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Union Of India v. Ram Peary Debi Kanoria

Calcutta High Court
Sep 19, 1983
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Union of India filed a suit seeking a declaration that two deeds of settlement (dated 22nd March, 1957 and 25th March, 1967 as stated in the plaint) were not binding upon creditors, including the plaintiff, in respect of Smt. Ram Peary Debi Kanoria. The original defendant, Ram Peary Debi Kanoria, had been assessed for income-tax (earlier at Benaras and, since assessment year 1952-1953, at Calcutta). The assessment for 1952-1953 was completed on or about 29th March, 1957 and included a sum of Rs. 1,90,000 as undisclosed and secreted income. Outstanding income-tax dues remained unpaid.

During the course of the assessment for 1951-1952 it is alleged that Ram Peary Debi collusively executed two deeds of trust conveying, in total, Rs. 1,00,000 (two transfers of Rs. 50,000 each) in favour of trustees for the benefit of her grandchildren, without consideration and with the purpose of defeating creditors. The defendant subsequently died and her heirs/legal representatives were substituted.

The defendants raised a written-statement defence contending (inter alia) that an appeal from the assessment was preferred and disposed of; that the assessed sum of Rs. 1,90,000 was wrongly assessed; that at the time of execution of the two deeds the original defendant had no creditors and the deeds were bona fide settlements for the grandchildren; and that the suit was vexatious and liable to be dismissed.

At trial, the plaintiff led evidence through Income-tax department witnesses and produced demand-register extracts to prove outstanding tax demands and the transfers effected by the original defendant. The defendants did not call evidence at trial. The Court framed three issues: (1) maintainability of the suit as framed; (2) whether the two deeds of settlement (dated 22nd March, 1957 and registered on 25th March, 1957, as also referred in the plaint) were void and not binding upon the plaintiff; and (3) to what relief the plaintiff was entitled.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Is the suit maintainable as framed?
  2. Are the deeds of settlement dated 22nd March, 1957 and registered on 25th March, 1957 void and not binding upon the plaintiff?
  3. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • Evidence from Income-tax department officers and demand registers established outstanding tax demands against Ram Peary Debi Kanoria, including a carry-forward demand from year to year and a remaining liability of Rs. 20,793 in respect of assessment year 1952-1953.
  • The two deeds of trust/transfers (total Rs. 1,00,000) to the grandchildren were effected during the pendency of income-tax proceedings and were made without consideration and with intent to defraud creditors, particularly the Income-tax Department.
  • The plaintiff relied on documentary evidence (assessment forms, appellate order, demand register extracts) and oral testimony; defendants did not rebut these facts by adducing evidence.

Defendants' Arguments (as presented in the written statement and by Mr. P.N. Dey)

  • The assessment figure of Rs. 1,90,000 was wrongly and illegally assessed and therefore Ram Peary Debi was under no obligation to pay the same to the plaintiff.
  • At the time of executing the two deeds of trust the original defendant had no creditors; the deeds were bona fide settlements to provide for grandchildren and not executed with intent to defraud creditors.
  • Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act applies where the whole body of creditors is affected and not to a suit by a single creditor; therefore a suit by the plaintiff alone under Section 53 was improperly framed.
  • The suit purported to be representative under Order 1 Rule 8, Civil P.C.; the plaintiff failed to advertise/serve notice as required for representative suits, so the suit lost its character as a representative suit and was not maintainable.
  • Relied upon authorities (including (1962) 66 Cal WN 912 and AIR 1943 Mad 531) to support the proposition that a suit under Section 53 should benefit all creditors and follow the procedure for representative suits.
  • Prayed for dismissal of the suit as vexatious and harassing and sought costs.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(1962) 66 Cal WN 912 Referenced by defendants for the proposition that no evidence and no notice had been given in a representative-type suit. The Court recorded the defendant's reliance on the case but, after reviewing contrary authorities, did not accept the contention that only a suit on behalf of all creditors was maintainable; the case was considered but not followed as conclusive.
AIR 1943 Mad 531 — Nandaramdas v. Zulika Bibi Explains inference of fraudulent intent from conduct and holds that a suit under Section 53 should be instituted on behalf of or for benefit of all creditors; without asking permission under Order 1 Rule 8 the suit is wrongly framed. The Court quoted the decision's observations on inferring fraudulent intent but contrasted its holding with later authorities allowing a single creditor to sue; the Court did not treat Nandaramdas as overriding in the facts of the present case.
AIR 1973 Ker 125 Held that even if there is a single creditor he can file a suit under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act to set aside a fraudulent transfer. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that Section 53 is available to a single creditor and thus the plaintiff could maintain the suit even if other creditors were not shown to exist.
AIR 1930 Mad 665 Held that even if there was only one creditor, an act of the debtor in transferring all his property with a view to secrete it and defeat the creditor would be fraudulent and could be set aside. The Court recited this decision to reinforce the position that Section 53 can apply where there is a single creditor and uses it alongside other authorities to reject the defendants' argument that only a body of creditors can invoke Section 53.
AIR 1965 Andh Pra 68 Division Bench held that Section 53 would apply even where a debtor disposes of his property with intention of defeating one single creditor; no distinction between single and multiple creditors. The Court cited this decision to support its conclusion that Section 53 applies even where only one creditor exists, thereby undermining the defendants' maintainability objection.
AIR 1967 Ker 171 Expressed a similar view that the statute does not require more than one creditor to be in existence at the time of institution of the suit. The Court relied on this authority as part of a line of cases supporting the proposition that a single creditor may invoke Section 53.
AIR 1971 Assam 143 (para 10) Held that a Court should decline to frame an issue as to maintainability of a suit in the absence of specific averment in the written statement explaining why the suit is not maintainable. The Court applied this principle to hold that the defendants' bald plea that the suit was not maintainable (without specific pleading) could not sustain an issue of maintainability.
AIR 1925 Cal 547 — Abdul Hakim v. Abdul Gani Held that issuing of notice under Order 1 Rule 8 is the duty of the Court and if the Court fails in that duty, the suit should not be dismissed for want of such notice. The Court relied on this authority to reject the defendants' contention that the absence of notice (by the plaintiff) of a representative suit should defeat the plaintiff's case, since the issuance of such notice is a court duty.
AIR 1933 PC 183 — Kumaravelu Chettiar v. T.P. Ramaswami Ayyar Holds that when permission under Order 1 Rule 8 is granted, it is the imperative duty of the Court to direct notice to absent parties; absence of such notice given by the Court should not defeat the plaintiff's suit. The Court used this precedent to support the proposition that failure of the Court to give notice (if any) cannot be the ground for defeating the plaintiff's suit where the Court itself failed to perform its duty.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in these principal steps, based strictly on the materials and arguments recorded in the opinion:

  1. Evidence adduced by the plaintiff (tax assistant, Income-tax Officer, demand-register extracts and the assessment order) established outstanding tax demands against Ram Peary Debi Kanoria, including demands carried forward and a remaining quantified demand in relation to the assessment year 1952-1953.
  2. The plaintiff proved that during the pendency of the income-tax proceedings the original defendant effected transfers by two deeds of trust (aggregate Rs. 1,00,000) in favour of her grandchildren. The plaintiff asserted these transfers were without consideration and made with intent to defraud or delay creditors.
  3. The defendants did not adduce rebuttal evidence at trial to negate or explain the plaintiff's documentary and oral proof. The Court treated the relevant facts as unchallenged in the absence of contrary evidence.
  4. On the question of maintainability, the defendants contended Section 53 applies only for the benefit of the entire body of creditors and that the suit should have complied with the representative-suit procedure under Order 1 Rule 8 (including notice/advertisement). The Court examined case law and statutory provisions in answer to this contention.
  5. The Court reviewed authorities that supported both views — those suggesting a representative procedure is appropriate and those holding a single creditor can maintain a suit under Section 53. The Court relied on subsequent authorities (including AIR 1973 Ker 125, AIR 1930 Mad 665, AIR 1965 Andh Pra 68 and AIR 1967 Ker 171) holding that a single creditor may invoke Section 53 — concluding that Section 53 need not be confined to situations involving the whole body of creditors.
  6. The Court also held that a defendant's bare plea in the written statement that the suit is not maintainable (without specific pleading of facts showing why) is insufficient to sustain an issue on maintainability, relying on AIR 1971 Assam 143 to require specific averments in the written statement.
  7. The Court addressed the procedural contention that no notice had been served for a representative suit. It held that where the Court itself has a duty to cause notice to be served under Order 1 Rule 8, failure of the Court to give such notice cannot be used to defeat the plaintiff's suit (citing AIR 1925 Cal 547 and AIR 1933 PC 183).
  8. In addition to the Transfer of Property Act analysis, the Court noted that Section 281 of the Income-tax Act renders, in specified circumstances, transfers or charges created during pendency of proceedings void as against tax claims (subject to exceptions). The Court considered Section 281 supportive of the plaintiff's entitlement to relief in the circumstances of outstanding tax demands and transfers made during pendency of proceedings.
  9. Given the uncontroverted evidence of tax demands, the unchallenged proof of transfers made during the pendency of tax proceedings, the line of authorities permitting a single creditor to invoke Section 53, and the operation of Section 281 of the Income-tax Act, the Court found for the plaintiff on the material issues.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Issue No. 1 (maintainability) — answered in the affirmative.
Issue No. 2 (whether the deeds of settlement are void and not binding upon the plaintiff) — answered in the affirmative.
Issue No. 3 (relief) — the Court passed a decree in terms of prayers (b) and (f).

Implications:

  • The Court's ruling directly results in a decree favourable to the plaintiff: the suit was held maintainable and the impugned deeds were declared (or treated) as not binding upon the plaintiff, with relief granted in the terms specifically stated as prayers (b) and (f) in the plaint (the opinion records the decree entry in those terms).
  • The Court relied on both Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 281 of the Income-tax Act in reaching its decision: Section 53 was held available to the plaintiff even as a single creditor in the factual matrix; Section 281 supported the proposition that transfers made during pendency of income-tax proceedings can be void as against tax claims.
  • The decision turned on the uncontroverted documentary and oral evidence of outstanding tax demands and the execution of transfers during the pendency of proceedings, together with the defendants' failure to give rebuttal evidence or specific pleadings on maintainability.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel principle beyond application of established authorities and statutory provisions; the Court applied existing precedents to the facts before it and entered the decree in favour of the plaintiff. The direct effect is the decree for the plaintiff in terms recorded; no broader pronouncement claiming to create new law is stated in the opinion.

Order accordingly.

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JUDGMENT

Union of India filed a suit for a declaration that the two deeds of settlement both, dated 22nd of March, 1957 and 25th of March, 1967 were not binding upon the creditors including the plaintiff of Smt. Rampeary Debi Kanoria.

2. The original defendant Ram Peary Debi Kanoria was the widow of Ram Ballav Kanoria. For the purpose of income-tax she was assessed at Benaras previously. But since the assessment year 1952-1953 she was being assessed at Calcutta. The assessment for the year 1952-1953 was completed on or about 29th March, 1957 and a sum of Rs. 1,90,000/- was included in the said assessment as undisclosed and secreted income. There were outstanding dues towards income-tax from the said Ram Peary Debi Kanoria. Full particulars had been given in para 2 of the plaint. The said Ram Peary Debi Kanoria failed and neglected to pay the said sum assessed against her.

3. During the course of assessment for the year 1951-1952 she collusively with the intent to delay or defeat the creditors including the plaintiff executed two deeds of trust purporting thereby to convey two different sums of Rs. 50,000/- to the defendant Hariram Dhurka and Shyam Sundar Dhurka as trustees under the said deeds for the benefit of the grand son and grand daughter of the said Ram Peary Debi Kanoria who were beneficiaries under the said deed of settlement. There was no consideration whatsoever for such transfer and the said settlement were entered into solely for the purpose of defeating the claim of the creditors. The said Ram Peary Debi Kanoria died. As a result her death was recorded and the heirs and legal representatives of the said defendant had been substituted and brought on the record. As such legal heirs and representatives they are under an obligation to discharge the income-tax dues of the original defendant Ram Peary Debi Kanoria. The said sons had been directed to hand over the said sum to the beneficiaries Dinesh Kumar Kanoria and Urmila Debi Kanoria, the defendants Nos. 4 and 5 upon attainment of the age of majority. Inasmuch as the defendants were interested in denying the right, title and interest of the plaintiff the instant suit was filed.

4. In the written statement it was stated that an appeal was preferred from the assessment year 1952-1953 on 10th April, 1957 and the said appeal was disposed of on June 28, 1958. A sum of Rs. 1,90,000/- according to the defendants was wrongly and illegally assessed as purported to be undisclosed or secret income of the said Ram Peary Debi Kanoria as such Ram Peary Debi was under no obligation to pay the same to the plaintiff. According to the defendants at the time of the execution of the said two deeds of trust the original defendant No. 1 had no creditors as a result the said two deeds of settlement executed bona fide with the intention of providing for the grand children of the original, defendant No. 1. Under the circumstances the suit filed by the plaintiff was vexatious, and harassing and as a result should be dismissed with cost. The following issues were raised and settled at the trial:—

ISSUES

1. Is the suit maintainable as framed?

2. Are the deeds of Settlement dated 22nd March, 1957 and registered on 25th March, 1957 void and not binding upon the plaintiff?

3. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?

5. The plaintiff gave evidence through Barun Kumar Chakraborty, a tax assistant in the Income-tax department who proved with the help of the demand register the taxes due and payable by Smt. Ram Peary Debi Kanoria.

6. Amar Nath Ghosal proved with the help of the demand register being Ext. ‘F’ which was an extract from the demand collection register.

7. Tapan Kumar Chakraborty, the Income-tax Officer gave evidence that Ram Peary Debi was an assessee of his ward and from the demand collection register he gave evidence that demands were made in respect of the outstanding dues from Ram Peary Debi Kanoria. Such demands were outstanding from 1945-1946 up to 1962-1963 which she failed to pay. From the original assessment order Ram Peary Debi preferred an appeal but such appeal was rejected by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. From the order itself it appeared that a sum of Rs. 20,793/- in respect of the assessment year 1952-1953 remained due and payable by the said Ram Peary Debi Kanoria. Such demand had been carried forward from year to year in the demand registers. He also proved the transfers effected by Ram Peary Debi by two deeds of trust a total amount of Rs. 1 lakh in favour of her grand children.

6. All the original documents sent to Mr. S.K Mondal, Central Govt. Solicitor could not be traced from his office. A demand was made for a sum of Rs. 1,38,742.02/-. During the pendency of the income-tax proceeding the trust deeds were executed.

9. The defendants chose not to give any evidence at the trial. The plaintiff disclosed the assessment forms, order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner as also the extracts from the demand register to substantiate its claim.

10. Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act provides as follows:—

“53. Every transfer of immoveable property made with intent to defeat or delay the creditors of the transferor shall be voidable at the option of any creditor so defeated or delayed.”

11. The plaintiff gave evidence that such transfers were made fraudulently with all intent to defraud the creditors, more so the income-tax department who had huge claim against the said Ram Peary Debi during that period. No evidence was given in rebuttal by the defendant. Under the circumstances there has been no dispute as to the facts. As a result in view of the evidence tendered on behalf of the plaintiff and in view of the fact that no evidence in rebuttal had been given by the defendant so the facts remain unchallenged.

12. Mr. P.N Dey, appearing on behalf of the defendant submitted that the suit was not maintainable first of all inasmuch as according to the provisions of Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, it would only be attracted in a case where there had been a transfer of immovable property and where such transfer had been made to defraud the creditors that is the whole body of creditors and not a single creditor like the plaintiff, inasmuch as the plaintiff had not been able to give evidence as to the other creditors of, the said Ram Peary Debi Kanoria, under those circumstances the provisions of Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act would not be attracted. Further he submitted that the suit was in a representative capacity and falls under Order 1, Rule 8 inasmuch as there has been no advertisement carried out by the plaintiff this suit lost its character as of a representative suit. Under the circumstances the suit was not maintainable by the plaintiff. Mr. Dey craved reference to the case reported in (1962) 66 Cal WN 912 and submitted that no evidence had been laid and that no notice was given by the plaintiff. He further craved reference to the case reported in AIR 1943 Mad 531 and submitted that inasmuch as such a suit is for the benefit of all the creditors the procedure as laid down for a suit of representative character ought to have been followed strictly by the plaintiff. In the case reported in AIR 1943 Mad 531, Nandaramdas v. Zulika Bibi it was held:

“Positive proof of a fraudulent intent which is a matter of mind is rarely if ever possible. The intention has in the majority of cases to be inferred from the conduct of the party and the circumstances proved. When a person who is indebted to a considerable extent and is apprehensive of further liabilities arising in the future, makes no provision for any of them, but makes a gift of the bulk of his properties in favour of a near relation, the inference is almost irresistible that he did so with an intent to defraud creditors.

A suit under Section 53, T.P Act should be instituted on behalf of or for the benefit of all the creditors and not merely on behalf of the plaintiff alone. Therefore, where a suit is filed on behalf of the plaintiff alone and the permission of the Court to sue on behalf of or for the benefit of all the creditors is not asked under Order 1, Rule 8, Civil P.C the suit is wrongly framed and is liable to be summarily dismissed.”

The provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 are designed to save time and expense and to ensure a convenient trial of question in which a large body of persons are interested, while avoiding at the same time a multiplicity of suits and consequent harassment to parties. Much of the benefit intended by the rule and the simplicity of procedure secured by it would be lost by construing it to mean that the entire body of persons interested in the litigation are or should be deemed to be actually parties to it”

13. But in the case reported in AIR 1973 Ker 125 it was held that even if there is a single creditor he can file a suit under S. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act to set aside a fraudulent transfer. It was further held that there need not be more than one creditor in existence for the purpose of availing of the provisions of Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. Reciting therein the case reported in AIR 1930 Mad 665 where it was held that even if there was only one-creditor then the act of the debtor in transferring all his property to a stranger with a view to secrete the same and defeat the creditor would be fraudulent and such transfer could be set aside. A Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case reported in AIR 1965 Andh Pra 68 held that Section 53 would apply even where a debtor disposes of his property with the intention of defeating one single creditor. There was no distinction between a case where a transferor had a single creditor and a case where he had several creditors. Similarly in the case reported in AIR 1967 Ker 171 similar view was expressed by holding that the letter (sic) did not require and at the time of institution of the suit more than one creditor should be in existence.

14. So far issue No. 1 is concerned save and except pleading in the written statement that the suit is not maintainable the defendant has not stated apart from such bald statement why the suit was not maintainable as framed by the plaintiff. Under the circumstances the defendant was not entitled to urge without such pleading that the suit was not maintainable. In the case reported in AIR 1971 Assam 143 (para 10) where it was held:

“That a Court should decline to frame an issue as to maintainability of a suit in absence of specific averment in the written statement as to how and in what circumstances the same is not maintainable in law. A mere vague recital in the written statement, without anything more, cannot be the basis for raising such an issue. Issues are framed for a right decision of the case with an object to pinpoint the real and substantial points of difference between the parties specifically and unambiguously emerging out of the pleadings. Vague issues, suggested in a mechanical way, should not be framed to keep the door open for astute casuistry as a suit proceeds at different levels leading inevitably to the law's delay. The Court has to own its own responsibility in framing issues.”

15. So far Mr. Dey's submission that no notice had been served of the suit having been filed in the representative capacity under Order 1, Rule 8 is concerned in the case reported in AIR 1925 Cal 547, Abdul Hakim v. Abdul Gani it was held:—

“That issuance of a notice under the rule is not a mere matter of formality but the wording showed that it was the duty of the Court to cause the service of the notice of the publication of the advertisement, on being moved for that purpose. Under the circumstances in a case where such notice had not been given the suit could not be dismissed on account of the failure of the Court to perform its own duty.”

16. In the case reported in AIR 1933 PC 183, Kumaravelu Chetriar v. T.P Ramaswam Ayyar where it was held that when permission under Order 1, Rule 8 is granted and on such permission being given it becomes the imperative duty of the Court to direct notice to be given to the absent parties. Under the circumstances it was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that in the absence of the notice being given by the Court the plaintiff's suit should not he defeated in the absence of such notice being published or given.

17. The principle as laid down in S. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act had also been extended to cases of an assignment of a decree on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience. The same principle was also made applicable in cases of transfer of moveables by some High Courts. Apart from that Section 281 of the Income-tax Act which provides:—

“281. (1) Where during the pendency of any proceeding under this Act or after the completion thereof, but before the service of notice under Rule 2 of the Second Schedule, any assesses creates a charge on, or parts with the possession (by way of sale, mortgage, gift, exchange or any other mode of transfer whatsoever) of, any of his assets in favour of any other person, such charge or transfer shall be void as against any claim in respect of any tax or any other sum payable by the assessee as a result of the completion of the said proceeding or otherwise:

Provided that such charge or transfer shall not be void if it is made—

(i) for adequate consideration and without notice of such proceeding or, as the case may be, without notice of such tax or other sum payable by the assessee; or

(ii) with the previous permission of the Income-tax Officer.

(2) This section applies to cases where the amount of tax or other sum payable or likely to be payable exceeds five thousand rupees and the assets charged or transferred exceed ten thousand rupees in value.

Explanation: In this section, “assets” means loans, building, machinery, plant, shares, securities and fixed deposits in banks, to the extent to which any of the assets aforesaid does not form part of the stock in trade of business of the assessee.”

18. Moreover the defendant did not plead or give any evidence to indicate that the said Ram Peary Debi had other creditors. The question whether there are other creditors besides the plaintiff is a question of fact of a particular case and unless there is any proof that there are other creditors the defence that the suit is liable to be dismissed inasmuch as no notice had been served as such the suit could not be held for and on behalf of the body of the creditors is untenable. In any event in view of the provisions as contained in Section 281 of the Income-tax Act, the plaintiff is entitled to claim the relief as prayed for. Under the circumstances in view of the facts and circumstances of the case this Court answers the issues in the manner following:—

Issue No. 1 in the affirmative. Issue No. 2 in the affirmative. So far issue No. 3 is concerned this Court passes a decree in terms of prayers (b) and (f).

Order accordingly.