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M/S. National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Anjali Mallick & Ors. .
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This Rule (Civil Rule No. 422(M) of 1992) was issued by a Division Bench directing the respondent opposite parties (the claimants before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal) to show cause why implementation of an award dated 16.9.91 in MAC Case No. 166 of 1990 (Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Midnapore) should not be stayed until the disposal of an appeal and for any other orders the Court may deem fit.
By an order dated 13.3.92, implementation of that award was stayed. The Court heard counsel for the appellant petitioner (the insurer), counsel for the respondent claimants, and a Senior Advocate as amicus curiae. The appellant insurer had filed separate but factually identical appeals (FMAT 176/1992, FMAT 177/1992, FMAT 178/1992) challenging identical awards of Rs. 25,000/- made by the Tribunal in relation to a single accident. A Division Bench earlier directed the insurer to deposit 50% of the award (Rs. 12,500/-) with the Registrar, and that amount was deposited on 19.2.92.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether implementation of the award dated 16.9.91 should be stayed pending the disposal of the insurer's appeal.
- Whether the Insurance Company is liable under the Motor Vehicles Act (the no-fault provisions / third-party risk provisions) for persons who were gratuitous passengers in a goods vehicle (i.e., whether such passengers qualify as "third parties" covered by the insurer).
- Whether the deposited sum of Rs. 12,500/- (50% of the award), already placed with the Registrar, should be released to the claimant-respondents notwithstanding the pending appeal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Insurance Company's) Arguments
- The insurer (through Mr. Ajit B. Majumdar) contended that the deposited sum (Rs. 12,500/-) should not be allowed to be withdrawn by the claimants while the appeal was pending.
- The insurer relied on authorities (including Jibanananda Mohanty v. Artatrana Misra and the Supreme Court decision in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. Pvt. Ltd.) for the proposition that third-party risk under section 95 (Motor Vehicles Act, 1939) or section 147 (Motor Vehicles Act, 1988) does not include gratuitous passengers; a passenger in a goods vehicle not carried for hire or reward is not a third party and the insurer is not liable for such passengers.
Respondent Claimants' Arguments
- The claimants (through Mr. P.B. Sahu) urged that the deposited Rs. 12,500/- should be disbursed to them, arguing in part that there is a no-fault liability of the Insurance Company which warrants immediate payment.
- The respondent relied on authorities (including Ravi Kumar v. Ram Prakash; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mst. Sukhiabai; Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Maheswari Roy) that support the principle of immediate/no-fault liability and the limited availability of defenses to insurers under the no-fault provisions.
Amicus Curiae's Submissions
- The amicus (Mr. Biswajit Chowdhury) placed before the Court the Division Bench decision National Insurance Co. v. Dundamma and related Karnataka authorities which emphasize that, for goods vehicles, liability of the insurer is confined to persons permitted under the applicable motor vehicle rules and that, in some circumstances, an owner of the goods travelling as a passenger may be a third party covered under section 95(1)(b)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jibanananda Mohanty v. Artatrana Misra (Orissa High Court), 1992 ACJ 851 | Propounded that third-party risk under section 95 (MV Act, 1939) or section 147 (MV Act, 1988) does not include gratuitous passengers; a passenger not carried for hire/reward in a goods vehicle is not a third party and insurer not liable. | The Court recorded that the appellant relied on this authority but concluded that the cases relied upon by the appellant did not have application to the facts where no-fault liability under section 92A/section 140 was in play. |
| Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. Pvt. Ltd., (1977) AIR 1977 SC 1735; 1977 ACJ 343 | Held that under section 95, risk to a passenger who is not carried for hire or reward need not be insured; insurer not liable for such passenger. | The Court noted the insurer's reliance but did not accept that this principle controlled the present case involving the no-fault provisions; the Court found the cited authorities inapplicable to the no-fault context before it. |
| National Insurance Co. v. Dundamma (Karnataka High Court Division Bench), 1992 ACJ 1 | Held that in respect of goods vehicles, insurer's liability is confined to persons permitted under Rule 161 (Karnataka MVR 1963) and that owners of goods travelling as passengers could be third parties covered by section 95(1)(b)(i). | The judgment was placed before the Court by amicus curiae, but the Court ultimately found the authorities relied upon by the insurer and amicus not to have application to the no-fault liability context of the present matter. |
| Channappa v. Laxman, AIR 1979 Karnataka 93 | Earlier Karnataka decision treated as precedent in Dundamma (principle concerning status of persons travelling in goods vehicles). | The Court recorded that Dundamma treated Channappa as good law; however, the Bench did not consider these precedents decisive in the instant no-fault dispute. |
| Indian Mutual General Insurance Society Ltd. v. Manzoor Ahsan, 1977 ACJ 85 : AIR 1977 Calcutta 34 | Held that if a truck met with an accident and the owner of the goods died, the insurer was not liable under section 95(1)(b) because the deceased was a hirer and not travelling under a contract of employment with the vehicle owner. | The Court noted the insurer's reliance on this authority but found it inapplicable to the no-fault provisions being applied in the present case. |
| Ravi Kumar v. Ram Prakash, AIR 1989 Delhi 261 (Single Judge) | Held that an exception/defence against no-fault liability under section 92A is not available to an insurer; liability under section 95 includes liability under section 92A; defences under section 96(2) are limited in the context of section 92A by reason of section 92E: the liability is peremptory and immediate. | The Court accepted the authority as supporting the principle that no-fault liability requires immediate payment by the insurer and treated it as relevant to the question of release of deposited funds to claimants. |
| Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan, AIR 1987 SC 1184 | Considered whether an insurer could claim immunity from a decree on the basis of a policy exclusion (e.g., exclusions as to named drivers or unlicensed drivers) under section 96(2)(b)(ii). | The Court noted that Ravi Kumar had distinguished Skandia; the present Bench referred to that distinction in explaining the scope of defenses available to insurers under the no-fault/statutory provisions. |
| United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mst. Sukhiabai, AIR 1992 Madhya Pradesh 53 | Held that for a no-fault liability the insurer must instantly discharge such liability and that the Tribunal need not name a tortfeasor or apportion; insurer can pursue restitution questions in the same trial rather than by separate suit. | The Court cited this decision as supportive of the principle that no-fault liabilities must be promptly discharged by insurers and that restitution/recourse can be pursued separately. |
| Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Maheswari Roy, AIR 1992 Calcutta 330 | Held that liability under section 92A could not be defeated on any ground; Parliament intended that no-fault liability not be taken away; also addressed that section 306 (Succession Act) did not cause abatement in proceedings under Chapter VII-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. | The Court regarded this authority as supporting the view that no-fault liability under the statutory scheme is intended to be effective and immediate and should not be defeated by other grounds. |
| Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More, (1991) 3 SCC 530 : AIR 1991 SC 1768 | Described the no-fault provision (section 92A of MV Act, 1939 or section 140 of MV Act, 1988) as beneficial legislation intended to secure expeditious payment of limited compensation; held that beneficial legislation should be interpreted to advance its purpose and that Claims Tribunals need not follow the normal procedural adjudication prescribed elsewhere in the Act for such limited relief. | The Court expressly took this decision into consideration and applied the principle that the no-fault statutory provision must be construed beneficially. Relying on this, the Bench directed release of the entire deposited amount (Rs. 12,500) to the claimants without security and without prejudice to the parties' rights. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner:
- Joinder of appeals and common hearing: The Court allowed the appellant's application to have the three separate but factually identical appeals (FMAT 176/1992, FMAT 177/1992, FMAT 178/1992) heard together because common questions of fact and law existed (identical FIR, charge-sheet, investigation report, insurance policy and witnesses).
- Deposit and interim order: A prior Division Bench order required the insurer to deposit 50% of the award (Rs. 12,500) with the Registrar, and that deposit was made. The immediate interlocutory question was whether the claimants could withdraw that deposited amount while the appeals remained pending.
- Competing authorities and positions: The insurer relied on decisions (including Orissa and Supreme Court authorities) that, in their submission, denied coverage to gratuitous passengers in goods vehicles because such passengers are not "third parties" under section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (and corresponding provisions). The insurer sought to prevent withdrawal of the deposit pending resolution of that legal question.
- Countervailing authorities favoring no-fault payment: The claimants (and supporting authorities relied upon by them) advanced the position that the no-fault provisions (section 92A of the 1939 Act / section 140 of the 1988 Act) impose an immediate, limited, statutory liability on insurers; available defenses are constrained; and therefore deposited funds should be made available to victims promptly.
- Evaluation and interpretive approach: The Bench declared that the cases relied upon by the insurer and by the amicus did not have application to the facts where the no-fault liability regime applied. The Court invoked the interpretive principle from Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More: the no-fault provision is beneficial legislation intended to secure expeditious payment of limited compensation and should be construed so as to advance that beneficent purpose rather than defeat it.
- Consequential application: Applying that principle, and having regard to the statutory scheme that contemplates immediate limited compensation without requiring the Claims Tribunal to follow the full procedural adjudication applicable to ordinary claims, the Bench concluded that the deposited sum ought to be released to the claimants without security and without prejudice to the parties' rights and contentions.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
Rule disposed of.
The Court directed that the entire deposited amount of Rs. 12,500/- (which had been ordered to be deposited by the appellant Insurance Company) be withdrawn by the claimant-respondents without furnishing any security and without prejudice to the rights and contentions of both parties. The Rule (Civil Rule No. 422(M) of 1992) stands disposed of and the Court made no order as to costs.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the claimants are entitled to immediate release of the deposited 50% of the award (Rs. 12,500) despite the pending appeal.
- The order is grounded on the Court's view that the no-fault statutory regime (section 92A/section 140 and related provisions) is intended to provide expeditious, limited compensation and should be interpreted beneficially; consequently, interim deposits required by earlier orders should be made available to victims promptly.
- The Court disposed of the Rule without expressing any broader new legal precedent beyond applying established authorities (notably Shivaji Dayanu Patil) to the facts; the decision resolves the immediate interlocutory dispute between these parties (release of deposited funds) and preserves the parties' substantive rights on appeal.
End of summary based exclusively on the provided opinion.
This Rule being Civil Rule No. 422(M) of 1992 has been issued by a Division Bench of this Court asking the respondent opposite parties who are the claimants before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to show-cause as to why the implementation of the award dated 16.9.91 in MAC Case No. 166 of 1990 of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Midnapore should not be stayed till the disposal of the appeal and such further order/orders should not be made as to the Court may deem fit and proper.
2. By an order dated 13.3.92 the implementation of the award in MAC Case No. 166 of 1990 was stayed. We have heard Mr. Ajit Bhusan Majumdar for the appellant petitioner and Mr. P.B Sahu for the respondent and Mr. Biswajit Chowdhury, Senior Advocate as amicus curiae.
3. There is an application for analogous hearing of the present appeal along with FMAT 176 of 1992 filed by the appellant where Parvati Dehari filed a claim on account of the death of her son Danga Dehari in the selfsame accident. Another claim was filed by Chabi Khamroi claiming compensation for the death of her husband Badal Khamroi in the said accident. In each of the three cases the Tribunal made an award at the rate of 25,000/-. National Insurance Co. Ltd. has filed three separate appeals being FMAT 176 of 1992, FMAT 177 of 1992 and FMAT 178 of 1992 contending inter alia that as the victims were gratuitous passengers in the truck and had no insurance coverage, the Insurance Company had no liability to bear the compensation as awarded by the Tribunal below. We allow the application for analogous hearing of all the three appeals being FMAT 176 of 1992 and FMAT 178 of 1992 to be heard along with the present appeal being FMAT 177 of 1992 since common questions of fact and law are involved in all the three appeals, the FIR, charge-sheet and investigation report are also identical covering all the three cases and the insurance policy as also the witnesses are also identical in respect of all the three cases.
4. By an order dated February 18, 1992 a Division Bench of our Court directed the appellant Insurance Company to put in 50% of the amount of the award that is Rs. 12,500/- with the Registrar, Appellate Side by an account payee cheque and we are given to understand that a sum of Rs. 12,500/- was deposited on 19.2.92 by Mr. A.B Majumdar, Advocate by C.D Challan No. 1344 with the Account Section.
5. Mr. Ajit Majumdar contended that even though Rs. 12,500/- was deposited by the appellants in the present case the same amount should not be allowed to withdraw by the claimants-respondents. We have heard Mr. P.B Sahu, the learned advocate for the claimants respondent in this context who urged us to disburse the same amount of Rs. 12,500/- to the claimant respondents contending inter alia that it was a no-fault liability of the Insurance Company.
6. Mr. Majumdar placed before us a Division Bench Judgment of the Orissa High Court in Jibanananda Mohanty v. Artatrana Misra reported in 1992 Accidents Claims' Journal 851 for the proposition that as regards the third party risk which the Insurance Company is to bear under section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 or under section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it will not mean and include a gratuitous passenger. A passenger who is not carried for hire or reward in a goods vehicle is not a third party and the Insurance Company is not liable on that account. Mr. Majumdar in this context also relied upon a Supreme Court judgment in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. Pvt. Ltd., reported in 1977 Accidents Claims Journal 343 : AIR 1977 SC 1735, where it was held that under section 95 the risk to a passenger in a vehicle who is not carried for hire or reward is not required to be insured and the Insurance Company is not liable under the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act.
7. Mr. Chowdhury as amicus curiae also placed before us a 3-Judge decision of a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in National Insurance Co. v. Dundamma*, reported in 1992 Accidents Claims Journal, page 1 where it was held that in respect of goods vehicle, the liability of the Insurance Company is confined to the number of persons permitted to be carried in the goods vehicle under Rule 161 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules 1963 and the goods carried are those as defined in section 2(7) of the Act. It was held in this context that a previous decision in Channappa v. Laxman reported in AIR 1979 Karnataka 93 was still good law and that the owner of the goods travelling as a passenger in goods vehicle was a third party in respect of whom the risk was required to be compulsorily covered by section 95(1)(b)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
8. Reliance was also placed on a Calcutta High Court Division Bench judgment in Indian Mutual General Insurance Society Ltd. v. Manzoor Ahsan, reported in 1977 ACJ 85 : AIR 1977 Calcutta 34 where it was held that if a truck met with an accident and owner of the goods carried died, the Insurance Company was not liable to satisfy the award in terms of section 95(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 because the deceased was a hirer and was not travelling under any contract of employment with the owner of the vehicle.
9. Mr. Sahu on the other hand relied upon a Single Judge decision of the Delhi High Court in Ravi Kumar v. Ram Prakash, reported in AIR 1989 Delhi 261 for the proposition that an exception or a defence against no-fault liability is not available to insurer. That was a case where a minor drive a vehicle who was himself disqualified to hold a driving licence. It was urged on behalf of the Insurance Company that there was no liability under section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It was held in this case that when an insurance company is saddled with liability to the extent provided in section 95 of the Act, that liability would include the liability incurred under section 92-A of the Act as well. Though no doubt various defences as provided under section 96(2) of the Act are available to the insurance company but these defences would not be available to the insurance company in respect of its liability to pay compensation under section 92A in view of the overriding effect of this statutory provision by virtue of section 92E of the Act. Perhaps, the only defence that would be available would be that the offending vehicle was not insured with the insurance company in question. Provisions of section 92A are peremptory and do not admit of any exception or defence and these provisions provide for immediate relief and that would appear to be the intention of the legislature as well. It cannot be said that Chapter VII-A is an independent provision separate from Chapter VIII of the Act of 1939. Proceedings under section 92A of the Act brook no delay. The only thing that is required to be seen is that the policy of insurance complies with the requirements as laid down in the Act and it is immaterial if ultimately the petition fails either on the principle of fault or even on any of the defences permissible to the insurance company as laid down in section 96(2) of the Act. Liability of the insurance company under section 92A of the Act to the extent mentioned therein would therefore appear to be absolute. This decision, however, took into consideration the Supreme Court decision in Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1184. The latter decision was distinguished since in that case the question arose as to whether the insurance company was entitled to claim immunity from a decree obtained by the legal representatives of the victim on the ground that the insurance policy provided a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence and that such exclusion was permissible in the context of section 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act for claiming immunity against the obligation to satisfy the judgments against the insured in respect of third party risks.
10. Mr. Sahu also placed reliance on a Single Bench Judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Mst. Sukhiabai, reported in AIR 1992 Madhya Pradesh 53 in which it was held that in respect of awarding of compensation if there is a no-fault liability, such liability is to be instantly discharged by the insurance company and the Tribunal need not name tortfeasor apportioning his liability. However, the insurance company can agitate question of restitution in the same trial and need not file separate suit therefor. Mr. Sahu further relied on a Calcutta High Court Division Bench judgment in the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Maheswari Roy, reported in AIR 1992 Calcutta 330 where it was held that a liability under section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act could not be put to an end on any ground whatsoever. The Parliament made it clear that no fault liability could not be taken away by any other provisions of any other Act. In the facts of the said case, however, the Court had to deal as to whether section 306 of the Succession Act had any manner of application to a proceeding under Chapter VILA of the Motor Vehicles Act where it answered the question that there was no case of abatement.
11. We have given the matter our anxious consideration. We do not think that the cases cited by Mr. Majumdar or Mr. Chowdhury had any manner of application to the facts and circumstances of the present case where the no fault liability of the Insurance Company comes into play. We take into consideration the principle of law enunciated in Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 530 : AIR 1991 SC 1768. The no fault provision as is propounded in section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 or section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 is in the nature of a beneficial legislation enacted with a view to confer the benefit of expeditious payment of a limited amount by way of compensation to the victims of an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle on the basis of no fault liability. In the matter of interpretation of a beneficial legislation the approach of the courts is to adopt a construction which advances the beneficient purpose underlying the enactment in preference to a construction which tends to defeat that purpose. Here the Claims Tribunal is not required to follow the normal procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules with regard to adjudication of a claim as delineated in the Act (110A of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 or section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act 1988). We would, accordingly, direct that the entire amount of Rs. 12,500/- which has been ordered to be deposited by the appellant Insurance Company should be withdrawn by the claimants respondent without furnishing any security and without prejudice to the rights and contention of both the parties. Rule stands disposed of accordingly without any order as to costs.
Rule disposed of.
A.R
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