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Kumaraswamy Reddiar v. Noordeen & Others

Kerala High Court
Feb 2, 1960
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Govinda Menon, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the proprietor of Lakshmi Talkies, Quilon, occupying premises in Survey Nos. 8069 and 8070 leased originally by the owners (respondents 1 and 2) to P.K. Subbiah Pillai at Rs. 500 per month for five years from 1-4-1127 (M.E). Subbiah Pillai assigned his leasehold right to the petitioner with the owners' knowledge and consent. The petitioner filed B.R.C. No. 54 of 1955 under Section 4 of the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order (the Rent Control Order) for fixation of fair rent.

The Rent Controller fixed fair rent at Rs. 475 per mensem by proceedings dated 28-7-1956 (Ext. P.1). Both parties appealed to the Collector (appellate authority) who fixed the fair rent at Rs. 500 by order dated 17-12-1956 (Ext. P.2). Respondents 1 and 2 and the petitioner filed revision petitions (Nos. 5 and 6 of 1957) before the Government. After an amendment to clause 16 of the Rent Control Order and a notification, the revision petitions were heard by the District Judge of Quilon (3rd respondent). The District Judge, by common order (Ext. P.3) dated 9-12-1957, held that the petition to fix fair rent was not maintainable because the petitioner was not a tenant within the meaning of the Rent Control Order.

The petitioner moved this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking certiorari to quash Ext. P.3. The petitioner challenged (a) the District Judge's jurisdiction to exercise revision powers transferred by amendment to clause 16 of the Rent Control Order and (b) the validity of the notification delegating revision power; and (c) the District Judge's finding that the petitioner was not a tenant within Rule 2(4) of the Rent Control Order. Respondents contested these grounds and raised a preliminary objection that the petitioner should have raised the jurisdictional objection before the tribunal itself and is now precluded from seeking extraordinary relief.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the amendment to clause 16 of the Rent Control Order and the notification delegating the power of revision to the District Judge deprived the Government of jurisdiction in respect of revision petitions pending before the Government at the time of amendment (i.e., whether the District Judge had jurisdiction to decide the revision petitions).
  2. Whether the delegation/notification amending rule 16(1) of the Rent Control Order was illegal and ultra vires the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Public Safety Measures Act, V of 1950.
  3. Whether the District Judge was correct in holding that the petitioner was not a tenant within the meaning of Rule 2(4) of the Rent Control Order.
  4. Whether a petitioner who failed to raise an objection to jurisdiction before a subordinate tribunal may, in certiorari proceedings under Articles 226/227, raise that objection for the first time (and, relatedly, how the doctrines of vested rights and retrospective operation of statutes affect pending proceedings).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The District Judge had no jurisdiction to exercise revisionary power by virtue of the amendment to clause 16 of the Rent Control Order; the revision petitions were pending before the Government when the amendment came into force and should have been decided only by the Government.
  • The notification amending rule 16(1) and delegating Government's revision power to officers (including the District Judge) was illegal and ultra vires Sections 15 and 22 of the Public Safety Measures Act, V of 1950, under which the Control Order was promulgated.
  • The District Judge erred in holding that the petitioner was not a tenant within the meaning of Rule 2(4) of the Rent Control Order.

Respondents' (Owners') Arguments

  • Denied the petitioner's contentions substantively.
  • Preliminary objection: the petitioner should have raised the jurisdictional objection before the tribunal; having submitted to the jurisdiction of the District Judge and argued on merits, the petitioner is now precluded and estopped from challenging jurisdiction by extraordinary writ under Articles 226 and 227.
  • Asserted that the notifications amending clause 16(1) of the Rent Control Order were not illegal or ultra vires the Travancore-Cochin Public Safety Measures Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbjah Choudhry (A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 540) The right of appeal is a substantive (vested) right governed by the law prevailing at the date of institution of the suit or proceeding; vested rights are not to be taken away by subsequent enactment unless expressly or by necessary intendment. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that a revision/appeal right pending when a law is altered cannot be taken away by the amendment unless retrospective effect is clearly intended; this lends force to the petitioner's contention about lack of jurisdiction after amendment.
Chinna Kunju Kunju v. Kutti Neelakantan (1957 K.L.T. 980 : 1957 K.L.J. 882) Reiterated that right of appeal is vested and venue/rights should be determined with reference to law prevailing when suit instituted; retrospective operation is to statutes of procedure not to statutes affecting vested rights. Cited to show that where proceedings were instituted before repeal/replacement of law, the old law governs and thus pending appeals/revisions should not be shifted by subsequent enactment.
Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340) A decree or order passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity; such invalidity can be set up whenever relied upon and cannot be cured by consent of parties. Used to support the general proposition that lack of jurisdiction renders proceedings void and consent/submission cannot validate them; invoked in discussing effect of submission to jurisdiction.
Rex v. Williams (1914 1 K.B. 608) In certiorari, the High Court normally will not grant a writ unless the applicant files an affidavit negative of knowledge of the facts which would have put him on inquiry when before the inferior court; writs are discretionary and conduct may preclude relief. Applied to emphasize that failure to object below ordinarily disentitles an applicant to certiorari unless he can show lack of knowledge of the jurisdictional defect when before the inferior tribunal.
Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Corporation, Madras (I.L.R. 50 Mad. 130) The English authorities indicate that certiorari will not be granted where an applicant, armed with a point ousting jurisdiction, elected to argue on merits; but discretion exists where applicant can show lack of knowledge. Followed to show the discretionary nature of certiorari and that absence of knowledge in affidavit influenced granting of writ; used to illustrate circumstances where writ may be granted despite non-objection below.
M.U.M. Services Ltd. v. R.T. Authority, Malabar (A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 59) Authority for the view that failure to raise jurisdictional objection below is a material factor in refusing certiorari. Cited as supporting case law where courts have refused extraordinary relief when jurisdictional point was not raised before the subordinate forum.
Surya Rao v. Board of Revenue (A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 472) Similar authority on raising jurisdictional issues before subordinate tribunal. Referred to among decisions that limit a first-time jurisdictional challenge in writ proceedings.
Elanak Ramakka v. State (A.I.R. 1955 Hyderabad 97) In certiorari practice, an applicant who had the point available below and elected to argue on merits may be precluded from seeking writ; discretion of High Court to refuse. Relied upon to show consistent approach that courts may refuse certiorari where applicant submitted to tribunal jurisdiction.
G.M.T. Society v. Bombay State (A.I.R. 1954 Bombay 202) Where a petitioner did not raise jurisdictional point before Government and acquiesced, he was disentitled to relief under Art. 226 when Government decided against him. Used to support the proposition that conduct of petitioner (acquiescence) can disentitle him to exercise of writ jurisdiction.
Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 397) Petitioners who acquiesced in transfer of their cases and submitted to jurisdiction of officers to whom cases were transferred could not invoke writ jurisdiction subsequently. Applied to show that acquiescence in jurisdiction elsewhere disentitles petitioners to constitutional relief if they later object once decision is adverse.
Dholpur Co-op. T. & M. Union v. Appellate Authority (A.I.R. 1953 Rajasthan 193) Where lack of jurisdiction is patent, absence of a prior objection does not necessarily disable a petitioner from raising the question in Art. 226; distinction between patent and non-patent lack of jurisdiction. Cited to show authorities where writ was allowed even though objection was not taken earlier when lack of jurisdiction was patent.
Musal Bhant v. Ganga Charan (A.I.R. 1953 All. 118) Authority where High Court granted writ in circumstances explained by facts. Referred to as an example where relief was granted despite non-objection below, illustrating fact-specific discretion.
U.C. Bank v. Their Workmen (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 230) Consent cannot give jurisdiction if a condition going to the root of jurisdiction has not been fulfilled; consent cannot confer jurisdiction where it is inherently lacking. Cited but the Court observed the case could not be taken as authority that jurisdictional questions can always be raised for the first time in certiorari; distinguished on facts.
N. Gopalan v. Central Road Traffic Board, Trivandrum (1958 K.L.T. 410 : 1958 K.L.J. 497) It is not open to a party to raise for the first time in certiorari proceedings the question of jurisdiction of a subordinate tribunal unless he challenged it below or shows he was unaware of facts that would put him on inquiry. Quoted approvingly; applied as a controlling local authority on the necessity of challenging jurisdiction below or explaining lack of knowledge before raising it in writ proceedings.
Venkitasubramonia Iyer v. Catholic Bank of India Ltd. (1957 K.L.T. 411 : 1957 K.L.J. 381) Considered in N. Gopalan and concerned the same general topic of challenging jurisdiction. Referred to as part of the body of local decisions supporting the proposition that first-time jurisdictional challenges in certiorari are generally impermissible absent explanation.
Calicut Wynad Motor Service Ltd. v. State of Kerala (1959 K.L.T. 521 : 1959 K.L.J. 410) Distinguished total non-existence of authority from defective constitution; if authority is non-existent altogether, petitioner not precluded from raising jurisdictional defect if unaware at relevant time. Quoted and discussed; applied to draw distinction between total absence of authority (where relief may be appropriate) and mere defective constitution (where submission may bar relief).
Rajalekshmi Motor Service v. Government of Kerala (1959 K.L.J. 1425) Discussed facts where petitioner had not raised jurisdiction earlier but relief under Art. 226 depends on discretion and whether decision is perverse. Used to illustrate that conduct of petitioner is a factor but not an absolute bar; court will not interfere unless satisfied decision is perverse.
Jagatjit Cotton Textile Mills Ltd. Phagware v. Industrial Tribunal, Patiala (A.I.R. 1959 Punjab 389) Summarised principles: (i) court's power to grant/refuse writ is discretionary; (ii) failure to raise objection below is relevant; (iii) such failure ordinarily precludes relief unless explained; (iv) depends on facts. Quoted as a succinct summary of relevant principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction where jurisdictional objections were not raised below; the Court adopted these principles in analysis.
Uthram Nal Umaprabha Thampuratty v. State of Kerala & Others (1960 K.L.T. 7 : 1960 K.L.J. 38) Reaffirmed that court has power to grant or refuse certiorari and failure to raise objection below is ordinarily ground to refuse writ. Followed to support the Court's conclusion that failure to raise jurisdiction below disentitles petitioner in ordinary circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by (i) identifying the petitioner's principal contention (that pending revision petitions could not be transferred by amendment to clause 16 and that the District Judge therefore lacked jurisdiction), and (ii) reviewing relevant authorities on two interlinked legal themes: the protection of vested rights against retroactive legislation and the doctrine governing first-time jurisdictional objections in writ proceedings.

On vested rights and retrospectivity:

  • The Court relied on Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbjah Choudhry and Chinna Kunju Kunju v. Kutti Neelakantan to state the settled rule that a right of appeal/revision is a substantive (vested) right governed by the law prevailing at the date of institution of the proceeding and, absent an express or necessarily implied retrospective provision, subsequent legislation should not be construed to deprive parties of such vested rights.
  • Applying these authorities, the Court acknowledged that there is "very great force" in the petitioner's submission that there was total lack of jurisdiction in the tribunal which passed the impugned order, insofar as the amendment purported to affect pending revision petitions.

On submission to jurisdiction and first-time constitutional challenges:

  • The Court reviewed English and Indian authorities (including Rex v. Williams, Kiran Singh, Lakshmanan Chettiar, and a number of Indian High Court and Supreme Court decisions) establishing two related principles:
    • A proceeding or decree made by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and cannot be validated by consent (Kiran Singh, U.C. Bank).
    • Nevertheless, the High Court's power to issue writs of certiorari/prohibition is discretionary; where a party, armed with a jurisdictional point, elected to argue the matter on merits before the inferior tribunal or acquiesced in the inferior tribunal's jurisdiction, the High Court will ordinarily refuse to grant writ relief unless the applicant explains satisfactorily why the point was not raised earlier or shows he was unaware of facts putting him on inquiry (Rex v. Williams; Lakshmanan Chettiar; N. Gopalan; Jagatjit Cotton Textile Mills; others).
  • The Court analyzed a range of cases illustrating nuances: (a) where there is a total non-existence of the authority (not merely a defective constitution), a petitioner unaware of the defect when proceedings occurred may still be permitted to challenge jurisdiction; (b) where the defect is merely procedural or the tribunal was merely defectively constituted, submission to jurisdiction and conduct of the parties are material and may disentitle a petitioner to writ relief.
  • Applying these principles to the present facts, the Court found that the petitioner "took his chance" of obtaining a favourable order from the District Judge and, when the order went against him, sought writ relief for the first time without providing any explanation or affidavit addressing why the point on jurisdiction was not raised before the tribunal.
  • Given the absence of any factual explanation in the petitioner's affidavit for failure to raise the jurisdictional point earlier, the Court held that the petitioner's conduct disentitled him, in the exercise of the High Court's discretionary writ jurisdiction, to the relief he sought.

In short, while the Court recognized the strength of the vested-rights argument (that a pending revision cannot be taken away save by express retrospective provision), it balanced that against the discretionary limits on writ relief when a party has acquiesced or taken a chance before the subordinate forum and failed to explain the omission. On the facts before it, the absence of any explanation led the Court to refuse the writ.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED — The petition under Articles 226 and 227 was dismissed. The Court ordered that parties shall bear their own costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The District Judge's order (Ext. P.3 dated 9-12-1957) stands; the petition to quash that order by certiorari was refused and the petitioner obtains no relief from this Court.
  • On doctrine: The decision underscores two concurrent propositions drawn from prior authorities: (a) a vested right of appeal/revision existing when proceedings are instituted is protected against retrospective deprivation except by clear legislative intent; and (b) the High Court's extraordinary writ jurisdiction is discretionary and a petitioner who submitted to the subordinate tribunal's jurisdiction and failed to raise a jurisdictional objection there, without satisfactory explanation, will ordinarily be precluded from obtaining writ relief. The judgment applies these established principles to the facts, and does not purport to lay down new law beyond the application of those principles.

Costs: Each party to bear its own costs, as ordered by the Court.

Show all summary ...

Govinda Menon, J.:— This is a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari to quash the order passed by the 3rd respondent, the District Judge of Quilon under clause 16 of Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, hereinafter referred to as Rent Control Order. The petitioner is the proprietor of Lakshmi Talkies, Quilon situated in Survey Nos. 8069 and 8070 in Quilon Pakuthy. The owners of the building are respondents 1 and 2 to this petition. They leased the said building to one P.K Subbiah Pillai of Trivandrum on a monthly rent of Rs. 500/- for a period of 5 years from 1-4-1127 (M.E). Subbiah Pillai, it is stated, assigned his leasehold right to the petitioner with the knowledge and consent of respondents 1 and 2 and the petitioner says that he is now running the cinema. The petitioner filed B.R.C No. 54 of 1955 under Section 4 of the Rent Control Order for fixing the fair rent of the building. The Rent Controller by his proceedings dated 28-7-1956 fixed the fair rent at Rs. 475/- per mensem. Ext. P. 1 is the order. Against the said order both the petitioner and respondents 1 and 2 filed appeals before the Collector who was the appellate authority. He disposed of the appeals by his order Ext. P. 2 dated 17-12-1956 fixing the fair rent at Rs. 500/- a month. Against the order of the appellate authority respondents 1 and 2 and the petitioner filed revision petitions Nos. 5 and 6 of 1957 before the Government. By virtue of the amendment to clause 16 of the Rent Control Order and the notification thereunder the revision petitions were heard by the District Judge of Quilon and the learned District Judge by a common order Ext. P. 3 dated 9-12-1957 held that the petition to fix the fair rent was not maintainable on the ground that the petitioner was not a tenant within the meaning of the Act.

2. The petitioner now seeks to quash the order of the District Judge, Quilon, Ext. P. 3 dated 9-12-1957. The grounds taken up by the petitioner are that the District Judge has no jurisdiction to exercise any powers of revision by virtue of amendment to clause 16 of the Rent Control Order and that the notification amending rule 16(1) of the Rent Control Order delegating the power of revision, said to vest in the Government, to any officer, specially authorised by the Government, is illegal and ultra vires the provisions contained in Sections 15 and 22 of the Public Safety Measures Act, V of 1950 under which the Control Order has been promulgated; that the revision petitions were pending before the Government, when clause 16 of the Rent Control Order was amended, and so the revision petitions ought to have been disposed of only by the Government and cannot be transferred to the District Judge. It is also contended that the District Judge has erred in holding that the petitioner was not a tenant within the meaning of Rule 2(4) of the Rent Control Order. Respondents 1 and 2 in their counter, besides denying the various contentions raised in the petitioner's affidavit, have taken a preliminary objection that the question of the lack of jurisdiction should have been raised by the petitioner before the tribunal itself and the petitioner, having submitted to the jurisdiction of the District Judge and having argued the case on the merits and taken a chance of getting a decision in his favour and having failed, is now precluded and estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the District Judge and claiming the extraordinary remedy provided under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of having the order quashed. According to them the notifications amending clause 16(1) of the Rent Control Order are not illegal or ultra vires the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Public Safety Measures Act, V of 1950.

3. The main ground pressed before us by the petitioner is that the revision petitions were filed before the amendment came into force, that the amendment has no retrospective operation and that the revision petition pending at the time of the coming into force of the amendment should have been heard and decided only by the Government, and they contended that there was a total lack of jurisdiction in the Court of the District Judge to decide this case.

4. Reliance was placed on the decision in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbjah Choudhry (A.I.R 1957 S.C 540). The Supreme Court held that:

“The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right and that right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal.

This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise.”

5. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observe:

“In construing the Articles of the Constitution we must bear in mind certain cardinal rules of construction that statutes should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect vested right. The golden rule of construction is that, in the absence of anything in the enactment to show that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act was passed.”

6. A similar question came up for consideration before this High Court in Chinna Kunju Kunju v. Kutti Neelakantan (1957 K.L.T 980 : 1957 K.L.J 882). The question was whether the venue for appeal against the 3 decrees, appealed against should be determined with reference to the provisions of the Kerala Civil Courts Act, 1957, or with respect to the corresponding provisions in the Travancore Cochin and Madras Civil Courts Act. If the former law applies, the proper forum for the appeals against the decrees would be the District Court of Trivandrum and the District Court of Palghat. If the latter Act applies, all three appeals have to be heard by the High Court, and it was held that as the suits have been instituted prior to the enactment of the Kerala Civil Courts Act, the venue of the appeal should be determined with reference to the provisions, of the Travancore Cochin and Madras Civil Courts Acts. Their Lordships held, after discussing the case law including the case reported in A.I.R 1957 Supreme Court 540, that:

“A right of appeal is a vested right and not a matter relating to practice or procedure. A party, in whose favour a vested right has accrued cannot be deprived of that right by supervening legislation, unless the legislation by express words or by necessary intendment took away that right and that the substantive right to prefer an appeal arises, when the suit is instituted, and not when the decision, which is to be appealed against is rendered, and their Lordships also observed that retrospective operation is given only to statutes affecting practice and procedure and not to enactments affecting vested rights.”

7. In the light of the above rulings, there is very great force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is total lack of jurisdiction in the Tribunal which passed the impugned order.

8. It is then argued that if there is total lack of jurisdiction, submission to jurisdiction by the petitioner or waiver of the question of jurisdiction on his part would not better the position of the respondent in the eye of the law when the decision so given is a mere nullity. Reliance was placed on Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan (A.I.R 1954 S.C 340). Their Lordships observed at page 342 as follows:

“It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity; and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.”

9. Various other decisions have also been brought to our notice relating to decrees passed in suits where the decree was challenged as one passed without jurisdiction. It was held in those cases that where a suit has been decreed by a court having no jurisdiction, the parties cannot by their mutual consent, convert proceedings into a judicial process and that where there is no inherent jurisdiction in the court neither submission to jurisdiction nor acquiescence nor taking part in these proceedings will debar the party from contending that the decree is one passed without jurisdiction. But the question is whether these principles apply in cases where a party invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution when he has not raised the question before the Tribunal itself.

10. The question of a party's disability to raise the question of jurisdiction in certiorari proceedings on the ground that he had failed to raise the question before the subordinate Tribunal had come up for consideration in various cases. Most of these cases refer to the well known case of Rex v. Williams (1914-1 K.B 608). That was a case where a baker was convicted under S. 4 of the Bread Act of 1836 by two Justices of the Peace. One of the Justices who constituted the Bench was debarred from sitting on the Bench by virtue of the provisions contained in S. 15 of the Act which provided that no person concerned in the business of a baker shall be capable of acting or shall be allowed to act as a Justice of the Peace under the Act. The accused did not raise the question of jurisdiction during the trial. He applied for the issue of a writ of certiorari to question the conviction on the ground that S. 15 of the Act had been contravened and therefore the conviction is illegal and void. He did not also state in the affidavit that he was not aware of the disqualification of one of the Justices of the Peace at the time the case was heard.

11. Channell, J. observed as follows:

“No objection was taken to the jurisdiction of the Court below at the hearing before that court; that being so, it is the rule of this court not to grant a writ of certiorari except upon an affidavit which negatives knowledge on the part of the applicant when he was before the court below of the facts on which he bases his objection. That rule is established on good grounds. It applies equally whether the objection is on grounds which make the act of the Justices voidable or void”.

12. The learned Judge also observed:

“In my view the writ is discretionary. A party may by his conduct preclude himself from claiming the writ ex-debito justitia, no matter whether the proceedings which he seeks to quash are void or voidable. If they are void it is true that no conduct of his will validate them; but such considerations do not affect the principles on which the court acts in granting or refusing the writ of certiorari. This special remedy will not be granted ex-debito justitia to a person who fails to state in his evidence on moving for the rule nisi that at the time of the proceedings impugned, he was unaware of the facts on which he relies to impugne them”.

13. This decision has been followed in a Full Bench case of the Madras High Court in Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Corporation, Madras (I.L.R 50 Mad. 130). In that case application was made for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Commissioner of the Corporation of Madras and the Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Madras declaring the petitioner to be disqualified as a candidate for the election to the Corporation. The contention was that both these officers acted without jurisdiction and hence their order was a nullity. A preliminary objection was raised that certiorari should not be issued where the person who applies for the writ has, by his conduct, taken the chance of a pronouncement in his favour on the merits without challenging the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Their Lordships observed that:

“The English authorities which were cited prima facie establish the proposition that in such circumstances the applicant cannot obtain a writ of certiorari ex-debito justitia, but the court is exercising a purely discretionary power”.

14. Regarding the contention that failure to object to jurisdiction of this tribunal debars the applicant when the object is one involving the investigation of facts which were or should have been within the knowledge of the applicant when he was before the lower court, and does not apply to a contention of law, the learned Judges stated:

“We see no warrant in the cases for drawing any such distinction because, in our opinion the test that they lay down is whether the applicant armed with a point either of law or of fact which would oust the jurisdiction of the lower court has elected to argue the case on its merits before that court. If so, he has submitted himself to a jurisdiction which he cannot be allowed afterwards to seek to repudiate. We are of opinion that the applicant has so conducted himself as to preclude this court from exercising a discretionary jurisdiction in his favour”.

15. These decisions were followed in M.U.M Services Ltd. v. R.T Authority, Malabar, (A.I.R 1953 Mad. 59) and Surya Rao v. Board of Revenue (A.I.R 1953 Mad. 472). To the same effect is the decision in Elanak Ramakka v. State (A.I.R 1955 Hyderabad 97) to which one of us was a party. There, relying on the case reported in Rex v. Williams (1914 1 - K.B 608), it was held that;

“It is well known that in the matter of issue of a writ by way of certiorari, the High Court's powers are discretionary and where the applicant, armed with the point which would oust the jurisdiction of the subordinate tribunal has elected to get the case decided by the court on its merits, he must be taken to have submitted to its jurisdiction and he cannot be allowed later to repudiate that decision in a petition for a writ of certiorari.”

16. Reference may also be made to the decision of the Bombay High Court in G.M.T Society v. Bombay State (A.I.R 1954 Bombay 202). That was a case under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Regional Transport Authority had granted a permit to the petitioners. The State Transport Authority before whom the matter was taken in appeal dismissed the appeal. A further appeal was taken to the Government and the Government reversed the decision of the Regional Transport Authority. The party who obtained the permit and who lost the same before the Government filed an application under Art. 226 for quashing the order of the Government as being without jurisdiction. Objection was raised that the petitioners were precluded from raising the question of jurisdiction for the first time in the High Court when they had not raised it before the Tribunal. The learned Judges observed:

“The petitioners never raised the point as to the jurisdiction of Government when Government heard the matter. The petitioners were quite content to permit Government to hear the appeal preferred by respondent 4. If Government had decided in favour of the petitioners, we would not have heard anything further about the jurisdiction of Government to hear appeal from the decision of the State Transport Authority, but it is because Government have decided against the petitioners that the petitioners have thought of coming to us in order to exercise our jurisdiction under the Constitution.”

17. Their Lordships also stated that the High Court exercised a special jurisdiction in such matters and is entitled to know what the tribunal has to say on the question of jurisdiction which the petitioner wants to agitate before the court. High Court does not exercise ordinary jurisdiction under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It is always open to the petitioner to assert his rights in a suit properly held, but when he chooses to assert his rights by calling upon the High Court to exercise its special jurisdiction, the High Court must itself lay down certain principles for the exercise of that jurisdiction. After pointing out the rights of parties in a suit and the right to take up the question of jurisdiction at any stage, their Lordships observed:

“But the principle is different when the petitioner comes to this court for a writ. The Court must tell the petitioner, it was open to you to raise that point before the tribunal whose order you are challenging. You have sat on the fence, you have taken a chance of the tribunal deciding in your favour, and it is not open to you now to come to us and ask for a writ.”

18. The writ was therefore refused.

19. We may now refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India (A.I.R 1957 S.C 397). There the petition was under Art. 32 of the Constitution questioning the validity of the transfer of certain income-tax files and the subsequent assessment orders passed in those cases. The ground that was taken was that Section 5(7A) of the Income-tax Act was ultra vires the Constitution as infringing the fundamental rights enshrined in Article 14 and Art. 19(1)(b) and that the whole proceedings were without jurisdiction and void. In dealing with the objection that the question of jurisdiction was not raised before the tribunal, their Lordships observed as follows:

“There is moreover another feature, which is common to both these groups and it is that none of the petitioners raised any objection to their cases being transferred in the manner stated above and in fact submitted to the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officers to whom their cases had been transferred. It was only after our decision in Bidi Supply Co. v. The Union of India (Supra) was pronounced on 20th March, 1956, that these petitioners woke up and asserted their alleged rights, the Amritsar group on 20th April, 1956, and the Raichur group on 5th November 1956. If they acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officers, to whom their cases were transferred, they were certainly not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Art. 32. It is well settled that such conduct of the petitioners would disentitle them to any relief at the hands of this court. (Vide Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. II, 3rd Edn p. 140, para 265, Rex v. Tabrum: Ex-Parte Dash ((1907) 97 L.T 551 (U) Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Corporation of Madras (I.L.R 50 Madras 130).)”

20. The Supreme Court therefore held that they were not entitled to challenge the order of transfer as unconstitutional and void.

21. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred us to the case reported in A.I.R 1953 Rajasthan 193 (Dholpur Co-op. T. & M. Union v. Appellate Authority). That case related to proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution and related to the Constitution of the appellate authority to hear appeals against the orders of a Regional Transport Authority under the Motor Vehicles Act. There were certain defects in the constitution of the Tribunal. But no objection to such constitution was taken before the Tribunal itself. When the question of jurisdiction was sought to be raised, objection was taken that the question of jurisdiction cannot be gone into, as the applicant did not raise the question before the appellate Tribunal. In dealing with this contention the learned Judges observed at page 196 of the report:

“Coming to the third objection, it is true that if a party does not raise any objection to the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal, which depends upon the allegations and proof of certain facts, that party will not be allowed to raise objection about jurisdiction in an application under Art. 226. Where, however, the lack of jurisdiction is patent, the mere fact that no objection was taken before the statutory authorities would not disable the applicant from raising such question in an application under Art. 226.”

22. The decision in Rex v. Williams (1914 1 K.B 608) and the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court reported in Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Corporation of Mdaras (I.L.R 50 Mad. 130) were relied upon in support of the proposition that the question of jurisdiction cannot be taken for the first time in the writ proceedings. It is seen from the judgment that the applicant before the High Court in that case had filed affidavits to the effect that they did not know about the irregularities and illegalities in the constitution of the tribunal before whom they appeared. In the affidavit the applicants had clearly stated that in consequence of such absence of knowledge on their part, they were prevented from raising any objection as to the jurisdiction of the appellate authority. These statements were not denied by the opposite parties and therefore the learned Judges observed:

“There is, therefore, no wonder if the petitioners were unable to raise any objection on the ground of jurisdiction before the appellate authority”.

23. This must have weighed with their Lordships in granting the writ. So this decision cannot be taken as an authority for the position that without any such explanation, in all cases, where the lack of jurisdiction is patent, the High Court is bound to issue a writ to quash the order. It is on the same grounds that a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court granted a writ in the case reported in A.I.R 1953 All. 118 (Musal Bhant v. Ganga Charan).

24. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed great reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in U.C Bank v. Their Workmen (A.I.R 1951 S.C 230). That is a case under the Industrial Disputes Act, where it was found, that the tribunal was not properly constituted according to law and their Lordships held that it was a matter going to the root of the jurisdiction of the tribunal. The learned Chief Justice observed as follows:—

“Nor can consent give a court jurisdiction if a condition which goes to the root of the jurisdiction has not been performed or fulfilled. No appearance or consent can give a jurisdiction to a court of limited jurisdiction which it does not possess. The distinction clearly is between the jurisdiction to decide matters and the ambit of the matters to be heard by a tribunal having jurisdiction to deal with same. In the second case, the question of acquiescence or irregularity may be considered and overlooked. When however the question is of the jurisdiction of the tribunal to make the award under the circumstances summarised above, no question of acquiescence or consent can affect the decision.”

25. On reading the decision of the Supreme Court, it will be seen that objection was raised about the sitting of the two members as a tribunal and it had been over-ruled and therefore no question of acquiescence or estoppel arises. This decision therefore cannot be taken as an authority for the position that such a question on jurisdiction can be raised for the first time in certiorari proceedings.

26. Reliance is then placed on the decision in N. Gopalan v. Central Road Traffic Board, Trivandrum (1958 K.L.T 410 : 1958 K.L.J 497). In an exhaustive order, Vaidialingam, J. considered all the decisions bearing on the question including a decision of Raman Nayar, J. in Venkitasubramonia Iyer v. Catholic Bank of India Ltd. (1957 K.L.T 411 : 1957 K.L.J 381) and held:

“It is not open to a party to raise for the first time in certiorari proceedings the question of jurisdiction of the subordinate tribunal, unless he has challenged this jurisdiction before that tribunal itself or he satisfies the court that he was unaware of the circumstances which will put him on an inquiry as to the lack of jurisdiction of the subordinate tribunal.”

27. The learned Judge on the facts of that case found that there was no total lack of jurisdiction and that it was only a case of defective jurisdiction. In the course of considering some of the decisions cited on behalf of the petitioners the learned Judge distinguished these cases also on the ground that they were cases of total want of jurisdiction and as such no question of submission to jurisdiction arose. Reliance has been placed on these observations for the argument that in a case of total lack of jurisdiction the petitioners are as a matter of right entitled to the issue of a writ.

28. In a later case under the Motor Vehicles Act, Calicut Wynad Motor Service Ltd. v. State of Kerala (1959 K.L.T 521 : 1959 K.L.J 410), Justice Varadaraja Iyengar made a distinction between total non-existence of the authority on the one side and defective constitution of the authority on the other. He relied on the following observation of Justice Vaidialingam reported in 1958 K.L.T 410:

“It is not open to the applicants to raise the question about the defective constitution (as contra distinguished from the absence of altogether) of the State Transport Authority for the first time in High Court under Art. 226. The petitioner has submitted to the jurisdiction of the State Transport Authority and by such conduct, the petitioner has disentitled himself to get any relief from the High Court in proceedings under Art. 226.”

29. And held that in that particular case R.T.A was non existent altogether in point of law and there was absolutely no scope for deciding the question of issue of permit legally as between the rival applicants. The petitioner had no knowledge of the defect that attached to the R.T.A at the time it purported to pass the order and therefore the petitioner is not precluded from raising the question of jurisdiction.

30. This case went up in appeal in Rajalekshmi Motor Service v. Government of Kerala (1959 K.L.J 1425), and in dealing with the contention that the petitioner should not have been allowed to raise the question of jurisdiction, our learned brother M.S Menon, J. observed as follows:

“that the petitioner did not raise the question of jurisdiction before the Regional Transport Authority is admitted. As a matter of fact the petitioner appears even to have sought and obtained a stage carriage permit for another route from the same Authority. It is also admitted that the petitioner has filed an appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and that it is pending disposal.

These are circumstances, however, which cannot be considered as ousting or limiting the jurisdiction of this court under Art. 216 of the Constitution. They are only factors which may induce a Judge to refuse a remedy under that article.

Iyengar, J. did not consider these factors as sufficient to decline interference and in such a case whatever may have been our own reactions in similar circumstances we should not interfere unless we are satisfied that the decision is perverse.”

31. It is true that want of jurisdiction cannot be cured by waiver. But it does not involve the further proposition that the High Court is obliged to grant an application for prohibition or certiorari made by a party who has approbated the defective proceedings. Certiorari and prohibition are in general, discretionary remedies and the conduct of the applicant may in particular cases have been such as to disentitle him to a remedy. Whether the tribunal lacked jurisdiction is one question, whether the court having regard to the applicant's conduct ought, in its discretion, to set aside the proceedings is another. Even though his conduct in invoking a non-existent jurisdiction would have done nothing to confer jurisdiction on the tribunal, yet if a party who had taken part in the proceedings of a tribunal which had no jurisdiction were subsequently to apply to the court to have the proceedings set aside, it is hardly conceivable that he would be awarded a remedy. This distinction, we are afraid, seems to have escaped the notice of Iyengar, J. and there was also the further fact that in that particular case there was evidence that the petitioner had no knowledge of the want of jurisdiction of the tribunal.

32. Reference may in this connection be made to the decision in Jagatjit Cotton Textile Mills Ltd. Phagware v. Industrial Tribunal, Patiala (A.I.R 1959 Punjab 389). The petition was under Art. 226 of the Constitution by which the award made by the Industrial Tribunal was sought to be questioned by certiorari on the ground that the tribunal had no jurisdiction. It was found in that case that the award was null and void having been made by a tribunal that had no jurisdiction in the matter. The entire case law has been reviewed and the principles have been summarised as follows:

“(i) The court has always the power and the discretion to grant or refuse to grant the writ and while exercising the discretion it will take into consideration all the relevant factors;

(ii) The failure to raise objection to defect or lack of jurisdiction of the tribunal before it is always a material and relevant factor and must be taken into account and it makes no difference whether such a defect is patent or latent;

(iii) ordinarily such a conduct would preclude the petitioner from claiming the writ unless a cogent explanation is furnished by stating the necessary facts upon affidavit which should satisfy the court that the failure to raise the objection relating to jurisdiction was not deliberate, or that the petitioner had no knowledge of facts on which the objection could be based;

(iv) it would naturally depend on the facts of each case whether such conduct has been established as would disentitle the petitioner to any such relief.”

33. Following largely on the above decision Velu Pillai, J. in Uthram Nal Umaprabha Thampuratty…* v. State Of Kerala & Others… (1960 K.L.T 7 : 1960 K.L.J 38), held that:

“The court has the power to grant or refuse to grant a writ of certiorari. The failure to raise the objection to the jurisdiction of the inferior court is a relevant point to be borne in mind; the ordinary rule is to refuse a writ in such circumstances.”

34. It cannot be said that these decisions lay down any general rule that in every case in which objection to jurisdiction had not been taken before the tribunal, no relief should ever be granted in the exercise of the discretionary powers vested in the High Court. How far the conduct of a petitioner has disentitled him to any relief, would depend on the facts of each case and if a reasonable 1 explanation is given for not taking any objection to jurisdiction before the tribunal, that can be accepted by the High Court and relief could be granted by way of certiorari. In this case the petitioner took his chance of obtaining a favourable order from the District Judge and when the order finally went against him he has come forward with this petition questioning the want of jurisdiction of the tribunal for the first time. There can be no doubt that such a conduct in the absence of any explanation or statement of facts in the petitioner's affidavit with regard to the failure to raise the point before the tribunal would disentitle the petitioner to the reliefs now claimed by him in this petition.

35. For these reasons we would dismiss the petition, but under the circumstances leave the parties to bear their own costs.