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Imperial Bucket Co., A Firm v. Sm. Bhagwati Basak Opposite Party.
Factual and Procedural Background
The present matter is a revision application by a tenant directed against an order of Mr. R.C. Dutt Gupta, learned District Judge, Howrah dated 16-8-1952. The sequence of events in the record is as follows:
- On 25-3-1949 the petitioner (tenant) filed an application for fixation of standard rent under the West Bengal Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948 (the 1948 Act).
- On 9-4-1951 the Rent Controller passed an order fixing the standard rent. The petitioner applied for a certified copy on 10-4-1951; the certified copy was ready for delivery on 20-4-1951.
- The petitioner filed an appeal against the Rent Controller’s order on 15-5-1951. The respondent objected that the appeal was out of time because, it was contended, the time taken to obtain a certified copy could not be excluded and Section 12 of the Limitation Act did not apply to that appeal.
- The learned District Judge sustained that preliminary objection, holding that the 30-day period prescribed by Section 32(1) of the 1948 Act was absolute and not extendable by Section 12 of the Limitation Act.
- The petitioner obtained revision to this Court. The matter was heard and ultimately came before G.N. Das, J. as part of a Division Bench reference.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Section 12 of the Limitation Act (exclusion of time taken to obtain certified copies) applies to an appeal filed under Section 32(1) of the West Bengal Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948.
- Whether Section 17(3) of the West Bengal Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950 (the 1950 Act) makes provisions of the 1950 Act (in particular Section 32(2) of the 1950 Act) applicable to proceedings begun under the 1948 Act.
- Whether Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act brings into operation the relevant provisions of the Indian Limitation Act (including Section 12) in respect of appeals prescribed by a special or local law (here, the 1948 Act), and whether the 1948 Act is to be treated as a "complete code" that would exclude such application.
- Whether appeals filed before an appellate authority (possibly a persona designata) rather than a court fall within the expressions "suit, appeal or application" in Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act so as to attract Section 12.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Petitioner’s) Arguments — Mr. Lahiri
- The learned District Judge erred in holding that the appeal was filed out of time.
- Section 17(3) of the 1950 Act should attract the provisions of Section 32(2) of the 1950 Act (which excludes time taken to obtain a certified copy) and thereby allow the petitioner to exclude that time.
- Even if the 1948 Act governs the appeal, the limitation prescribed therein is a branch of adjective law and therefore the strict period in Section 32(1) should not be read to deny the petitioner the benefit of excluding time taken to obtain a certified copy.
- The 1948 Act is a special and local law; hence Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act applies and Section 12 of the Limitation Act (exclusion for time to obtain certified copies) should be available to the petitioner.
- Referred to several cases where Section 12 of the Limitation Act had been applied on general principles to support his position.
Respondent's (Opposite Party’s) Arguments — Mr. Dev
- The 30-day period in Section 32(1) of the 1948 Act is absolute and Section 12 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to appeals under that provision.
- Section 17(3) of the 1950 Act does not make the whole of the 1950 Act applicable to proceedings started under the 1948 Act (implicit in opposing the petitioner’s reliance on the 1950 Act).
- Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act is excluded because the 1948 Act is a complete code and does not admit extension of time under the Limitation Act.
- Section 29(2)(a) has no application because the appeal was not filed before a court but before a persona designata; therefore the words “suit, appeal or application” should be confined to appeals to courts.
- Argued that Section 32(1) or the Rules under the 1948 Act did not require the filing of a certified copy of the Rent Controller’s order and hence Section 12 of the Limitation Act should not be available.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| P.C. Guha v. B.A. Basil, AIR 1951 Cal 554 (A) | Held that Section 17(3) of the 1950 Act was limited and did not make the 1950 Act wholly retrospective; forum of appeal for proceedings started under 1948 Act is governed by the 1948 Act. | The Court relied on this decision to reject the petitioner’s contention that Section 17(3) made Section 32(2) of the 1950 Act applicable to proceedings begun under the 1948 Act. |
| Sati Prosad Garga v. Gobinda Chandra, AIR 1929 Cal 325 (B) | Construction of the word “expressly” to mean an express exclusion and not exclusion by implication. | The Court used this construction to conclude that Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act would apply unless the special law expressly excludes the Limitation Act provisions. |
| John Poulson v. Madhusudan Pal Chowdhry (1865) 2 WR Act X R. 21 (C) | Earlier Full Bench view that a particular Act (Act 10 of 1859) was a complete code and did not admit extension by the general Limitation Act. | The Court recited this historical decision while explaining the evolution of judicial opinion and legislative amendment affecting Section 29; it concluded that later amendments rendered that reservation ineffective. |
| Dropadi v. Hiralal, 34 All 496 (D) | Full Bench holding that Section 12 of the Limitation Act was applicable where the special Act was not a complete code; Section 12 could extend appeal time. | The Court discussed this case as part of the line of authorities showing that when a special law is not a complete code Section 12 may apply; the Court then addressed the post-amendment effect. |
| Powell v. Kempton Race Course Co. (1899) AC 143 | Rule on use of preamble: preamble may aid construction but cannot qualify a clear and unambiguous enactment. | The Court invoked this principle in rejecting the submission that the preamble of the Limitation Act should restrict the plain words “suit, appeal or application” to matters only before courts. |
| Makhanlal Roy v. Pramatha Nath, AIR 1953 Cal 50 (F) | When language of a limitation statute is ambiguous, it must be construed strictly in favour of the right to proceed; limitation statutes should not be extended by implication if penalizing. | The Court applied this interpretive principle to support a broad reading of “suit, appeal or application” in Section 29(2)(a), favoring the right to proceed. |
| Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey, AIR 1932 PC 165 (G) | Observations that equitable considerations are out of place in construing limitation statutes and that strict grammatical meaning is the guide. | The Court noted this principle but held it did not benefit the opposite party because the grammatical meaning of “suit, appeal” encompasses appeals before a persona designata as well. |
| Charles E. Ring v. The Collector of Bombay, AIR 1948 Bom 387 (H) | Decision concerning an application for review under a Rent Control Act where the special Act contained no limitation period; the case considered whether Section 29(2)(a) applied. | The Court distinguished this case as not governing the present facts and declined to treat it as persuasive for narrowing Section 29(2)(a). |
| Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T.S. Chettyar Firm, AIR 1928 PC 103 (I) | Judicial Committee held Section 12 of the Limitation Act is unqualified in language and an appellant will benefit from it if he annexes a certified copy to the memorandum of appeal, even where rules do not require certified copies. | The Court relied on this decision to reject the argument that Section 12 could not apply because the rules did not require certified copies; it treated the Rangoon case as analogous and supportive. |
| Mohon Lal Hardeo Das v. Commissioner of Income-tax, AIR 1930 Pat 14 (J) | Observation that on general principle and Section 29 of the Limitation Act, time required for obtaining copies under relevant sections should be excluded in computing limitation. | The Court cited this as an instance where Section 12 (or analogous exclusions) had been applied; however, it stated the decision did not need to rest solely on these cases. |
| Kunja Behari v. Mrityunjoy Prasad, AIR 1950 Cal 54 (K) | Decision under Section 37(a) of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors' Act (cited as another example). | Cited as supporting authority illustrating application of Limitation Act principles; not essential to the Court’s primary conclusion. |
| Amritsar Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioner, Sales Tax, AIR 1953 All 816 (L) | Application of Section 12 of the Limitation Act in computing limitation under a special taxing statute (U.P. Sales Tax Act) for making a reference. | Cited as an additional authority where Section 12 principles were applied; Court noted these authorities but based its decision on Section 29(2)(a)’s effect. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court’s analysis proceeds in sequential steps, grounded in statutory construction and precedential authorities cited in the record:
-
Scope of Section 17(3) of the 1950 Act:
- The Court rejected petitioner’s primary contention that Section 17(3) of the 1950 Act imported Section 32(2) of the 1950 Act so as to allow exclusion of the time for obtaining certified copies. The Court followed the view taken in P.C. Guha v. B.A. Basil that Section 17(3) is limited to requiring that fixation of standard rent be made in accordance with the 1950 Act but does not render the whole 1950 Act retrospective or wholly applicable to proceedings started under the 1948 Act.
- Even if Section 32(2) of the 1950 Act were held to apply, the Court noted that Section 32(2) refers to appeals contemplated by Section 32(1) of the 1950 Act (i.e., appeals in proceedings initiated after the 1950 Act), and thus would not benefit the petitioner whose proceedings began under the 1948 Act.
-
Applicability of Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act:
- The Court observed that the 1948 Act is a special and local law and that Section 32(1) of the 1948 Act prescribed a period of limitation differing from that in Schedule I of the Limitation Act.
- Because there was no express exclusion in the 1948 Act of the specific provisions of the Limitation Act referred to in Section 29(2)(a), the Court applied the construction adopted in Sati Prosad Garga v. Gobinda Chandra that “expressly” means an express exclusion and not exclusion by implication.
- The Court concluded Section 29(2)(a) would be attracted to appeals under Section 32(1) of the 1948 Act, thus making the provisions referred to in Section 29(2)(a) (including Section 4, Sections 9–18, and Section 22 of the Limitation Act) applicable unless expressly excluded by the special law.
-
Whether the 1948 Act is a "complete code":
- Opposite party argued the 1948 Act was a complete code, thereby excluding Section 29(2)(a). The Court examined this contention and concluded that amendments to Section 29 (notably by the Indian Limitation (Amendment) Act, 1922) altered the earlier position and that the provision was intended to make the cited Limitation Act provisions applicable unless expressly excluded.
- The Court further found the 1948 Act was not a complete code because rules framed under it (by virtue of powers under Sections 45(2) and 47) have statutory force and refer to other statutes; thus the 1948 Act is not exhaustive and does not expressly exclude the Limitation Act provisions.
-
Meaning of “suit, appeal or application” and appeals before a persona designata:
- Mr. Dev urged the Court to construe “suit, appeal or application” in the Limitation Act as confined to matters before courts, relying on the preamble of the Limitation Act. The Court applied the principle from Powell v. Kempton Race Course Co. that a preamble cannot cut down a clear and unambiguous enactment, and found the words to be clear and unambiguous.
- The Court held that “suit, appeal or application” in Section 29(2)(a) in their plain meaning include appeals whether filed in a court or before a persona designata; the Court therefore refused to limit the expressions to courts alone.
- Because of this interpretation, it was unnecessary for the Court to decide definitively whether the appellate authority under Section 32 of the 1948 Act is a court or persona designata for purposes of the present decision.
-
Application of Section 12 of the Limitation Act:
- Given its conclusions on Section 29(2)(a), the Court held that Section 12 of the Limitation Act (which permits exclusion of time required to obtain a certified copy of an order) applies to appeals under Section 32(1) of the 1948 Act.
- The Court rejected the respondent’s attempt to distinguish Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T.S. Chettyar Firm (Rangoon case) on the ground that that appeal had been filed before a court; the Court regarded the Rangoon case as directly on point and persuasive: Section 12 is unqualified in language and will benefit an appellant who annexes a certified copy to the memorandum of appeal.
- Consequently, the time taken to obtain the certified copy in the present case was to be excluded and the appeal was therefore held to have been filed within time.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
THE PETITION SUCCEEDS. The Rule is made absolute.
Implications (direct consequences for the parties):
- The Court overruled the District Judge's view that appeals under Section 32(1) of the 1948 Act are barred from benefit under Section 12 of the Limitation Act. The Court held that Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act makes the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act (including Section 12) applicable to appeals under the 1948 Act unless expressly excluded.
- The appeal filed on 15-5-1951 was held to have been filed in time, after excluding time taken to obtain the certified copy; accordingly the view of the learned District Judge on limitation was set aside.
- The case is remitted to the District Judge for decision on the merits in accordance with law.
- The petitioner is entitled to the costs of the Rule; the hearing fee was assessed at three gold mohurs.
The opinion does not purport to establish a broader new principle beyond the conclusions reached on the construction and applicability of Sections 29(2)(a) and 12 of the Limitation Act in relation to the 1948 Act; the direct effect is the remand and allowance of costs as stated above.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G.N Das, J.:— This is an application in revision on behalf of a tenant and is directed against an order passed by Mr. R.C Dutt Gupta, learned District Judge, Howrah, dated 16-8-1952.
2. The facts shortly stated are that on 25-3-1949, the petitioner filed an application for fixation of standard rent in respect of the disputed premises under the provisions of the West Bengal Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948, hereinafter called the 1948 Act. On 9-4-1951, the Rent Controller passed an order fixing the standard rent. It appears from the certified copy of the order of the Rent Controller which was filed in the court below that an application for a certified copy of the order was made on 10-4-1951. The copy was ready for delivery to the petitioner on 20-4-1951. The appeal against the order of the Rent Controller was filed on 15-5-1951. It was duly registered and it came on for hearing before Mr. R.K Dutt Gupta, learned District Judge, Howrah. At that stage an objection was raised on behalf of the respondent to the appeal that the appeal had been filed out of time inasmuch as the time taken for obtaining a certified copy of the order of the Rent Controller could not be excluded, the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act not being applicable to the appeal filed by the petitioner.
3. The learned District Judge gave effect to the preliminary objection being of the opinion that the period prescribed for filing an appeal under Section 32(1) of the 1948 Act which was 30 days was absolute and was not liable to an extension by virtue of the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act.
4. Against this order the petitioner moved this Court in revision and obtained the present Rule. The Rule came up for hearing before Chunder, J. The learned Judge by an order dated 9-12-1952 referred the matter to a Division Bench. By a determination made by the Chief Justice this revision case has come up for hearing before us.
5. Mr. Lahiri, learned Advocate for the petitioner, has contended that the learned District Judge was in error in his view that the appeal had been filed out of time. Mr. Lahiri has contended, that the effect of Section 17(3) of the West Bengal Rent; Control (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1950, hereinafter called the 1950 Act, attracted the provisions contained in S. 32(2) of the 1950 Act.
6. In my opinion, this contention is not correct. Section 17(3) of the 1950 Act only requires that the fixation of the standard rent should be made; in accordance with the provisions of the 1950 Act; even though the application for fixation of the standard rent might have been filed while the 1948; Act was in operation. Section 17(3) does not make the whole of the 1950 Act applicable to proceedings for fixation of rent started while the 1948 Act was in force. This view was taken by a Bench of this Court in the case of — ‘P.C Guha v. B.A Basil’, AIR 1951 Cal 554 (A). In that case it was pointed out that Section 17(3) was limited in its application and did not make the 1950 Act wholly retrospective in its operation. It was further held that the forum of appeal against an order fixing the standard rent made on an application while the 1948 Act was in operation would be governed by the provisions of the 1948 Act.
7. Even conceding that Section 32(2) of the 1950 Act was attracted, this would not assist the petitioner in the present case. Section 32(2) of the 1950 Act is in these terms:
“Such appeal shall be filed within 30 days of the order of the Controller excluding the day of the order and such time as is required for obtaining a certified copy of the order.”
8. The expression “such appeal” refers to an appeal contemplated by Section 32(1) of the 1950 Act. The appeal contemplated by Section 32(1) of the 1950 Act refers to an appeal made on an order made by the Rent Controller in proceedings initiated after the 1950 Act came into operation. The result is that even if S. 32(2) was attracted, the petitioner can derive no benefit therefrom.
9. Mr. Lahiri has further contended that conceding that the 1948 Act was applicable and governed the forum of an appeal in case of an order fixing a standard rent on an application made-while the 1948 Act was in operation the limitation, prescribed under the 1948 Act was a branch of adjective law and as such the period of limitation, prescribed in Section 32(1) would not apply.
10. I have already said that even if we assume that the 1950 Act was applicable, that would not help the petitioner in getting round the difficulty occasioned by reason of the delay in filing the appeal beyond the period of 30 days.
11. Mr. Lahiri has further contended that the 1948 Act, assuming it applies, was a special and local law and as such the provisions contained in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would be attracted with the result that Section 12 of the Limitation Act would be available to the petitioner in the matter of exclusion of time taken for obtaining a certified copy of the order of the Rent Controller.
12. The material portion of Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act runs as follows:
“Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule……… and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation, prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law…… (a) the provisions contained in S. 4, Ss. 9 to 18 and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law……….”
13. It cannot be disputed that the 1948 Act was a special and local law. The 1948 Act governed in part the relationship of landlord and tenant of certain categories. It was a local Act because its operation was limited to certain areas. Section 32(1) of the 1948 Act prescribed a period of limitation for filing an appeal which was different from that prescribed in Schedule 1, Limitation Act. There is no express provision in the 1948 Act which excludes the applicability of the provision contained in the Indian Limitation Act referred to in Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act.
14. The word “expressly” has been construed by this Court in the case of—‘Sati Prosad Garga v. Gobinda Chandra’, AIR 1929 Cal 325 (B) to mean an express exclusion and not to mean exclusion by mere implication. The above discussion shows that Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act would be attracted to an appeal preferred under Section 32(1) of 1948 Act and as such Section 12 of the Limitation Act would be applicable.
15. Mr. Dev, learned Advocate for the opposite party has, however, contended that Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act was excluded because the 1948 Act was a complete Code and did not admit of any extension of time under the provisions of Section 29(2).
16. This general argument, in my view, proceeds on a misconception of the effect of the amendment of Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act as made by the Indian Limitation (Amendment) Act, Act 10 of 1922.
17. The submission made by Mr. Dev overlooks the effect of the legislative changes in the Indian Limitation Act since the enactment of the Indian Limitation Act (Act 14 of 1859). The question was debated as early as the year 1865. The question arose in connection with the applicability of the provisions of Section 14 of Act 14 of 1859 in its application to a suit for rent instituted under Act 10 of 1859.
18. A Full Bench of this Court answered the question in the negative being of the opinion that Act 10 of 1859 was a complete Code and did not admit of any extension by reason of the application of S. 14 of Act 14 of 1859 (John Poulson…Defendant; v. Madhusudan Pal Chowdhry…Plaintiff.*’, (1865) 2 WR Act X R. 21 (C)). Since then the trend of judicial opinion has oscillated between two extreme views. The question again came up for consideration before the Full Bench of the Allahabad Court in the case of — ‘Dropadi v. Hiralal’, 34 All 496 (D). This case turned on a construction of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1908 in its unamended form. The section in its unamended form ran as follows:
“Where by any special or local law now or here inafter in force in British India a period of limitation is especially prescribed for any suit, appeal or application nothing herein contained shall ‘affect or alter’ the period so prescribed.”
19. The Full Bench which was presided over by Sir Henry Richards, C.J was of the opinion that
“where the special or local Act is not a complete Code the general provisions of the Indian Limitation Act cannot be said to affect or alter the period prescribed by a special Act but only the manner in which the period is to be calculated.”
20. In that case an appeal had been filed against an order made under Section 37 of the then Provincial Insolvency Act (Act 3 of 1907) setting aside certain transfers made by an insolvent. The question was whether the time fixed for filing the appeal could be extended under Section 12 of the Limitation Act. The Full Bench was of the opinion that Section 12 was applicable and had the effect of extending the time being of the view that the Provincial Insolvency Act (Act 3 of 1907) was not a complete Code and the effect of Section 12 was not to affect or alter the period prescribed by the Provincial Insolvency Act.
21. The reservation made by the Full Bench namely that the special or local Act should not be a complete Code has, in my opinion, been rendered ineffective by the amendments of Section 29 of the Limitation Act as made by the Indian Limitation (Amendment) Act (Act 10 of 1922).
22. I have already quoted the terms of Section 29(a) of the Limitation Act as amended. In my opinion, the clear intention of the amendment was to make Section 4 Ss. 9 to 18 and 22 applicable to suits, appeals and applications unless expressly excluded. But even conceding that the provisions contained in the Indian Limitation Act do not apply where the special or local law is a complete Code, the concession is of no assistance to the opposite party because, in my opinion the 1948 Act is not a complete Code. By virtue of the powers conferred under Section 47, Section 45(2) of the Rent Control Act, 1948, rules have been framed under the Act which have statutory force. An examination of these rules clearly shows that the 1948 Act was not exhaustive and that it was not a complete Code. The rules refer to other statutes. A reference to these statutes is necessary in order to give effect to the provisions contained in the 1948 Act. The position, therefore, is that even if it is assumed that the contention of Mr. Dev is correct the assumption does not assist the opposite party.
23. Mr. Dev has further contended that S. 29(2)(a) has no application in the facts of the present case because the appeal that was filed in the Court below by the petitioner was an appeal which was not filed in any court but before a ‘persona designata’. This contention has to be examined. Section 29(2)(a) speaks of suit, appeal or application. In their plain meaning the words ‘suit or appeal’ refer to any suit or any appeal, be it filed in a court or before a ‘persona designata’.
24. But Mr. Dev contends that the words suit, appeal or application’ must be construed in the light of the preamble to the Indian Limitation Act. The preamble to the Indian Limitation Act states that the Indian Limitation Act is a consolidating Act dealing with “the law of limitation of suits, appeals and certain applications to courts.” Mr. Dev contends that the preamble must control the words ‘suit or appeal’ occurring in Secion 29(2)(a), Limitation Act.
25. He has referred us to the decision in the case of — ‘Powell v. Kempton Race Course Co. (1899) AC 143 (E). In that case Earl of Halsbury L.C made the following pertinent observation:
“Two propositions are quite clear; one, that a preamble may afford useful light as to what a statute intends to reach, and the other that if an enactment is itself clear and unambiguous, no preamble can qualify or cut down the enactment.”
26. In my opinion, the words suit, appeal or application occurring in Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act are clear and unambiguous. They do not admit of any doubt or dispute. In this view no reference to the preamble is necessary.
27. I may also refer to the observation of Lord Davy in the case cited above at page 183:
“The preamble is the key to the statute and affords a clue to the scope of the statute where the words construed are in themselves without the aid of the preamble capable of more than one meaning.”
28. As I have said just now the words ‘suit, appeal or application’ are clear and unqualified. Even if there was any doubt about this matter, the words ‘suit, appeal or application’ must be construed on the principle, enunciated in the case of — ‘Makhanlal Roy v. Pramatha Nath’, AIR 1953 Cal 50 (F), para 14 which runs as follows:
“It must also be borne in mind that a court ought not to put such an interpretation upon a statute of limitation by implication and inference as may have a penalizing effect unless the court is forced to do so by the irresistible force of the language used. The Limitation Act being an Act which takes away or restricts the right to take legal proceedings must, when the language is ambiguous, be construed strictly, i.e in favour of the right to proceed.”
29. Mr. Deb has referred us to the observations made by the Judicial Committee in the case of — ‘Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey’, AIR 1932 PC 165 (G) which say that equitable considerations are out of place in construing the statute of limitation and that the strict grammatical meaning of the words is the only safe guide. That principle, however, is of no assistance to the opposite party. Here the words ‘suit, appeal’ in their grammatical meaning, mean any suit or appeal. Even if it be ambiguous the ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the right to proceed.
30. My conclusion, therefore, is that the rules of construction referred to above do not justify the court in adding to the words ‘suit, appeal or application’ the words ‘to court’. The words ‘suit, appeal or application’ must be read in their plain sense as inclusive of any suit or appeal or application prescribed by a special or local law.
31. Our attention has also been drawn by Mr. Dev to the case of — ‘Charles E. Ring… v. The Collector Of Bombay….’, AIR 1948 Bom 387 (H) which was decided by Tendolkar, J. sitting singly. In that case the question arose as to the period of limitation for an application for review under Section 38 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act (Act 7 of 1944). In the case cited there was no period of limitation prescribed by the special Act, and as such Section 29(2)(a) could hardly apply.
32. The contention was that the period of limitation should be determined by a reference to Article 173, Sch. I, Limitation Act. It was suggested that as the application for review under Section 38 of the aforesaid Rent Control Act of 1944 had to be made not to a court, the exemption sections detailed in Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act could not be availed of. It was in that connection that the learned Judge made the observation relied on.
33. In my opinion, that case does not govern the present case. In any event, in my view, there is no justification for construing Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act in a restricted sense. The section ought to have its full operation being intended to remove a hardship which existed before the amendment of that section by the Indian Limitation (Amendment) Act (Act 10 of 1922).
34. My conclusion, therefore, is that the time for filing the appeal should be extended by applying the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act.
35. Mr. Dev has further contended that even assuming that this is the position, Section 12 of the Limitation Act cannot be attracted in the facts of the present case for two reasons. In the first place he has contended, that S. 32(1) of the 1948 Act or the Rules framed under that Act did not require the filing of a certified copy of the order of the Rent Controller and as such Section 12 of the Limitation Act cannot apply. Such a contention was made but was repelled by the Judicial Committee in the case of — ‘Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T.S Chettyar Firm’, AIR 1928 PC 103 (I). In that case an appeal had been filed from a judgment of a Judge sitting singly on the Original Side of the Rangoon High Court. The appeal against the judgment had been filed beyond the period prescribed by the Letters Patent. The limitation was sought to be saved on the ground that the time required for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment should be added to the period prescribed by the Letters Patent. The rules of the Rangoon High Court did not require the filing of a certified copy of the judgment in case of an appeal under the Letters Patent. Even so, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the language of Section 12 of the Limitation Act is unqualified and that in all cases an appellant will have the benefit of S. 12 in case he annexed to the memorandum of appeal a certified copy of the judgment appealed from.
36. Mr. Dev has also contended that in the Rangoon case the appeal was filed before a Court whereas in the present case the appeal was filed not before a Court but before a “persona designata”. This argument cannot be accepted. An appeal which was filed in the Rangoon case was filed in accordance with the provisions of the Letters Patent. Order 41 R. 1 of the CPC which requires the annexing of a copy of the judgment appealed from was not applicable to such appeals. I do not see any valid ground for distinguishing the present case from the facts of the Rangoon case referred to above.
37. Mr. Lahiri has referred us to certain cases where the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act have been applied on general principles.
38. He has referred us in the first place to the case of — ‘Mohon Lal Hardeo Das v. Commissioner of Income-tax B. & O.’, AIR 1930 Pat 14 (J). The observations of Fazal Ali, J which are relied on are in these terms:
“On general principle and in view of Section 29 of the Limitation Act the period required for obtaining copies of the order under S. 32 or under S. 34 of the Act shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation for reference by an assessee under S. 66(2)(3).”
39. He has also referred us to the case of — ‘Kunja Behari v. Mrityunjoy Prasad’, AIR 1950 Cal 54 (K) which was a case under Section 37(a) of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors' Act.
40. There is also a decision in the case of — ‘Amritsar Sugar Mills Company Limited…(Petitioner); v. The Commissioner, Sales Tax…(Opposite-Party).)’, AIR 1953 All 816 (L) where in case of an application for a reference under Section 11(2)(b) of the U.P Sales Tax Act (Act 15 of 1943) the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act were applied in computing the period of limitation prescribed by the said Act for making a reference under the relevant provisions of the aforesaid Act.
41. It is not necessary to base my decision on these cases because I have already reached the conclusion that Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act makes the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act applicable. In this view there is no doubt that the appeal which was filed before the appellate authority under S. 32 of the 1948 Act was filed in time.
42. In the above view it is not necessary to decide the question whether the appellate authority constituted under S. 32 of the 1948 Act is a Court or a ‘persona designata’.
43. The result, therefore, is that the view taken by the learned District Judge as regards the limitation applicable to appeals preferred under S. 32 of the Rent Control Act must be overruled and it must be held that the appeal was filed in proper time.
44. The learned District Judge, who heard the appeal, did not deal with the merits of the appeal being of the opinion that the appeal itself was barred.
45. In the result, this petition succeeds. The Rule is made absolute and the case remitted to the District Judge for deciding the appeal on the merits in accordance with law. The petitioner will be entitled to the costs of this Rule, hearing fee being assessed at three gold mohurs. Debabrata Mookerjee, J: I agree.
R.G.D
46. Rule made absolute.
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