K. Balakrishnan Nair, J.:— The point to be decided in this O.P is whether there is any time limit for filing a Revision Petition before the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal under S. 84 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. The brief facts of the case are the following:

2. The petitioners are the members of the Coastal Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. No. 3036, Kollam. They have availed loans from the said Bank. They committed default in paying the amounts due under the loans. Therefore, the Bank moved the arbitrator and Exts. P1 and P1 (a) have been passed in favour of the Bank and against the petitioners. The respondents in the arbitration case filed R.P Nos. 236/2002 and 235/2002 before the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal under S. 84 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. Those Revision Petitions were filed after a delay of one year and four months and two years and five months respectively. Therefore, the Tribunal dismissed the Revision Petitions as barred by limitation by Exts. P2 and P2(a) orders. This Original Petition is filed challenging those orders. The petitioners submit that the Act does not prescribe any period of limitation and therefore, they can move the Tribunal at any time, according to their convenience. The 1st respondent has filed a counter affidavit, supporting the impugned order. It is submitted that since no petitions to condone the delay have been filed, in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court relied on by the Tribunal, the Revision Petitions were rightly rejected.

3. I heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent Bank and also the learned Government Pleader. The point to be decided is whether the Revision Petitions filed by the petitioners are barred by limitation and therefore, the revisions were rightly dismissed. S. 84 of the Co-operative Societies Act reads as follows.

“84. Revision by Tribunal.— The Tribunal may call for and examine the record of any proceedings in which an appeal lies to it for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed and if in any case it shall appear to the Tribunal that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled or revised, the Tribunal may pass such order thereon as it may deem fit:

Provided that the Tribunal shall not take any action under this section if,—

(a) the time for appeal against the decision or order has not expired; or

(b) the decision or order has been made the subject matter of an appeal.

(c) further that no order shall be made under this section unless notice has been

(d) given and they have been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.”

4. The Legislature has chosen to prescribe periods of limitation for filing appeal under S. 82 before the Tribunal, appeal under S. 83 before the Government, review before the Tribunal under S. 85 and revision before the Government under S. 87. Only in the case of revision under S. 84 before the Tribunal, the Legislature has chosen not to prescribe any time limit. So revisions were being entertained without any reference to the delay in filing them. There is no decision of this Court directly on this point. But the Tribunal has relied on a decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Moideen Koya v. Kunhammed Haji (1999 (2) KLT 646 FB), interpreting S. 20 of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act to dismiss the revisions. S. 20 of the said Act reads as follows:

“20. Revisions.—

(1) In cases where the Appellate Authority empowered under S. 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.

(2) The costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under sub-s. (1) shall be in its discretion.”

5. Interpreting this provision, a Single Judge of this Court in Narayanan v. Rent Controller (1988 (2) KLT 74) has held that though no time limit was prescribed under S. 20, the power of revision should be invoked within a reasonable time limit, say 90 days. If the revision is filed beyond that period, the delay should be satisfactorily explained. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:

“11. It may at this juncture point out that the District Court has committed a gross error in entertaining the Revision Petition filed after a long lapse of 10 years, 7 months and 21 days. It is true that S. 20 of the Act does not specify any time limit for approaching the Revisional Court. On the other hand, it enables the District Court at any time to call for and examine the records of the Appellate Authority in relation to any order passed or proceedings taken, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of the said order or proceedings. That does not however mean that the District Court can exercise its jurisdiction at any future time without any limitation whatsoever. The exercise of revisional power is entirely discretionary and should be in the interests of justice. S. 20 does not confer any right on the petitioner but only vests a power in the District Court. It is a privilege conferred on the petitioner, and not a right. The petitioner is therefore expected to be diligent in invoking the revisional power. He must come to court without undue delay I should say, at the earliest. As noted by a Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay in a case arising under S. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, delay in approaching the court is one of the factors on which the exercise of the discretion rests. The court observed:—

The court will in all cases, regard its exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction as discretional and subject to considerations of the importance of the particular case, or of an applicant, and of his merits with respect to the case in which the interference of the court is sought.

(Shiva Nathaji v. Joma Kashinath (ILR 7 Bom. 831)

12. Krishnalyer, J. had occasion to deal with a case where the Revisional Court entertained the revision after a period of two years from the date of the Appellate Authority's order. The Judge observed:

‘The revision was filed, as I said earlier, over 2 years after the appeal was disposed of, but was admitted and heard, because by a strange omission in the statute, as both sides submitted, no period of limitation is fixed in the matter of entertaining a revision. Litigation can become a long-acting torment if an order can be challenged years later on the pretext that there is no period of limitation fixed in the statute. Of course, it is for the Legislature to remedy this lacuna, but it is certainly open to the Revisional Court to decline to exercise its discretion when a party moves for relief after a period of indiscrete delay.’

(Padmanabha Pillai v. Narayana Pillai (1969 KLJ 614)

13. It is well to remember at this stage that the Limitation Act, 1908 had not prescribed any period of limitation for a Revision Petition under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Nevertheless it had been the accepted rule of practice and discretion in almost all High Courts that the party aggrieved must approach the High Court for the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under S. 115 within a period of 90 days, namely the period prescribed for filing an appeal. (Vide Mulla on the Code of Civil Procedure 14th Edition, Volume I, page 696, Note 37 and AIR Commentaries on the Code of Civil Procedure 10th Edition Volume Two, page 388, Note 17). This was the conventional period within which any suitor was required to approach the High Court, subject of course to extension of the time on sufficient cause being shown. Any application for revision beyond this period was treated as belated. The Limitation Act of 1963 gave legislative recognition to this conventional period by its Art. 131 in the Schedule to the Act. Even a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution has normally to be filed within a period of 90 days. It has been so held in the decisions in Vekitasubramonia Iyer v. Catholic Bank of India Ltd. (1957 KLT 411) and Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala (1986 KLT 817).

14. When this is the well established practice even in relation to proceedings under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Art. 226 of the Constitution, there is no reason why the Revisional Court should be permitted to deal with a Revision Petition under S. 20 of the Act, without any limit of time.

15. It must be observed here that expedition is the watchword in proceedings under the Act. When S. 24 hope fully prescribes a period of four months for passing final orders by the Rent Control Court, and S. 18 prescribes a bare period of thirty days for filing an appeal and a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution which lies against the order of the Revisional Court has ordinarily to be filed within ninety days, it cannot be that the intermediate authority, namely the Revisional Court alone should have an unlimited period of time within which to exercise its jurisdiction. The words ‘at any time’ have to be delimited to reasonable levels having regard to prevalent practice and the nature of the power to be exercised. A period of ninety days should be treated as the reasonable time within which an aggrieved party should move under S. 20. Any delay thereafter has to be explained satisfactorily before the court can be requested to exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner.

16. It is axiomatic that any authority exercising discretionary powers should act reasonably. Reasonableness is the touchstone of all judicial and quasi judicial actions. (See in this connection: Secretary of State v. Metropolitan Borough of Tameside (1976 (3) All England Law Reports 665). The District Court functioning under S. 20 should therefore, exercise its power in a reasonable manner. Any delay in invoking the power makes its exercise oppressive, arbitrary and unreasonable. Since ninety days has all along been accepted as a reasonable period for invoking the power of revision, the District Court should act only if approached by the aggrieved party within ninety days. That is not to say that it will not, in appropriate cases, where the delay is properly and satisfactorily explained, interfere, or exercise its discretion, even if approached beyond this period. Sufficient cause should be established in all such cases.”

6. This decision was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in V.P Thomas v. V.K Mukunda Menon (1992 (2) KLT 9). A Full Bench of this Court in Moideeen Koya v. Kunhammed Haji (1999 (2) KLT 646 FB), considered the above said decisions and held that even if there was delay, court could entertain the Revision Petition, if the same was explained properly.

7. The wordings of S. 84 of the Co-operative Societies Act and that of S. 20 of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act are similar, as much as in both the cases the discretion is conferred on the concerned revisional authority to revise the orders, provided the jurisdictional pre-conditions are disclosed. S. 29 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125 deals with the situation where a power is conferred and no time limit is prescribed for the exercise of the same. The said section reads as follows:

“29. Provisions when no time prescribed.— Where no time is prescribed or allowed within which anything shall be done, such thing shall be done with all convenient speed, and as often as the prescribed occasion arises.”

8. The occasion arises in this case only when the facts of a particular case are brought to the notice of the Tribunal. A Tribunal does not normally call for the records of the cases decided by the arbitrators. So, here the delay is occasioned in presenting the facts before the Tribunal to persuade it to exercise its power under S. 84. Therefore, the provisions of S. 29 will not govern the presentation of the petition for revision, but may govern exercise of power by the Tribunal.

9. Since there is no binding decision on this point under S. 84, I think the principle laid down by this Court under S. 20 of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act can be safely followed in this case also. So, if a revision is filed beyond a reasonable time limit, say 90 days, the petitioner should explain in the revision, the reason for the delay. Since there is no limitation prescribed, there need not be any separate petition to condone the delay. The facts which will explain the reasons for the delay should be pleaded in the Revision Petition. If the Tribunal is satisfied that the petitioner was prevented by good reasons from approaching it earlier, the revision can be entertained.

10. Coming to this case, it must be assumed that the delay in presenting the Revision Petitions has not been explained, as there is no discussion about it in Ext. P2 or P2(a). The petitioners have chosen, not to produce those Revision Petitions also. Since the Tribunal was entertaining Revision Petitions filed with long delay, the petitioners cannot be blamed for not explaining the delay, especially in view of the fact that there is no direct decision of this Court under S. 84 of the Act. I think, in view of the said position, the petitioners must be given a chance to explain the delay on their part in preferring the Revision Petitions. Accordingly, Exts. P2 and P2(a) are quashed. The Co-operative Tribunal shall re-hear the Revision Petitions Nos. 235/2002 and 236/2002, if the petitioners file affidavits before the Tribunal, explaining the reasons for the delay in preferring the Revision Petitions and copies of the same are sent simultaneously to the 1st respondent by registered post. If such affidavits are filed before the Tribunal within one month from today, it shall re-hear the Revision Petitions in accordance with law. While considering the question of delay, the Tribunal shall also take into account whether any third party rights will be affected by entertaining and deciding the revisions on merits. The amount paid by the petitioners as per the interim order of this Court shall be adjusted against the liability due from them to the Bank.

11. Original Petition is disposed of as above. No costs.