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Ashoke Saha v. State Of West Bengal & Ors. .
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal challenges a judgment and order dated 10.12.98 of a learned single Judge in W.P. No. 20530 (W) of 1998, which dismissed the writ petition filed by the father of a student, Miss Anima Saha. The background as set out in the opinion is as follows:
- Miss Anima Saha appeared in the Secondary Examination in 1977 and obtained 56% (Second Division).
- She was admitted to Class XI in the Science stream at Baidyabati Charushila Bose Balika Vidyalaya and later promoted to Class XII.
- When her registration form was sent to the second respondent (the Council), it was rejected inter alia on the ground that she was not qualified to be admitted (i.e., did not meet statutory/regulatory eligibility for the Science stream).
- The single Judge found that she had not fulfilled the eligibility criteria for admission to the Science stream and that the second respondent had rightly refused to permit her to appear at the examination.
- The present appeal challenges that decision; it raises questions about the responsibilities of the school authorities, estoppel, and the power of the Council to condone or exempt regulatory requirements.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the student (Miss Anima Saha) can be permitted to appear in the Higher Secondary examination despite not meeting the eligibility criteria for the Science stream as prescribed by Regulation 14 (i.e., whether the Council or the school could be estopped from enforcing the eligibility condition).
- Whether the school authorities' failure (if any) to ensure the student's proper admission and registration precludes the Council from refusing permission to appear (argument of estoppel and prejudice to the student).
- Whether the Council had power under Regulation 2(c)(1) of the West Bengal Council of Higher Secondary Education (Examination) Regulations, 1982 to condone non-compliance (including non-registration or late registration) or otherwise exempt the student from mandatory eligibility requirements.
- Whether, under Regulation 12, the student could have changed elective subjects and whether that avenue ought to have been used/permitted to avoid disqualification.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The student could not reasonably be expected to be aware of the detailed regulations; responsibility lay with the school authorities to ensure proper admission into the courses for which she was eligible.
- Because the school admitted and promoted the student, the school authorities — and consequently the Council (second respondent) — are estopped or precluded from denying her the right to appear in the examination.
- Regulation 2(c)(1) (Examination Regulations, 1982) grants the Council power to condone or make exemptions; the Council ought to have exercised that power in this case.
- Regulation 14 (Admission and Allied Matters Regulations, 1987) prescribed minimum marks of 45% (as originally framed) and it was for the school authorities to prevent improper admission; alternatively, the student could have been permitted to change elective subject under Regulation 12.
- The daughter should not suffer because of alleged laches or negligence on the part of the school authorities; appellant relied on several precedents to support equitable relief.
Respondent No. 2's Arguments
- Admission to Class XI and eligibility for particular streams are governed by mandatory statutory regulations; no pupil may be admitted who does not fulfil the requisite criteria.
- The registration form in the writ petition was not pleaded to have been accompanied by the prescribed fees; further, the prescribed months for registration were not complied with (registration should be in January/February and not later than July, but the instant form was sent in September and refused in that month).
- The third proviso to Regulation 2(c)(1) (Examination Regulations, 1982) does not apply to a pupil who was not registered at all; the power to condone is confined to the circumstances set out in that proviso and not to permit registration where none was validly effected.
- The court should not be guided by misplaced sympathy; reliance was placed on authority (Guru Nanak Dev University v. Parminder Kr. Bansal) to support refusal of ad hoc relief contrary to statutory/regulatory provisions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shri Krishan v. The Kurukshetra University, AIR 1976 SC 376 | The Supreme Court found lapses by university authorities where students had been permitted to appear at examinations and later refused admission; in that fact situation the student could not be refused subsequently. | The present court distinguished this decision because in the instant case there existed a mandatory regulatory provision prescribing eligibility which was not complied with; consequently Shri Krishan did not control the result here. |
| Dr. Mrs. Sheela Ashok Patwardhan v. The Dean, Dr. V.M. Medical College, Solarpur, AIR 1989 SC 383 | Relief was considered where an applicant had requisite qualifications and a supernumerary post existed; decision concerned a situation where qualifications for admission were undisputed. | The court treated this decision as distinguishable on facts because in the present case the petitioner admittedly failed to comply with the mandatory regulatory qualifications. |
| Sanatan Gauda v. Berhampur University, AIR 1990 SC 1075 | Where the principal wrongly assured eligibility and the university permitted appearance, the Court held the university could not punish the student for the negligence of the principal; a student who had produced his marksheet and not engaged in fraud could not be refused the result. | The court found the Sanatan Gauda decision distinguishable on facts because in the instant matter the defect was pointed out to the Council as soon as it was brought to notice and the mandatory regulations were not complied with. |
| Sk. Abdul Rahim v. Judhisthir Rout, 1997 (1) CLJ 143 | Referenced as a precedent relied upon by the appellant (case concerned rights relating to admission). | The court noted this decision had considered a question relating to the right to take admission and observed it did not directly raise the precise issue before the present bench; it was therefore not determinative here. |
| Guru Nanak Dev University v. Parminder Kr. Bansal, (1993) 4 SCC 401 / AIR 1993 SC 2412 | Authority relied upon by respondent to show courts should not override statutory/regulatory requirements based on sympathy and that statutory scheme must be respected. | The court cited this authority in support of the proposition that statutory regulations govern eligibility and that sympathy cannot justify contravening mandatory regulatory provisions. |
| (Unspecified case) reported in AIR 1986 SC 1448 | The decision held that blame for wrongful admission lay upon the engineering colleges which granted admission where there was no imperative eligibility provision. | The court distinguished that decision on the basis that in the present case there was an imperative eligibility provision which the petitioner had not complied with. |
| A.P. Christian Medical Educational Society v. Government of A.P., (1986) 2 SCC 667 | Authority for the general principle that a pupil not entitled under statute/regulation to appear in an examination should not be allowed to do so. | The court placed this decision among a series of authorities supporting strict enforcement of statutory/regulatory eligibility and non-permission of ineligible candidates to appear. |
| State of T.N. v. St. Joseph Teachers' Training Institute, (1991) 3 SCC 87 | Principle that courts cannot grant relief on humanitarian grounds when that relief would be contrary to the law/statute. | The court cited this decision to reinforce that humanitarian sympathy cannot override clear statutory/regulatory requirements governing eligibility. |
| State of Maharashtra v. Vikas Sahebrao Roundale, (1992) 4 SCC 435 | Listed among decisions upholding the principle that statutory/regulatory eligibility must be enforced. | Used as part of a body of precedents supporting the court's conclusion that an ineligible pupil should not be permitted to appear. |
| Central Board of Secondary Education v. Nikhil Gulati, (1998) 3 SCC 5 | Another authority in the series affirming enforcement of statutory/regulatory eligibility for examinations. | Cited as support for the court's view that eligibility requirements cannot be lightly waived. |
| Central Board of Secondary Education v. Sunil Kumar, (1998) 5 SCC 377 | Part of the jurisprudence cited for the proposition that pupils not entitled under regulations should not be permitted to appear in examinations. | Referenced to show consistent Supreme Court authority enforcing eligibility rules for examination candidates. |
| Central Board of Secondary Education v. Adarsh Kumar Sedhwarayar, 1998 (2) CHN 61 (Division Bench of this Court) | Held that where a school was not affiliated and statute did not permit private candidates, students could not be permitted to appear; emphasized statutory compliance. | The court relied on this Division Bench decision to affirm that unless statute permits appearance (e.g., as private candidates), students cannot be allowed to appear contrary to statutory scheme. |
| Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Mrs. Asha Ramchandra Ambekar, AIR 1994 SC 2148 | Principle that jurisdiction under mandamus should not be exercised to direct actions that would contravene statutory provisions (e.g., appointing contrary to statute). | Invoked to support the proposition that courts should not direct actions (or grant relief) that would be contrary to statutory/regulatory prescriptions. |
| G. Kaluan Sundaram v. U.Co Bank, CLT 1995 (2) HC 201 | Authority noted for the observation that sympathy has no role to play where the law and statutory provisions are clear. | Cited to reinforce that sympathy cannot guide the court to override legal norms and statutory/ regulatory conditions. |
| Latham v. Richard Johnson & Nephew Ltd., 1911-13 AER (reprint) p.117 (Farwell L.J.) | Quoted for the maxim that sympathy or sentiment should not guide search for legal principles. | Quoted by the court to underline the admonition against deciding matters on sympathy rather than legal principle; used to buttress the court's strict approach to regulatory compliance. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds from a careful textual and purposive reading of the relevant regulations and the facts as presented:
-
Identification of the governing regulatory provisions:
- Regulation 10 (Registration of Students) prescribes the form, fee, and timeline for registration: submission by 28th February of the year in which a student is in Class XI, with exceptional acceptance till 31st July of the year in which a student is in Class XII subject to a late fine and possible further extension by the Council only on specific declaration of the Head of Institution.
- Regulation 14 (Admission and Allied Matters Regulations, 1987) prescribes minimum marks for eligibility to offer specified elective subjects at Higher Secondary Level (after substitution by notification dated 8.7.92, it prescribes minimum percentages in corresponding subjects).
- Regulation 12 permits change of elective subjects within a limited period or in certain cases where performance is reported to be very unsatisfactory, but with consequences (e.g., prosecution of studies again from Class XI when change is allowed).
- Regulation 2(c)(i) of the Examination Regulations, 1982 defines the condition for a regular candidate (including registration) and contains a third proviso relating to the Council's power to condone or make exemption, which the court construes narrowly.
-
Mandatory character of eligibility requirements:
The court finds that Regulation 14 and the eligibility requirements it sets out are imperative in character. They constitute conditions precedent to admission to a particular stream (here, the Science stream). If a pupil does not meet these conditions, the relevant authority has no jurisdiction to permit the pupil to be admitted to, or to appear as a regular candidate in, that stream.
-
Estoppel and school error:
The court rejects the appellant's estoppel argument against the statutory Council. Even if the school wrongly admitted or promoted the student, the rule of estoppel cannot be invoked to compel a statutory body (the Council) to act beyond the statutory framework. The Council is bound to act within the four corners of the statute and regulations.
-
Scope of condonation/exemption under Regulation 2(c)(i):
On proper construction, the court concludes the Council's power to condone or exempt (under the third proviso) is limited to particular conditions specified in the provision (for example, issues such as admission within three years of passing the last qualifying examination or attendance shortfalls). It does not extend to permitting registration or acceptance where mandatory registration requirements (e.g., time limits set out in Regulation 10) have not been adhered to in a manner that would authorize the Council to waive those fundamental prerequisites for being a regular candidate. Moreover, no application for condonation or exemption had been filed in this case.
-
Registration requirement:
Regulation 10 is procedural but carries substantive consequences because Regulation 2(c)(i) makes registration a first condition of being a regular candidate. The Council's power to accept late registrations is circumscribed (acceptance till 31st July for Class XII with a fine), and the court construed that there is no power to extend time beyond that date save as expressly permitted by the regulations. Thus, the student must be properly registered to be a regular candidate.
-
Precedent analysis:
The court reviewed and distinguished precedents relied on by the parties. It distinguished decisions where students had been permitted to appear and where there was no imperative eligibility provision (or where the institution itself had assured eligibility and the university had allowed appearance). The court also cited a series of Supreme Court decisions and a Division Bench decision of this court imposing strict compliance with statutory/regulatory eligibility requirements and rejecting humanitarian relief where it would contravene law. The court emphasized that sympathy is not a ground to contravene mandatory legal requirements.
-
Conclusion of analysis:
Having applied the mandatory regulatory provisions (Regulations 10, 12 and 14 and Regulation 2(c)(i) of the Examination Regulations, 1982), and having considered the precedents, the court concluded that the learned trial Judge committed no error in dismissing the writ petition.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED.
Implications and direct effects:
- The judgment and order of the learned single Judge dated 10.12.98 dismissing the writ petition is upheld; the petitioner (appellant father) does not succeed on the merits.
- There will be no order as to costs in the appeal (i.e., costs were not awarded against the appellant).
- The court permitted the second respondent (the Council) to take steps to register the appellant (presumably the student) in accordance with law — indicating that registration may be considered if undertaken in conformity with the statutes and regulations.
- The court recorded that Xerox certified copy of the order, if applied for urgently, shall be given on priority basis.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down any new legal principle beyond enforcing the existing regulatory scheme; the decision applies established principles and authorities to the facts of the case (i.e., it enforces mandatory regulatory eligibility and limits the role of estoppel and sympathy where statutory prescriptions apply).
Final notation in the opinion: S.N. Bhattacharya, J. agreed with the judgment; the appeal was dismissed.
Satyabrata Sinha, J.—This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 10.12.98 passed by a learned single Judge of this court in W.P No. 20530 (W) of 1998, whereby and whereunder the writ application filed by the writ-petitioner was dismissed. The writ-petitioner-appellant is the father of a student, Miss. Anima Saha. She appeared in the Secondary Examination in the year 1977 and was placed in Second Division having obtained 56% of the total marks. She was admitted in Baidyabati Charushila Bose Balika Vidyalaya in Class XI in Science stream. She had also been promoted to Class XII. When her registration form was sent to the second respondent, the same was rejected, inter alia, on the ground that she was not qualified to be admitted. The learned trial Judge having considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties had come to the conclusion that the daughter of the writ-petitioner-appellant having not fulfilled the eligibility criteria for getting admission in the Science stream, had rightly been refused by the second respondent to appear at the examination.
2. Mr. Basu Mallick, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has, inter alia, raised three questions in support of this appeal. The learned counsel submits that the daughter of the appellant cannot be said to be aware of regulation and it was for the school authorities to see that she gets admission in proper courses to which she was entitled to. Mr. Basu Mallick would urge that having admitted and promoted the appellant, the School authorities and consequently, the second respondent are estopped and precluded from placing an embargo in the matter of her appearance at the examination. The learned counsel has submitted that in terms of Regulation 2(c)(1) of the West Bengal Council of Higer Secondary Education (Examination) Regulations, 1982, the Council having power to condone or make exemption, it is a fit case in which such a power ought to have been exercised. The learned counsel submits that in terms of Regulation 14 of the West Bengal Council of Higher Secondary Education (Admission and Allied Matters) Regulations, 1987, the minimum marks having been prescribed as 45%, it was for the school authorities to see that the petitioner was not admitted and in any event, permitted to change the elective subject in terms of Regulation 12. According to the learned counsel, the daughter of the petitioner cannot suffer owing to latches and negligence on the part of the school authorities. Strong reliance in this connection has been placed on Shri Krishan v. The Kurukshetra University reported in AIR 1976 SC 376, Dr. Mrs. Sheela Ashok Patwardhan v. The Dean, Dr. V.M Medical College, Solarpur reported in AIR 1989 SC 383, Sanatan Gauda v. Berhampur University reported in AIR 1990 SC 1075 and Sk. Abdul Rahim… v. Judhisthir Rout…. reported in 1997 (1) CLJ 143.
3. Mr. Chatterjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent on the other hand, submitted that the matter relating to admission in Class XI being guided by a statutory regulation no pupil could be admitted to Class XI who does not fulfil the requisite criteria. The learned counsel submits that in the writ application it was not pleaded that the form for registration of the candidate was accompanied by the prescribed fees. It was pointed out that in terms of the Rules, such form for registration should be filed in the month of January and not later then the month of July of the relevant year; whereas in the instant case the form for registration of the writ-petitioner-appellant was sent in September and the same had been refused in that month itself, which would go to show that there was no delay and/or latches on the part of his client. The learned counsel submits that the third proviso appended to Regulation 2(c)(1) of the Examination Regulations, 1982 cannot be said to have any application in the instant case inasmuch as the power to condone or make exemption by the council is referable to the condition referred to in the said provision and not in respect of a pupil who was not registered at all. Mr. Chatterjee, submits that the court is not to be guided by misplaced sympathy and in support of the said contention, strong reliance has been placed on Guru Nanak Dev University v. Parminder Kr. Bansal reported in (1993) 4 SCC 401.
4. Regulation 10 deals with the registration of students which reads thus:—
“All students admitted into Class XI of a recognised institution should immediately apply in the prescribed form for registration of their names with the Council on payment of the requisite registration fee through the Head of the same institution. Students migrating from other States should pay migration fee. Cases of registration are to be submitted in the prescribed form duly filled in and countersigned with the usual fee of Rs. 5.00 latest by the 28th February of the year in which a student is in Class XI. Under exceptional circumstances registration form shall be accepted till the 31st July of the year in which a student is in Class XII provided a fine of Re. 1.00 is paid for each such form. The Council reserves the right to extend this date in exceptional circumstances on the specific declarations of the Head of the institutions. The Heads of the institutions are to submit registration forms in two instalments. One by the 28th February of the year in which the students are in Class XI and the other by the 31st July of the year in which the students are in Class XII. (Fees shall be deposited in the manner provided at the bottom of registration form).”
5. Regulation 14 as it originally stood provided that no student shall be admitted in the Science stream unless the combined aggregate score in physical science, life science and mathematics is not less than 45%. The said regulation was, however, substituted by Notification dated 8.7.92, relevant portion whereof reads thus:—
“In order to be eligible to take following elective subjects at Higher Secondary Level the student must obtain a minimum percentage of marks in the corresponding subject in the equivalent examination (i.e M.P or its equivalent) as noted below:—
Higher Secondary Subjects. Minimum Marks to be obtained in Madhyamik or equivalent examination Mathematics Statistics. 34% Business Economics including Business Mathematics. 34% Biological Science, Zoology. 34% in Life Science Bottany, Physiology, Physicsand/or Chemistry 34% in Physical Science Geography 34% in Geography”.
6. The regulation as noticed hereinbefore leave no manner of doubt whatsover that the same is mandatory in character. The proviso appended to Regulation 14 as it originally stood provides for a condition precedent for admission of a student in a particular stream. It is true that in terms of Regulation 12, a change in the elective subject may be applied for, but the same can be done only in the event conditions precedent therefor are fulfilled. Regulation 12 of the West Bengal Council of Higher Secondary Education (Admission and Allied Matters) Regulations 1987, reads thus:—
“12. Change of Elective Subjects. A student may be allowed to change any elective subject(s) offered by him/her at the time of admission in accordance with the subject combinations stated in Regulation 6(b) in Class XI only within a period of 3 months from the date of admision or within the 31st December of the year whichever is earlier if the Head of the Institution is satisfied with the reasons therefor.
The Council may, however, allow change of elective subject(s) to a student if his/her performance in the said subject(s) at the annual examination at the end of Class XI is reported by the Head of the Institution within a month to be very unsatisfactory.
Provided, however, the said pupil shall have to prosecute a regular course of studies again from Class XI:
Provided further that an unsuccessful candidate of Higher; Secondary Examination shall not be allowed readmission into an institution but may be permitted to appear as external candidate with non-laboratory based subjects on fulfilment of other requisites prescribed for the purpose.”
7. It is not the case of the appellant that his daughter has opted for change of the elective subject. The power of the Council to change the elective subject as provided for in the said regulation clearly shows that the same would be permissible if the performance of the student in the said subject at the annual examination at the end of Class XI is reported by the Head of the Institution within a month to be very unsatisfactory. The proviso appended to the aforementioned provision clearly mandates that in the event such change in the elective subject is allowed by the Council, the concerned pupil shall have to prosecute a regular course of studies again from Class XI. The question which arises for consideration is as to whether Regulation 14 is an essential condition or not. Once it is held that the said provision contains an essential condition and the concerned authority had no jurisdiction or power to make any exception/exemption in relation thereto, it must be held that before a pupil is admitted to a particular class he must fulfil the conditions precedently laid down therefor.
8. Having considered the phraseology used in Regulation 14 of the 1987 Regulations, we are of the opinion that as the same provides for eligibility of a candidate for offering the same subject as mentioned therein, the same is imperative in character. If the petitioner-appellant had been admitted by the school authorities wrongly, the rule of estoppel shall not apply as against the second respondent herein. The second respondent is a creature of the statute. It is bound to act within the four corners of the statute and only in the event it has the power to make any condonation and/or exemption adhering to the conditions laid down under the Regulations, it has no other option but to pass an order in terms of the statute.
9. In this view of the matter, we do not find any infirmity in the judgment passed by the learned trial Judge.
10. So far as the registration of the student is concerned, the same is governed by the Regulation 10, which reads thus:—
“10. Registration of Students.—All students admitted into Class XI of a recognised institution should immediately apply in the prescribed form for registration of their names with the Council on payment of the requisite registration fee through the Head of the same institution, students migrating from other States should pay migration fee. Cases of registration are to be submitted in the prescribed form duly filled in and countersigned with the usual fee of Rs. 5.00 latest by the 28th February of the year in which a student is in Class XI. Under exceptional circumstances registration form shall be accepted till the 31st July of the year in which a student is in Class XII provided a fine of Re. 1.00 is paid for each such form. The Council reserves the right to extend this date in exceptional circumstances on the specific declarations of the Head of the institutions. The Head of the institution are to submit registration forms in two instalments—One by 28th February of the year in which the students are in Class XI and the other by the 31st July of the year in which the students are in Class XII. (Fees shall be deposited in the manner provided at the bottom of registration form).”
11. The said regulation is procedural in nature. However, keeping in view the fact that Regulation 2(c)(i) of the Examination Regulation, 1982, clearly mandates that the first condition for being a regular candidate would mean a pupil registered by the Council is clearly a pointer to the fact that before a pupil can be permitted to appear in examination held by the second respondent as regular candidate, he/she must be registered. The respondent No. 2 on the face of Regulation 2(c)(i) cannot invoke its power of condonation of making an exception as provided for in the third proviso appended to in relation to registration of the candidate. As noticed hereinbefore, Regulation 10 clearly provides for mode, manner and time during which the application for registration should be made. There, of course, exists a provision for payment of late fine, but the same does not mean that it has any power to extend the time beyond 31st July of the year of which a student, who is in Class XII, would file such an application, which itself was subject to the condition that a fine as prescribed be paid. The power of condonation or maing exemption as provided for in Regulation 2(c)(i) of the Examination Regulation, 1982 upon proper construction thereof would be that the same applies in relation to a candidate (1) he is taken admission into Class XI within the period of three years from the date of his passing last qualifying examination; (2) attendance in Classes XI and XII is not less than 75% which as accepted at the Bar has now been amended to the extent that the power of exemption of Council is limited only to the 50% of the attendance. Thus essential conditions of being a regular candidate cannot be waived. In any event, no application for condonation or making exemption had been filed nor the Council has been asked to exercise its discretion in terms of third proviso appended to Regulation 2(c)(i) of 1982 Examination Regulations.
12. In Shri Krishan v. The Kurukshetra University reported in AIR 1976 SC 376 the Supreme Court found that the lapses were on the part of the University authorities. The students were permitted to appear at the examination and it was in that situation held that he could not have been refused to be admitted subsequently for any infirmity which should have been looked into for giving candidate permission to appear. The said decision has been distinguished by the Supreme Court as also by other High Courts in many other cases. In a decision reported in AIR 1986 SC 1448 the apex court held that the blame for wrongful admission squarely lay upon Engineering Colleges which granted admission to the students. However, in that case there was no such provision prescribing eligibility which was imparative in nature. In the instant case the petitioner admittedly had not complied with the mandatory provision of the regulations. In Dr. Mrs. Sheela Ashok Patwardhan v. The Dean, Dr. V.M Medical College, Solarpur reported in AIR 1989 SC 383, a supernumerary post was specifically created but despite the same when an application for admission was filed, the same had not been considered. It had not been disputed in the said case that the appellant therein had all the requisite qualifications for admission to post-graduate degree. In Sanatan Gouda v. Berhampur University reported in AIR 1990 SC 1075, again a candidate was allowed to appear at pre-Law and intermediate Law examinations but the result was not declared. Sharma, J. as the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India then was, however, noticed:—
“The Principal wrongly assured the University authorities that he had verified the position and that all the candidates were eligible. In these circumstances, the argument is that the appellant cannot take advantage of the fact that the University allowed him to appear at the examination. I am afraid, the stand of the respondent cannot be accepted as correct. From the letters of the University it is clear it was not depending upon the opinion of the Principal and had decided to verify the situation for itself. In that situation it cannot punish the student for the negligence of the Principal or the University authorities. It is important to appreciate that the appellant cannot be accused of making any false statement or suppressing any relevant fact before anybody. He had produced his marks-sheet before the College authority with his application for admission and cannot be accused of any fraud or misrepresentation. The interpretation of the rule on the basis of which the University asserts that the appellant was not eligible for admission is challenged by the appellant and is not accepted by the College and my learned Brother accepts the construction suggested by him as corrects. In such a situation evern assuming the construction of the rule as attempted by the University as correct, the Principal cannot be condemned for reconmmendlng the candidature of the appelant for the examination in question. It was the bounden duty of the University to have scrutinised the matter throughly before permitting the appellant to appear at the examination and not having done so it cannot refuse to publish his results.”
13. In the instant case the respondent No. 2 had pointed out the defect as soon as the matter was brought to its notice. It may be noticed that Sawant, J. also in that case held that in view of the regulation 10 framed under Chapter VIII of the Berhampur University observed:—
“Even though, therefore, for admission to the Law course there is no requirement of any particular marks for post-graduate students like the appellant and the appellant is entitled to be admitted under Regulation I in Chapter VIII of the said Regulations quoted earlier, the appellant satisfies the other qualification as well, viz. he has passed the M.A examination with 36 per cent in the aggregate deducting 13 marks in one of the papers and is, therefore, duly qualified to be admitted to the Law course.”
14. The said decision therefore, is also distinguishable on facts. On the other hand there are series of decisions wherein the Supreme Court has clearly laid down the law that a pupil who is not entitled to appear in the examination should not be allowed to do so in violation of the statutory regulation. Reference in this connection, may be made to A.P Christan Medical Educational Society v. Government of A.P reported in (1986) 2 SCC 667; State of T.N v. St. Joseph Teachers' Training Institute reported in (1991) 3 SCC 87; State of Maharashtra v. Vikas Sahebrao Roundale reported in (1992) 4 SCC 435; Central Board of Secondary Education v. Nikhil Gulati reported in (1998) 3 SCC 5; Central Board of Secondary Education v. Sunil Kumar reported in (1998) 5 SCC 377. In a decision reported in 1997 (1) CLJ 143, a Division Bench of this court was considering a matter relating to the right of a person to take admission and not with the question raised therein. In this jurisdiction also a Divsion Bench of this court in Central Board of Secondary Education v. Adarsh Kumar Sedhwarayar reported in 1998 (2) CHN 61 upon considering the aforementioned decision as also the decision of the apex court in Guru Nanak Dev University v. Parminder Kumar Bansal reported in (1993) 4 SCC 401 : AIR 1993 SC 2412 as also other decisions held:—
“It is beyond any dispute that the said Park Point School was not affiliated with the appellant. The writ petitioner might have taken admission under a misconception but it is beyond any cavil of doubt that unless the statute permits appearance of students as private candidates they cannot be permitted to do so.”
15. The Bench further noticed—
“In life Insurance Corporation of India v. Mrs. Asha Ramchandra Ambekar reported in AIR 1994 SC 2148, the law has been laid down in the following terms:
“Thus apart from the directions as to appointment on compassionate grounds being against statutory provisions, such direction does not take note of this fact. Whatever it may be the court should not have directed the appointment on compassionate grounds. The jurisdiction under mandamus cannot be exercised in that fashion.”
“In G. Kaluan Sundaram v. U.Co Bank reported in CLT 1995 (2) HC 201, I had observed that in the fact of that case even sympathy has no role to play and in that connection noticed:
In Latham v. Richard Johnson & Nephew Ltd. reported in 1911-13 AER (reprint) page 117, Farwell L.J observed—
“We must be very careful not to allow our sympathy sentiment is a dangerous will Or the wisp to take as a guide in the search for legal principles.
“In the State of Tamil Nadu v. St. Joseph Teachers Training College, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 87 the apex court observed that court cannot grant relief on humanitarian ground contrary to law.”
16. Upon considering the provisions of the relevant regulations, court having found that the petitioners therein did not come within the purview of the said Regulations, the writ applications filed by them were directed to be dismissed.
17. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is, accordingly, dismissed; but in the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. However, the second respondent may take steps to register the appellant in accordance with law.
Xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for urgently, shall be given on priority basis.
S.N Bhattacharya, J.—I agree.
K.PAppeal dismissed
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