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Laxmibai v. Keshrimal Jain .
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent (husband) and the appellant (wife) were married according to Hindu rites in November 1978 at Morar, Gwalior. Two children were born of the marriage: a son, Jitendra Kumar, and a daughter, Kumari Chandni, who were aged about 3 years and 1 year respectively when the suit was instituted. The respondent petitioned for relief under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, alleging cruelty by the wife (including assertions that she repeatedly made allegations of the husband's illicit relationship with his sister-in-law and expressed fear for her life). The husband alleged that the wife left the matrimonial home in July 1979 without cause and did not return.
Summons were issued but, according to the record, the registered-post envelope returned with an endorsement "Refused to take" did not contain a copy of the plaint accompanying the summons. The matter was taken up on dates when the Presiding Officer was absent (21-7-1981), and the Reader fixed another date; subsequently the District Judge proceeded ex parte and on 15-9-1981 passed an ex parte decree for judicial separation under Section 13A of the Hindu Marriage Act instead of a decree for dissolution under Section 13(1)(ia).
The appellant/wife filed an appeal; a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed that appeal (decision reported: AIR 1986 MP 138). The present appeal is under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against that Single Judge's judgment and decree dated 27-11-1984.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the ex parte decree for judicial separation under Section 13A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, could be sustained where (on the record) there was no valid service of summons (specifically because the summons envelope did not contain a copy of the plaint as required by Order V, Rule 2, CPC)?
- Whether an appeal against an ex parte decree can be used to challenge errors, defects or irregularities apparent on the face of the record (as distinct from converting the appeal into proceedings to set aside the decree under Order IX, Rule 13 or Order XLIII, Rule 1(d), CPC)?
- Whether the trial Court had jurisdiction to proceed ex parte when the date fixed for appearance fell on a day when the Presiding Officer was on leave and no fresh notice was issued to the defendant?
- Whether the evidence adduced by the plaintiff (the respondent) was sufficient on merits to justify the ex parte decree for judicial separation?
- Whether the trial Court committed legal infirmity by not making efforts at reconciliation as required by Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act before granting relief?
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent's counsel contended that there was no occasion to make any effort at reconciliation because the defendant (wife) was ex parte, and a Court is competent to proceed in such cases without attempt at reconciliation. This contention was supported by reliance on Raj Paul Bhagria v. Surinder Kaur (1985 DMC 185) as cited by the respondent's counsel.
Appellant's Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellant's specific legal arguments in the appeal record provided.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ramlal Chaurasia v. Rewa Coal Fields Ltd. (1986 MPLJ 507) | That an appeal against an ex parte decree cannot be converted into proceedings for setting aside the decree under Order IX, Rule 13 or into an appeal under Order XLIII, Rule 1(d); but an appellant can show errors, defects or irregularities apparent on the face of the record to set aside an ex parte decree. | The Court relied on this authority to state the proper scope of an appeal from an ex parte decree and to explain that defects apparent on record can justify setting aside an ex parte decree. |
| Gwalior Municipality v. Motilal (1977 MPLJ 562 : AIR 1977 MP 182) | Same proposition as above regarding the scope of appeals against ex parte decrees. | The Court cited it alongside Ramlal Chaurasia to support the proposition that an appeal cannot be converted into setting-aside proceedings but can challenge apparent errors or insufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence. |
| Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh (AIR 1992 SC 1604 : 1992 All LJ 620 : 1992 AIR SCW 174) | Presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897: where a document is sent by registered cover and the addressee is endorsed as having refused to accept, service is presumed unless rebutted by legal evidence. | The Court acknowledged this presumption but observed that, on the facts, the registered envelope did not contain a copy of the plaint; therefore the presumption did not cure the defect of invalid service required under Order V, Rule 2, CPC. |
| Chhutbai v. Madanlal (AIR 1989 MP 280) | The necessity and mandatory nature of serving a copy of the plaint with summons under Order V, Rule 2, CPC. | Cited as authority that where summons are not accompanied by a copy of the plaint, service is not valid and a decree obtained on that basis must be set aside; used to support setting aside the ex parte decree in the present case. |
| Laxminarayan S. Sharma v. Rameshwar R. Khandaewal (AIR 1990 MP 155) | Support for the principle that Order V, Rule 2 is mandatory and summons must be accompanied by a copy of the plaint. | Relied upon to reinforce the mandatory requirement and to conclude that absence of the plaint-copy rendered service invalid. |
| Electric Construction and Equipment Co. Ltd. v. Permali Wallace Ltd. (1991 JLJ 45) | Authority cited among decisions holding that summons must be accompanied by plaint as per Order V, Rule 2. | Used with other cases to demonstrate established law that lack of plaint-copy invalidates service and thereby vitiates any decree passed thereafter. |
| Daulatram v. Ishwari Prasad (1992 (I) MPJR SN 88 : 1993 (I) MPWN 7) | Similar support regarding mandatory service requirements under Order V, Rule 2. | Relied on to support the conclusion that the decree was vitiated by invalid service. |
| Raghurajsingh v. Kalyanaprasad (1964 JLJ SN 78) | Authority that when the date fixed in the notice falls on a day when the Presiding Officer is on leave (or is otherwise a holiday), the Court cannot proceed ex parte unless a fresh date is notified; the defendant is not bound to attend until fresh notice. | Cited to support the Court's conclusion that proceeding ex parte when the Presiding Officer was on leave and without fresh notice was improper and amounted to lack of jurisdiction to proceed ex parte. |
| Kranti Kumar Jha v. Dr. J.B. Shrivastava (1978-1 MPWN 443) | Authority on the rule that a court should not proceed ex parte where the date given in the notice is declared holiday or the Presiding Officer is on leave without fresh notice. | Used to buttress the proposition that the Court should have issued a fresh notice instead of proceeding ex parte. |
| Mohanlal Brijlal v. Manga (1986 CCLJ N 39) | Similar authority on invalidity of proceeding ex parte in circumstances of non-notified adjournment/leave of Presiding Officer. | Cited to reinforce the Court's conclusion on the illegality of the ex parte proceedings. |
| Sushila Bai v. Ram Nihore (1991 MPLJ 229) | Further authority on the duty of Court to notify fresh date and not to proceed ex parte when earlier date fell on absence of Presiding Officer. | Applied in the same context to show the irregularity on the face of the record. |
| Chaturbhuj Pande v. Collector Raigarh (AIR 1969 SC 255 : 1969 All LJ 159) | Principle that a judge must test oral evidence on the basis of probabilities and not act as a 'computer' simply accepting untested statements; courts must require admissible and legal evidence to grant relief. | Invoked to demonstrate that the plaintiff's lone casual statement was insufficient proof, and that a judge must evaluate evidence on probability even in ex parte proceedings. |
| Modi P.R. v. Collector, Durg (1975 JLJ 595) | Similar principle regarding assessment of oral evidence and the need for proper evaluation by the judge. | Cited to support the Court's view that plaintiff's evidence was inadequate to justify the decree. |
| Leela Pande v. Sachendra Kumar Pande (1994 (2) Vibha 10) | Authority that Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act requires the Court to take steps to reconcile parties before granting relief and that sincere effort at reconciliation is mandated. | Relied on to hold that failure to attempt reconciliation constituted a legal infirmity warranting setting aside the decree. |
| Ram Kumar v. Kamla Dutta (AIR 1981 J & K 9) | Support for the duty under Section 23(2) to attempt reconciliation before granting relief under the Act. | Used with other authorities to conclude that absence of reconciliation efforts was a legal flaw. |
| Neera v. Kishan Swamp (AIR 1975 All 337) | Another authority cited for the requirement of reconciliation efforts under Section 23(2). | Applied to reinforce the Court's conclusion on legal infirmity for failure to attempt reconciliation. |
| Raj Paul Bhagria v. Surinder Kaur (1985 DMC 185) | Cited by respondent's counsel for the proposition that where a defendant is ex parte, the Court may proceed without making reconciliation efforts. | Not accepted by the Court on the facts because the District Judge had not satisfied himself that summons were duly served; the Court therefore rejected the respondent's reliance on this decision in the circumstances. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a stepwise analysis, applying procedural and substantive principles expressly mentioned in the opinion:
- On the procedural scope of appeals from ex parte decrees: The Court explained that while an appeal against an ex parte decree cannot be converted into proceedings under Order IX, Rule 13 (to set aside the decree) or into an appeal under Order XLIII, Rule 1(d), an appellant may successfully show from the record that an apparent error, defect or irregularity affected the decision and thereby secure setting aside and remittance for retrial. The Court relied on Ramlal Chaurasia and Motilal to state this principle.
- On service of process: The Court recognized the presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act that a registered article endorsed as "refused to take" is presumed served (as illustrated by Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh), but it examined the actual contents of the returned envelope and found no copy of the plaint had been sent with the summons as required by Order V, Rule 2, CPC. Because Order V, Rule 2 uses mandatory language ("shall"), the Court held that absence of a plaint-copy meant there was no valid service and that a decree obtained on that basis must be set aside (supported by authorities such as Chhutbai v. Madanlal and others).
- On the question of proceeding ex parte when the Presiding Officer was on leave: The Court held that the original date of appearance (21-7-1981) fell on a day when the Presiding Officer was absent; the Reader fixed another date but that was not a notified hearing date. In such circumstances, the Court should have issued a fresh summons or given fresh notice; failing which it had no jurisdiction to proceed ex parte. The Court cited authorities (Raghurajsingh, Kranti Kumar Jha, Mohanlal Brijlal, Sushila Bai) to support that proposition.
- On the sufficiency of evidence: The Court observed that the respondent/plaintiff examined only himself and gave a short, casual statement which lacked particulars and supporting circumstances to establish cruelty. The Court referred to the settled principle (Chaturbhuj Pande; Modi P.R.) that a judge must assess evidence on the basis of probabilities and must require admissible and legal evidence even in ex parte cases; the Court concluded the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to sustain the decree.
- On failure to attempt reconciliation: The Court noted that Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act places a duty on the Court to endeavour reconciliation before granting relief under the Act. The failure to make such an effort was characterised as a legal infirmity (citation of Leela Pande, Ram Kumar, Neera v. Kishan Swamp).
- On the respondent's counter-argument regarding reconciliation: The Court rejected the respondent's contention (relying on Raj Paul Bhagria) that reconciliation was unnecessary because the defendant was ex parte, because the District Judge had not first verified valid service of the summons. Therefore, the Court found that the District Judge had not applied his mind properly before proceeding ex parte.
Holding and Implications
Final Disposition: The appeal is ALLOWED. The ex parte judgment and decree under Section 13A of the Hindu Marriage Act is set aside.
Consequential Orders and Immediate Effects: The matter is remitted to the District Judge, Gwalior, for fresh consideration in accordance with law. The Court directed that the trial Court should decide the case expeditiously and, as far as possible, within four months. Parties were directed to appear in the Court below on 5th October, 1994; if reconciliation is not effected, the case is to proceed de die in diem. Each party was directed to bear their own costs.
Broader Implications: The opinion applied established procedural principles (service requirements under Order V, Rule 2 CPC; limits on the scope of appeals from ex parte decrees; duty to attempt reconciliation under Section 23(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act) to the facts at hand. The Court did not purport to lay down any novel legal proposition beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities; the immediate legal effect is to set aside the impugned ex parte decree and to require a fresh trial in accordance with the principles articulated in the opinion.
1. This is an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent by the appellant/defendant, the wife, against the judgment and decree dated 27-11-1984, passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in First Appeal No. 29 of 1984 (decision reported in AIR 1986 MP 138), preferred against ex parte judgment and decree for judicial separation passed under Section 13A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for short, the 'Act' by the District Judge, Gwalior, on 15-9-1981.
2. Material facts giving rise to this appeal are these. Respondent was married to appellant according to Hindu rites in November, 1978, at Morar, Gwalior. From the wedlock, a son Jitendra Kumar and a daughter, Kumari Chandni, aged 3 years and 1 year respectively, on the date of institution of the suit, were begotten to them. The respondent claimed dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce under section 13(1)(i-a) of treating the husband with cruelty as the appellant used to tease him by making allegations and aspersions against the husband of his illicit relationship with his sister-in-law (brother's wife). It is also averred that applicant used to make similar false allegations and used to apprehend that she will be killed by him. Husband alleged that conduct and behaviour of the wife was cruel since after the solemnization of the marriage; so much so that she left her matrimonial home in July, 1979 without any cause and thereafter, did not turn up.
3. A notice of the said petition was issued which was received unserved. Thereafter, fresh summons was sent by registered post without enclosing therewith a copy of the plaint, giving the first date of hearing as 21 -7-1981. The notice was received back with a Postal endorsement dated 20-5-1981, "Refused to take". On 21-7-1981, the Presiding Officer was on leave. Hence, the Reader of the Court fixed the next date as 10-8-1981 to place the case before the Presiding Officer. On 16-8-1981, the District Judge, after perusing the endorsement of refusal and considering the fact that the appellant/defendant did not appear on 21-7-1981 and after on 10-8-1981, ordered the case to proceed ex parte. On the next date of hearing, the respondent examined himself and gave a statement of nine lines, without stating any particulars of cruelty except that the appellant used to make a false aspersion of his illicit relationship with his brother's wife and, therefore, his mind used to remain disturbed. The respondent also stated that his wife has filed an application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A certified copy of the orderdated 20-8-1981 (Ex. P/l), passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior, of these proceedings is on record wherein, in para 7, the defence of making aspersion of illicit relationship by the wife against the husband with his brother's wife and cruelty was not found proved. However, the application was dismissed as the learned Magistrate found that the wife with her children left her matrimonial home at her own accord. The District Judge, on appreciation of evidences, passed an ex parte decree under Section 13A of Judicial separation instead of decree for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act.
4. Having come to know that an ex parte decree of judicial separation has been passed the appellant/wife preferred an appeal. The learned single Judge, placing reliance on two Division Bench decisions of this Court in Ramlal Chaurasia v. Rewa Coal Fields Ltd. Calcutta (1986 MPLJ 507) and Gwalior Municipality v. Motilal (1977 MPLJ 562 : AIR 1977 MP 182), dismissed the appeal holding that when a party chooses to file an appeal against an ex parte decree, the decree can only be challenged on merits and it cannot be set aside on the ground that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance. Hence, this appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.
5. Shri Ramji Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri N. K. Modi, learned counsel for the respondent, heard Record perused.
6. After hearing counsel on both sides and on going through the record, we are of the opinion that the ex parte decree for judicial separation passed under Section 13A of the Act cannot be sustained for reasons to follow.
7. True, when an appeal is filed against an ex parte decree under Section 96(2), CPC, that appeal cannot be converted into proceedings for setting aside the decree with the concomitant duty of affording the parties an opportunity of adducing evidence for and against any ground that may be raised in support thereof under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC. Nor can such an appeal be converted into an appeal under Order XLIII, Rule 1(d), CPC. However, such an appellant can show from the record as it stands that there is in the order proceeding ex parte against him, any error, defect or irregularity which has affected the decision of the case. If he succeeds in so doing, the ex parte decree will be set aside and the case will be remitted for retrial. On merits also, a party, through appeal, can demonstrate that evidence adduced by the plaintiff on which ex parte order has been passed is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case to pass a decree or even as the evidence prima facie is deficient for passing the decree. See, Ramlal Chaurasia's case as also Motilal's case (both supra).
8. In the case in hand, we find that there was no service of the summons. True, there is a presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, that when a document is sent under registered cover and on that, there is an endorsement of refusal by addressee to accept, the notice must be presumed to have been served and service shall be deemed to be a valid service unless it is rebutted by legal evidence. See, Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh. (AIR 1992SC 1604 : 1992 All LJ 620 : 1992 AIR SCW 174. But, from the closed envelope which was opened in the presence of the parties, it is clear that no copy of petition/plaint was sent to the appellant along with the summons of the petition. Order V, Rule 2, CPC, in mandatory terms provides that every summons shall be accompanied by a copy of the plaint or, if so permitted, by a concise statement. Therefore, the law is that along with the summons, a copy of the plaint should be served, as it is very much essential because the purpose of service of a copy of the plaint or, if so permitted, of a concise statement thereof, is to bring home to the defendant, the knowledge of a particular suit having been instituted against him so that the defendant may know that the claim brought about the plaintiff against him and make up the mind against the claim. This is the reason why the law-makers have made Rule 2 of Order V, CPC mandatory by use of the word "shall". Accordingly, if the summons are not accompanied by a copy of the plaint, it cannot be said that there is due or valid service on the defendant and if there is no valid service, a decree on such defendant has to be set aside. See, Chhutbai v. Madanlal (AIR 1989 MP 280), Laxminarayan S. Sharma v. Ramesh-war R. Khandaewal (AIR 1990 MP 155); Electric Construction and Equipment Co. Ltd. (M/s.) v. Permali Wallace Ltd., (1991 JLJ 45) Daulatram v. Ishwari Prasad (1992 (I) MPJR SN 88: 1993 (I) MPWN 7). Besides, after the receipt of the envelope with an endorsement purporting to have been made by a postal employee to the effect that the defendant has refused to take delivery of the postal article, when was tendered to the defendant, the Court, under Order V, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 19-A, CPC, did not declare that the summons had been duly served on the defendant, that infirmity is there on the face of the record. There is yet another reason to hold that the appellant/defendant was not duly served, in the summons, the. date of appearance was 21-7-1981, on that date, the Presiding Officer was on leave. Therefore, the next date fixed by the Reader of the Court, was not a date of hearing; hence, the Court ought to have issued a fresh notice to the defendant, but instead of that, the Court illegally proceeded ex parte on the assumption that the defendant was absent on 21-7-1981 and is also absent on the date fixed by the Reader. In such a situation, when a date given in the notice of summons is declared holiday or the Presiding Officer is on leave, unless another date is notified by issue of a fresh summons or by exhibiting a date on the Notice Board, a Court cannot proceed ex parte, till the next date is notified a defendant is not bound to attend and may wait for another notice. See, Raghurajsingh v. Kalyanaprasad (1964 JLJ SN 78) Kranti Kumar Jha v. Dr. J.B. Shrivastava (1978-1 MPWN 443); Mohanlal Brijlal v. Manga 1986 CCLJ N 39), Sushila Bai v. Ram Nihore (1991 MPLJ 229). Therefore, for the above reasons, the Court was having no jurisdiction to proceed ex parte; the error is apparent and the decree so passed is illegal and is liable to be set aside. Even for argument's sake the above grounds relate to invalid service making out a case amounting to sufficient cause, and ought to have been taken in a proceeding under O. IX, Rule 12, CPC, and could not be seen in an appeal under Section 28 of the Act. In that case too, it is not the law that if a defendant fails to appear in response to the notice of summons of the Court, a Court is bound to pass a decree at once or on the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. In an ex parte case also, a plaintiff has to prove his case by producing legal evidence for passing a decree as it is settled that a Court must act on admissible and legal evidence. While considering the evidence, the Court will not be bound to accept the statement of witnesses only because they have not been effectively cross-examined or evidence in rebuttal has not been adduced. A Judge is not a computer. In Civil cases, while assessing the value attached to oral evidence, a Judge has to test the evidence placed before him on the basis of probabilities. See, Chaturbhuj Pande v. Collector Raigarh (AIR 1969 SC 255 : 1969 All LJ 159; Modi P.R. v. Collector, Durg (1975 JLJ 595).
9. In the case in hand, the respondent/ plaintiff has examined himself only. His statement is casual, which is neither supported by circumstances or by any evidence, prima facie to hold that the appellant/wife treated the respondent/plaintiff with cruelty. Besides, cruelty was not found proved in proceedings under Section 195, Cr.P.C. Therefore, on merits, the decree passed by the District Judge and affirmed by the learned single Judge, cannot he affirmed.
10. There is yet another reason not to maintain the decree, as Section 23(2) of the Act casts a primary duty on the Court to ensure that the marriage tie is not broken and to make every effort in the first instance to bring about a reconciliation between the parties before proceeding to grant any relief under the Act. The law enjoins upon a Court to make sincere effort at reconciliation before proceeding to deal with the case in the usual course. Not making an effort under Section 23(2) is a legal infirmity. See, the decisions of this Court in Leela Pande v. Sachendra Kumar Pande (1994 (2) Vibha 10); Ram Kumar v. Kamla Dutta (AIR 1981 J & K 9); Neera v. Kishan Swamp (AIR 1975 All 337).
11. Shri Modi, learned counsel for the respondent, contended that there was no occasion to make any effort of reconciliation as the defendant was ex parte and the Court is competent to proceed in such cases without reconciliation. Reliance was placed, on a decision of Delhi High Court in case of Raj Paul Bhagria v. Surinder Kaur II ((1985) DMC 185). In the facts of this case, we are not inclined to accept the contention as the District Judge has not applied his mind and proceeded ex parte without verifying that the summon on the defendant were duly served or not.
12. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the appeal is allowed. The ex parte judgment and decree under Section 13A are set aside. The case is sent back to the District Judge, Gwalior, for deciding it afresh in accordance with law. As the petition was filed as far back as in the year 1981, we direct the Court to decide the case expeditiously; as far as possible, within a period of four months. Parties shall appear in the Court below on 5th October, 1994. If the reconciliation is not made, the case shall proceed de die in diem. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.
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