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Ponnamma Pillai v. Nambi .

Kerala High Court
Mar 24, 1981
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (George Vadakkel, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant filed an application for compensation under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. That application was time-barred, and the appellant consequently filed an application to condone the delay (I.A. 615/78). The Claims Tribunal refused to excuse the delay and, as a result, dismissed the main application (O.P. (M.V.) No. 14 of 1978). The present appeal challenges the decision of the Claims Tribunal dismissing the main application as barred by time.

The Claims Tribunal's judgment dismissing the main application reads: “I.A 615/78 for condoning delay in filing claim petition has been dismissed. Hence this petition is dismissed as barred by time. No costs.”

The Tribunal's order on the condonation application (I.A. 615/78) recorded that the petitioner alleged medical treatment during the relevant period but found that the petitioner did not produce a medical certificate and therefore dismissed the condonation petition for failure to establish reasonable grounds. The appellate court, however, noted that a medical certificate dated 1.2.1978 was in fact filed with the application and concluded that the Claims Tribunal's statement that no certificate was produced was factually incorrect.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a decision of a Claims Tribunal dismissing an application filed under section 110-A (as time‑barred) is an "award" within the meaning of section 110-B of the Act and therefore appealable under section 110-D.
  2. What is the meaning of the term "entertained" in section 110-A(3): does it refer to mere filing/receipt of an application or to its being admitted to consideration / adjudicated upon?
  3. Whether the dismissal of a condonation application (as distinct from dismissal of the main application) is itself an appealable order under section 110-D (not decided definitively by this Court).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents raised a preliminary objection that no appeal lies from the Claims Tribunal's decision because that decision does not constitute an "award" as contemplated by sections 110-B and 110-D of the Act.
  • The respondents' objection had two strands:
    • (1) By dismissing the condonation application the Claims Tribunal never entertained (in the sense relied upon by respondents) the main application.
    • (2) The Claims Tribunal did not make an award determining the amount of compensation; therefore the decision cannot be an "award" under section 110-B and so is not appealable under section 110-D.
  • The respondents relied on decisions such as Zarin v. Shantubhai and Rambhau Laxman Pingale v. Poona Municipal Corporation to support the position that the order rejecting an application as time‑barred is not an award.

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant maintained that a Claims Tribunal's decision dismissing a main application as time‑barred (after refusing condonation) is a decision — an "award" — and therefore is appealable under section 110-D.
  • The appellant relied on authorities and the ordinary/legal meaning of "award" to argue that even a decision refusing relief (i.e., awarding nothing) is an award (analogous to arbitral awards that reject claims but are still "awards").
  • The appellant cited several precedents (discussed below) that support the proposition that an order dismissing the main application as time‑barred after refusal to condone delay is an appealable award.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
L.E. Works v. Asst. Commr., Sales Tax (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 488) Interpretation of the word “entertain” — held to mean “admit to consideration”. The Court relied on this decision to hold that “entertained” means admission to consideration (i.e., taken up by the court for the first time), not merely filing/receipt.
Hindustan Commercial Bank v. Punnu Sahu (1971 3 SCC 124) Accepted the view that “entertain” refers to initiation of adjudication / proceeding to consider on merits. Used to support the interpretation that the prohibition in section 110-A(3) applies to adjudication or consideration on merits.
Kundan Lal v. Jagan Nath Sharma (A.I.R. 1962 All. 547) Interpreted “entertain” as meaning “adjudicate upon” or “proceed to consider on merits”. Referred to as part of a line of High Court decisions adopting this interpretation.
Dhoom Chand Jain v. Chamanlal Gupta (A.I.R. 1962 All. 543) Interpreted “entertain” as adjudication/consideration on merits. Referred to as supporting the same view adopted by High Court and accepted by Supreme Court.
Haji Rahim Bux & Sons v. Firm Samiullah & Sons (A.I.R. 1963 All. 320) Same interpretive principle for “entertain”. Included in the list of supporting High Court authorities.
Mahavir Singh v. Gauri Shankar (A.I.R. 1964 All. 289) Same interpretive principle for “entertain”. Included in the authorities cited for the interpretive stance.
B. Govindarajulu v. M.L.A. Govindaraja Support for view that dismissal of main application is an award. Cited by this Court as supporting the conclusion that dismissal is an award.
Gopalaswami v. Navalgaria Support for view that dismissal is an award; apparently went further to suggest condonation-order dismissal may be appealable. Cited as supporting the Court's view; the present Court noted that some decisions including this one appeared to have gone further (on condonation orders) but the present Court refrained from expressing an opinion on that broader point.
S.T. Pillai v. E.M. Mani Support for view that dismissal is an award; similar scope as Gopalaswami. Also cited as supportive, with similar qualification by this Court about the further proposition on condonation orders.
S. Johny v. Ademma (Andhra Pradesh High Court) Held dismissal of main application as time‑barred is an award, but order dismissing condonation application is not an award. This Court referenced it as taking a distinction between dismissal of main application (appealable) and dismissal of the condonation application (not appealable).
Komal Charan v. State Held that decision dismissing the main application as time‑barred after refusing condonation is an appealable award; disapproved contrary observations in a single judge decision. Relied upon as in point with the present Court’s view that dismissal of main application is an award.
K.L. Trikha v. Jupiter General Insurance Co. Held dismissal of the main application as time‑barred (after refusing condonation) is appealable. Referred to as being in point and supportive of the Court’s conclusion.
Satish Chandra v. State of U.P. (1971 A.C.J. 180 All) A single-judge observation to the contrary (disapproved by Komal Charan). Mentioned as a decision whose contra observations were disapproved by Komal Charan.
Om Prakash v. N.F. & G. Insurance Co. (A.I.R. 1962 M.P. 19) Cited in the list of authorities given on behalf of the appellant; the particular question here did not arise in that case. The Court observed that the question now before it did not arise in this decision and so it was not germane.
Pritpal Singh v. New Suraj Transport Co. (1974 A.C.J. 277 Pb. & Hya.) Cited but held not germane to the specific question in this case. Observed to be not directly relevant to the point under examination.
Nazi Ali Newas v. Radheshyam Khatowal (1978 A.C.J. 95 Assam) Cited but not germane to the specific question in the present appeal. Recorded as cited by the appellant but not material to the point under consideration.
Zarin v. Shantubhai (1968 A.C.J. 327 Gujarat) Held that where Claims Tribunal returned the application (for lack of jurisdiction) and did not dismiss or determine the claim, that order was not an appealable award. This Court said the decision relied on by respondents was of no assistance to them (distinguished on its facts because that order was not a dismissal/determination of the claim).
Rambhau Laxman Pingale v. Poona Municipal Corporation (1978 A.C.J. 463 Bombay) The Bombay High Court held that an order rejecting an application for compensation as time‑barred is not an award. The present Court expressly disagreed with that conclusion and could not accept it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court engaged in a textual and functional analysis of sections 110-A(3), 110-B and 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act with the following principal steps:

  1. Interpretation of “entertained”: The Court examined the meaning of the word “entertained” in section 110-A(3), adopting the approach in L.E. Works and related decisions that “entertain” means to “admit to consideration” or to “proceed to consider on merits” (i.e., to take up the matter for adjudication). The Court therefore understood the prohibition in section 110-A(3) as barring the Claims Tribunal from adjudicating on a belated application unless the applicant shows sufficient cause for delay.
  2. Scope of the Claims Tribunal’s inquiry: The Court held that the inquiry mandated by section 110-B “on receipt of an application” includes consideration of whether the application is belated and, if so, whether there is sufficient cause for the delay. Thus the tribunal’s inquiry necessarily may include a preliminary determination on the condonation question and, if condonation is granted, proceed to the merits; if condonation is refused, the inquiry stops and the tribunal dismisses the application as time‑barred.
  3. Meaning of “award”: The Court analysed the ordinary and legal meaning of “award,” noting that it commonly denotes a judicial decision (including an arbitrator’s decision which may reject a party’s claim). The Court reasoned that a Claims Tribunal’s decision at the close of its inquiry — whether to grant compensation (and quantify it) or to hold that the applicant is not entitled to compensation — is a decision and thus falls within the concept of an “award” under section 110-B.
  4. Consistency with statutory language: The Court pointed to section 110-B’s text and to the provision for recovery of money “where any money is due from any person under an award,” using that language to show that an award can exist even where no money is due to the applicant (i.e., where the award holds the applicant not entitled to compensation).
  5. Consequent conclusion on appealability: Based on the above, the Court concluded that a decision dismissing an application under section 110-A at any stage of the inquiry under section 110-B — including dismissal because the application is time‑barred after refusal to condone the delay — is an “award” and therefore attracts section 110-D (i.e., it is appealable to the High Court under the Act).
  6. Limits on the holding: The Court noted that some earlier decisions (e.g., Gopalaswami and S.T. Pillai) may have gone further and suggested that dismissal of a condonation application itself is appealable; the Court expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on that particular further point and distinguished decisions like Zarin (where an application was returned for want of jurisdiction and not dismissed) and questioned the reasoning of the Bombay High Court in Rambhau Laxman Pingale.
  7. Application to the present case on facts: The Court examined the record of the condonation application (I.A. 615/78) and observed that a medical certificate dated 1.2.1978 had in fact been filed with the application, contrary to the Claims Tribunal’s statement that no medical certificate was produced. The Court concluded that the Claims Tribunal had not applied its mind properly to the condonation petition and therefore set aside both the order on the condonation application and the decision dismissing the main application. The Tribunal was directed to decide the condonation application and the main application afresh in accordance with law.

Holding and Implications

Holding: A decision of the Claims Tribunal dismissing an application under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act at any stage of the inquiry under section 110-B — including dismissal on the ground that the application is time‑barred after refusing condonation of delay — is an "award" within the meaning of section 110-B and is thus appealable under section 110-D.

Direct consequences in this case:

  • The Court overruled the respondents' preliminary objection that no appeal lies from the Claims Tribunal's dismissal of the main application.
  • The Court set aside the Claims Tribunal's order on the condonation application (I.A. 615/78) and its dismissal of the main application (O.P. (M.V.) No. 14 of 1978), because the Tribunal had not applied its mind (including an incorrect factual statement about the absence of a medical certificate that, on the record, had in fact been produced).
  • The Court directed that the Claims Tribunal decide the condonation application and the main application afresh in accordance with law. No order as to costs was made.

Broader implications and limits:

  • The decision clarifies that a dismissal of a main claim as time‑barred (after the tribunal's consideration of the condonation application) operates as an appealable award, protecting the claimant's right of appeal against an adverse decision on entitlement to compensation as well as against quantification.
  • The Court expressly refrained from deciding whether an order that only dismisses the condonation application (without dismissing the main application) is itself an appealable order under section 110-D; thus that narrower question remains open.

Disposition in the instant matter: Appeal allowed. The Claims Tribunal’s order on condonation and its dismissal of the main application are set aside; the Tribunal is directed to rehear the condonation application and the main application in accordance with law. No costs.

Show all summary ...

George Vadakkel, J.:— The appellant filed an application under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short the Act). Since it was time-barred he also filed an application to condone the delay. The Claims Tribunal refused to excuse the delay and consequently dismissed the main application. This appeal is from the decision on the main application.

2. Respondents have raised a preliminary objection that no appeal lies from the abovesaid decision since, according to them, that decision does not amount to an award as mentioned in sections 110-B and 1J0-D of the Act. The contention is twofold: (1) the Claims Tribunal, having dismissed the condonation-application, has not entertained the main application; and (2) the Claims Tribunal has not made an award determining the amount of compensation. Section 110-A (3) reads:

“110-A. Application for compensation—

xxxxxx

(3) No application for compensation under this section shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident:

Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time.”

section 110-B is as follows:

“110-B. Award of the Claims Tribunal— On receipt of an application for compensation made under section 110-A, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim and may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person to whom compensation shall be paid; and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be.”

Section 110-D provides:

“110-D. Appeals—(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:

Provided that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.

(2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than two thousand rupees.”

3. While section 110-A (3) prohibits entertainment of a belated application, section 110-B requires the Claims Tribunal to hold an inquiry ‘on receipt of an application’. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in L.E Works v. Asst. Commr., Sales Tax . A.I.R 1968 S.C 488. in somewhat similar content “if the legislature intended that the word ‘file’ or ‘receive’ was to be used (in section 110-A (3)) there was no difficulty in using those words”. What does the word ‘entertained’ in section 110-A(3) then mean is the first question that falls for consideration.

4. Following L.E Works v. Asst. Commr., Sales Tax that Court in Hindustan Commnrl., Bank v. Punnu Sahu . 1971 3 SCC 124 said as follows:

“It is the contention of the appellant that the expression ‘entertain’ found in the proviso refers to the initiation of the proceedings and not to the stage when the court takes-up the application for consideration. This contention was rejected by the High Court relying on the decision of that court in Kundan Lal v. Jagan Nath Sharma . A.I.R 1962 All. 547.. The same view had been taken by the said High Court in Dhoom Chand Jain v. Chamanlal Gupta . A.I.R 1962 All. 543., and Haji Rahim Bux and Sons v. Firm Samiullah and Sons . A.I.R 1963 All. 320., and again in Mahavir Singh v. Gauri Shankar . A.I.R 1964 All. 289.. These decisions have interpreted the expression ‘entertain’ as meaning ‘adjudicate upon’ or ‘proceed to consider on merits’. This view of the High Court has been accepted as correct by this Court in Lakshmiratan Engineering Works Ltd. v. Asst. Commr., Sales Tax, Kanpur”.

5. The injunction in section 110-A (3) is therefore against ‘adjudicating upon’ the claim for compensation or ‘proceeding to consider on merits’ that claim. In L.E Works v. Asst. Commr., Sales Tax, the Supreme Court answered the following question:

“The question, therefore, is at what stage can the appeal be said to be entertained for the purpose of the application of the proviso? Is it ‘entertained’ when it is filed or is it ‘entertained’ when it is admitted and the date is fixed for hearing or is it finally ‘entertained’ when it is heard and disposed of?”

as follows:

“In our opinion these cases have taken a correct view of the word ‘entertain’ which according to dictionary also means ‘admit to consideration’. It would therefore appear that the direction to the court in the proviso to section 9 is that the court shall not proceed to admit to consideration an appeal which is not accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the admitted tax. This will be when the case is taken up by the court for the first time.”

6. The prohibition in section 110-A (3) is not absolute. Under the proviso thereto the applicant is entitled to satisfy the Claims Tribunal that he was prevented by sufficient cause from applying in time and the Claims Tribunal, on being so satisfied, has to entertain the claim. Therefore, ‘the inquiry into the claim’ which the Claims Tribunal has to hold on receipt of an application’ as envisaged by section 110-D would be one concerning also the question as to whether the application is belated or not, and if belated, whether the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from applying in time. Where the Claims Tribunal finds that the application is belated but is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making it in time, the inquiry proceeds as regards the merits of the claim resulting in a decision granting (fully or partially) the compensation claimed or refusing to grant compensation, depending upon the merits of the case. Where the Claims Tribunal finds that the application is time-barred and that there was no sufficient cause for not applying in time, the inquiry stops at that stage resulting in the dismissal of the application. In other words, in such a case the Claims Tribunal refuses to proceed to consider the claim on merits or to adjudicate upon the claim on merits. Without considering the merits of the claims, the Claims Tribunal makes a decision that the applicant is not entitled to any compensation. In view of what is said above it cannot be said that the application found to be belated and dismissed on that ground has been thrown out at the threshold itself, as contended for on behalf of the respondents.

7. The ordinary meaning of the word ‘award’ is, a decision. Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary assigns to that word the following meaning: “v.t to adjudge: to determine: to grant-n judgment: final decision, esp. of arbitrators; that which is awarded: a price”. The Concise Oxford Dictionary gives the meaning of that word as a ‘judicial decision; payment, penalty, assigned by this’. And, attribution of such a connotation to the word ‘award’ is not only unknown in legal parlance but is familiar. For example in the Arbitration law the arbitrator's decision is invariably referred to as an ‘award’. Even where the arbitrator completely negatives a claim advanced by one of the parties to the arbitration and refuses to grant any relief to him, his decision is an ‘award’ capable of being filed in court and compelled to be filed in court.

8. At the close of ‘the inquiry into the claim’ the Claims Tribunal is required to ‘make an award determining the amount of compensation’ and apportioning the liability therefor amongst the insurer, owner and driver. It is contended that a decision of the Claims Tribunal dismissing a claim in toto is not an award since there is no determination of the amount of compensation. The submission is that unless the Claims Tribunal finds that the applicant is entitled to some compensation, howsoever small the amount of compensation so found may be, the decision is not an award. This would mean that the applicant-claimant will have no right of appeal even in cases where the Claims Tribunal wrongly and mistakenly refuses to grant any compensation, not on the basis of any preliminary finding that the claim is time-barred, but after a full inquiry into the merits of the case, as for example, where the claim is dismissed wrongly holding that the applicant has no locus standi or that he has not proved the accident. If such be the correct position of law, it would result in restricting the claimant's right of appeal only to matters relating to quantification of compensation. In other words, the claimant will have no right of appeal against a decision adverse to him on the question of his entitlement to compensation and he can, in appeal complain only about adequacy of compensation granted. However, when an appeal is preferred by the respondents in the claim proceedings, they can question not only the quantum of compensation granted but also the claimant's entitlement thereto. This is to say, that the decision of the Claims Tribunal on the question of the claimant's entitlement to compensation, which will be the principal and main question in the case, is final so far as the claimant is concerned but not so as regards the respondents in the claim proceedings. We do not think that the legislative intent is such.

9. After holding the inquiry directed to be held, the Claims Tribunal decides the claim. The Claims Tribunal is by section 110-B enabled to quantify the amount of compensation and make an enforceable award (decision) where it finds that the applicant is entitled to compensation. In case where the Claims Tribunal finds that the applicant is not entitled to compensation, it makes an award (decision) holding so. That its decision in either of the cases mentioned above is an award is clear from section 110-B of the Act which provides for recovery of money in cases ‘where any money is due from any person under an award’ suggesting thereby that under all awards money may not be due to the applicant.

10. In the backdrop of the discussion in the preceding paragraphs we hold that a decision of the Claims Tribunal dismissing an application filed under section 110-A of the Act at any stage of the inquiry held under section 110-B of the Act and for whatsoever reasons, is an award under section 110-B thereof and that consequently, section 110-D of the Act is attracted to such a decision. We overrule the preliminary objection.

11. B. Govindarajulu v. M.L.A Govindaraja; Gopalaswami v. Navalgaria and S.T Pillai v. E.M Mani support the above view. However, it is necessary to point out that Gopaiaswami v. Navalgaria and S.T Pillai v. E.M Mani appear to have gone to the extent of holding that the dismissal of a condonation application itself is appealable under section 110-D of the Act. We refrain from expressing any opinion on that point. We may here refer to the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in S. Johny v. Ademma which holds that while the dismissal of the main application as time-barred would be an award, the order dismissing the application to excuse the delay in filing it would not be an award. The decisions in Komal Charon v. State and K.L Trikha v. Jupiter General Insurance Co., are in point which hold that the decision dismissing the main application as time-barred after refusing to condone the delay in filing the same is an appealable award. Komal Charan v. State has disapproved the observations to the contra made by a Learned Single Judge in Satish Chandra v. State of U.P . 1971 A.C.J 180 All... In Om Prakash v. N.F & G. Insurance Co. . A.I.R 1962 M.P 19.; Pritpal Singh v. New Suraj Transport Co. . 1974 A.C.J 277 Pb. & Hya.. and Nazi Ali Newas v. Radheshyam Khatowal . 1978 A.C.J 95 Assam. cited on behalf of the appellant the question raised herein did not come up for consideration and we do not think that those decisions are in any way germane to the point under examination herein.

12. Zarin v. Shantubhai . 1968 A.C.J 327 Gujarat. was a case where the Claims Tribunal returned the application for compensation holding that it has no jurisdiction as the accident took place prior to the constitution of Claims Tribunal where for as stated therein the order was ‘not one of dismissal or disposal of the claim or determination of the claim in any other manner’. The Gujarat High Court held that it is not an appealable award. This decision relied on behalf of the respondents is of no assistance to them. Understanding the decision of the Gujarat High Court as one taking a view contrary to what we have taken in the case on hand, and without any discussion, the Bombay High Court in Rambhau Laxman Pingale v. Poona Municipal Corporation . 1978 A.C.J 463 Bombay. held that an order rejecting an application for compensation as time-barred is not an award. With respect, we cannot agree.

13. The Claims Tribunal, Trivandrum dismissed O.P (M.V) No. 14 of 1978 by the following Judgment:

“I.A 615/78 for condoning delay in filing claim petition has been dismissed. Hence this petition is dismissed as barred by time. No costs.”

14. The order on I.A 615/78 is as follows:

“This is a petition to condone delay in filing claim petition. Accident was on 7.3.1976 Rules came into force in July 1976. Claim petition has been filed on 1.2.1978, after a delay of about 1 year and 5 months. In her affidavit she had alleged that she could not file the petition in time. She was under treatment between 14.8.1976 to 31.1.1978 She does not allege that during this period she was unable to move about or meet her counsel. The allegations in the affidavit are denied by respondents. Petitioner has not even produced a medical certificate. Hence the allegations cannot be said to be established. I, therefore, hold that petitioner has failed to establish leasonable grounds for condoning the delay in filing claim petition. Petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.”

15. It may at once be pointed out that the application for compensation filed on 1.2.1978 under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was accompanied by I.A 615 of 1975 and a Medical Certificate dated 1.2.1978 issued by the Assistant Surgeon of the Government Hospital, Nemom and therefore, the statement in the order on I.A 615 of 1978 that ‘the petitioner has not even produced a medical certificate’ is factually wrong. We are not satisfied that the Claims Tribunal has applied its mind in disposing of I.A 615 of 1978. We set aside the order on I.A 615 of 1978 as also the decision in the main application, O.P (M.V) 14 of 1978 on the file of the Claims Tribunal, Trivandrum, and direct that Tribunal to decide the condonation application and the main application afresh in accordance with law. No order as regards costs.

16. Allowed.