2) contemplate withdrawal of a suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit hence the plaintiff must ask for the leave of the Court and must make out a case for that purpose under clause (a) or (b) of Order XXIII, Rule 1(2). Thus mere non-mention of the permission to file a fresh suit in the said Order of the High Court, though such prayer was made in the application of the plaintiff, will not affect the maintainability of the present suit and the present suit is in order.

13. With respect to the second contention it was argued that when defendants 1 and 2 were admitted in possession of the suit house as monthly tenants the plaintiff was bound to have taken notice of the title or equities if any, of the defendants, particularly of defendant no. 1, and as such was bound to inquire from defendant no. 1 as to the nature of his possession. In the absence of such an inquiry the plaintiff cannot claim any title which would affect the interests of defendant No. 1. In this connection Mr. Das relied upon the provisions of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act. The relevant portions of section 3 run thus:—

“3. In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context—

“a person is said to have notice of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, lie would have known it.

Explanation II—. Any person acquiring any immoveable property or any share or interest in any such property shall be deemed to have notice of the title, if any, of any person who is for the time being in actual possession thereof.”

14. On the basis of this provision it is argued that defendants 1 and 2 being actually in possession, the plaintiff should have made inquiries from them as to the nature of their possession. In this connection reliance was placed on a decision reported in Balchand v. Bulaki, AIR 1929 Pat 284, where their Lordships, relying upon the well known decision of Daniels v. Davison, (1809) 16 Ves 249 held:

“If the property to be sold is not in the possession of the vendor but of another person it is the duty of the purchaser to make enquiries from that person, and that he is bound by all the equities which the party in possession may have in the property.”

15. In that case their Lordships have observed:

“It is true that the case of (1809) 16 Ves. 249 has been held to be an extreme case beyond which the doctrine of constructive notice ought not to be extended but at the same tune it has been followed by the Indian Courts in a number of cases.”

16. In this connection, however, a Full Bench decision reported in Hari Charan v. Kaula Rai, AIR 1917 Pat 478 may be seen. There the principle of law laid down in the case of (1809) 16 Ves 249 and some of the Indian decisions that followed it was discussed. Chamier, C.J who gave the leading judgment, observed:

“Assuming that the rule in (1809) 16 Ves 249 is applicable to Indian Cases, I would point out that notice has been defined in more than one Indian Act in terms which do not go so far as the English cases and that both here and in England it has been repeatedly said by judges that (1809) 16 Ves 249 was an extreme case beyond which the doctrine of notice ought not to be extended and the case of Panny v. Watts, (1849) 1 Mac and G. 150 suggests a doubt whether the mere occupation by a person of property would be notice of an agreement not connected with his occupation, though the case was disposed of on other grounds. There appears to be no case in the books in which the Courts have been asked to apply the doctrine of Daniels v. Davison, (1809) 16 Ves 249, to a case like the one before us, in which the person who had the contract to pin-chase in his pocket was in possession not of the entire property sold to another but only a small portion of that property”.

17. In the Full Bench case the plaintiffs and defendants lived in the same village. The plaintiffs four years before the contract had been in possession as mortgagee of a few plots of land belonging to the family of defendants 1 to 5. The nature and origin of their possession were known to everyone in the village including defendants 14 and 15 who obtained a registered sale-deed from defendants 1 to 5. The plaintiffs contended that defendants 14 and 15 had taken the sale-deed with full notice of their previous agreement for sale made in favour of the plaintiffs. Chamier, C.J further held:

“In my opinion it would be a great extension of the doctrine of (1809) 16 Ves 249 to hold that in this case defendants 14 and 15 had constructive notice of the agreement to sell nine bighas ten cottahs to the plaintiffs.”

18. This Full Bench decision is a complete answer to the second point raised on behalf of the appellant. Defendant No. 1 was admittedly in possession only of a portion of the suit property and the plaintiff knew as everybody in Deogarh must have known, that defendant No. 1 was in possession of a portion of the suit house merely on the basis of a monthly tenant. The plaintiff had no reason to believe that defendant No. 1 was in possession of the same on the basis of any tide or on any other basis excepting as a monthly tenant. This contention must therefore fail.

19. So far as the third contention is concerned both the courts below have found as a fact that the agreement Ex. D Was ante-dated as 20-8-1949 but it was in fact executed on the evening of 27-9-1949 on which date the sale-deed Ex. 1 was registered and as such there was no previous contract between defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3. They have further found that there had been no part performance of the contract nor was there any delivery of possession in furtherance of the contract and the plaintiff had no notice of any contract between defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3. The concurrent findings of fact of both the courts below are sufficient to dispose of this contention. Moreover there are no materials to show that defendant No. 1 was in possession as a vendee in respect of the suit house. It has been held in a case reported in Sashirekhamma v. Garbham Suramma, 17 Cut LT 62 : (AIR 1952 Orissa 163) that the mere fact of continuance of possession is not enough to charge the transferee with notice of I the contract to sell. If the character of the possession changes from that of a tenant to that of a vendee in part performance of the contract, it must be proved that the subsequent transferee had notice thereof. This contention of the appellant must therefore fail. In the result, therefore, there is no merit in this second appeal which is dismissed with costs.

LE/DHZ.

20. Appeal dismissed.