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Sheikh Abdul Samad v. Jitoo Chowdhury

Calcutta High Court
May 12, 1949
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Factual and Procedural Background

The suit was instituted by the Plaintiff (Appellant) for ejectment of the Defendant from cadastral survey Plot No. 633 of Khatian 587, Mouza Garulia on termination of the Defendant's tenancy by a notice to quit under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Plaintiff alleged that he had taken a lease by potta dated 19 Pous, 1308 (3 January 1902) from his two uncles, Osman and Meajan, covering 9 cottas, and that he had sub-leased three cottas to the Defendant for residential (non-agricultural) purposes. In the record-of-rights finally published in 1931 the Defendant was recorded as an under-raiyat with a right of occupancy; the Plaintiff challenged that entry as wrong. The Plaintiff claimed to have served a notice to quit under section 106 on 21 Jaistha, 1342, and alleged the tenancy was determined from 1 Sravan, 1342.

Procedurally: the Court of first instance (Munsif) decreed the suit. On appeal, after various stages, the Additional District Judge, 24-Parganas, dismissed the suit by judgment dated 6 March 1940, holding that the Plaintiff had inherited his uncles' raiyat interest and that the sub-lease made the Defendant an under-raiyat; that decision relied on the case of Babu Ram Roy v. Mohendra (Mahendra) Nath Samanta. The Plaintiff filed a second appeal. Under Order 41, rule 11, the hearing was stayed on 7 April 1940 under section 3 of the Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act; on 2 December 1947 that stay was vacated and the appeal was admitted. On 20 July 1948 B.K. Mukherjea, J., remitted an issue to the lower Appellate Court—“What was the status of Osman at the time when the potta of 1308 was granted”—and directed fresh evidence to be taken. The lower Appellate Court thereafter found that Osman and Meajan held as non-agricultural bastu tenants at the date of the potta and that the disputed land formed part of that non-agricultural holding. The lower Appellate Court also found that the non-agricultural holding was later amalgamated and recorded as raiyati mokurari in the record-of-rights. The present Division Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the Court of Appeal's judgment, and restored the Munsif's decree; parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Defendant's tenancy is governed by the Transfer of Property Act (as a non-agricultural sub-lease) or by the Bengal Tenancy Act (as an under-raiyat) — specifically whether the status of the superior lessor at the inception of the potta (1308) determines the Defendant's status.
  2. Whether the principle in Babu Ram Roy v. Mohendra/Mahendra Nath Samanta — that a person holding under a raiyat is an under-raiyat even if the holding is for non-agricultural purposes — applies where the superior holding was non-agricultural at inception but later became raiyati by amalgamation or subsequent events.
  3. Whether the findings made by the lower Appellate Court after the remand were within the scope of the remand order issued by Mukherjea, J.
  4. Whether the present appeal is liable to be stayed under section 3 of the Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act of 1940, i.e., whether an appeal falls within the expression “suit or proceeding” in section 3.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Sen)

  • The tenancy created by the potta of 19 Pous, 1308 was a non-agricultural tenancy at its inception; therefore the subsequent merging of rights into a higher raiyat right could not alter the status of a subordinate tenant who took a non-agricultural sub-lease.
  • Following the lower Appellate Court's findings after remand, Osman and Meajan held as non-agricultural bastu tenants at the date of the potta; consequently the Defendant's sub-lease was non-agricultural and governed by the Transfer of Property Act.
  • The decision in Babu Ram Roy's case applies only if the tenancy of Osman and Meajan was agricultural on the date of the potta; since the remand finding is that it was non-agricultural at inception, Babu Ram Roy does not apply.

Respondent's Arguments (Mr. Mukherjee)

  • The findings recorded after remand were beyond the scope of the order of remand; the earlier finding was that the amalgamation took place with jamas inherited from the Plaintiff's uncles and the Plaintiff should not have been allowed to show a different mode of amalgamation after remand.
  • Under section 4(3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the Defendant is an under-raiyat because he holds immediately under the Plaintiff, who is presently a raiyat; the present status of the Plaintiff matters for determining the Defendant's status.
  • The appeal should be stayed under section 3 of the Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act because the appeal is a continuation of the suit or, at least, is a “proceeding” within the meaning of that section.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Babu Ram Roy v. Mohendra (Mahendra) Nath Samanta That a person holding under a raiyat will be an under-raiyat even if he holds for non-agricultural purposes. The Additional District Judge relied on this case to hold that the Defendant became an under-raiyat when the Plaintiff inherited a raiyat interest. The Division Bench found that the case did not apply where the superior holding was non-agricultural at inception (per remand findings), and therefore Babu Ram Roy was inapplicable to the facts here.
Arun Kumar Sinha v. Durga Charan Basu Mukherjea and Roxburgh, JJ., criticised the rule in Babu Ram Roy and pointed out it was open to serious exceptions; they noted the rule had remained unchallenged for a long time and did not refer the matter to a Full Bench. The court relied on this criticism to adopt a narrow construction of section 4(3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, holding that a person is an under-raiyat only if he holds under a raiyat at the inception of his lease; the court declined to extend Babu Ram Roy.
Jahur Mia v. Abdul Gaffur Biswas, J., held that the words “suit or proceeding” in section 3 did not include an appeal; Mukerjea, J., agreed with the order on a different ground but was not prepared to say “proceeding” did not include an appeal. The court cited this authority as part of conflicting authorities on whether an appeal falls within “suit or proceeding”; the Division Bench decisions that followed Biswas, J.'s view influenced the court to hold that the present appeal was not liable to be stayed under section 3.
Prankrishna Mukherjee v. Jnanada Roy Edgley and Biswas, JJ., approved the view taken by Biswas, J., in Jahur Mia that “suit or proceeding” does not include an appeal. The Division Bench approval of Biswas, J.'s view was an important basis for the court's conclusion that the present appeal is not liable to be stayed under section 3 of the Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act.
Howrah Jute Mills v. Bakshi Sk. Napit Followed Prankrishna Mukherjee's case; Edgley and Biswas, JJ., applied the view that the expression does not include an appeal. Used as supporting Division Bench authority in concluding that an appeal is not a “suit or proceeding” for the purpose of section 3 and therefore the appeal should not be stayed.
Ram Charit Bhakat v. Tetari Kumari Kuor Henderson, T., sitting singly, agreed with Biswas, J.'s view that “suit or proceeding” does not include an appeal. Cited as a single-judge authority consistent with the view that an appeal is not caught by section 3; contributed to the court's survey of authorities on the point.
Rukmini Mahesri v. Prahlad Chandra Agarwalla Biswas, J., sitting singly, reviewed authorities and reaffirmed his view that “suit or proceeding” does not include an appeal. Cited as an authority confirming Biswas, J.'s approach and forming part of the body of decisions the court considered before holding that the appeal was not liable to be stayed under section 3.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a sequence driven by the remand issue ordered by B.K. Mukherjea, J., and by subsequent factual findings made by the lower Appellate Court:

  1. Remand and factual determination — Mukherjea, J., remitted the specific issue "What was the status of Osman at the time when the potta of 1308 was granted" to the lower Appellate Court. On fresh evidence the lower Appellate Court found Osman and Meajan had the interest of non-agricultural bastu tenants in the 9-cotta holding at the date of the potta, i.e., their interest was not that of a raiyat.
  2. Effect of the remand findings — The court accepted the remand findings and concluded that where the superior lessor's holding was non-agricultural at inception, the sub-lease in favour of the Defendant was non-agricultural at its inception and retained that character. Consequently, the principle in Babu Ram Roy (applying only where the superior holding was a raiyat at inception) did not apply.
  3. Scope-of-remand objection — The Respondent argued post-remand findings went beyond scope; the court rejected that objection, holding that the remit was wide enough to permit inquiry into who were the persons from whom the Plaintiff inherited different jamas and that findings on amalgamation were incidental explanatory matters connected to the main remitted issue.
  4. Interpretation of section 4(3) Bengal Tenancy Act — The Respondent's alternative argument that the Defendant is an under-raiyat because he holds immediately under the Plaintiff (who is now a raiyat) was considered. The court found this argument objectionable because it would negate the remand's purpose (the remand was on the footing that the Plaintiff's present status was immaterial and that the Defendant's status would be determined by the status of the Plaintiff at the date of the potta). More fundamentally, the court relied on the criticism of Babu Ram Roy in Arun Kumar Sinha v. Durga Charan Basu and adopted a narrow construction of section 4(3): a person will be an under-raiyat only if he holds under a raiyat at the inception of his lease.
  5. Whether the appeal was liable to be stayed under section 3 of the Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act — The court surveyed inconsistent authorities on whether “suit or proceeding” includes an appeal. Noting Division Bench decisions (Prankrishna Mukherjee v. Jnanada Roy and Howrah Jute Mills v. Bakshi Sk. Napit) that adopted the view that the expression does not include an appeal, the court was “constrained” to hold that the present appeal was not liable to be stayed. The court also observed that the Respondent had not objected to hearing under section 3 when Mukherjea, J., remitted the issue, but permitted argument on the point because it affected jurisdiction.
  6. Resulting application of legal principles — Because the sub-lease was non-agricultural at inception and the Babu Ram Roy rule did not apply, the Defendant's rights fell to be governed by the Transfer of Property Act rather than the Bengal Tenancy Act; on that basis the court allowed the appeal and set aside the appellate court's judgment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Division Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the Court of Appeal below, and restored and affirmed the judgment of the Munsif.

Implications:

  • The court held that where a superior lessor's holding was non-agricultural at the inception of the lease (potta of 1308 here), a sub-lease that was non-agricultural at inception retains that character and the tenant's rights are governed by the Transfer of Property Act rather than by the Bengal Tenancy Act as an under-raiyat.
  • The court declined to apply broadly the principle in Babu Ram Roy in circumstances where the superior holding was non-agricultural at inception; it adopted a narrow construction of section 4(3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, reading an under-raiyat to require that the subordinate tenant have held under a raiyat at the inception of his lease.
  • The court determined that, on the authorities it considered (including Division Bench decisions), an appeal is not liable to be stayed under section 3 of the Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act (i.e., the expression “suit or proceeding” does not include an appeal for the purposes of that section), and therefore the earlier stay was not applicable to bar the appeal on that statutory ground.
  • No broader binding new precedent was expressly proclaimed beyond the court's application of prior critical commentary (Arun Kumar Sinha) to endorse a narrow reading of section 4(3); the direct effect was to change the outcome between the parties: the Appellant's ejectment suit is revived (Munsif's decree restored) and the parties are to bear their own costs.

Order as to costs: The court directed that the parties should bear their own costs throughout.

Show all summary ...

Lahiri, J.:— The suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted by the Plaintiff for ejectment of the Defendant from cadastral survey Plot No. 633 of the Khatian 587, Mouza Garulia on termination of the Defendant's tenancy by a notice to quit under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court of Appeal below dismissed the suit and hence this appeal is by the Plaintiff.

2. The Plaintiff's case is that he took a lease of 9 cottas of land under a potta dated the 19th of Pous, 1308 (=3rd January, 1902) from his two uncles Sk. Osman and Sk. Meajan and out of this area of 9 cottas the Plaintiff granted a sub-lease to the Defendant for three cottas for residential purposes; in the record-of-rights finally published in 1931 the Defendant was recorded as an under-raiyat with a right of occupancy. This entry was challenged by the Plaintiff as wrong. The Plaintiff further alleged that he served a notice to quit under sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on the 21st of Jaistha, 1342, by registered post and the Defendant accepted the same with the result that the tenancy was determined with effect from the 1st of Sravan, 1342. The Defendant denied the validity and sufficiency of the notice and alleged that the tenancy was governed by the Bengal Tenancy Act and that he took the lease for agricultural purposes. The Court of first instance decreed the suit and then after passing through various stages the suit was finally dismissed by the Additional District Judge, 24-Parganas by a judgment dated the 6th of March, 1940, upon the finding that on the death of the Plaintiff's lessors who were his uncles the Plaintiff inherited their interest and as that interest was that of a raiyat, the Plaintiff became a raiyat and the lease-hold interest held by him was merged in the higher right with the result that the Defendant became an under-raiyat under the Plaintiff. As the Plaintiff himself became a raiyat the sublease graned by him to the Defendant made the Defendant an under-raiyat, no matter whether the sub-lease was for agricultural or non-agricultural purposes. For this proposition of law the Additional District Judge relied upon the case of Babu Ram Roy v. Mohendra Nath Samanta(1), decided by Mitra, J. and affirmed on Letters Patent Appeal by Maclean, C.J and Pargiter, J.

3. Against this decision the Plaintiff has filed this second appeal, the hearing of which under Or. 41, r. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was stayed by an ex parte order dated the 7th of April, 1940, under sec. 3 of the Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act. On December 2, 1947, that ex parte order of stay was vacated and the appeal was admitted under Or. 41, r. 11. On the 20th of July, 1948, the appeal was taken up for final hearing by B.K Mukherjea, J., before whom it was argued by the Appellant that if the tenancy created by the potta dated the 19th of Pous, 1308, was a non-agricultural tenancy at its inception the subsequent event by which the rights acquired under the potta merged in the superior rights of the lessor, could not affect the status of the subordinate tenant. Though this was an important question in the case it was not raised in the Court below and Mukherjea, J., accordingly acting under Or. 41, r. 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure remitted the following issue to the lower Appellate Court: “What was the status of Osman at the time when the potta of 1308 was granted.” The lower Appellate Court was directed to take fresh evidence and record a finding on the point.

4. In pursuance of the direction given by Mukherjea, J., the lower Appellate Court has recorded the following findings:—

(a) “On a comparative estimate of the evidence adduced by the two parties, I am of opinion that the Appellant's contention that the holding of Osman and Meajan measured only 9 cottas and that the entire holding was a non-agricultural bastu holding is true.”

(b) “I hold from the evidence on record that Osman and Meajan had the interest of non-agricultural bastu tenant in their holding of 9 cottas to which the disputed land appertains and their interest was not that of a raiyat,”

5. The lower Appellate Court has further found that this non-agricultural holding of 9 cottas belonging to Osman and Meajan was inherited by the Appellant Abdul Samad and amalgamated with certain other agricultural holdings inherited by him from his father and all the holdings were converted into one holding bearing a consolidated rent of Rs. 6 and recorded as raiyati mokurari in the record-of-rights.

6. Mr. Sen appearing for the Appellant has argued that in view of the finding arrived at by the Court of Appeal below after the order of remand made by Mukherjea, J., it must be held that the tenancy of the Defendant is governed by the Transfer of Property Act. The effect of the judgment of Mukherjea, J., is that the principle of the decision of Babu Ram Roy's case will apply only if the tenancy of Osman and Meajan be found to be an agricultural tenancy on the date of the potta dated the 19th of Pous, 1308. The finding, however, is that the tenancy of Osman and Meajan was not agricultural tenancy on the date of the potta, but that it became an agricultural tenancy on a subsequent date. Upon this finding it seems to us that Babu Ram Roy's case has no application. The Sub-lease in favour of the Defendant was non-agricultural at its inception and it retained that character throughout.

7. Mr. Mukherjee appearing for the Respondent has strenuously challenged the findings arrived at after remand on the ground that they were beyond the scope of the order of remand. The argument is that it had been found by the lower Appellate Court before the remand that the amalgamation took place not with the paternal jama of the Plaintiff but with other jamas inherited from the Plaintiff's uncles Meajan and Osman, and it was not, therefore, open to the Plaintiff after the remand to show that a part of the jama recorded in C.S Plot No. 583 belonged to the Plaintiff's father and another part belonged to his uncles. We are not impressed by this argument because we think that the scope of the order of remand was wide enough to cover an enquiry into the question as to who were the persons from whom the Plaintiff inherited the different jamas. The finding as to the mode of amalgamation is only incidental to the main issue that was remitted for investigation, viz., what was the status of Osman and Meajan on the date of the potta, and after having arrived at the necessary finding on that issue, the learned Subordinate Judge went into the question of amalgamation only for the purpose of explaining the entry in the record-of-rights. The dakhila, Ex. 8 (c) shows that the amalgamation did not lake place even on the 20th of Chaitra, 1319. If that be so, the Defendant must be held to have taken a sub-lease from a non-agricultural lessor for non-agricultural purposes and his rights will accordingly be governed by the Transfer of Property Act.

8. Mr. Mukherjee has argued in the second place that according to the definition of an under-raiyat as given in sec. 4 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act the Defendant is an under-raiyat inasmuch as he held immediately under the Plaintiff who is at present a raiyat though the Plaintiff was not a raiyat at the time when he (Plaintiff) took lease from Osman and Meajan in 1308 or at the time when he granted the sublease to the Defendant. This argument is open to a two-fold objection: in the first place it makes the order of remand made by B.K Mukherjea, J., altogether nugatory as that order was made on the footing that the present status of the Plaintiff was immaterial and the Defendant's status would be determined by the status of the Plaintiff on the date of the potta of 1308. After having submitted to that order and having unsuccessfully adduced evidence on that point, it is hardly open to the Defendant to say now that the rights of the Defendant should be determined by the present status of the Plaintiff. But there is a more serious objection to this argument and that is this: In the case of Arun Kumar Sinha v. Durga Charan Basu(2), Mukherjea and Roxburgh, JJ., pointed out that the rule of law laid down in the case of Babu Ram Roy v. Mahendra Nath Samanta that a person holding under a raiyat will be an under-raiyat even if he holds it for non-agricultural purposes is open to serious exceptions. But their Lordships did not refer the matter to a Full Bench simply because it had remained unchallenged for a considerable time. This criticism of Babu Ram Roy's case inclines us to put a narrow construction upon the word of sec. 4 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act and to hold that a person will be an under-raiyat only if he holds under a raiyat at the inception of his lease (?). The interpretation sought to be put upon sec. 4 (3) of the Bengal Tenancy Act by Mr. Mukherjee would have the effect of extending the principles of the decision in Babu Ram Roy's case which we are not prepared to do in view of the criticism by Mukherjea. J, in the case of Arun Kumar Sinha v. Durga Charan Basu.

9. It remains for us to consider the question whether the present appeal is liable to be stayed under the provisions of sec. 3 of the Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act of 1940. It is conceded that the Defendant is a non-agricultural tenant within the meaning of the Act. But Mr. Sen has argued that the appeal by the landlord is neither a suit nor a proceeding within the meaning of sec. 3 and is not liable to be stayed, Mr. Mukherjee on the other hand has contended that the appeal is a continuation of the suit and in any case it is a proceeding. The decisions on the point are not uniform. In the case of Jahur Mia v. Abdul Gaffur(3), Biswas, J., held that the words “suit or proceeding” in sec. 3 did not include an appeal, but Mukerjea, J., who agreed with the order made by Biswas, J., on a different ground, was not prepared to go so far as to say that the word “proceeding” did not include an appeal. In the case of Prankrishna Mukherjee v. Jnanada Roy(4) Edgley and Biswas, JJ., approved of the view taken by Biswas, J., in Jahur Mia's case. Prankrishna Mukherjee's case was followed by Edgley and Biswas, JJ., in the case of Howrah Jute Mills v. Bakshi Sk. Napit(5) decided on January 5, 1942. In Ram Charit Bhakat v. Tetari Kumari Kuor(6), Henderson, T., sitting singly agreed with the view of Biswas, J., that the expression “suit or proceeding” in sec. 3 does not include an appeal. Lastly, in Rukmini Mahesri v. Prahlad Chandra Agarwalla(7), Biswas, J., sitting singly reviewed all the authorities and re-affirmed his view that the expression “suit or proceeding” does not include an appeal. In this state of the authorities, particularly in view of the two decisions of Division Bench in the cases of Prankrishna Mukherjee v. Jnanada Roy and Hozurah Jute Mills v. Baksi S.k Napit we are constrained to hold that the present appeal is not liable to be stayed under sec. 3 of he Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act of 1940.

10. We have already stated that the hearing of the appeal under Or. 41, r. 11 was stayed under that Act by an ex parte order dated 7th April, 1941, which was vacated by another ex parte order dated 2nd De cember, 1947.

11. It is remarkable that when eventually the appeal was taken up for final hearing by B.K Mukherjea, J., on the 20th of July, 1948, the Respondent did not take any objection to the hearing under sec. 3 of the Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act and submitted to the order of remand. But in view of the fact that the question now raised before us by Mr. Mukherjee is a question affecting the jurisdiction of the Court, we have allowed him to argue it and decided to give our decision on the merits of his argument.

12. The result of our decision is that this appeal must be allowed, the judgment and decree of the Court of Appeal below are set aside and that of the Munsif restored and affirmed.

13. In the circumstances of the case we direct that the parties should bear their own costs throughout.

N.D.R