- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Arangil Raghavan v. K. Sreedhara Panicker And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner (landlord) filed R.C.P. No. 158 of 1985 in the Rent Control Court, Kozhikode, seeking eviction of the legal representatives of the tenant Kelappa Panicker from the petition schedule building under the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The landlord alleged that the building had been sub-let by the tenant to respondent No. 3. The original tenant, Kelappa Panicker, an astrologer, died in 1973. Respondent No. 3 asserted that he had practised astrology with Kelappa Panicker during the latter's lifetime and, after Kelappa Panicker's death, had entered into a partnership with Kelappa Panicker's heirs, denying that there had been an unauthorised sub-letting.
The Rent Control Court found that respondent No. 3's contentions of prior association and of partnership with the heirs were not established, but nevertheless refused eviction on the ground that the landlord must have been aware of respondent No. 3’s presence and therefore had consented to the sub-lease. The Appellate Authority affirmed the finding that the partnership/association was not established and also concluded that the landlord’s knowledge of respondent No. 3's presence amounted to consent, and consequently denied eviction despite finding a sub-lease.
The landlord filed this Revision under Section 20 of the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, challenging the Appellate Authority's refusal to grant eviction under Section 11(4)(i) of the Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the theory of acquiescence or implied consent can be invoked to defeat a landlord's statutory right to obtain eviction under Section 11(4)(i) of the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act when a tenant has sub-let without landlord's consent.
- Whether mere knowledge of a sub-tenant's occupation or the landlord's receipt of rent (or other indicia such as electricity connection) suffices to establish the landlord's consent or waiver of the statutory right to evict under Section 11(4)(i).
- Whether the decision in Kalyanasundram Pillal v. Ramamoorthy (1985 KLT 922), which treated long landlord silence as strong corroborative evidence of consent, is a correct statement of law applicable to Section 11(4)(i) of the Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (Landlord's) Arguments
- The decision in Kalyanasundram Pillal v. Ramamoorthy (1985 KLT 922), relied upon by the courts below, is based on a misunderstanding of the scope of Section 11(4)(i) and requires reconsideration.
- Where the lease does not authorise sub-letting and there is no prior consent of the landlord, a sub-letting attracts eviction under Section 11(4)(i); implied consent or acquiescence cannot be imported to defeat that statutory right.
Respondent No. 3's Arguments
- Respondent No. 3 claimed he practised the profession of astrology along with the original tenant, Kelappa Panicker, during the latter's lifetime, and after Kelappa Panicker's death had entered into a partnership with Kelappa Panicker's heirs, thereby denying that there was a sub-letting without landlord's consent.
Court(s) Below (Rent Control Court / Appellate Authority) — Reasoning Applied
- Both the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority found that respondent No. 3's contentions of association and partnership were not established, but nevertheless refused eviction on the ground that the landlord must have been aware of respondent No. 3’s presence and therefore had consented to the sub-lease (invoking a theory of acquiescence).
- Both courts drew inspiration from Kalyanasundram Pillal v. Ramamoorthy (1985 KLT 922), which had held that long silence by the landlord is a strong corroborative circumstance supporting a contention of consent to sub-letting.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kalyanasundram Pillal v. Ramamoorthy (1985 KLT 922) | Held that long silence on the part of a landlord is a strong corroborative circumstance in support of the contention of the tenant that there was consent to the sub-letting; presumes landlord would have acted if sub-letting was without consent. | The Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority relied upon this decision to infer landlord's consent from knowledge/long silence; this Court held that the decision does not lay down the correct law for Section 11(4)(i) and cannot be accepted as correct. |
| Kammath v. Chandran, 1989 (1) KLJ 292 | Shows that a sub-tenant let in with the consent of the landlord only gets immunity from eviction under Section 11(4)(i) and is not entitled to raise other claims under the Act. | Used to emphasise that a sub-tenant is not a tenant under the Act and has limited protection even when let in with landlord's consent. |
| Varghese Ittoop v. Ibrahim, 1991 (2) KLJ 444 | Same principle as Kammath: a sub-tenant's protection is limited to immunity from eviction when landlord's consent exists. | Reinforces that sub-tenancy does not confer full tenant rights and that statutory protections are narrow. |
| K.K Krishnan v. M.K Vijaya Raghavan (AIR 1980 SC 1756) | Held that notwithstanding Section 108(j) of the Transfer of Property Act, a tenant would be liable to eviction under Section 11(4)(i) of the Act even if there is no express prohibition in the lease, unless the lease specifically authorises sub-letting. | Cited to support the proposition that a lease must specifically authorise sub-letting to prevent eviction under Section 11(4)(i). |
| Janab M.P Azad v. Fathim Sarohimi Suresh (1983 (1) RCJ 249) | Held that sub-letting or assignment of a lease is objectionable unless the lease deed contains a term permitting it. | Applied to underscore that absence of an express lease term permitting sub-letting renders the sub-letting objectionable under the Rent Act. |
| Gappulal v. Thakurji Shriji Dwarkadheeshji (AIR 1969 SC 1291) | Held that landlord's permission for sub-letting is not established merely because the landlord realised the rent after the sub-letting. | Used to reject the inference that receipt of rent alone establishes landlord's consent. |
| Hiralal Kapur v. Prabhu Choudhury (AIR 1988 SC 852) | Held that receipt of rent by way of cheques from both tenant and sub-tenant and awareness of the sub-tenant's activities are not sufficient to show the landlord accepted the sub-tenant as tenant. | Supports the position that acts such as receipt of rent or awareness do not, without more, constitute landlord's consent to sub-letting. |
| Pulin Behari Lal v. Mahadeb Dutta (1993) SCC 629 | Indicated that an inference of giving up of a statutory right would not be easily drawn by invoking acquiescence; mere knowledge/acceptance of rent without proof of conscious relinquishment does not amount to waiver. | Applied to require proof of conscious relinquishment before finding waiver of the statutory right to evict. |
| Ram Saran v. Pyare Lal (AIR 1996 SC 2361) | Held that the Rent Act is a special statute and its provisions supersede general tenancy law; mere knowledge of occupation by another and acceptance of rent in the sub-tenant's name will not create sub-tenancy unless induction is made with landlord's written consent (noting written consent requirement in context of that law). | Used to reinforce that mere knowledge or acceptance of rent does not create a sub-tenancy or defeat the landlord's statutory right; in the context of the present Act, consent need not be written but must be prior and affirmative. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analysed Section 11(4)(i) of the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, which makes a tenant liable to eviction if, after commencement of the Act, the tenant transfers his right under the lease or sub-lets the building (or part) without the consent of the landlord, unless the lease itself confers the right to sub-let. The Court emphasised that the statute contemplates either (a) an express lease-authorisation to sub-let, or (b) the landlord's consent to the sub-letting.
The Court interpreted "consent of the landlord" as a consent obtained prior to or for the sub-letting — in short, consent that precedes the act of sub-letting. It noted that a sub-tenant is not a tenant under the Act and that statutory protection for a sub-tenant is limited, citing authorities to that effect.
Relying on several decisions of the Supreme Court and earlier authorities, the Court concluded that mere knowledge of sub-letting, long silence, receipt of rent, an electricity connection in the sub-tenant's name, or similar indicia do not, by themselves, establish the landlord's consent or a conscious relinquishment (waiver) of the statutory right to evict. The Court expressly held that the theory of implied consent or acquiescence cannot be imported to defeat a claim under Section 11(4)(i) where the lease does not authorise sub-letting and there is no prior consent.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found no material to show that respondent No. 3 had independent occupation accepted by the landlord or that exclusive possession had been transferred to respondent No. 3 with the landlord's consent. Both lower authorities had found the partnership/association claims against respondent No. 3. The Court concluded there was a case of objectionable sub-letting entitling the landlord to eviction and that the Rent Control Court and Appellate Authority acted illegally and improperly in invoking acquiescence or waiver.
Holding and Implications
Revision allowed. The Court set aside the decision of the Appellate Authority and granted the landlord an order for eviction under Section 11(4)(i) of the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act.
Implications:
- The Court clarified that consent to a sub-letting contemplated by Section 11(4)(i) must precede the sub-letting; implied consent or acquiescence (e.g., by long silence or mere receipt of rent) cannot be relied upon to defeat the landlord's statutory right to evict.
- The decision rejects the view expressed in Kalyanasundram Pillal v. Ramamoorthy (1985 KLT 922) as an incorrect statement of law insofar as it permitted drawing the inference of consent from long silence in the context of Section 11(4)(i).
- The direct effect on the parties: the Appellate Authority's order is set aside, the landlord is granted eviction under Section 11(4)(i), and the respondents were given four months from the date of the judgment to vacate the premises.
Balasubramanyan, J.:— The petitioner in R.C.P No. 158 of 1985 on the file of the Rent Control Court, Kozhikode, being the landlord of a building, is the petitioner in this Revision filed under Section 20 of the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The landlord sought eviction of the legal representatives of the tenant, one Kelappa Panicker, from the petition schedule building on the allegation that the building has been sub-let by them to respondent No. 3 before the Rent Control Court. Kelappa Panicker, the predecessor of respondents 1, 2 and 4 to 8, was an Astrologer. He died in the year 1973, Respondent No. 3 before the Rent Control Court, according to him, had learnt astrology from Kelappa Panicker, the original tenant. His case was that he was practising the profession of that of an Astrologer along with Kelappa Panicker in the petition schedule building even during the life time of Kelappa Panicker. After the death of Kelappa Panicker, respondent No. 3 had entered into a partnership with the heirs of kelappa Panicker and hence there was no sub-letting which would justify on order for eviction under Section 11(4)(1) of the Act. The Rent Control Court found that the case of being associated with Kelappa Panicker, set up by respondent No. 3, has not been established. It also found that the case of partnership with heirs of Kelappa Panicker set up by respondent No. 3 has also not been established. But the Rent Control Court refused eviction to the landlord under Section 11(4)(1) of the Act, essentially on the ground that the landlord must have been aware of the presence of respondent No. 3 in the premises, since he was practising the profession of that of an Astrologer in the petition schedule building and from that, it could be inferred that the landlord had consented to the sub-lease. The Appellate Authority also found that the case of respondent No. 3 before the Rent Control Court that he was practising the profession of that of an Astrologer with Kelappa Panicker and subsequent to the death of Kelappa Panicker, he had entered into a partnership with the heirs of Kelappa Panicker, has not been established. The Appellate Authority also took the view that the landlord must have been aware of the presence of respondent No. 3 in the petition schedule building even while Kelappa Panicker was alive and thereafter and from this, it followed that no order for eviction under Section 11(4)(1) of the Act could be passed, since the landlord must be taken to have consented to the sub-lease. Thus, the Appellate Authority also refused eviction in spite of finding the sub-lease, pleaded by the landlord.
2. Thus, in spite of finding that the exclusive possession has been transferred to respondent No. 3 before the Rent Control Court by the original tenant, Kelappa Panicker, the Appellate Authority has denied an order for eviction to the landlord by applying a theory of acquiescence on the part of the landlord to the exclusive user of the building by respondent No. 3. The Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority have drawn inspiration from a decision of this Court in Kalyanasundram Pillal v. Ramamoorthy (1985 KLT 922). In that decision it was held that, long silence on the part of a landlord is a strong corroborative circumstance in support of the contention of the tenant that there was consent to the sub-letting. It was stated that if the sub-letting had been without the landlord's consent, it could be presumed that the landlord would not have been slow in instituting the proceeding for eviction as soon as he came to know it. It is submitted by learned counsel for the landlord that the decision relied on by the authorities below is based on a misunderstanding of the scope of Section 11(4)(i) of the Act and requires to be reconsidered since the question, how far a theory of acquiescence can be invoked in the context of Section 11(4)(i) of the Act, has not been properly considered in that decision.
3. Section 11(4)(i) of the Act provides that a tenant is liable to be evicted if, after the commencement of the Act, the tenant, without the consent of the landlord, transfers his right under the lease or sub-lets the entire building or any portion thereof, if the lease does not confer on him the right to do so. The two circumstances in which a sub-letting by a tenant does not lead to an order for eviction under Section 11(4)(i) of the Act, are the circumstances where the lease or the instrument of lease confers on him the right to do so and the circumstance where the subletting is made with the consent of the landlord. According to us, in a case where the lease does not authorise the tenant to sub-let, the consent of the landlord contemplated by the Section is a consent obtained prior to the sub-letting or a consent for the sub-letting. The Section speaks of a transfer of the right under the lease or sub-letting without the consent of the landlord as a ground for eviction.
4. On a proper reading of the provision, it is clear that the sub-letting should be with consent, to escape the consequences envisaged by that provision. In other words, the consent must precede the sub-letting. It has to be noted that a sub-tenant is not a tenant as defined in the Act and the sub-tenant gets no protection under the Act. This position is further emphasised by Section 21 of the Act. It has even been held that even a sub-tenant let in with the consent of the landlord only gets immunity from eviction under Section 11(4)(i) of the Act and is not entitled to raise any other claim under the Act. (See Kammath v. Chandran, 1989 (1) KLJ 292 and Varghese Ittoop v. Ibrahim, 1991 (2) KLJ 444). From the context also, it is clear that the subletting to escape the tentacles of Section 11(4)(i) of the Act should be one authorised by the lease or in the alternative, made with the consent of the landlord. Hence, it is not possible to import the theory of implied consent or acquiescence while dealing with a claim under Section 11(4)(i) of the Act.
5. It was held by the Supreme Court in K.K Krishnan v. M.K Vijaya Raghavan (AIR 1980 SC 1756) that notwithstanding the right available to a tenant under Section 108(j) of the Transfer of Property Act, a tenant would be liable to be evicted under Section 11(4)(i) of the Act even if there is no express prohibition in the lease deed regarding subletting and unless the lease deed itself specifically authorises a sub-letting. In Janab M.P Azad v. Fathim Sarohimi Suresh (1983 (1) RCJ 249) this Court held that a subletting or the assignment of a lease has to be treated as objectionable, unless the lease deed itself contains a term, permitting the sub-letting or the assignment. The Supreme Court in Gappulal v. Thakurji Shriji Dwarkadheeshji (AIR 1969 SC 1291) held that the permission of a landlord for a subletting is not established from the mere fact that the landlord realised the rent, after the sub-letting. In Hiralal Kapur v. Prabhu Choudhury. (AIR 1988 SC 852), the Supreme Court held that even in a case wheer, after sub-letting of a portion by the tenant, rent was being received by the landlord by way of two cheques, one drawn by the tenant and the other, by the sub-tenant coupled with the fact that the landlord was aware that certain activities of the sub-tenant was being carried on in a part of the premises, was not sufficient to establish that the landlord had accepted the sub-tenant as a tenant in respect of the portion used by the subtenant. In Pulin Behari Lal v. Mahadeb Dutta (1993) SCC 629), the Supreme Court indicated that an inference of giving up of a right under a statute would not be easily drawn by invoking the theory of acquiescence in such cases. The Supreme Court held that mere knowledge of sub-letting and/or acceptance of rent, in the absence of proof of conscious relinquishment of right to eviction, would not amount to waiver by a landlord. To establish waiver of benefit conferred by provision of statute, conscious relinquishment of such benefit has to be proved. In Ram Saran v. Pyare Lal (AIR 1996 SC 2361), the Supreme Court held that the Rent Act is a special statute governing and regulating tenancy and sub-tenancy. The provisions in this special statute supersede the general law of tenancy if the provision of the special statute are incompatible with the general law of tenancy. Mere knowledge of the landlord about the occupation of the tenanted premises by a person other that the tenant and acceptance of rent for the tenanted premises tendered by the tenant in the name of the sub-tenant will not create a sub-tenancy unless induction of the subtenant is made with the written consent of the landlord. Of course, in our Act, a written consent is not insisted upon. But, in the context of Section 11(4)(i) of the Act and the insistance on the existence of an authorisation in the lease, for the sub-letting which is the other saving provision in favour of the tenant, it is certainly clear that the consent contemplated by Section 11(4)(i) of the Act is a consent to the sub-letting before the subletting and mere knowledge, inaction on the receip of rent by the landlord even after somebody else is let into the building, would not lead to the loss of the right of the landlord under Section 11(4)(i) of the Act to evict the tenant. On a true interpretation of Section 11(4)(i) of the Act in the light of the decisions referred to above, we must hold that the view expressed in Kalyanasundram's case (1985 KLT 922) cannot be accepted as correct. The said decision does not lay down the correct law.
6. In the case on hand, there is nothing to show that any independent occupation of respondent No. 3 before the Rent Control Court, while the original tenant Kelappa Panicker was alive or subsequent to his death, was accepted by the landlord or there was transfer of exclusive possession to respondent No. 3 with the consent of the landlord. The mere fact that respondent No. 3 was found in the premises when Kelappa Panicker was alive and was practising his profession as an Astrologer or that an electric connection was taken in the name of respondent No. 3, would not lead to an inference that there was a sub-letting of the premises in favour of respondent No. 3 by Kelappa Panicker, with the consent of the landlord. The case of respondent No. 3 that there was a partnership between Kelappa Panicker and himself initially and thereafter, between the heirs of Kelappa Panicker and himself has been found against by both the authorities below. It is also clear that the heirs of Kelappa Panicker are nowhere in the scene. They are employed elsewhere. In this situation, it is clear that the landlord has made out a case of objectionable sub-letting, entitling the landlord to an order for eviction under Section 11(4)(i) of the Act. In our view, the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority have clearly acted illegally and improperly in refusing an order for eviction to the landlord under Section 11(4)(i) of the Act by invoking a theory of acquiescence or waiver of the right of the Landlord. There is no material based on which a waiver of a statutory right can be postulated in this case. We are therefore satisfied that interference is called for with the decision of the Appellate Authority under Section 20 of the Act.
We therefore allow this Revision and setting aside the decision of the Appellate Authority, grant the landlord an order for eviction under Section 11(4)(i) of the Act.
Learned counsel for respondents submitted that some time may be given to the respondents to vacate the petition schedule building. Considering the circumstances as a whole, we grant the respondents a period of four months from this date to vacate the petition schedule building.
Revision allowed.
Alert