Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Joseph v. John

Kerala High Court
Jun 1, 1959
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Second Appeal)

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit underlying this Second Appeal was instituted by two plaintiffs seeking partition of their two-third share in a leasehold suit property that had belonged to Thomman. On Thomman's death, the property came into the possession of his widow Eliswa, and his children, who included the plaintiffs, defendants 2 to 6 and a deceased person named Joseph. In execution of a decree against Eliswa and Joseph, the 1st defendant purchased the suit property and obtained possession of it on the 3rd Kanni 1112; he has remained in possession since that date. The suit was instituted on 14 May 1952 (1 Edavam 1127).

The trial court (learned Munsiff) held in favour of the 1st defendant. On appeal, the District Judge reversed that decision and held against the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant therefore preferred this Second Appeal. The principal question before this court was whether the plaintiffs' rights in the suit property had been extinguished by reason of the 1st defendant's adverse possession.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the possession of the 1st defendant (a purchaser in execution from one co‑owner) of the whole joint property amounts to adverse possession as against the other co‑owners and thereby extinguishes their rights.
  2. Whether a transferee from a co‑owner stands in the same position as the transferor (the co‑owner) such that the transferee cannot prescribe against other co‑owners in the absence of an actual ouster or notice.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs alleged that Joseph had been in sole possession of the suit property and that, fraudulently and in collusion with the 1st defendant, Joseph transferred the property to the 1st defendant to defeat the rights of the other co‑owners.

1st Defendant's / Respondent's Position

  • The 1st defendant resisted the suit and relied on having acquired the property in execution proceedings (purchase in execution) and possession since 3rd Kanni 1112.
  • The learned District Judge (whose order was under appeal) relied on the principle in Siddiah v. Rengadas (4 D.L.R Mys. 140) that a transferee from a co‑owner stands in the same position as the transferor and therefore cannot prescribe against other co‑owners in the absence of ouster.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hardit Singh v. Gurumukh Singh, AIR 1918 P.C. 1 Uninterrupted possession of joint property by a co‑owner is prima facie referable to his lawful title as a co‑owner and is not, without more, to be regarded as an assertion of a separate adverse claim. The court applied this principle to explain the law as between actual co‑owners but expressly distinguished it from the position of a transferee who is in truth a stranger to the other co‑owners.
Radhamoni Delbi v. Collector of Khulna, ILR 27 Cal. 943 Elements of adverse possession as between strangers: possession adequate in continuity, publicity and extent to show it is adverse; possession must be overt so that the person affected, if vigilant, would be aware. The court relied on this articulation to hold that the possession of a stranger (a transferee) of joint property is prima facie adverse and satisfies these elements.
Sarju Kairi v. Panchananda Sarma, AIR 1959 Assam 15 Applied the co‑owner rule to a transferee (i.e., held that a transferee from one co‑owner cannot prescribe against other co‑owners because there is no duty on co‑owners to watch another's conduct). The court criticized and disagreed with this reasoning, observing that the position of a transferee is different and that the possession of a stranger imports notice.
Palania Pillai v. Amjath Ibrahim Rowther, AIR 1942 Mad 622 (Full Bench) Where a stranger is let into possession by one co‑sharer and cultivates for his own benefit, the other co‑sharers must normally know and adverse possession requirements (continuity, publicity, extent) can be satisfied. The court relied on this Full Bench decision to support the proposition that the transferee's possession is adverse and that the other co‑owners are or should be aware.
Secretary of State v. Virarayau, ILR 9 Mad 175 Earlier Madras High Court authority concerning possession and related principles (cited as earlier supporting material). Referenced as one of the cases followed by the Full Bench which supported the view that a transferee's possession is adverse.
Muthuswamy v. Ramakrishnan, ILR 12 Mad 292 Earlier Madras High Court authority cited in the Full Bench's body of supporting decisions. Referenced as an antecedent case followed by the Full Bench on the adverse‑possession principle for transferees.
Bhavrao v. Rakhmin, ILR 23 Bom 137 (Full Bench) Held that a purchaser/transferee enters as owner and his possession is adverse to co‑owners from the moment he takes possession. The court cited and adopted this Full Bench principle as supporting its conclusion that the transferee's possession is adverse from entry.
Jogendra Nat Roy v. Baladeb Das, ILR 35 Cal 961 Decision holding that transferee's possession is adverse to co‑owners. Noted as another supporting decision; the court treated it as consistent with the view that transferee's exclusive possession is adverse.
Rajinder Lal v. Kuer Rai, AIR 1934 Pat 502 Patna High Court decision aligned with the rule that a transferee's possession is adverse. Referred to as supporting the adverse‑possession principle for transferees.
Krishna Iyer v. Muthukumar Pillai, 29 Trav LJ 647 Travancore High Court decision effectively following ILR 23 Bom 137, concluding transferee's possession may operate as ouster. Referred to as another authority heading to the same conclusion (that transferee's possession can be adverse and may operate as ouster).
Bibi Rafiquan v. Najibkhan, AIR 1958 Pat 530 Contained observations that there is no distinction between a co‑owner's possession and a transferee's possession; decision itself turned on Article 142 of the Limitation Act. The court described these observations as obiter and noted the case's actual decision depended on Article 142; consequently it did not treat it as controlling on the point.
Dip Narain Rai v. Pundeo Rai, AIR 1947 Pat 99 Followed earlier All‑India decisions and held that transferee's possession did not start adverse possession as against co‑owners (contrary view). The court noted this as a contrary authority which did not consider Full Bench decisions of Madras and Bombay; the opinion did not follow that line.
Subbah Lal v. Fateh Mohammed, ILR 54 All 628 (AIR 1932 All 393) All‑India decision forming part of the contrary line that a transferee's possession is not necessarily adverse as against co‑owners. Mentioned as an antecedent in the contrary line of authority which the court did not adopt in the present case.
Sivasankaran v. State, 1952 Ker L.T. 195 (AIR 1952 Trav Co 208) Observations relating to execution proceedings leading to transfer of co‑owner's interest. The court observed these remarks related specifically to execution proceedings and stated they had no bearing on the principle under consideration.
Article 142, Limitation Act Statutory provision invoked in one cited decision (Bibi Rafiquan) affecting outcome on limitation grounds. The court noted that Bibi Rafiquan's decision turned on Article 142, and therefore the observations there were obiter for the point of transferees' adverse possession.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first stating the well‑established principle applicable where one co‑owner alone remains in uninterrupted possession of joint property: such possession is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to be referred to his lawful title as a co‑owner and not treated as an assertion of an adverse separate right (drawing on Hardit Singh v. Gurumukh Singh). That principle governs situations where the possessor is in fact a co‑owner.

However, the court drew a clear distinction between (a) the sole possession of a true co‑owner and (b) the sole possession of a person who is not in fact a co‑owner but who has obtained possession (or title and possession) from a co‑owner by transfer or purchase. For the latter category the court held the transferee must be treated as a stranger vis‑à‑vis the other co‑owners.

Relying on the test articulated in Radhamoni Delbi (continuity, publicity and extent; overt possession that would put an attentive owner on notice), the court reasoned that the possession of a stranger (here, the transferee/purchaser in execution) of joint property is prima facie adverse to the other co‑owners and satisfies the elements of adverse possession if the possession is open, continuous and of sufficient extent. The court emphasized that possession by such a stranger, being overt, imports notice to the co‑owners.

The court then considered competing lines of authority. It observed that some decisions (for example Siddiah v. Rengadas and certain Patna decisions) treat the transferee as standing in the shoes of the transferor co‑owner and thus not able to prescribe against other co‑owners absent ouster. The court accepted that such reasoning may explain the transferee's title (i.e., the purchaser steps into the transferor's shoes as regards the interest acquired) but distinguished that from the question of possession: even if title is imperfect, exclusive possession entered under a transfer is, in the court's view, adverse.

The court placed particular weight on Full Bench decisions of the Madras and Bombay High Courts (and certain Division Bench decisions) which held that the possession of a transferee from a co‑owner of the whole property is adverse to the other co‑owners from the moment of his taking possession. The court found these authorities persuasive and relied on them (for example Palania Pillai (Full Bench), ILR 23 Bom 137 (Full Bench), Jogendra Nat Roy, and others) to conclude that the transferee's possession is adverse from the date of entry.

Addressing the Assam High Court decision in Sarju Kairi which applied the co‑owner rule to transferees, the court rejected that reasoning and relied on Full Bench authority (which Sarju Kairi had not considered) to the contrary. The court considered attempts to limit the rule (e.g., requiring specific knowledge by the co‑owners of the transfer) as unsound, stating that the overt possession of a stranger must import such knowledge.

On these premises the court concluded that the 1st defendant's possession, as a transferee/purchaser in execution who had been in exclusive possession, satisfied the requirements of adverse possession. Because that possession had continued for more than twelve years, it extinguished the plaintiffs' title.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: Appeal allowed; the decree passed by the learned District Judge is vacated and the decree of the learned Munsiff is restored.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The court held that the possession of the 1st defendant (a transferee/purchaser in execution from a co‑owner) was adverse to the other co‑owners from the moment he entered into possession.
  • Because that possession continued for more than twelve years, the plaintiffs' title was held to be extinguished by adverse possession and the Munsiff's decree in favour of the 1st defendant was restored.
  • There will be no order as to costs in the appellate court and in this court.

Broader implications articulated by the court:

  • The opinion affirms the position taken by several Full Benches and Division Benches that a transferee who obtains possession from one co‑owner of the whole property is to be treated as a stranger vis‑à‑vis the other co‑owners and that his exclusive, open, continuous and notorious possession is adverse to those co‑owners from the moment of entry.
  • The court rejected the narrower view that a transferee always stands in the same position as the transferor for purposes of possession against co‑owners; the court treated prior contrary decisions as distinguishable or not persuasive where Full Bench authority to the contrary exists.

No new order as to costs was made; the appeal was allowed and the earlier decree in favour of the 1st defendant was restored.

Disposition: Appeal allowed. (HC/V.S.B)
Show all summary ...

1. The suit out of which this Second Appeal arises, was instituted by two plaintiffs, for a partition of their two-third share of the suit property, which is a leasehold and belonged to Thomman. After his death, the suit property came into the possession of his widow Eliswa, and his children, the plaintiffs, defendants 2 to 6 and deceased Joseph. In execution of a decree against Eliswa and Joseph, the 1st defendant purchased the suit property, and obtained possession of it, on the 3rd Kanni 1112 and he has been in possession ever since. The suit was resisted by the 1st defendant, and the chief question to be decided in this appeal is, whether the plaintiffs' right in the suit property has been extinguished by reason of the 1st defendant's adverse possession. The suit was instituted on the 14th May 1952, corresponding to the 1st Edavam 1127. The court of first instance held in favour of the 1st defendant; but on appeal, the District Judge held against him and he has therefore preferred this appeal.

2. It was not disputed, that the widow and children of Thomman were co-owners of the suit property. Though it is 30 cents in extent and the sale record and the delivery list in the 1st defendant's favour have this as 13 cents, it may now be taken as concluded, by the decree of the courts below, that the entire property of 30 cents came into the possession of the 1st defendant, as a result of the execution proceedings.

3. The case of the plaintiffs, that Joseph, having been in sole possession of the suit property, fraudulently and in collusion with the 1st defendant, transferred it to him in order to defeat the other co-owners, has not been substantiated. It may also be stated, that the decree and execution proceedings pursuant to which the 1st defendant obtained title, were not binding on the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 6. The question of adverse possession has to be decided on these premises.

4. The learned District Judge relied on Siddiah v. Rankadas, 4 D.L.R Mys. 140, in support of his view, that the transferee from a co-owner of the whole of the joint property stands in the sama position as the transferor himself as against the other co-owners, and cannot prescribe against them in the absence of ouster. There are also a few cases, to be mentioned later, which have taken the same view, but there are weighty pronouncements by Full Benches in the Madras and Bombay High Courts, and by division benches in the Calcutta and Patna High Courts, to the contrary.

5. The principle underlying the rule of adverse possession as between co-owners was stated by Lord Buckmaster in Hardit Singh v. Gurumukh Singh, AIR 1918 P.C 1 in these terms:—

“Uninterrupted possession of such property (joint property), without more, must be referred to be lawful title possessed by the joint holder to use the joint estate, and cannot be regarded as an assertion of a right to hold it as separate, so as to assert an adverse claim against other interested members. If possession may be either lawful or unlawful, in it he absence of evidence, it must be assumed to be the former.”

6. The sole possession of a co-owner, though of the whole property, is therefore referable to his lawful title as co-owner, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. But in my view, this principle has no application to the sole possession of one, who is not in fact a co-owner, but who has obtained possession of the whole property from one who was a co-owner, by virtue of a transfer or otherwise; for this purpose, he must, as he really is, be treated to be a stranger to the other co-owners.

7. Adverse possession as between strangers, has only to be in the language of the Privy Council in Radhamoni Delbi v. Collector of Khulna, ILR 27 Cal. 943 “adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent, to show that it is adverse to the competitor”; it is sufficient, that such “possession was overt, and without any attempt at concealment, so that, the person against whom time was running ought, if he exercised due vigilance, to be aware of what was happening.” The possession of a stranger, of joint property is prima facie adverse, and satisfies these elements of adverse possession and I see no valid reason, to deny him the benefit of such possession, as against those who claim to be co-owners of the property.

8. But the Assam High Court in Sarju Kairi v. Panchananda Sarma, AIR 1959 Assam 15, applied the rule as between co-owners, also to a transferee from one of them against the other co-owners stating one of the reasons to be, that

“there is no duty cast upon the co-owner to watch the conduct of another co-owner, and be on a look out to find out the extent of the share purported to be transferred, and to intervene, if more than the real share has been transferred. He is entitled to assume, that the permissive nature of the possession has passed on to his co-sharer's transferee who has now become the co-owner in place of the original co-owner.”

9. In my view, this reasoning is more than sufficiently met by the following observations of Leach C.J, in Palania Pillai v. Amjath Ibrahim Rowther, AIR 1942 Mad 622 decided by a Full Bench, to which no reference was made in Sarju Kairi's case, AIR 1959 Assam 15.

“Where one of several co-sharers lets into possession a stranger, who proceeds to cultivate the land for his own benefit, the other co-sharers must, unless they deliberately close their eyes, know of what is going on, but if they are so regardless of their own interests, they must take the consequences. Where a person who is in possession under a usufructuary mortgage granted by one of several co-parceners remains in possession of the land, and cultivates it for years, a position which we have here, there can be no doubt, that the requirements of continuity, publicity, and extent for adverse possession are fully complied with.”

10. The Full Bench followed earlier cases of the same court, Secretary of State v. Virarayau, ILR 9 Mad 175, decided by Turner, C.J and Muthuswamy Iyer, J. and Muthuswamy v. Ramakrishnan, ILR 12 Mad 292, decided by Muthuswamy Iyer and Wilkinson, JJ., the Full Bench case of the Bombay High Court Bhavrao v. Rakhmin, ILR 23 Bom 137 and also Jogendra Nat Roy v. Baladeb Das, ILR 35 Cal 961, and over-ruled a few cases to the contrary, decided by the same High Court. It decided, that the possession of the transferee of a property from one co-owner is adverse to the other co-owners from the moment of his taking possession. In ILR 23 Bom 137 (FB) the principle was stated in these terms:—

“As he (the transferee) enters as owner and in right of his conveyance, his possession is adverse to them (the co-owners)……….It may be, and indeed is the case, that such purchaser by his purchase does not get a good title to the land conveyed to him by a single coparcener… Nevertheless, his exclusive possession does not on that account cease to be adverse. He entering as owner his possession must, we think, necessarily be adverse to the true owners. Adverse possession depends upon the claim or title under which the possessor holds, and not upon a consideration of the question, in whom the true ownership is vested—whether in a single person or in many jointly.”

11. As already indicated, this was also the view held in Jogendra Nath Rai's case, ILR 35 Cal 961 referred to. It was so decided in Rajinder Lal v. Kuer Rai, AIR 1934 Pat 502. Krishna Iyer v. Muthukumar Pillai, 29 Trav LJ 647 decided by the former Travancore High Court, in effect came to same conclusion following ILR 23 Bom 137 (FB) and other cases, but on the reasoning, that the entry of the purchaser in the property operated as an ouster of the co-owners, though an observation was also made, that the same principle as between co-owners would perhaps apply in the case of an alienee from one of them as well. It may be mentioned, that in the case decided by the Assam High Court, Sarjoo Prosad, C.J limited the rule, that there is no distinction in mis-respect between the possession of a co-owner and of a transferee from him, laid down in the leading judgment, observing that “in certain cases, a transfer by a co-owner of the entire property on the footing that it belongs to him alone, to the detriment of the interest of his co-owner, might in itself amount to an act of ouster so as to convey an independent right to the purchaser, and enable the purchaser to start prescribing against the co-owner of his transferor from the very date of the transfer”; but it was also added, that the other co-owners must have knowledge of the transfer constituting the act of ouster, and that in the absence of such knowledge the possession of the transferee, cannot be held to be adverse to the true owners. With great respect. I cannot agree; the possession of a stranger on the land must import such knowledge.

12. The cases which have held the contrary view may now be mentioned. Siddiah v. Rengadas relied on by the learned District Judge, held, that the delivery of possession of the entire property is nothing more than of the right, title, and interest, which the judgment-debtor held in the property, and therefore the purchaser in execution, of such interest, can only step into the shoes of the judgment-debtor who was only a co-owner of the property; this may be a valid reasoning as to his title, but not, as to his possession. The observations of the Patna High Court in Bibi Rafiquan v. Najibkhan, AIR 1958 Pat 530 that there is no distinction in this respect between a co-owner's possession and a transferee's possession were obiter and the decision itself turned on the applicability of Article 142 of the Limitation Act. But in Dip Narain Rai v. Pundeo Rai, AIR 1947 Pat 99 which followed Subbah Lal v. Fateh Mohammed, ILR 54 All 628 : (AIR 1932 All 393), also held the same view. His case did not advert to the Full Bench decisions of the Madras and Bombay High Courts. The observations in Sivasankaran v. State, 1952 Ker L.T 195 : (AIR 1952 Trav Co 208) relied on for the respondent, were made in relation to the execution proceeding which led to the transfer of the co-owner's interest, and have no bearing. On principle, and in accordance with the weight of judicial pronouncements, I come to the conclusion, that the possession of a transferee from a co-owner, of the whole property, is adverse to the other co-owners from the moment of his entry. If so, the possession of the 1st defendant has been adverse for more than twelve years, and has extinguished the title of the plaintiffs. The decree passed by the learned Judge is vacated, and that passed by the learned Munsiff is hereby restored. The appeal is allowed, but there will be no order for costs in the appellate court, and in this court.

HC/V.S.B

13. Appeal allowed.