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National Bank Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, D.R.T & Ors.

Calcutta High Court
May 23, 2002
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Narayan Chandra Sil, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion considers the maintainability of an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India arising out of an order dated 10 April 2002 passed by the Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, Kolkata in O.A. No. 128 of 2001.

The facts, as recorded in the impugned order, are that the applicant (a bank) filed an application dated 18 February 2002 before the Tribunal. After hearing the parties the Presiding Officer passed an interim status quo order dated 10 April 2002 restraining defendant Nos. 2 and 3 from operating bank account No. 412800566 of defendant No. 3 maintained with defendant No. 2, without touching a sum of U.S. Dollar 3,52,250. The Presiding Officer found a prima facie case for recovery of Rs. 1,43,67,841/- in favour of the applicant-bank against the defendants (including defendant Nos. 2 and 3) and fixed 30 April 2002 as the date for hearing the main application and for filing written objections by the defendants.

Before the Tribunal could hear the main application on the date fixed, the bank petitioner filed the present petition under Article 227 in the High Court challenging the interim order. The respondents (O.Ps) contested the maintainability of the Article 227 petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the application under Article 227 of the Constitution is maintainable against the interim order passed by the Presiding Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, Kolkata dated 10 April 2002.
  2. Whether the availability of an alternative remedy by way of appeal under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 227 in this case.
  3. Whether an interim order that is alleged to be unreasoned or devoid of reasons renders the order a nullity and therefore justifies interference by the High Court under Article 227.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Applicant-Bank)

  • The impugned interim status quo order is devoid of reasons; where a quasi-judicial authority makes an order it must record reasons, and an unreasoned order is a nullity. The petitioner relied upon the Siemens decision and a similar decision in Calcutta Municipal Corpn. v. Paresh R. Kampani to support this contention.
  • The availability of an alternative remedy (under Section 20 of the Act) does not operate as an absolute bar to an Article 227 petition. The petitioner relied on authorities (including A.V. Venkateswaran and Whirlpool) to contend that an alternative remedy will not operate as a bar at least in cases of (i) enforcement of fundamental rights, (ii) violation of principles of natural justice, or (iii) where the order/proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction. The petitioner also relied on Jenson & Nicholson for the proposition that the High Court has discretion to entertain Article 227 in appropriate cases.

Opposing Parties' Arguments (O.Ps / Respondents)

  • The maintainability of the Article 227 petition is disputed on the ground that Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Act provides an alternative and efficacious remedy by way of appeal; accordingly, the Article 227 petition is not maintainable.
  • It was submitted that the Presiding Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal had jurisdiction to pass the interim order and that any grievance could have been agitated before the appellate authority under Section 20 of the Act.
  • Counsel for respondent(s) also drew attention to factual points: that the money restrained does not belong to the National Bank of Bangladesh (as argued by one respondent), and emphasized that the order impugned was an interim one pending the Tribunal's further hearing fixed on 30 April 2002.
  • Reliance was placed on General Manager, Northern Railway v. Sarvesh Chopra to emphasise limits to precedential reliance (i.e., a decision is authority only for what it decided).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. v. The Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 981 : AIR 1976 SC 1785 Where an authority exercises a quasi-judicial function it must record reasons; every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons; the requirement to give reasons is a basic principle of natural justice. The petitioner relied on this case to argue that the interim order was a nullity if it was unreasoned. The Court recorded the petitioner's reliance but did not accept that the interim order lacked jurisdiction or was otherwise void for that reason in the circumstances of this case.
Calcutta Municipal Corpn. v. Paresh R. Kampani, (1998) 2 C.L.J 87 Reported in the opinion as supporting a similar decision regarding the requirement of reasons for quasi-judicial orders. The petitioner cited it as a corroborative authority for the principle that reasons must support quasi-judicial orders.
Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan, (2001) 6 SCC 569 : AIR 2001 SC 3208 (V (2001) SLT 778 : II (2001) BC 642) This case was referred to in the context of discussions on alternative remedies; the opinion records it but does not extract an explicit rule from it in the text provided. The opinion records the case as part of the submissions but does not state a specific application of its ratio beyond noting the parties' references to it.
A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Ramchand S. Wadhwani, AIR 1961 SC 1506 The existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction; the exceptions (complete lack of jurisdiction, violation of natural justice) are not exhaustive and the High Court has discretion in appropriate cases to entertain relief despite an alternative remedy. The Court treated this as the "mother decision" and central guiding authority for exercising discretion under Article 227 where an alternative remedy exists; it followed the flexible discretionary approach described in this case.
Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, (1998) 8 SCC 1 : VIII (1998) SLT 380 Confirmed that alternative remedy is not a bar to High Court exercising writ/judicial review jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: enforcement of fundamental rights, violation of natural justice, or where the order/proceeding is wholly without jurisdiction (or vires of an Act is challenged). The petitioner invoked this authority to support the proposition that Article 227 may be entertained despite an alternative remedy in limited contingencies; the Court considered it among other authorities on the point.
Jenson & Nicholson v. Industrial Investment Bank of India, (2002) 1 C.L.J 219 Noted that the existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar, but the discretion to entertain Article 227 should be exercised only where order was passed without jurisdiction, in violation of natural justice, or was manifestly illegal; also observed that an order prejudicially affecting a party may be challengeable in appeal. The Court cited and relied on aspects of this decision to emphasize that discretion to interfere is to be sparingly exercised and that not only "final orders" may be challengeable by appeal if prejudicial.
P.Ch. Dey v. Allahabad Bank, AIR 1999 Cal. 96 The opinion records disagreement by another bench (Jenson & Nicholson) with this case's ratio on a point concerning appealability of orders under the Act; the provided text does not elaborate the original rule of P.Ch. Dey. The opinion notes that Jenson & Nicholson differed with P.Ch. Dey, but does not adopt or apply P.Ch. Dey's ratio in the present decision.
General Manager, Northern Railway v. Sarvesh Chopra, (2002) 4 SCC 45 : II (2002) SLT 306 Principle that a decision is authority for what it decides and not for what it did not decide; limits may exist on reading a decision for propositions it did not address. Respondents relied on this decision to caution against over-reading precedents; the Court recorded the submission and used it as part of the context in assessing precedential reliance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the main question as whether the Article 227 petition was maintainable in view of an alternative remedy provided by Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Act and in light of the circumstances under which interference by the High Court is justified.

Step 1 — Identification of central principles: The Court reviewed competing principles drawn from precedents. It accepted A.V. Venkateswaran as the leading or "mother" decision on the discretionary approach: the existence of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction; exceptions such as lack of jurisdiction or breach of natural justice are not exhaustive and the High Court possesses discretion to act depending on the facts of each case.

Step 2 — Assessment of the impugned order and jurisdiction: The Court examined the impugned interim status quo order and found that it was passed by the Presiding Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Presiding Officer had fixed a subsequent date (30 April 2002) to hear the main application and to allow the defendants to file objections.

Step 3 — Application of discretionary principles to facts: The Court observed that the Tribunal's final hearing on 30 April 2002 could not proceed because of the filing of the Article 227 petition in the High Court. The judge emphasised that Article 227 is not merely a tool to stall proceedings before an authority of proper jurisdiction. Given that the Presiding Officer had jurisdiction, and the matter was set down for final hearing, the Court concluded that the circumstances did not justify the exercise of the High Court's discretionary supervisory jurisdiction to entertain and sustain the Article 227 petition.

Step 4 — Conclusion drawn from the analysis: Applying the guiding discretionary principles (as crystallised in A.V. Venkateswaran and reinforced by subsequent decisions noted in the opinion), and having regard to the facts that the order was interim, within jurisdiction, and that the Tribunal had fixed a date to conclude its proceedings, the Court exercised its discretion against entertaining the Article 227 petition and found it liable to be dismissed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition under Article 227 is DISMISSED.

Direct consequences and directions:

  • The Article 227 application was dismissed on contest without any order as to costs.
  • The learned Presiding Officer of Kolkata Debts Recovery Tribunal-I was directed to dispose of the matter expeditiously (i.e., to proceed with the Tribunal's hearing and decide the main application).

Broader implications: The opinion applies existing discretionary principles regarding alternative remedies and the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction (following A.V. Venkateswaran and related authorities). The Court did not indicate that it was laying down any new precedent; its decision is a fact-specific exercise of discretion declining to interfere with an interim order of a Tribunal that was within jurisdiction and had fixed a date for final hearing.

Show all summary ...

Narayan Chandra Sil, J.:— This is to consider the maintainability of the application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India which arose out of the Order dated 10th April, 2002 passed by the Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, Kolkata in connection with O.A No. 128 of 2001.

2. The O.Ps have challenged the maintainability of the application and as such the question of maintainability has been taken up for consideration.

3. It appears from the impugned order of the Presiding Officer, Kolkata Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, dated 10th April, 2002, that the application dated 18th February, 2002 filed by the applicant-Bank was taken up for consideration by him. After hearing both the parties the learned Presiding Officer passed the interim order of status quo restraining the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 from operating the Bank account bearing No. 412800566 of the defendant No. 3 maintained with the defendant No. 2 without touching a sum of U.S Dollar 3,52,250. In arriving at such decision the learned Presiding Officer after having considered the materials placed before him found prima facie case in favour of the applicant-Bank for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,43,67,841/- against the defendants including the defendant Nos. 2 and 3. Thereafter the learned Presiding Officer fixed the date on 30th April, 2002 for hearing the main application itself giving opportunities to the defendants for filing written objection.

4. On hearing the submissions of the learned Advocates for all the parties it appears to me that the main question for determination at this stage is whether the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is maintainable particularly in view of the provisions of appeal against the impugned order passed by the learned Presiding Officer.

5. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order is devoid of any reason as to why such status quo order was passed and unreasoned order is a nullity. In support of this contention the learned Advocate for the petitioner has referred to the ratio decided in the case of The Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. v. The Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 981 : AIR 1976 SC 1785, in which it was held that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes and every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. Then the Hon'ble Apex Court also held that the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. In this connection the learned Advocate for the petitioner has also referred to the ratio decided in the case of The Calcutta Municipal Corpn. v. Paresh R. Kampani, (1998) 2 C.L.J 87, where the similar decision was made.

6. Taking the case of the O.Ps that since Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to the Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’ only) has provided the alternative remedy in appeal, an application under Article 227 is not maintainable and as regards the decision made in the case of Punjab National Bank v. O.C Krishnan, V (2001) SLT 778 : II (2001) BC 642 (SC) : (2001) 6 SCC 569 : AIR 2001 SC 3208, the learned Advocate for the petitioner submits before me that the contention of the O.Ps is not correct inasmuch as it is now the settled principle that the alternative remedy will not operate as a bar at least in case of three contingencies, viz., (i) enforcement of any fundamental right or (ii) where there has been a violation of principle of natural justice or (iii) the order or proceeding is wholly without jurisdiction. In this connection the learned Advocate for the petitioner has referred to the ratio decided in the case of A.V Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, AIR 1961 SC 1506, in which it was inter alia held as below:

“The wide proposition that the existence of an alternative remedy is a bar to the entertainment of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution unless (1) there was a complete lack of jurisdiction in the officer or authority to take the action impugned, or (2) where the order prejudicial to the writ petitioner has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and could, therefore, be treated as void or non est and that in all other cases, Courts should not entertain petitions under Article 226 or in any event not grant any relief to such petitioners cannot be accepted. The two exceptions to the normal rule as to the effect of the existence of an adequate alternative remedy are by no means exhaustive, and even beyond them a discretion vests in the High Court to entertain the petition and grant the petitioner relief notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. The broad lines of the general principles on which the Court should act having been clearly laid down, their application to the facts of each particular case must necessarily be dependent on a variety of individual facts which must govern the proper exercise of the discretion of the Court, and in a matter which is thus pre-eminently one of discretion, it is not possible or even, if it were it would not be desirable to lay down inflexible rules which should be applied with rigidity in every case which comes up before the Court.”

7. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has also referred to the ratio decided in the case of Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, VIII (1998) SLT 380 : (1998) 8 SCC 1, in which it was, inter alia, held that it has been consistently held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the alternative remedy is not a bar for the High Court to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution at least in case of three contingencies namely where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of principles of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has also referred to the ratio decided in the case of Jenson & Nicholson v. Industrial Investment Bank of India, (2002) 1 C.L.J 219. In the said case it was observed by the Single Bench of this Court that there is no dispute with the proposition of law that existence of an alternative remedy is not the absolute bar in the matter of entertaining an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. But law is equally settled that such discretion should not be exercised unless it is established that the order impugned in such application was passed without jurisdiction or against the principle of natural justice or is manifestly illegal. Then the learned Judge differed with the ratio decided in the case of P.Ch Dey v. Allahabad Bank, AIR 1999 Cal. 96, and held that it is not correct that only a “final order” under Section 19 of the Act is appealable under Section 20 of the Act but any order made or deemed to have been made by the Tribunal can be challenged in appeal if such order prejudicially affects an aggrieved appellant. And in doing so the learned Judge dismissed the application for review in considering an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India holding that there was no error even apparent on the face of record.

8. Mr. Debangsu Basak, learned Counsel appearing with Mr. H.K Mitra for the O.P No. 2 has pointed out to me that the interim impugned order was passed on 10th April, 2002 by the learned Presiding Officer and the next date of hearing of the injunction petition was fixed on 30th April, 2002 but the injunction petition could not be heard for filing of the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner before this Court. It is also pointed out by him that if there was any grievance of the petitioner against the interim order of status quo that could be agitated before the appellate authority under Section 20 of the said Act. It is also submitted before me that the judgment passed in the case of Jenson & Nicholson (supra) speaks of the exigencies including the question of jurisdiction, but there is no doubt about it that the Presiding Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal has got the perfect jurisdiction to entertain the matter and the case of the petitioner that the Bank of India which is the O.P No. 2 in the instant case had no cause of action to agitate before the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal. Mr. Basak then submits that the two suits one before the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal and the other before the High Court are different inasmuch as in the case before the Tribunal the maintainability of the same was challenged whereas in the suit before the High Court the maintainability has not been challenged. Mr. Pratik Prokash Banerjee, learned Counsel appearing for the O.P No. 2, the exporter submits before me that money does not belong to the National Bank of Bangladesh and only interim order has been passed by the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal. It is submitted by him that there is no dispute as regards the general principles adopted in the various case laws cited by the learned Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Banerjee has referred to the ratio decided in the case of General Manager, Northern Railway v. Sarvesh Chopra, II (2002) SLT 306 : (2002) 4 SCC 45, in which it was inter alia, held:

“A decision of this Court is an authority for the proposition which it decides and not for what it has not decided or had no occasion to express an opinion on. The two decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondent hold a clause providing a departmental or an in house remedy and attaching finality to the decision therein to be an “excepted matter” because such were the clauses in the contracts which came up for the consideration of this Court. Those decisions cannot be read as holding nor can be relied on as an authority for the proposition by reading them in a negative way that if a departmental remedy for settlement of claim was not provided then the claim would cease to be an ‘excepted matter’ and such should be read as the decision of this Court.”

9. Mr. Ashish Chakraborty, the learned Advocate appearing for the O.P No. 5 has drawn my attention to the impugned order.

10. Now, after having considered the submissions made by all the parties before me and the different case laws referred to by the learned Advocates for the parties I like to take the decision made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of A.V Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay (supra) as a mother decision and an authority on this issue. Thus, after having followed the ratio decided in that case the principle of which appears to have been taken in the other subsequent judgments of the different High Courts including that in the Hon'ble Apex Court, it appears to me that the exigencies or the conditions of complete lack of jurisdiction, prejudice to either of the parties, violation of the principle of natural justice, etc. are all dependent on the facts and circumstances of each case. And in this connection I would like to recall the underlined portion of the judgment passed in the case of A.V Venkateswaran, (supra) appearing in my order at page 4 ante.

11. What is the background of the instant case here before me? The Presiding Officer of Kolkata Debts Recovery Tribunal-I passed an interim order which is very much within his jurisdiction and thereafter fixed the date for hearing of the main application on 30th April, 2002. The main application could not be heard on that day due to the filing of the instant petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In such circumstances, even keeping the controversy of availing the efficacious remedy from the Appellate Court under the provisions of Section 20 of the said Act aside, which is apparent is that the finality of the order, and who knows the relief sought for by the petitioner here before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, could not be achieved, at the time of final hearing of the application by the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal on the date fixed i.e, on 30th April, 2002. To my considered view the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not only for stalling the proceeding before the authority of proper jurisdiction and as such in view of what has been discussed in the foregoing lines I am of the view that the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is liable to be dismissed.

12. Accordingly, the application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is dismissed on contest without any order as to costs. The learned Presiding Officer, Kolkata Debts Recovery Tribunal-I is directed to dispose the matter expeditiously.

13. Petition dismissed.