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Ittiavira Thomas v. Sankaranarayanan Kesavan Nampori Of Manakkattu And Another

Kerala High Court
Mar 1, 1963
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Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

On 28 November 1944 (13th Vrischikam 1120 M.E.) Raman Namboodiri, the karnavan of a Namboodiri joint family (illom) governed by the Travancore Malayala Brahmin Act, executed Ext. P-1 granting the suit illom land (47 cents) on kanom to the 1st defendant for Rs. 50 and a michavaram of Rs. 8 per year. On 12 February 1947 (30th Makaram 1122 M.E.) the 1st defendant assigned the kanom to the 2nd defendant and delivered possession. Raman Namboodiri died on 12 July 1951.

On 22 September 1952 Kesavan Namboodiri, the succeeding karnavan (1st plaintiff), filed suit on behalf of the illom for cancellation of the kanom and recovery of possession with mesne profits, alleging the kanom was void under Section 5 of the Malayala Brahmin Act. The suit was decreed ex parte on 25 October 1952.

A partition of the illom occurred on 9 November 1955 (Ext. P-2). The suit property fell to the share of Parameswaran Namboodiri, who thereafter sought execution of the ex parte decree in 1957, claiming to be transferee of the decree. The 2nd defendant applied under Order IX, Rule 13 to set aside the ex parte decree; Parameswaran was treated by the court as an assignee-decree-holder and, in effect, was entered as 2nd plaintiff in the application. The 2nd defendant's restoration application was dismissed by the trial court but allowed on appeal; that appellate order was upheld in revision by the High Court on 27 January 1958.

The trial subsequently proceeded on the footing that Parameswaran was the plaintiff entitled to relief; his name was formally entered in the plaint as 2nd plaintiff only after trial but before judgment. The trial court and the lower appellate court gave differing findings on necessity and acquiescence; the appellate court remanded to the trial court to determine mesne profits and compensation for improvements. The 2nd defendant appealed against the order of remand. The present opinion deals with that appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the kanom granted by the karnavan was void under Section 5 of the Travancore Malayala Brahmin Act for want of the statutory requirements (consideration, illom necessity, and written consent of all major members).
  2. Whether the plaintiffs' suit for possession was barred by limitation (application of Article 91, Article 142 or Article 144 and Section 22 of the Indian Limitation Act) or otherwise time‑barred in consequence of partition.
  3. Whether the partition of the illom and consequent devolution of the property to a branch (Parameswaran) operated to extinguish the right to impugn the kanom or caused abatement of the suit.
  4. Whether Parameswaran Namboodiri was properly brought on record as a plaintiff (by virtue of the Order IX, Rule 13 application and related orders) and, if so, whether he can continue the suit without any new limitation objection (i.e., whether Section 22 Limitation Act applies to him as a new party).
  5. Whether the defence of acquiescence (including alleged receipt of rents and reference to documents in the partition deed) or the defence discovered by the trial court could defeat the plaintiffs' claim.
  6. Whether, on the facts, necessity (for the illom) in terms of Section 5 was established.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The kanom was void under Section 5 of the Malayala Brahmin Act because the statutory conditions were not satisfied: there was no illom necessity, no written consent of all major members, and (as to the plaintiffs' case) consideration was not sufficient to validate the kanom for illom immovable property.
  • The suit was in time; it was brought within twelve years of the date on which possession passed (the plaintiffs relied on the applicable limitation provision—either Article 142 or Article 144—so the suit was not barred).
  • The suit was brought by the karnavan on behalf of the illom; subsequent partition did not defeat the plaintiffs' right to impugn the kanom or to continue the suit (or devolve the right in such a way as to abate the suit).

2nd Defendant's Arguments

  • The kanom was valid: there was consideration, there was illom necessity, and there was the consent of all members of the illom (the 2nd defendant asserted consent and necessity).
  • The members (including the plaintiffs) subsequently acquiesced in and affirmed the kanom, and thereby were precluded from questioning it (the 2nd defendant relied on acquiescence by receipt of rents and by the partition deed listing the kanom counterpart among handed-over documents).
  • The 2nd defendant disputed the plaintiffs' claimed rate of mesne profits and pleaded entitlement to compensation for improvements in the event of eviction.
  • Procedurally, the 2nd defendant initially sought to rely on limitation (Article 91) in an attempt to defeat the plaintiffs' suit but this was repelled by the courts below and was not repeated before the court in the present appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Neelakanta Pillai v. Madhavl Amma, 1958 Ker LT 890 Quoted for a headnote suggesting that after a tarwad (or thavazhi) becomes divided, a divided member cannot maintain a suit on behalf of the tarwad to set aside an alienation effected before division. The court observed that the judgment, on reading, did not lay down the absolute proposition that a tarwad is a legal person which dies on partition; the court did not accept the broad proposition urged by the appellant as laid down by that decision.
Venkatanarayana v. V. Somaraju, AIR 1937 Mad 610 (Full Bench) Authority for the proposition that the representative character of the karnavan is not affected by a severance of status pending the suit unless the other members choose to disaffirm it. The court relied on this to hold that the karnavan represented the members from the start and that a branch taking the property on partition could be regarded as constructively a party and entitled to be impleaded as plaintiff.
Banwari Singh v. Sakhraj Singh, AIR 1931 All 585 Support for the proposition that Section 22 of the Limitation Act is not attracted where a person is not a new party but has been constructively a party to the suit. Applied to conclude that when Parameswaran was constructively a party and then brought on record, Section 22 did not apply and no fresh limitation objection could arise as to him being a new party.
Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram, ILR 45 Cal 94 : AIR 1917 PC 156 Judicial Committee observation that "the introduction of a plaintiff or a defendant for one stage of a suit is an introduction for all stages." Adopted by the court to support the view that Parameswaran's being made a party in the Order IX, Rule 13 application (a later stage) effectively brought him into the suit for all stages and entitled him to prosecute the suit thereafter.
Salil Kumar v. S.N. Ghose, AIR 1960 Cal 203 Discussed in relation to the legal effect of bringing a legal representative on record in an application under Order IX, Rule 13. The court acknowledged what was said in that case but distinguished the present facts and followed the principle in Brij Indar Singh to treat the Order IX, Rule 13 introduction as bringing a plaintiff into the suit for all stages.
Venkatanarasimha v. Suryanarayana, AIR 1926 Mad 325 Cited (with Salar Beg) in relation to the legal effect of interlocutory applications and bringing parties on record. The court noted these decisions but expressed that it saw little difficulty in treating an Order IX, Rule 13 application as a stage of the suit that can bring a person on record as a party for the suit.
Salar Beg v. Kotayya, AIR 1926 Mad 654 Cited alongside Venkatanarasimha concerning procedural consequences of bringing parties on record. The court referred to these cases but maintained its view that an Order IX, Rule 13 application is an interlocutory stage that can effect impleadment for the suit.
Saila Bala v. Nirmala Sundari, AIR 1958 SC 394 Authority cited for the proposition that Section 146 of the CPC has wider scope than Order 22, Rule 10 and bears on substitution after partition. Relied upon to support the proposition that even if Parameswaran were not literally on record, he could maintain the appeal under Section 146 of the CPC by reason of his branch having succeeded to the entire interest in the property.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds from statutory text and the factual record to the procedural posture and the legal consequences:

  1. Statutory requirements (Section 5, Travancore Malayala Brahmin Act). The court identified three statutory requisites for a valid kanom by a karnavan: (a) consideration; (b) illom necessity; and (c) written consent of all major members of the illom. The court noted the absence of the written consent of major members (including the plaintiffs) and observed both lower courts correctly held that subsequent written consent would not cure the statutory defect.
  2. Consideration and necessity. The concurrent finding that consideration had passed was accepted and not reopened. On necessity, after reviewing evidence (noting the kanom and counterpart did not state purpose and the only oral evidence—D.W.1, the 1st defendant—was vague and did not establish a specific purpose or enquiry), the court agreed with the lower appellate court that necessity was not proved. It emphasized that, though the lack of written consent alone is sufficient to render the transaction bad, the question of necessity remains relevant only if other defenses (e.g., acquiescence) are successful.
  3. Acquiescence. The court examined the plea that members had accepted the kanom by receiving rent and by the partition deed listing the kanom counterpart among documents given to sharers. The trial court rejected the rent evidence; the appellate court was not pressed on that point. The trial court's finding that the partition deed (Ext. P-2) evidenced acceptance was criticized: the court held that acceptance/acquiescence is a matter for pleading, not only evidence, and that mere listing of a document among handed-over papers does not amount to affirming the substantive transaction—especially where the ex parte decree had then been obtained setting the transaction aside.
  4. The trial court's sua sponte point. The trial court, without hearing parties, raised the point that the 2nd plaintiff had not been properly brought on record, that the 1st plaintiff's cause of action ceased by partition, and that the 2nd plaintiff's cause of action (if any) was barred by limitation—thereby dismissing the suit. The appellate court disagreed with that gratuitous point and held the 2nd plaintiff entitled to decree for possession, remanding for determination of mesne profits and compensation. The appellate court's approach was preferred.
  5. Nature of a Hindu joint family and devolution on partition. The court analyzed the legal nature of a joint Hindu family: rejecting the idea that a joint family is a legal person akin to a corporation that "dies" on partition, the court described a joint family as a collection of individuals with community of interest. Rights inhere in the individual members; on partition rights devolve on the several members in accordance with the division. Thus partition does not extinguish the members' rights to impugn an alienation made by the manager; rights pass to those who respectively receive them on partition.
  6. Representative status of the karnavan and impleading of Parameswaran. The court relied on Venkatanarayana to hold that the karnavan's representative role is not affected by severance unless disaffirmed. From the outset the 2nd plaintiff was constructively a party; under Order 1, Rule 8(2) analogy and Order 1, Rule 10 principles, a person constructively a party should be made an actual party and heard. When a person already constructively a party is brought on record, Section 22 of the Limitation Act does not apply because he is not a new party (citing Banwari Singh).
  7. Legal effect of Order IX, Rule 13 application. The court treated an Order IX, Rule 13 application as an interlocutory application and hence as a stage of the suit. Citing Brij Indar Singh, the court held that introduction of a plaintiff in such an application amounts to bringing that person on record for all stages; consequently, Parameswaran being impleaded in the O.9 R.13 application should be regarded as a plaintiff in the suit, and not as a new party subject to limitation objections. The court rejected the narrower reading in the Calcutta decision (Salil Kumar) as leading to anomalous results.
  8. Practical outcome of the reasoning. Given that (a) written consent was absent; (b) consideration was proved but necessity was not made out on the evidence; and (c) acquiescence was not established (and could not be relied on where not pleaded), the kanom could not be upheld. The appellate court's order remanding for determination of mesne profits and compensation was therefore appropriate. The court emphasized that Parameswaran could properly prosecute the suit as a plaintiff and that no fresh limitation difficulty arose from his being brought on record via the interlocutory application.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL DISMISSED. (The court dismissed the 2nd defendant's appeal with costs.)

Direct consequences and implications discussed in the opinion:

  • The kanom was rendered invalid by reason of the statutory defect (absence of the written consent of all major members under Section 5 of the Malayala Brahmin Act); consideration was not in dispute but necessity was not proved on the evidence; acquiescence by the plaintiffs was not established.
  • Parameswaran Namboodiri, having been constructively a party and having been brought on record by an interlocutory application under Order IX, Rule 13, must be regarded as a plaintiff in the suit and entitled to prosecute it; Section 22 of the Limitation Act was not attracted to treat him as a new party.
  • The suit was to be remanded to the trial court to determine mesne profits and compensation for improvements and to pass an appropriate decree for possession consistent with the appellate court's findings.
  • The court clarified that partition of a joint family does not destroy the rights of individual members to sue in respect of property formerly held jointly; rights devolve on individuals or branches in accordance with the partition and do not vanish merely because the joint family comes to be divided.
  • The court applied and explained procedural principles about impleading in interlocutory applications (Order IX, Rule 13) and the relationship between such impleading and limitation law, adopting the view that being made a party in that stage brings a person into the suit for all stages.

The opinion did not purport to create a novel rule of law beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities on (a) the effect of partition on rights in joint family property and (b) the procedural consequences of impleading parties in interlocutory proceedings. The final operative order was the dismissal of the appeal with costs and the confirmation of the remand for determination of mesne profits and compensation.

Show all summary ...

1. By Ext. P-1, dated 13th Vrischikam 1120 M.E (28th November 1944) one Raman Namboodiri, the Karnavan of a Namboodiri joint family-illom as it is called governed by the Travancore Malayala Brahmin Act, III of 1106 (which has been inaccurately referred to by the courts below as the Namboodiri Act) granted the suit property, a piece of illom land, 47 cents in extent, (and worth, according to the evidence of the 1st defendant himself about Rs. 1,000) on kanom to the 1st defendant for a sum of Rs. 50 and a michavaram of Rs. 8 a year. Two years later, on 30th Makaram 1122 M.E (12th February 1947), the 1st defendant assigned the kanom to the 2nd defendant and put the latter in possession. Raman Namboodiri died on 12th July 1951, and on 22nd September 1952, Kesavan Namboodiri the succeeding Karnavan (who now figures in the suit as the 1st plaintiff) brought the present suit professedly on behalf of the Illom, in his capacity as karnavan thereof, for a cancellation of the kanom deed and for recovery of the property from the hands of the two defendants with mesne profits, past and future, on the ground that the kanom was void under the provisions of Section 5 of the Malayala Brahmin Act. (The former was an unnecessary relief; the suit was in truth a suit for possession on the footing that the kanom was void; the kanom could be ignored and there was no need to have it set aside; and the courts below rightly repelled the attempt of the 2nd defendant to bring the suit within Article 91 of the Limitation Act, an attempt which has not been repeated before me, and rightly held that the suit was in time having been brought within 12 years of the date on which possession passed, whether it is Article 142 or Article 144 that applies).

2. The suit was decreed ex parte on 25th October 1952. Three years later, there was a partition in the Illom under Ext. P-2, dated 9th November 1955, and the suit property fall to the share of the branch of one Parameswaran Namboodiri who now figures as the 2nd plaintiff in the suit Some time in 1957, Parameswaran Namboodiri applied for execution of the ex parte decree claiming to be the transferee of the decree. On receipt of notice of this application, the 2nd defendant came forward with an application under O.IX, R. 13 of the Code to set aside the ax parte decree. To this application, he made only Kesavan Namboodiri (now the 1st plaintiff and then the only plaintiff) a party. On 27th March 1957, the court ordered notice of the application to Parameswaran Namboodiri whom it described as the assignee-decree-holder. The court itself seems to have construed this order as an order impleading Parameswaran Namboodiri as a party respondent to the application, and, under the initials of the Judge, the name of Parameswaran Namboodiri was entered in the application as 2nd plaintiff-2nd respondent.

3. Thereafter, on 13th July 1957, the 2nd defendant applied for the issue of notice to Parameswaran Namboodiri and in this application lie described Parameswaran Namboodiri as the 2nd plaintiff. The 2nd defendant's restoration application was dismissed by the first court but was allowed in appeal, and the appellate order was upheld by the High Court in revision on 27th January 1958.

4. Thereafter, the first court took up the trial of the suit and the trial proceeded on the footing that Parameswaran Namboodiri was the person entitled to relief in the suit and that he was a plaintiff therein in fact, It was he that prosecuted the suit there was, however, no formal order impleading him as a plaintiff and no amendment of the plaint until the Court, on noticing the omission after the close of the trial but before judgment, had his name entered in the plaint as the 2nd plaintiff on the strength of the order of 27th March 1957.

5. Section 5 of the Travancore Malayala Brahmin Act runs as follows:

“5. Except for consideration and illom necessity, and with the written consent of all the major members of the illom, no karnavan or other managing member shall sell illom immovable property or execute kanom deeds in respect thereof, or mortgage it with possession for a period of more than twelve years or lease it with or without premium for a period of more than twelve years.

Nothing in this section shall affect the right of the karnavan to execute solely renewal of kanom deeds already executed.”

6. It is clear from the section that three things are necessary for the validity of a kanom of illom property by a karnavan. There must be consideration, there must be illom necessity, and there must be the written consent of all the major members of the illom. The case of the plaintiffs was that none of these three conditions was satisfied, whereas, the defence put forward by the 2nd defendant was that there was consideration and necessity and also the consent of all the members of the Illom and that, in any case, the members, in particular the two plaintiffs, having subsequently acquiesced in, and affirmed the kanom were precluded from questioning it. The 2nd defendant disputed the rate of mesne profits claimed in the plaint and also pleaded that, in the event of eviction, he was entitled to compensation for improvements.

7. The first court found, what Indeed was not disputed, that there were major members in the illom other than the kamavan, Raman Namboodiri, at the time of the) execution of the kanom the plaintiffs themselves were two of them and that there was not the written consent of these major members. It found that the kanom was for consideration and for illom necessity. It found further that the plaintiffs had acquiesced in the kanom and were therefore not entitled to question it. And, after it had reserved Judgment, it took upon itself to raise a new point not taken by the parties, and, without hearing them in the matter, it held that the 2nd plaintiff had not been properly brought on record, that by reason of the partition, the 1st plaintiff had ceased to have a cause of action to maintain the suit, that the cause of action which the 1st plaintiff had, did not, in the absence of an assignment of the ex parte decree, devolve on the 2nd plaintiff, and that, so far as any independent cause of action which the 2nd plaintiff might have had was concerned, that had become barred by the time he came to court on 29th January 1957 seeking execution of the decree, that being the earliest date on which he could be regarded as having been made a party for the purpose of Section 22 of the Indian Limitation Act if he indeed was made a party at all. In this view, it dismissed the plaintiffs' suit, and it left the issues regarding mesne profits and compensation or improvements undetermined.

8. The 2nd plaintiff appealed. The appellate court accepted the findings of the trial court regarding consideration and the absence of the written consent of the major members of the illom. It however, disagreed with it with regard to necessity and acquiescence as also with regard to the point Which the trial court had discovered and which it not unjustifiably characterised as a difficulty which the trial Court had gratuitously created. Consequently, it held that the 2nd plaintiff was entitled to a decree for possession, but, since the trial court had not decided the issues regarding compensation for improvements and mesne profits, It remanded the suit to it for passing a decree for possession after determining these issues. The 2nd defendant has come up with this appeal against the order of remand.

9. As I have said, the fact that there; were other major members in the illom when Ext. P-1 was executed by the karnavart and that their written consent was not obtained (although one of tham, who held a power of attorney from the karnavan, did attest the document) is not disputed. Both courts have held, I Wink rightly, though unnecessarily since there was no written consent; prior or subsequent, that a subsequent written consent is of no avail.

10. Turning next to the requirements of consideration and necessity, with regard to the former, the finding is concurrent that consideration did pass, and that is no longer open to question. There remains the question of necessity. On this I am inclined to accept the finding of the lower appellate court that necessity has not been proved. Neither the kanom deed Ext. P-1, nor the counterpart, Ext. D-2, states the purpose for which the kanom amount of Rs. 50 was taken, and the written statement filed by the 2nd defendant only contains a vague statement that the money was taken for the needs of the illom.

11. With regard to this, the only evidence is the testimony of the 1st defendant, the original kanomdar, who was examined as D.W 1. He no doubt stated that the money was taken for the use of the illom but he was unable to say for what particular purpose. (Both the lower courts appear to have misread his evidence for they say that he said that the money was taken to pay for rice which the illom had bought on credit from his shop. But he only said that the illom used to buy rice and other provisions on credit from him; he did not say that the Kanom amount of Rs. 50 was taken for discharging any such outstanding). Neither did he say that he made any enquiries whatsoever regarding the alleged necessity. He was told that the money was required for the use or the illom. But by whom he did not choose to say, and he had to confess that he had never met and spoken the karnavan, Raman Namboodiri.

12. In this state of the evidence, the conclusion reached by the lower appellate Court that necessity had not been proved seems to me the only possible conclusion. In any went, the undisputed fact that there was not the written ??? required by the statute is sufficient to render the sansaction bad, and, unless the 2nd defendant succeeds in his plea of acquiescence, or in the defence which the, first Court discovered for him, a finding one way or the I other on the issue of necessity cannot affect the result of the suit.

13. On the question of acquiescence, the plea in the written statement was that there was an acceptance of the kanom transaction by the members of the illom by receipt of rent from the defendants. But the evidence regarding payment of rent, consisting of the mere word of mouth of the two defendants, was rejected by the trial Court and this case of acceptance by receipt of rent does not appear to have been pressed before the lower appellate Court. The first Court however found that the deed Ext. P-2, dated 9th November 1955, by which the members of the illom, including the two plaintiffs, enterea into a partition, evidenced an acceptance of the kanom and that the plaintiffs having once affirmed the transaction were precluded from questioning it. But, in agreement with the lower appellate Court. I think that it was not right in holding so. In the first place, no such acquiescence or acceptance was pleaded in the written statement.

14. The facts constituting an acceptance or acquiescence are matter for pleading, not merely for evidence, and, in the absence of a pleading on the matter, no amount of evidence is of any avail. Secondly, I share the lower; appellate Court's difficulty in discerning anything in Ext. P-2 amounting to an acceptance of the kanom. What is relied upon on behalf of the 2nd defendant is that among the numerous documents listed in the partition deed as handed over to the several sharers, the kanom counterpart, Ext. D-2, finds a place. That document was undoubtedly one of the documents in the possession of the illom which had to be handed over to the shara concerned, and I fail to see how a mere mention of the document in the list can amount to an acceptance of the transaction embodied in the document. And that at a time when the? transaction in question had been set aside (the ex parte-decree was then in force) at the instance of the karna) van of the illom.

15. What is most strenuously urged on behalf of the 2nd defendant is a variation of the first Court's self-discovered theme. Notwithstanding that the plaint expressly averred that the 1st plaintiff was suing as the karnavan of the illom and was in that capacity claiming possession of the property to which the illom was entitled, the first Court took the untenable view that the suit was brought by the 1st plaintiff in his personal capacity as a mera member of the illom, because, as a junior member of the illom, a cause of action had accrued to him when the kanom was granted. That cause of action accrued to all the members excepting the karnavan, and, why a succeeding kamavan should not represent all the members, just as he could in any other suit, is more than I can follow.

16. In the appeal here, the same line, namely, that the suit was brought by the 1st plaintiff on a cause of action personal to him and was neither by or on behalf of the illom and that cause of action disappeared with the dissolution of the illom on partition, was taker? — see paragraph 7 of the memorandum — but the argument before me has been on the footing that the suit was a suit brought by the illom itself. The argument is that with the division effected by Ext. P-2, the illom as such ceased to axist, and that, with it ceased the right (which belonged, and could belong, only to the undivided illom) fo impugn the kanom and obtain possession of the property.

17. That right could not, and did not, devolve on any of the branches into which the illom divided itself, indeed, the argument has proceeded to this length, namely, that, if pending a suit for possession brought by the manager of a joint family, a division of status occurs, then the suit must abate and the property lost for ever to the several members of the family. The joint family to which the property belonged dissolves with the division leaving no heirs or successors.

18. I am afraid this argument proceeds on the fallacious assumption that a Hindu joint family is, like a corporation, a legal person, an altogether different person from the natural persons composing It, an assumption which, even if well founded, is of little avail as we shall presently see. Only a legal person can possess rights or sue in enforcement of them. The very first characteristic of a legal right as set out in Salmond on Jurisprudence (Eleventh Edition page 265) is that it is vested in a person. Now, it has often been said that a Hindu joint family is a legal entity, but, so far as I am aware, it has never been said that it is a legal person, although I must confess that some decisions have used the words, “entity” and “person” as if they were synonymous. But, a legal entity means only a thing recognized by the law as real in itself and distinct from its qualities and attributes, and, while every legal person is necessarily a legal entity, the converse is not true.

19. In fact, so far as personality is concerned, a Hindu joint family is nothing more than a collection of individual persons with a certain community of interest, and terms such as “joint family” or “tarwad” or “illom” are but compendious expressions designed to denote all the individuals composing the body — see the definition of ‘inom’ in Section 2(2) of the Malayala Brahmin Act as meaning and including all the members of a Malayala Brahmin joint family with community of property and the similar definitions of “tarwad” in the Travancore Nayar Act and the Madras Marumakkatnayam Act.

20. That the General Clauses Act defines “person” as including a body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, does not mean that an unincorporated body of individuals is all legal person. We no doubt invest a joint family with a certain measure of personality for the sake of convenience when we speak of a suit brought by a joint family or of property belonging to a Joint family (just as we do of a trust or a firm when we speak of a suit by a trust or a firm or the property of a trust or a firm) but I do not think that it can be said that a joint family as such possesses any rights or owns any property or brings a suit. It is the individuals constituting the joint family, namely, the members thereof, that possess the rights, own the property or bring the suit, and, when a division is effected, the rights held by the members jointly devolve on the several members or sharers in accordance with the division. There is therefore no such thing as the death of a joint family on a partition being effected or of any right of the joint family being lost thereby. The right continues to reside in the individuals to whom it is exclusively allotted in the partition.

21. On behalf of the appellant, it is argued that the decision in Neelakanta Pillai v. Madhavl Amma, 1958 Ker LT 890, proceeds on the footing that a tarwad is a legal person which dies on partition, leaving its quondam members with no right to impugn alienations made before the partition and recover the property alienated. Indeed the second headnote to this decision reads.

“After a tarwad or thavazhi becomes divided, a divided member cannot maintain a suit on behalf of the tarwad or thavazhi as such to set aside an alienation effected before division.”

22. But from the judgment it would appear — see paragraph 6 — that no such proposition was laid down in the case and that their Lordships only referred to certain authorities as supporting such a proposition.

23. It is a little difficult to understand how a right which is vested in every individual member of a joint family and which is personal to him, although any exercise thereof must be for the benefit of all the members, can disappear merely because the members choose to effect a partition and alter the manner in which they are to hold the properties hitherto held by them jointly, although, of course, the result of the partition might be to vest the right in some of the members to the exclusion of the rest. However that might be, the correctness or otherwise of the proposition is not material for the purpose of the present case. It is enough to say that there is nothing in the decision to suggest that a tarwad or other joint Hindu family is, like a corporation, a legal person.

24. Even if it be that a joint family is a legal person, it seems to me that when by the act that effects its dissolution, namely, the partition, a particular property hitherto owned by the entire joint family devolves on a particular individual or branch, the right to institute a suit in respect of that property devolves with it so that the individual or branch would be entitled to continue a suit brought by the original joint family under Section 146 of the CPC, the scope of which is wider than that of Order 22, Rule 10 — see Saila Bala v. Nirmala Sundari, AIR 1958 SC 394 — if not under O. 22, Rule 10.

25. But, it seems to me that the true position is that a joint family is a group of persons, the membership of which, and the manner in which the members whereof hold joint property and joint rights, are regulated by law. It is a concept or institution which is a creature of the law and not of act of parties (though act of parties can put an end to it) and that is why it is called a legal entity. Property and other rights are jointly held by all the members of the family and, surely, those, rights cannot disappear by reason of an arrangement between the members whereby certain rights are thereafter to be held by one or more of the members to the exclusion of the rest. The right to avoid an alienation made by a manager is a right which inheres personally in each individual member of a joint family although he must exercise it not for himself alone but for the benefit of all, and, if in a partition, any particular right is not the subject-matter of allotment, it seems to me that it must still belong to all the members of the original joint family, whether as tenants-in-common or as coparceners is a matter of no consequence.

26. Turning to the case on hand, we have already seen that the suit was brought by the 1st plaintiff as the karnavan of the family. Every member of the family was therefore constructively, though not ‘eo nomine’, a party to the suit, the karnavan representing all of them, and, as pointed out in Venkatanarayana v. V. Somaraju, AIR 1937 Mad 610 (FB), the representative character occupied by the karnavan is not affected by a severance of status pending the suit unless the other members choose to disaffirm it. Therefore, from the very beginning, the 2nd plaintiff was constructively, though not ‘eo nomine’, a party to the suit, and, that being so, it seems to me, he was entitled to be made an actual party at any stage of the suit — Order 1, Rule 8(2) of the Cede affords a close analogy. If a person is already constructively a party to a suit because somebody who is a party represents him therein so that the decision in the suit is going to be binding on him, it is only right and proper that he should be heard if he so wishes and be made a party for the purpose — Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code could be properly invoked. All the more so if, as a result of a partition in a family, the particular joint family property in respect of which a suit has been brought falls to his share in which case Section 146 and Order 22, R. 10 of the Code would also come into play. And when a person, who is already constructively a party to a suit, is actually brought on record as a party, no question of limitation arises. Section 22 of the Limitation Act is not attracted because he is not a new party — see Banwari Singh v. Sakhraj Singh, AIR 1931 All 585.

27. The only question remaining is whether Parameswaran Namboodiri was, in fact, impleaded as a plaintiff in the suit, and, in this connection, it is to fie noted that he alone filed the appeal before the lower appellate Court although the 1st plaintiff was impleaded therein as the 3rd respondent. I do not think that this matter can give room for much dispute. In the first place, as 1 have already said, both sides assumed that Parameswaran Namboodiri had come on record as the 2nd plaintiff. The trial in the suit proceeded on that basis; it was Parameswaran Namboodiri that prosecuted the suit; and, as I have already indicated more than once, I do not think that the first Court should, of its own accord, have taken up a point which was not merely not taken by the parties but was even not put to them. Had the omission to enter his name in the plaint been pointed out at the proper time, either by the opposite party or by the Court, undoubtedly Parameswaran Namboodiri would have made an application to remedy the omission and the application would have been granted as a matter of course.

28. It would also appear from the decision in AIR 1958 SC 394, that even if Parameswaran Namboodiri were not on record in the suit, he could nevertheless have maintained the appeal under Section 146 of the CPC by reason of the entire interest of the undivided illom in the property in suit having devolved on his branch by the partition under Ext. P-2, in other words, as a person who had taken the place of the original plaintiff. That being so, he necessarily figures as a substituted plaintiff in the appeal and further trial after remand can only be on the basis that he is a plaintiff in the suit.

29. All this apart, we have seen that Parameswaran Namboodiri was impleaded as 2nd plaintiff in the 2nd defendant's application under Order 9, Rule 13, and, with great respect to what has been said in Salil Kumar v. S.N Ghose, 63 Cal WN 883 : (AIR 1960 Cal 203), I ttiink this is a case to which the observation of the Judicial Committee in Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram, ILR 45 Cal 94 at p. 110 : (AIR 1917 PC 156 at p. 161) that,

“the Introduction of a plaintiff or a defendant for one stage of a suit is an introduction for all siages.”

30. Applies with even greater force than in the case tneir Lordships had to consider. With equally great respect to what has been said in Venkatanarasimha v. Suryanarayana, AIR 1926 Mad 325 and Salar Beg v. Kotayya, AIR 1926 Mad 654, I see little difficulty in regarding an application under Order 9, Rule 13 like, for example, an application under Sect on 152 or 153 or Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code, as marking a stage of the suit, I think it is an application in the suit, and I am unable to appreciate why it should be regarded as an altogether Independent proceeding merely because the suit has been disposed of. It is to be noticed that the definition of the term “interlocutory application” in Rule 5(8) of the Travancore-Cochin Civil Rules of Practice and in Rule 3(8) of the Madras Rules does not insist that the main proceeding should be pending when the interlocutory application is made, and an application under Order IX, Rule 13 is commonly and, in my view” rightly, regarded as an interlocutory application in the suit. To hold as was done in the Calcutta case that when a legal representative is brought on record in an application under Order 9, R. 13, that will not amount to his being brought on record in the suit itself would load to most anomalous results as noticed in that case itself. Supposing the application under Order 9, Rule 13 is brought, as often happens, years after the original plaintiff is dead, after the time limited for ??? aside an abatement of the suit. Such “an application can be brought only against the legal representative of the plaintiff and he can figure in the application only as representing the plaintiff. Supposing the application is allowed, the result will be that the ex parte decree against the defendant is set aside but the suit thus restored to file, and which has to be proceeded with under the terms of Order 9, Rule 13, would stand abated. Thus both the decree and the suit would be lost. I do not think that, in such circumstances, it should be necessary for the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to come forward with an application to excuse the delay and have the abatement set aside. The decree, which was his, having been set aside after he was brought on record as the person who had taken the place of the original plaintiff, he should be entitled to prosecute the suit as of right. He should automatically find himself in a position to do so and should not have to crave any indulgence for the purpose. I think the correct position is that, on his being made a party to the application under Order 9, Rule 13 as having taken the place of the original plaintiff, which is the only character he can occupy therein, he must be regarded as having taken the plaintiffs place in the suit itself, in other words, as having been impleaded therein as a plaintiff. There can be no abatement after decree. By his being made a party in the application under Order 9, Rule 13, which is a stage of the suit subsequent to the decree, the legal representative is made a party to the suit and no question of abatement arises. In the result, I dismiss the appeal with costs.

LG/M/D.V.C

31. Appeal dismissed.