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Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Kerala v. K. Ahamed

Kerala High Court
Jul 2, 1973
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Judgment Summary — Full Bench on Explanation to Section 271(1)(c) (Finance Act, 1964)

Factual and Procedural Background

This case was heard by a Full Bench pursuant to an order of reference by a Division Bench dated 28 November 1972. The reference arose because of a conflict between two earlier Division Bench decisions (I.T.R No. 38 of 1970 and I.T.R No. 71 of 1968).

The assessment year in question is 1963–64. The assessee filed a return dated 8 September 1966 disclosing a total income of Rs. 13,746. The assessment fixed the assessee's total income at Rs. 65,570, meaning the returned income was less than 80% of the assessed total.

By amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 1964, the word "deliberately" was omitted from clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 271 and an Explanation was added to section 271(1)(c) providing that where returned income is less than 80% of the income assessed under sections 143, 144 or 147 (subject to a specified reduction), the person shall be deemed to have concealed or furnished inaccurate particulars of income for purposes of clause (c), unless he proves that the failure did not arise from fraud or gross or wilful neglect.

The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner imposed penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c). The Appellate Tribunal held that the amended Explanation did not apply because the assessment year 1963–64 ended before the amendments came into force and applying the amended section would be retrospective. The Full Bench was asked to resolve whether the Appellate Tribunal was correct in holding that the Explanation to section 271(1)(c) was not applicable in this case.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the Explanation to section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (as introduced by the Finance Act, 1964) is not applicable to the assessee in respect of the act of furnishing inaccurate particulars for the assessment year 1963–64.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
I.T.R No. 71 of 1968 (Division Bench) Held that liability under the amended provision depends on whether the elements of the section were satisfied when the act was committed; supported applying amended section to acts committed after amendment even if assessment year had ended. The Full Bench accepted the principle in I.T.R No. 71 of 1968 as correct and followed it in this case.
I.T.R No. 38 of 1970 (Division Bench) Held that the amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 1964 (effective 1 April 1964) would not apply in relation to assessment year 1963–64. The Full Bench overruled the decision in I.T.R No. 38 of 1970, stating that that view "does not appear to be correct."
Hajee K. Assainar v. Commissioner of Income-tax (Division Bench of this Court) Referenced as a decision in accordance with the view in I.T.R No. 71 of 1968 (i.e., supportive of applying the law as it stood at the time of the act). The Full Bench cited this decision as supporting the view taken in I.T.R No. 71 of 1968.
Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Patiala v. Bhan Singh Boota Singh [1974] 95 I.T.R 562 (Punjab & Haryana High Court) Referenced as supportive authority aligning with the view in I.T.R No. 71 of 1968. The Full Bench noted this decision as consistent with and supportive of the principle adopted in I.T.R No. 71 of 1968.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vedlapatla Veera Venkataramiah [1943] 11 I.T.R 308 (Madras) Stated principle: whether an act or omission constitutes an offence must be determined with reference to the law at the time of the commission of the act or omission. The Full Bench relied on this general principle to support the conclusion that liability should be determined by reference to the law as it stood when the act of furnishing inaccurate particulars occurred.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the problem by focusing on the timing of the act (the furnishing of inaccurate particulars) rather than the assessment year as an index of applicability.

Key points of the court's reasoning, as expressed in the opinion, are:

  • The Finance Act, 1964 amended clause (c) of section 271(1) and added an Explanation which deems a person to have concealed particulars or furnished inaccurate particulars if his returned income is less than 80% of the assessed income, subject to the person proving lack of fraud or gross/wilful neglect.
  • On the facts, the assessee's returned income (Rs. 13,746) was less than 80% of the assessed income (Rs. 65,570); therefore, the Explanation was "directly attracted."
  • Once the Explanation is attracted, there arises a statutory presumption that the assessee furnished inaccurate particulars unless he proves the failure was not due to fraud or gross/wilful neglect.
  • The act of furnishing inaccurate particulars in this case occurred after the amendments were introduced to the section; applying the amended provision to such an act is not retrospective application of the law.
  • The Tribunal's contrary conclusion—that the amended section would not apply because the assessment year 1963–64 ended before the amendments came into force—was rejected. The court stated that the "year of assessment has nothing to do with the question of liability arising under section 271(1)(c)" and that the only question is whether the elements of the section were satisfied when the act was committed.
  • The Full Bench relied on its earlier decision in I.T.R No. 71 of 1968, on Hajee K. Assainar and on the Punjab & Haryana High Court decision in Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Patiala v. Bhan Singh Boota Singh as authorities supporting the view that the amended provision applies to acts committed after the amendment, irrespective of the assessment year reference.
  • The court also invoked the principle articulated in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vedlapatla Veera Venkataramiah that whether an act is an offence must be determined with reference to the law in force at the time of the commission of the act or omission.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Full Bench answered the referred question in the negative — that is, it held against the Appellate Tribunal's view and in favour of the department. The court concluded that the Explanation to section 271(1)(c) as amended by the Finance Act, 1964 is applicable in the present case.

Direct consequences and implications explicitly stated in the opinion:

  • The imposition of penalty by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner was justified because the Explanation applied (the returned income was less than 80% of assessed income and the act of furnishing inaccurate particulars occurred after the amendment).
  • The decision in I.T.R No. 38 of 1970 was overruled.
  • The correct principle is that laid down in I.T.R No. 71 of 1968, which the Full Bench adopted.
  • The parties were directed to bear their respective costs.
  • A copy of the judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar was to be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.

The opinion resolves the conflict between earlier Division Bench decisions by adopting the view that liability under the amended section is determined by reference to whether the statutory elements are satisfied at the time the act was committed; it expressly overrules the contrary Division Bench decision.

Show all summary ...

Govindan Nair, A.C.J:— This tax referred case has come up before the Full Bench on an order of reference by a Division Bench dated 28th November, 19721. The reference was made because of the conflict between the decisions in I.T.R No. 38 of 19702 and I.T.R No. 71 of 1968 3.

2. The question is:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal is correct in law in holding that the Explanation to section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is not applicable to this case?”

3. By the amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 1964, the word “deliberately” has been omitted from clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 271 and an Explanation was added which is in these terms:

“Where the total income returned by any person is less than eighty per cent. of the total income (hereinafter in this Explanation referred to as the correct income) as assessed under section 143 or section 144 or section 147 (reduced by the expenditure incurred bona fide by him for the purpose of making or earning any income included in the total income but which has been disallowed as a deduction), such person shall, unless he proves that the failure to return the correct income did not arise from any fraud or any gross or wilfull neglect on his part, be deemed to have concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income for the purposes of clause (c) of this sub-section.”

4. The year of assessment with which we are concerned is 1963–64. It is admitted that the return filed by the assessee for the year is the one dated September 8, 1966. The amount of income disclosed by the return was only Rs. 13,746. The assessment was completed fixing the total income at Rs. 65,570. The income returned was, therefore, less than 80 per cent. of the total income assessed. The Explanation to section 271(1)(c) was thus directly attracted.

5. This means that it must be presumed that the assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars of his income, unless he established that the failure to return the correct income did not arise from any fraud or any gross or wilful neglect on his part. The act of furnishing inaccurate particulars had taken place after the amendments were introduced to the section. Imposition of penalty by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner was, therefore, justified. The Tribunal held that the amended section would not apply because the year of assessment (1963–64) ended before the amendments were effected. It was further observed that to apply the section would be to give retrospective operation to the section as amended.

6. The year of assessment has nothing to do with the question of liability arising under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. And to apply the section as amended to an act committed after the amendment is not to give the section retrospective effect. The only question is whether the elements of the section had been satisfied when the act was committed. This is what a Division Bench of this court said in I.T.R No. 71 of 1968. In that case, the concealment had taken place before the section was amended. However, in another Division Bench decision in I.T.R No. 38 of 1970 the view was taken that the amendments introduced by the Finance Act, 1964, which came into force on April 1, 1964, will not apply in relation to the assessment year 1963–64. This view, as has been mentioned in the order of reference, does not appear to be correct. The view taken in I.T.R No. 71 of 1968 is in accordance with the decision of another Division Bench decision of this court in Hajee K. Assainar v. Commissioner of Income-tax and the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Patiala v. Bhan Singh Boota Singh [1974] 95 I.T.R 562 Punj...

7. On general principles too, it is the view taken in I.T.R No. 71 of 1968 that should prevail. The principle in such cases had been laid down by Sri Lionel Leach, Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vedlapatla Veera Venkataramiah [1943] 11 I.T.R 308 Mad... Whether an act or omission is an offence must be determined with reference to the law at the time of the commission of the act or omission.

8. In the light of the above, we overrule the decision in I.T.R No. 38 of 1970. The correct principle is that laid down in the decision in I.T.R No. 71 of 1968 .

9. We, therefore, answer the question that has been referred to us in the negative, that is, in favour of the department and against the assessee. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs.

10. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.

11. Question answered in the negative.