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Dy. Commr. Of Salestax v. Sulaiman

Kerala High Court
Jan 23, 1986
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Legal Opinion Summary — Balakrishna Menon, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

These tax revision cases were instituted by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law) and raise the common question whether an assessee is liable to pay tax under S. 5A of the Kerala General Saletax Act, 1963 on the purchase turnover of raw-bones that are converted into bone-meal and sold as fertiliser.

The assessments concern the assessment years 1975-1976, 1976-1977, 1977-1978 and 1978-1979. For the first three years the Assessing Officer initially completed assessments on best judgment and subsequently initiated reassessment proceedings under S. 19 on the ground that the purchase turnover of raw-bones had escaped assessment. The Assessing Officer issued revised assessment orders for those years treating the purchase turnover as liable to tax under S. 5A. For 1978-1979 the assessment order likewise included the purchase turnover of raw-bones as taxable under S. 5A.

On appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner remanded all cases for fresh consideration and to give the assessee an opportunity to prove his case; the remand in respect of 1978-1979 included matters beyond the S. 5A issue. The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Ernakulam) set aside the reassessment proceedings for 1975-1976, 1976-1977 and 1977-1978 holding that no tax was leviable on the purchase turnover of raw-bones under S. 5A. For 1978-1979 the remand order was confirmed but confined to other matters; on the S. 5A point the Tribunal held the sale was not liable to tax. The Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law) filed these revisions against the Tribunal's orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the purchase turnover of raw-bones, which are converted into bone-meal and sold as fertiliser, is liable to tax under S. 5A(1)(a) of the Kerala General Saletax Act, 1963 — specifically, whether the raw-bones are "consumed in the manufacture of other goods for sale" so as to attract S. 5A liability.
  2. Whether leave to appeal to the Supreme Court should be granted in respect of the matter (procedural question raised by the assessee's prayer for leave).

Arguments of the Parties

Deputy Commissioner / Department

  • Asserted that raw-bones purchased by the assessee are consumed in the manufacture of bone-meal, which is sold as fertiliser; consequently the purchase turnover of raw-bones is liable to tax under S. 5A(1)(a) of the Act.

Assessee

  • Relied on the decision of the Madras High Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Subbaraj (47 STC 30), which held that raw-bones cannot be said to have been "consumed" in the process of producing crushed bone, bone-meal, etc., and therefore S. 7-A(1)(a) (the Tamil Nadu counterpart) would not apply. The assessee thus contended absence of liability under S. 5A.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pio Food Packers (41 STC 364; affirmed 46 STC 63) Set out the three conditions under S. 5A(1)(a): (1) goods purchased must have been consumed; (2) such consumption must be in the process of manufacture; and (3) the manufacture must be of other goods for sale. Established test that manufacture occurs only when processed article is commercially distinct and no longer regarded as the original commodity. The Court applied the Pio Food Packers test and its articulation of "consumption" and "manufacture" to determine whether bone-meal is commercially distinct from raw-bones; the Court found Pio Food Packers' criteria supported taxing purchase turnover where the manufactured product has a different commercial identity.
East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Express (100 L.Ed 917) — U.S. decision (cited by Supreme Court in Pio Food Packers) Referenced as part of the comparative authority considered by the Supreme Court in assessing whether processing preserves or destroys the original identity of the commodity. The opinion notes the U.S. decision was considered by the Supreme Court in affirming that processing may still leave the commodity's original identity; it formed part of the jurisprudential foundation relied on in Pio Food Packers and indirectly supports the Court's analysis here.
Chowgule & Co. P. Ltd. v. Union of India (47 STC 125) Applied the Pio Food Packers test to examine whether blending ore constituted "manufacture" — test: whether processing produces a commercially different and distinct commodity. The Court cited Chowgule to illustrate the test's application and to show that where processing does not create a commercially distinct commodity, there is no "manufacture" for the purposes of the statutory test; used as part of the analytical framework to contrast with the bone-meal facts.
Kathiawar Industries Ltd v. Jaffrabad Municipality ((1979) 4 SCC 56 : AIR 1979 SC 1721) Considered the meaning of "consumption" and "use" (in an octroi context) and held that crushing uncrushed salt produces a commercially different article; "consumption" may include processes that render the original article commercially different. The Court relied on Kathiawar to show that "consumption" can include processes that bring into existence a commercially different product; this supported the conclusion that crushing/powdering raw-bones into bone-meal may amount to consumption in the statutory sense.
Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distributing Co. India Ltd. v. The Belgaum Borough Municipality (1963 Suppl. (2) SCR 216) Discussed the ordinary and legal senses of "consumption" — that it commonly means use which destroys or exhausts, but in some legal contexts it has a wider meaning. Referenced via Kathiawar as background authority on the meaning of "consumption"; used to support the broader legal understanding of "consumption" employed by the Court.
State of Tamil Nadu v. Subbaraj (47 STC 30) (Madras High Court) Held that raw-bones could not be said to have been "consumed" in producing crushed bone/bone-meal; emphasized that identity must be completely lost to constitute "consumption" under corresponding Tamil Nadu provision. The assessee relied on Subbaraj; the Court recorded the authority and its proposition but distinguished it by concluding, on the facts and applied tests from Supreme Court authorities, that bone-meal has a distinct commercial identity and thus the purchase turnover is taxable under S. 5A.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began with the text of S. 5A(1)(a) and identified its essential ingredients: (1) the goods purchased must have been consumed; (2) such consumption must be in the process of manufacture; and (3) the manufacture must be of other goods for sale. The Court emphasized the meaning of "consumption", "manufacture" and "other goods" as pivotal to determining liability under S. 5A.

The Court examined the line of authorities, principally the Division Bench and Supreme Court decisions in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pio Food Packers, which articulated that processing results in "manufacture" only when the processed commodity is commercially distinct and can no longer be regarded as the original commodity. That test requires an inquiry into whether the processed article is identified in trade as a new and distinct product.

The Court noted that in Pio Food Packers the process (slicing and canning pineapple) did not change the commodity's essential commercial identity and so S. 5A did not apply. The Supreme Court had reiterated that the question is one of commercial identity and whether the original commodity has been transformed into a new article.

The Court further considered Chowgule (blending of ores) and Kathiawar (crushing salt) to draw distinctions. Chowgule illustrated that where blending does not produce a commercially distinct product there is no manufacture; Kathiawar illustrated that crushing could, in some circumstances, produce a commercially different article and thereby constitute "consumption" in the broader legal sense. The Court also referenced Burmah Shell as part of the jurisprudence explaining that "consumption" may not require literal destruction.

The assessee's reliance on the Madras High Court decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. Subbaraj was recorded. That decision held raw-bones were not "consumed" in making crushed bone products and therefore S. 7-A(1)(a) would not apply. However, after applying the Pio Food Packers test and related authorities, the Court concluded that bonemeal manufactured from raw-bones has a different commercial identity as a fertiliser, even though the manufacturing process may involve only crushing and powdering.

On this basis the Court determined that the purchase turnover of raw-bones is taxable under S. 5A(1)(a) because the raw-bones are consumed in the manufacture of another commercially distinct commodity (bone-meal/fertiliser) for sale.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the tax revision and set aside the impugned orders of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal in respect of the taxability of the purchase turnover of raw-bones. The re-assessment orders for the assessment years 1975-1976, 1976-1977 and 1977-1978 are restored. The remand order in relation to the assessment year 1978-1979 is to remain, but subject to the Court's decision above; all other matters directed to be considered afresh should be considered and a fresh order passed by the assessing authority. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the Department's revisions succeed; the Assessing Officer's reassessments for 1975-76, 1976-77 and 1977-78 stand restored and the assessee's contention that raw-bones were not taxable under S. 5A was rejected by this Court.
  • For 1978-79 the remand remains in place for consideration of other matters, but the S. 5A point (that purchase turnover of raw-bones is taxable) is determined in favour of the Department and will guide the assessing authority on remand.
  • No new, sweeping precedent beyond application of established tests was announced; the Court applied existing Supreme Court authorities (notably Pio Food Packers and related decisions) to the facts and refused leave to appeal, indicating the Court did not regard any substantial question of law of general importance as arising for the Supreme Court's determination.

Disposition: Revision allowed; impugned Tribunal orders set aside; re-assessments restored for 1975-76, 1976-77, 1977-78; remand for 1978-79 to continue subject to this decision; leave to appeal refused.

Show all summary ...

Balakrishna Menon, J.:— All these tax revision cases at the instance of the Deputy Commissioner of Saletax (Law) raise a common question whether the assessee is liable to tax under S. 5A of the Kerala General Saletax Act, 1963 in respect of the purchase turnover of raw-bones converted into bone-meal for sale as fertiliser. The cases relate to 1975-1976, 1976-1977, 1977-1978, and 1978-1979. The assessments for the years 1975-1976, 1976-1977 and 1977-1978 were completed on best judgment by the sales-tax officer and separate orders for these years were issued fixing the taxable turnover and the sales-tax due thereon. The sales-tax officer later initiated proceedings under S. 19 of the Act on the ground that the purchase turnover of raw-bones of the assessee during these years liable to tax under S. 5A of the Act had escaped assessment. The assessing officer over-ruling the contentions of the assessee that the purchase turnover relating to raw-bones is not liable to tax, issued revised orders of assessment for these years. The order of assessment for the year 1978-1979 took in also the purchase turnover of raw-bones as liable to tax under S. 5A of the Act. In appeal by the assessee the Appellate Assistant Commissioner remanded all these cases for fresh disposal after giving the assessee a further opportunity to prove his case. The remand in respect of the assessment year 1978-1979 took in also matters other than the assessee's liability to tax under S. 5A of the Act. In further appeal The Salestax Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam has set aside the re-assessment proceedings in respect of the years 1975-1976, 1976-1977 and 1977-1978 holding that no tax is leviable on the purchase turnover of raw-bones under S. 5A of the Act. The remand order in respect of the assessment year 1978-1979 was, however, confirmed confining it to matters other than the assessee's liability to tax under S. 5A on the purchase turnover of raw-bones. In regard to the purchase turnover of raw-bones it was held that the sale is not liable to tax under S. 5A of the Act. It is against these orders of the Tribunal that the Deputy Commissioner of Salestax (Law) has come up in revision.

2. The relevant portion of S. 5A(1) is extracted below:—

“Every dealer who, in the course of his business, purchases from a registered dealer or from any other person any goods, the sale or purchase of which is liable to tax under this Act, in circumstances in which no tax is payable under S. 5, and either—

(a) consumes such goods in the manufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise;

*********

3. Shall, whatever be the quantum of the turnover relating to such purchase for a year, pay tax on the taxable turnover relating to such purchase for the year at the rates mentioned in S.S” According to the Department the raw-bone purchased by the assessee is consumed in the manufacture of bone-meal for sale in the market and therefore the purchase turnover of raw-bones is liable to tax under S. 5A. A Division Bench of this Court in Deputy Commr. of Sales Tax v. Pio Food Packers (41 STC 364) considering the question whether sliced pineapple packed in this is liable to tax under S. 5A of the Act stated at page 366:—

“The relevant clause in the section which has application is S. 5A(1)(a) and the conditions to be established before liability can be attracted are: (1) that the goods purchased have been consumed; (2) that such consumption was in the process of manufacture; and (3) that the manufacture was of pother goods for sale. It is necessary to concentrate on the expressions underlined, namely, “consumption”, “manufacture” and “other goods”. The last of these is to be noticed only to emphasis that the resultant product must be distinct and different from the goods consumed in the process of manufacture.”

4. After an elaborate consideration of the meaning of these expressions with reference to decided cases the Division Bench held that sliced pineapple, despite the rejection of the inedible portions, the core, the crown and the end of the fruit, and despite the process involved in packing it in containers for being made available in the market, remains the same as pineapple and there is neither “consumption” of the commodity; nor is there any process of “manufacture” of “other goods” for sale. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Deputy Commr. of Sales Tax v. Pio Food Packers (46 STC 63). It is stated at page 65:

“S. 5A(1)(a) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act envisages the consumption of a commodity in the manufacture of another commodity. The goods purchased should be consumed, the consumption should be in the process of manufacture, and the result must be the manufacture of other goods. There are several criteria for determining whether a commodity is consumed in the manufacture of another. The generally prevalent test is whether the article produced is regarded in the trade, by those who deal in it, as distinct in identity from the commodity involved in its manufacture. Commonly, manufacture is the end result of one or more processes through which the original commodity is made to pass. The nature and extent of processing may vary from one case to another, and indeed there may be several stages of processing and perhaps a different kind of processing at each stage. With each process suffered, the original commodity experiences a change. But it is only when the change, or a series of changes, take the commodity to the point where commercially it can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but instead is recognised as a new and distinct article that a manufacture can be said to take place. Where there is no essential difference in identity between the original commodity and the processed article it is not possible to say that one commodity has been consumed in the manufacture of another. Although it has undergone a degree of processing, it must be regarded as still retaining its original identity.”

5. The Supreme Court after considering its earlier decisions and the decision of the U.S Supreme Court in East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Express (100 L.Ed 917) stated at page 66:

“Although a degree of processing is involved in preparing pineapple slices from the original fruit, the commodity continues to possess its original identity, notwithstanding the removal of inedible portions, the slicing and thereafter canning it on adding sugar to preserve it.”

6. The decision in Pio Food Packers' case was followed in a later decision of the Supreme Court in Chowgule & Co. P. Ltd. v. Union of India (47 STC 125) wherein it is stated at page 130:

“The point which arises for consideration under the first question is as to whether blending of ore in the course of loading it into the ship through the mechanical ore handling plant constituted manufacture or processing of ore. Now it is well-settled as a result of several decisions of this Court, the latest being the decision given on 9th May, 1980, in Civild Appeal No. 2398 of 1978, Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pio Food Packers that the test for determining? whether manufacture can be said to have taken place is whether the commodity which is subjected to the process off manufacture can no longer be regarded as the original commodity, but is recognised in the trade as a new and distinct commodity.”

7. It is further stated at the same page:

“The ??? that is required to be applied is: does the processing of the original commodity bring into existence a commercially different and distinct commodity?.”

8. Applying the aforesaid test it was held that blending of different qualities of iron ore possessing different chemical and physical compositions for the purpose of standardisation to conform to certain contractual specifications does not bring into existence a commercially new and distinct commodity from the ore of different specifications blended together. The Supreme Court in Kathiawar Industries Ltd v. Jaffrabad Municipality ((1979) 4 SCC 56 : AIR 1979 SC 1721) had occasion to construe the meaning of the words “consumption” and “use” in considering the question whether uncrushed salt brought from outside the Octroi limits of the respondent Municipality was liable to octroi under the Saurashtra Terminal Tax and Octroi Ordinance and the Rules issued thereunder. After referring to the decision in Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distributing Co. India Ltd. v. The Belgaum Borough Municipality (1963 Suppl. (2) SCR 216) the Supreme Court stated at page 1723:

“In considering the meaning of the words “consumption” and “use” this Court observed in Burmah Shell case (supra) that the word ‘consumption’ in its primary sense means the act of consuming and in ordinary parlance means the use of an article in a way which destroys, wastes or uses up that article. But in some legal on texts, the word “consumption” has a wider meaning. It is not necessary that by the act of consumption the commodity must be destroyed or used up.”

9. After considering the question with reference to the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court it was held:

“Applying this test the conclusion is irresistible that when uncrushed salt is crushed in the factory it is commercially a different article and the uncrushed salt must be held to have been consumed. The word “use” is of wider import than “consumption”. It cannot be denied that the uncrushed salt has been used and by the user a new product, crushed salt has come into existence.”

10. The bonemeal manufactured out of raw-bones has got a different commercial identity as fertiliser even though the process of manufacture involved is only the crushing and powdering the same. Counsel for the assessee relies on the decision of the Madras High Court in the State of Tamil Nadu v. Subbaraj (47 STC 30) wherein it is held that raw-bones cannot be said to have been “consumed in the process of bringing into existence the crushed bone, bone grist, bone-meal, fluff or horn hoof, apart from the distinctive meaning that will have to be attributed to the word “manufacture”. Construing the wording in the corresponding S. 7-A(1)(a) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act it is stated at page 34:

“Inasmuch as the goods purchased are not consumed in the process of manufacture of some other goods, S. 7-A(1)(a) will not be attracted. The very use of the word “consume” contemplates that the goods purchased should have been devoured or exhausted in the process of manufacture with the result, its identity must have been completely lost. So long as its identity remained, the goods purchased and used in the manufacture of some other goods cannot be said to have been consumed in the process of manufacture of other goods.”

11. The decision of the Supreme Court in the Pio Food Packer's case referred to above makes it clear that if the product manufactured has a different commercial identity, the commodity purchased for such manufacture is liable to tax under S. 5A(1)(a) of the Act. The bonemeal manufactured for sale as fertiliser in the market has a separate commercial identity distinct from the raw-bones purchased. We are clearly of the view that the purchase turnover of raw-bones is liable to tax under S. 5A of the Act.

12. The result of the foregoing discussion is: we allow the tax revision cases and set aside the impugned orders of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. The re-assessment orders relating to the assessment years 1975-1976, 1976-1977 and 1977-1978 are restored. The remand order relating to the asessement year 1978-1979 will however remain and subject to the decision as stated above all other questions directed to be considered afresh will be considered and a fresh order of assessment will be passed by the assessing authority. Counsel for the assessee prays for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We do not see any substantial question of law of general importance that needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. The prayer for leave is accordingly rejected.

13. Leave refused.