- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Sarthi v. State Of Madhya Pradesh .
Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This judgment disposes of Criminal Appeals Nos. 121 and 122 of 1970 together with the principal appeal. The three appellants — Sarthi, Bhoklu and Nanhi — were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Noharsai.
The incident occurred at about noon on 28 August 1969 in the village Godhi, district Raigarh. The deceased's son Rabi lodged the first information report at about 2:30 p.m. Police found the body of Noharsai hanging from the ceiling of Majhi's house with a cloth tied round the neck. Post-mortem examination recorded an antemortem ligature mark, abrasions of little significance and concluded death was due to asphyxia by hanging. The doctor expressed the opinion that the hanging was, in all probability, homicidal and not suicidal.
Eyewitness Dujeram (P.W.1) and other witnesses (Govind P.W.2, Rabi P.W.3, Mandhar P.W.4) testified to a confrontation in which the three accused overpowered the deceased after drinking liquor, rendered him unconscious by slapping, striking and pressing his neck, and then tied a cloth around his neck and hanged him. The trial court relied on this eyewitness account and convicted the three accused of murder under Section 302 read with Section 34.
On appeal, the higher court examined the medical evidence, the eyewitness testimony, the role of intoxication, the sequence of acts and the appropriate legal classification of the offence(s) committed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 (murder) was justified on the facts of the case.
- Whether the accused acted from the beginning with the intention or knowledge required by Section 299 of the Penal Code such that their acts must be treated as murder (or culpable homicide) as a single transaction.
- What is the legal effect of the accused's intoxication on their mens rea and culpability (with reference to Section 86, Penal Code and cited authority).
- Where the victim was rendered unconscious and the accused thereafter hanged him, whether that subsequent act, done in panic and without ascertaining whether the victim was dead, amounts to murder or to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304, Part 2.
- How to classify and penalize a situation in which an accused initially intends only to cause hurt (simple or grievous) but a later act done under a mistaken belief or reckless indifference causes death.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Section 86, Penal Code (statutory provision) and Basdev v. State Of Pepsu | That voluntary intoxication (not administered without knowledge or against will) does not absolve the accused of responsibility; the accused must be attributed with the same knowledge of consequences as if sober. | The court relied on this principle to hold that the accused's consumption of liquor did not negate the requisite knowledge or intention; their intoxication was not shown to be such as to render them incapable of appreciating consequences. |
| In re Kaliappa Goundan, AIR 1933 Mad 798 : 34 Cri LJ 1109 | Illustration of cases where accused acted from the beginning with intention/knowledge to kill and subsequent acts are part of the same transaction. | Cited as an example of the class of cases where a preconceived plan to kill renders the whole sequence one transaction; court held the instant case did not fall in this class. |
| In re Thayamani, AIR 1943 Mad 571 | Another illustration of the "single transaction" principle where initial intention to kill converts subsequent acts into part of the same homicidal transaction. | Cited among authorities showing that where intention to kill existed from the start, later misapprehensions do not reduce the offence; the court found those authorities not applicable to the facts here. |
| Lingual v. Emperor, AIR 1945 Pat 470 | Same class: addresses series of connected acts forming one transaction when initial intention/knowledge to kill exists. | Cited as part of the group of authorities illustrating the "one series of acts" rule; the court held the present facts did not place the accused in that category. |
| Thabo Meli v. Reginam (1954) 1 All ER 373 (PC) | Establishes that when accused form a preconceived plan to kill, a sequence of acts may be treated as one transaction and misapprehension as to the moment of death does not reduce liability from murder. | The court explained this principle and quoted Lord Reid, but expressly held that the instant case does not fall within that class because the accused here did not act from the beginning with the requisite intention/knowledge under Section 299. |
| R. v. Church (1965) 2 All ER 72 | Followed Thabo Meli in treating a connected series of acts as a single transaction for culpability purposes. | Cited as subsequent authority following Thabo Meli; the court noted these authorities were not applicable to the present facts. |
| In re Palani Goundan, AIR 1920 Mad 862 : 20 Cri LJ 404 (FB) | Represents the view that when initial act is intended only to cause hurt and the accused then, believing the victim to be dead, does a further act (which actually causes death), the accused may be guilty only of causing hurt (not culpable homicide). | Cited to explain a class of cases where later acts done under a belief that the victim is dead may not amount to homicide; the court contrasted this approach with other authorities and placed the present case in a different factual category (reckless indifference). |
| Emperor v. Dalu Sardar, AIR 1915 Cal 221 : 15 Cri LJ 709 | Supports the view that where the accused believed the victim to be dead and then did an act causing death, the conviction may be limited to causing hurt rather than homicide. | Produced as an example of the class of decisions taking a limited view of culpability when the accused believed the victim dead; the court used it to outline divergent approaches in the authorities. |
| In re Chinnathambi (1952) 2 Mad LJ 550 : 1953 Cri LJ 449 | Another authority in the line that confines liability to hurt where the subsequent fatal act was done under a belief the victim was already dead. | Cited alongside Palani Goundan and Dalu Sardar to describe the jurisprudential line that the court reviewed and distinguished from the present facts. |
| The King v. Sreenarayan (1948) ILR 27 Pat 67 | Patna High Court found guilt under Section 304, Part 2 where the accused, in hastily believing the victim dead, acted with recklessness or gross negligence, thus imputing the required knowledge under Section 299(3). | Cited to show that one approach attributes knowledge to a defendant whose negligent belief of death nevertheless indicates recklessness; the court referenced this as part of the divergent authorities and used it to support the conclusion that recklessness can be imputed in some fact situations. |
| Buddha v. State (1959) ILR 9 Raj 762 | Example where, on facts showing lesser degree of negligence, the accused was convicted under Section 304A rather than higher culpability provisions. | Cited to illustrate that outcomes vary with degree of negligence; used as part of a spectrum of authorities the court surveyed. |
| Nannhu v. State, 1960 Cri LJ 605 (Madh Pra) | Authority noting that failure to take steps to ascertain whether a victim is dead may indicate that the accused did not in fact believe the victim was dead. | Used by the court to support the proposition that where accused did not attempt to check for life signs, their belief that the victim was dead may be doubtful; this underpinned the court's finding of reckless indifference rather than a settled belief that the victim was dead. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a step-by-step analysis, closely adhering to the factual record and the medical evidence:
- Assessment of evidence: The court accepted the eyewitness testimony of Dujeram (P.W.1) and corroborating witnesses (Govind, Rabi, Mandhar). The post-mortem supported death by hanging and a ligature mark consistent with antemortem hanging; the doctor thought hanging was probably homicidal.
- Intoxication: The accused and the deceased had consumed liquor voluntarily. The court applied Section 86 and cited Basdev v. State Of Pepsu to conclude that voluntary intoxication did not relieve the accused of responsibility; they must be attributed the same knowledge of consequences as if sober unless involuntary intoxication is shown (which was not).
- Early acts vis-à-vis mens rea: The court found that the initial acts (slapping, pressing the neck with one hand, holding down the deceased) did not show the degree of force or intention to cause death or to cause bodily injury likely to cause death. The absence of nail/finger marks and the medical findings indicated these acts caused unconsciousness and amounted to grievous hurt rather than an intention to kill.
- The critical later act — hanging: After the deceased became unconscious, the accused hanged him. The court analysed whether at that stage the accused believed the deceased to be dead, believed him to be alive, or were unmindful of whether he was alive or dead. There was no evidence they ascertained life signs; the court concluded they acted in panic and hung the deceased "unmindful of whether he was alive or dead."
-
Legal classification: The court surveyed two classes of authorities:
- Cases where the accused acted from the beginning with intention/knowledge to kill (Thabo Meli and related authorities), treating the whole sequence as a single transaction and sustaining a murder conviction; and
- Cases where the accused intended only to cause hurt and then, believing the victim dead, did a subsequent act which actually caused death (Palani Goundan line), leading in some authorities to conviction only for causing hurt or for lesser offences.
- Recklessness and imputation of knowledge: The court stated that if the accused hung the victim while being unmindful of whether he was alive or dead, and thereby caused death, the accused must be attributed the knowledge that by the act of hanging they were likely to cause death. On the facts, the court found the accused to have acted with reckless indifference at the hanging stage.
- Conclusion of analysis: Because the accused initially intended only to cause grievous hurt but subsequently, in panic and with reckless indifference, hung the unconscious victim causing death, they could not be held to have committed murder under Section 302 read with Section 34. Instead, their conduct fitted the offence described by Section 304, Part 2 (culpable homicide not amounting to murder on a finding of knowledge or reckless indifference), read with Section 34.
The court carefully limited its findings to the facts: it did not adopt wholesale the "single transaction" rule of Thabo Meli because the necessary mens rea at the outset was absent here; nor did it adopt the Palani Goundan approach as dispositive, because the accused acted with reckless indifference rather than a settled belief that the victim was dead.
Holding and Implications
Holding (final decision):
The appeals are partly allowed. The court ordered that the accused-appellants are acquitted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code and the sentences of life imprisonment imposed by the trial court are set aside. However, the accused are each convicted under Section 304, Part 2 read with Section 34 and sentenced to eight (8) years' rigorous imprisonment.
Implications
- Direct effect on the parties: The accused's murder convictions (Section 302 read with 34) and life sentences have been overturned; they have been re-convicted on the lesser count of culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304, Part 2 read with 34) and resentenced to 8 years' rigorous imprisonment each.
- Legal significance: The court's reasoning clarifies the application of competing lines of authority where an initial non-fatal assault is followed by a later act (done in panic or to conceal) that causes death. The court distinguished cases in which the accused acted with intention to kill from the outset (where the "single transaction" approach applies) and cases where accused acted under a belief the victim was dead. On these facts, the court attributed recklessness to the accused for having hung the unconscious victim without ascertaining life signs.
- No broad new precedent was expressly proclaimed beyond the court's application of existing principles to the facts: the decision's practical effect is the reclassification of the offence and the reduction of sentence in this case.
1. This judgment shall also dispose, of Criminal Appeals Nos. 121 and 122 of 1970. The appellants in these three appeals, Sarthi, Bhqklu and Nanhi, have been convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life for the murder of one Noharsai.
2. The incident resulting in the death of Noharsai happened at about 12 noon on 28th August, 1969, in village Godhi, Police Station Tamnar, District Raigarh. The first information report was lodged by Rabi (P.W. 3) son of the deceased at about 2.30 p.m. B. K. Singh (P.W. 12), Sab-Inspector, Police, went to the spot and found the dead body of Noharsai suspended from the ceiling of the house of Majhi with the help of a piece q cloth tied round the neck. The, postmortem examination of the dead body was carried out on 29th August by Dr. A. G. Shesh (P.W. 7). He found one abrasion on the lower part of the left side of the back and another abrasion over the lateral side of the left knee. These abrasions were antemortem but of little significance.
The doctor further found an antemortem ligature mark 1" in thickness above the level of thyroid cartilege extending obliquely backwards and disappearing behind the left ear. In the opinion of the doctor death was due to asphyxia resulting from hanging. The doctor did not find any nail injuries on the neck of the deceased. The stomach contents of the deceased showed that he had consumed alcohol. The doctor did not accept the suggestion that the hanging was suicidal for, in his opinion, it is not possible for a person under intoxication to commit suicide by hanging. The doctor's evidence leads to the definite conclusion that the death was caused by hanging and that in all probability the hanging was homicidal and not suicidal.
3. Majhi in whose house the dead body of Nohirsai was found was a cousin of the deceased. Majhi had died some time before the incident leaving behind his widow Dasmat alias Dolo (P.W. 5) as his heir in whose favour he had execute ed a will (Ex. P-2) on 23rd July, 1969. Majhi and Dasmat both had become invalid and were helped by the deceased and his son Babi for cultivating the lands. It is said that during his lifetime Majhi bad orally declared Rebi to be his successor. Dasmat being invalid had called Sukanti, daughter of accused Sarthi, for preparing her meals and looking after the household. It is suggested by the prosecution that Noharsai felt that Sukanti noay prove to be an obstacle in the way of his son Babi in ultimately getting the property of Dasmat and this had led to an ill feeling between him and Sarthi.
4. The eye-witness account of the entire happening is furnished by Dujeram (P.W. 1). Dujeram is Kotwar of village Amaghat which is at a distance of about one and half mites from Gogh. Dujeram happened to come to Godhi on Mtth August, 19Wj in connection with some work. While returning to Amaghat he, passed to front of the bungee of Majhi. pogrom heard some noise and he found that accused Nanhi and Bhoklu were sitting in front of the house and the deceased and accused Sarthi were grappling with each other in the courtyard. Dujeram saw Sarthi slapping the deceased. This quarrel ended for a short while when Sarthi was dragged outside by Kirti who was also tried along with the accused-appellants but was acquitted by the trial Court. Thereafter the deceased shouted from inside Majhi's house challenging Sarthi that he will not allow Sarthi's daughter to live in the house and to take the property of Dasmat. On hearing this the accused-appellants entered the house of Majhi crying that they will kill the deceased. Sarthi felled the deceased. He then slapped and fisted the deceased and also pressed his neck with one hand. Bhoklu caught hold of the hands of the deceased and Nanhi caught hold of his legs. The deceased became unconscious. All the three accused then tied a piece of cloth around his neck and hanged him from the ceiling of the house.
Dujeram's statement has been relied upon by the trial Court and we find no reason to take a different view of his evidence. Nothing has been brought out in his lengthy cross-examination to discredit his testimony. Govind (P.W. 2) reached the house of Majhi when Sarthi was beating the deceased with one hand and pressing his neck with the other hand. Govind also saw that Bhoklu had caught hold of the hands of the deceased and Nanhi had caught hold of his legs. Govind found1 that the accused were intoxicated having consumed liqupr, Govind further saw that the deceased had become unconscious. At this stage Govind became afraid and ran away from the place of occurrence. Govind was soon thereafter informed by Dujeram (P.W. 1) that the accused had hanged the deceased. The deceased's son Rabi (P.W. 3) also reached the place of occnrrence when Sarthi was pressing the neck of deceased with one' hand and was hitting him with the other hand. Rabi was chased away by the other two accused. Rabi then complained to Mandhar (P.W. 4) and some others. When Rabi again reached the place of occurrence he found the deceased's body hanging. Mandhar had reached somewhat earlier and he saw the accused running away from the place. We have no hesitation in accepting the story narrated by Dujeram (P.W. 1) and supported by these witnesses.
5. The prosecution has thus been able to prove the following facts; The deceased and all the three accused had on the fateful day consumed liquor and they were prone to pick up a quarrel at tiie slightest provocation. To begin with, there was grappling between the deceased and Sarthi and the latter slapped the former. This quarrel ended for a short while as the deceased and Sarthi were separated by Kirti. The deceased then shouted from Majhi's house that he will not allow Sarthi's daughter to live in that house and to take the property of Dasmat. This provoked Sarthi who with the other two accused again came to Majhi's house and overpowered the deceased. Sarthi pressed the neck of the deceased and slapped him. Bhoklu caught hold of the hands of the deceased and Nanhi caught hold of his legs. When the deceased became unconscious, all the three hanged him from the ceil'ng by tying a rope round his neck. The deceased died as a result of hanging.
6. Now let us take a closer view of these facts. There is no suggestion that the liquor was administered to the accused without their knowledge or against their will. We must, therefore, attribute to the accrued the same knowledge of the consequence of their acts as if they were quite sober. The evidence does hot also disclose that the degree of intoxication was such that the accused were beside their minds altogether. It must, therefore, be presumed that they intended the natural consequences of their acts: Section 86, Penal Code; Basdev v. State Of Pepsu., the facts do not show that there was any strong motive for the accused to kill the deceased. Pressure on the neck by hand was not applied with great force. It only made the deceased unconscious and did not lead to his death. No finger marks on the neck were noticed in post mortem examination. Therefore, the act of the accused Sarthi in overpowering the deceased and in pressing his neck with one hand end slapping him with the other hand while the other two accused were holding his hands and feet cannot be said to have been done with the intention of causing his death or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that the accused were likely to cause death. But the act of pressing the neck of a person who is overpowered and made helpless is an act endangering life and the acts of the accused up to the stage the deceased became unconscious clearly I fell under the definition of grievous hurt.
We now come to the stage when the deceased became unconscious. It appears that the accused then became panicky. They probably thought that the deceased if not already dead may die soon and, therefore, with the intention of concealing what they had earlier done they hanged the deceased. There is no material to hold that the accused believed the deceased to be already dead when they hanged him, They took no steps to ascertain whether he was alive or dead. No attempt was made to feel his pulse or to find out whether he was breathing or his heart was beating. The best that can be said in favour of the accused is that after the deceased became unconscious, they, hanged him in a panic unmindful of whether he was alive or dead. The accused may not have been certain that the deceased was alive but they were also not certain that he was really dead. In hanging the deceased in such a situation they acted with reckless indifference to the consequences.
7. What then is the offence which the accused have committed ? In cases where the accused from the beginning acts with the intention or knowledge referred to in Section 299 of the Penal Code and death results the offence is culpable homicide not amounting to murder or murder (depending upon the quality of intention or knowledge) even if in the later stages the accused is labouring under a mistaken impression that he is disposing of a dead body. The two stages of the acts in such cases are so closely connected in time and purpose that they are considered as parts of the same transaction: See In re Kaliappa Goundan AIR 1933 Mad 798 :34 Cri LJ 1109); In re Thayamani AIR 1943 Mad 571; Lingual v. Emperor AIR 1945 Pat 470 and Thabo Meli v. Reginam, (1954) 1 All ER 373 (PC). In the Privy Council case of Thabo Meli (supra) the appellants in accordance with a preconceived plan to kill took a man to a hut, gave him beer so that he was partially intoxicated and then hit him on the head. They then believing him to be dead rolled him over a low cliff, dressing up the scene to make it look like an accident. The medical evidence disclosed that the deceased was alive, though unconscious when he was left at the foot of the cliff and that he died of exposure.
The appellants, who were convicted of murder, argued before the Privy Council that there was absence of menses or intention to kill from the point of time the appellants thought that the man was already dead and, therefore, they could not be convicted of murder. In rejecting this argument Lord Reid said that "it was impossible to divide up what was really one series of acts" and that the crime was not reduced from murder to a lesser crime merely because the accused were under some misapprehension for a time during the completion of their criminal plot. Commenting upon this case Prof. Williams has observed. "In these cases the accused intends to kill and does kill; his only mistake is as to the precise moment of death and as to the precise act that effects death. Ordinary ideas of justice and commonsense require that such a case shall be treated as murder." (Criminal Law 2nd Edition, p. 174). The Privy Council case of Thabo Meli (1954) 1 All ER 373 and the observations of Prof. Williams were followed by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R, v. Church (1965) 2 All ER 72, where the accused was convicted of man slaughter on a lenient direction to the Jury by the trial Judge. The instant case does not fall in this class of cases for here, to begin with, the accused did not act with the intention or knowledge referred to in Section 299.
8. There is another class of cases where the original intention of the accused is to cause hurt simple or grievous and after hurt is caused the accused mistakenly believes that the victim has died and in that mistaken belief he does a further act to obliterate the traces of his crime and it is this later act which causes death of the victim-
In this class of cases one view is that the accused is only guilty of the offence of causing hurt or grievous hurt and he cannot be convicted for the offence of culpable homicide or murder: See In re Palani Goundan AIR 1920 Mad 862 :20 Cri LJ 404) (FB); Emperor v. Dalu Sardar AIR 1915 Cal 221 :15 Cri LJ 709); In re Chinnathambi, (1952) 2 Mad LJ 550 : 1953 Cri LJ 449. In Palani Goundan's case the accused struck his wife a blow on the head with a plough share which knocked her senseless. The accused believed her to be dead and in order to lay a false defence of suicide by hanging proceeded to hang her by a rope. The blow on the head was in fact not fatal and the cause of death was asphyxiation by hanging. On these facts the accused was held guilty of the offence under section 326 as his intention to begin with was not to cause death or such bodily injury as it likely to cause death and the subsequent act of hanging the senseless victim was done under the belief that he was hanging merely a lifeless body. On similar facts, however, Patna High Court found the accused guilty under Section 304, Part 2 on the finding that in hastily believing the victim dead the accused acted recklessly with gross negligence and must be imputed the knowledge required under the third clause of Section 299. See The King v. Sreenarayan (1948) ILR 27 Pat 67.
On similar facts but where the degree of negligence was comparatively less the accused was convicted under Section 304A by the Rajasthan High Court: Buddha v. State (1959) ILR 9 Raj 762. It will be seen that the difference of opinion in this class of cases is for the reason that the Madras and Calcutta cases do not take notice of the principle that a person acting recklessly or with gross-negligence can be imputed the knowledge that he is likely by his act to cause death of the victim. This principle which is relied upon by the Patna and Rajasthan High Courts is open to one objection that when the accused really believes the victim to be dead (howsoever negligently he may have got this belief), he does not in fact have the knowledge that he is likely to cause death of the victim by the act of burning or hanging the victim's body. The fact that the accused did not take necessary steps to ascertain whether the victim was dead or alive may go tp show that he did not really believe that the victim was dead: See Nannhu v. State, 1960 Cri LJ 605 (Madh Pra). But if a finding is reached that the accused did believe the victim t6 be dead, his negligence in reaching that belief is irrelevant for the question whether he had the knowledge referred to in the third clause of Section 299.
We do not, however, find it necessary to express any final opinion on this point because on the facts found in the instant case the accused acted recklessly unmindful of whether the victim was alive or dead. The Court in this class of cases may be faced with three fact situations, The accused may believe the victim to be dead, he may believe the victim to be alive or as in the present case he may be unmindful of whether the victim is alive or dead. Whatever may be the outcome when the accused believes the victim to be dead, we have no doubt that it would be clearly murder if the accused with the knowledge that the victim is alive hangs him with the object of concealing the earlier crime. Similarly, we have no doubt that if the accused, unmindful- of whether the victim is alive or dead hangs him and thereby causes his death, the accused must be attributed the knowledge that he may by the act of hanging was likely to cause death. On the facts of the instant case the accused, to begin with, had only the intention of causing grievous hurt, but when the deceased became unconscious they became panicky and, unmindful of whether the deceased was alive or dead, they hanged him causing his death. In hanging the deceased, the accused must be attributed the knowledge that they were likely to cause death. The accused although not liable for the offence of murder are clearly liable to be punished for the offence under Section 304, Part 2.
9. The appeals are partly allowed. The accused-appellants are acquitted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code and the sentences of life imprisonment are set aside. But they are each convicted under Section 304, Part 2, read with Section 34 and sentenced to 8 (eight) years' rigorous imprisonment.
Alert