Kulkarni, J.:—

All these five cases are by the claimants.

2. It is undisputed that the claimants in all these cases being dissatisfied with the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer filed applications under Section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act before the Land Acquisition Officer within ninety days from the date of set vice of the notice issued under sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act.

3. In C.R.P 238 of 1985, though the application was filed by the claimant in the year 1976, the Land Acquisition Officer made reference to the Civil Judge in December 1983. In C.R.P 2675 of 1984, the reference has been made in April 1983 i.e, nearly about eleven years after the application under Section 18(1) was made to the Deputy Commissioner. In C.R.P 706 of 1985, the Land Acquisition Officer has made the reference after a lapse of nearly eight years. In C.R.P 237 of 1985, the reference has been made by the Land Acquisition Officer after a lapse of nearly eight years after receiving the application of the claimant under Section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. In C.R.P 2324 of 1985, the reference has been made by the Land Acquisition Officer some eight years after the application under Section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was received by him.

4. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, read as—

“(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the collector for the determination of the court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.

(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken:

(a) If the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the collector's award;

(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the collector under Section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the collector's award, whichever period shall first expire.”

Section 18 of the Central Act, unlike Land Acquisition Act as amended by Karnataka Act, does not prescribe any period during which Land Acquisition Officer should refer the matter to the Court. On account of the Karnataka Amendment Act, position appears to be different in Karnataka area.

Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended by Karnataka Act reads as under—

18. Reference to Court.—(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award or amendment thereof may, by written application to the Deputy Commissioner require that the matter be referred by the Deputy Commissioner for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.

(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award or the amendment is taken;

Provided that every such application shall be made within ninety days from the date of service of the notice from the Deputy Commissioner under sub-section (2) of Section 12.

(3)(a) The Deputy Commissioner shall within ninety days from the date of receipt of an application under sub-section (1) make a reference to the Court.

(b) If the Deputy Commissioner does not make a reference to the Court within a period of ninety days from the date of receipt of the application, the applicant may apply to the Court to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference, and the Court may direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within such time as the Court may fix.”

The learned Counsel Sri Rama Bhat submitted that Section 18(3)(a) of the Act only requires the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference within ninety days from the date of receipt of an application under sub-section (1) of Section 18. He urged that this did not create any bar of limitation at all. According to him, the Land Acquisition Officer, after receiving the application under Section 18(1) of the Act in time, can make the reference to the Civil Court at any time.

5. In Gangavva…Petitioner*; v. Udachappa…. . AIR 1964 Mysore 107., this Court has held in para 8 on page 112, as—

“The only other decision cited in support of the contention that the L.A Court cannot go behind the reference is the decision in Hari Krishna Khosla v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1958 Punj. 490. This decision more or less, followed the decision of the Madras High Court in Venkateswaraswami's case, AIR 1943 Mad. 327, without noticing that the same had been overruled by a Division Bench of the said High Court in Narayanappa Naidu's case, AIR 1955 Mad. 23 which fact does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the Learned Judges who decided Hari Krishna Khosla's case, AIR 1958 Punj. 490. As Sri Jagannatha Shetty, the Learned Counsel for the petitioner, had placed great deal of reliance on that decision, it is necessary to examine the same in some detail.

It was held in that decision that Section 18 constitutes the Collector the sole authority for making the reference; in the statement, which he has to make under Section 19, the question of limitation is not one of these matters which he is required to state at all; he is not even bound to send the application which is to be made under Section 18 along with the reference which he makes; all that the Court then has to do or can do under Section 20 is to thereupon cause a notice specifying the date on which the Court will proceed to determine the objection; in other words, as soon as the Collector makes a reference and states for the information of the Court the various matters set out in Section 19, the Court has to perform a ministerial act, namely, of causing a notice of the nature mentioned in Section 20; there is no other provision in the statute which entitles the Court to re-examine the question whether the Collector's order was correct on the question of the application having been made within the period of limitation; the Court's jurisdiction is confined to considering and pronouncing upon any one of the four different objections to an award under the ‘Act’ which may have been raised in the written application for the reference.

From these conclusions, it follows that at any rate some of the conditions laid down are binding on the LAO to wit a written application and objections only as regards the four specified. From a reading of that judgment, it appears that the Court regarded these conditions as pre-requisites for a valid reference. If that is so it is not known how the Court was able to separate those conditions from the remaining conditions set out in Section 18. The Court did not address itself to the question as to what would be the position if the application to the L.A.O is made by a person other than the ‘person interested’. Would the L.A.O have authority to make a reference in such a case?

This question was left unanswered. The observation

“If the application was beyond time, the Collector need not make a reference. For the purpose of determining as to whether the application is within time, the Collector has to consider the facts and come to a decision. If he decided that the application was within time and otherwise in order, he would make a reference. It was entirely for him to decide whether he would make a reference. A reference having been made, it was not open to the Collector or to the State to say that the reference had been wrongly made nor could the Court sit in appeal over the Collector”

has no basis in the provisions contained in the ‘Act.’.

We have not been shown any provision under which the L.A.O is required to decide the question of limitation. The conditions mentioned in Section 18 appear to us to be conditions limiting and controlling the jurisdiction of the L.A.O They are not matters to be decided by the L.A.O The discussion in the above cited decision as to whether the L.A.O is an administrative Officer or a Judicial Officer is besides the point for our present purpose. Therefore, we are not called upon to examine the implications of the decision of the Privy Council in Ezra v. Secretary of State for India, ILR 32 Cal. 605 (PC).

Further on page 113, this Court has held, as—

(9) We are firmly of the opinion that the powers conferred on the L.A.O do not fall within the second category mentioned by Lord Esher, M.R in (1888) 21 QBD 313 viz.

“the legislature may intrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction, to determine whether preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does not exist, to proceed further or do something more.”

On the other hand, they fall within the first category mentioned by his Lordship viz., that

“if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to exist to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction but not otherwise.”

(10) It was then observed in Hari Krishna Khosla's case, AIR 1958 Punj. 490 that:

“In fact the proviso occurs in sub-section (2) of Section 18 and merely lays down that the application which has to state on which ground objection to the award is taken, has to be presented within the period prescribed, but the real matters, on which the reference can be required, are stated in sub-section (1). The provision made with regard to be period within which the application is to be presented is purely procedural and it is difficult to see how it can be regarded as a condition precedent.”

If this conclusion is correct, the L.A.O can make a reference after the lapse of any number of years. Such a construction cannot be viewed with favour; it lends itself to mischief as well as misuse. With respect to the learned Judges who decided the above case, we do not think that their analysis of the scheme of Sections 18 and 19 is correct. Section 18(1) says as to who could make the application; how the application is to be made; and what objections could be raised in the application made. Section 18(2) says that:

“The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken.”

Section 18(2) is a corollary to Section 18(1). Now we come to the proviso. The proviso lays down that such an application (meaning the application contemplated in Section 18(2)) shall be made within the time prescribed in clauses (a) and (b) of that proviso. The conditions laid down in Section 18 are not matters of procedure. They are conditions precedent for a valid reference. Statement under Section 19 is in the nature of a covering letter giving a brief summary of the relevant facts, to assist the L.A Court to decide the points in issue. It serves the purpose of a plaint in a civil suit.

We are unable to subscribe to the view that the L.A.O confers jurisdiction on the L.A Court either by means of a reference under Section 18 or by his report under Section 19. In our judgment, the L.A.O merely invokes the jurisdiction of the L.A Court by taking steps under Sections 18 and 19 of the ‘Act’.

(11) For the reasons mentioned above, we hold that the L.A Court can go behind the reference made by the Collector under Section 14 of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act (or under Section 18 of the Indian Land Acquisition Act) if the application on which the reference has been made is beyond the period of limitation.”

6. Therefore, this Court has clearly stated that if the Land Acquisition Officer makes a reference after the lapse of any number of years, it lends itself to mischief as well as misuse. These observations by the Full Bench of this Court clearly go to show that the Land Acquisition Officer is hedged in by the period mentioned in Section 18(3)(a). In short, what the Full Bench lays down is that the Land Acquisition Officer, if he wants to make a reference, should make a reference within ninety days from the date of receipt of the application. In short, it means that if he wants to make a reference on receiving the application under Section 18(1), he shall do so within ninety days and if he does not make a reference within ninety days from the date of receipt of Section 18(1) application, he loses the jurisdiction to make the reference to the Land Acquisition Court. The reason for this is quite obvious. The law also requires the claimant to be vigilant. It does not want him to sleep over the matter. Section 18(3)(b) lays down that if the Land Acquisition Officer does not make a reference to the Court within a period of ninety days from the date of receipt of the application, the claimant may apply to the Court to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference and the Court may direct the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference within such time as the Court may fix.

7. This Court has taken a view that it is Article 137 of the Limitation Act that would govern the case to be filed by the claimant. Article 137 of the Limitation Act prescribes a period of limitation of three years. Therefore, it is not as if the claimant would not have any remedy at all if the Land Acquisition Officer does not choose to make a reference within a period of ninety days. The law has been very fair to the claimant and it wants that the claimant should get the compensation as early as possible. Therefore, it prescribes a shorter period of limitation of ninety days for the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference. Therefore, the argument of Sri Rama Bhat that the Land Acquisition Officer can make a reference at any time is not supported by the wordings used in Section 18(3) and it runs contrary to the Full Bench decision cited above.

8. In the Land Acquisition Act 1894, Seventh Edition by A. Ghosh, on page 276, it has been stated as—

“In Mohammad Hasuddin v. The State of Maharashtra, (1979) 2 SCC 572 : AIR 1979 SC 404, it was held recently and finally by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that while making a reference under Section 18, the Collector does not act as an agent of the Government. Section 18(1) entrusts to the Collector the statutory duty of making a reference on the fulfilment of conditions laid down therein. Therefore he is nothing but a statutory authority exercising his own powers under the section I.L.R 1932 Cal. 605 (P.C) followed. The making of an application under Section 18 within the time prescribed by Section 18(2) is a sine qua non for a valid reference by the Collector. The Court functioning under the Act being a tribunal of Special Jurisdiction it is its duty to see that the reference made to it by the Collector under Section 18 that conditions laid down therein are duly complied with so as to give jurisdiction to hear the reference. It is certainly not silting as a Court of appeal. The Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the reference was made beyond the period of limitation and if it finds that it was so made, decline to answer the reference. It has overruled the previous decisions in Secretary of State v. Bhagwan Prasad, AIR 1929 All 769; Hari Krishan v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1958 Punj. 490; Venkateswaraswami v. Sub-Collector, AIR 1943 Mad. 327; State of U.P v. Abdul Karim, AIR 1963 All. 556 (FB); L.A Collector v. Janki Das, AIR 1967 Him. Pra. 26 (dissented by Cal. HC) and AIR 1959 All. 576, while approving those in Mahadeo v. Mamlatdar, AIR 1944 Bom. 200; Ananta Ram Banerjee…Claimant v. Secretary Of State…., 41 CWN 1291; AIR 1937 Cal. 680; ILR 30 Bom. 275; AIR 1951 Bom. 156; AIR 1955 Mad. 23; AIR 1957 Raj. 44; 1966 MPLJ 433; AIR 1969 Pat. 131; AIR 1971 Ker. 51; AIR 1975 Punj. 52 (FB); AIR 1962 J & K 59. The Calcutta High Court recently prior to the aforesaid Supreme Court decision, held the same view in State of West Bengal v. Ramkali Bhattacharya, 82 CWN 318, which further held that there is nothing in Section 18 empowering the Collector to allow or reject a petition of reference. On the other hand Section 19 compels the Collector to send statements etc., along with the reference to Court. Chagla, C.J in Morlays Bittani's case (AIR 1961 Bom. 156) held that ‘assuming that the Collector is wrong in the view that it takes to the maintainability of the petition and refuses to make a reference, it would be always open to the claimants to come to Court and to compel the Collector to make the reference if they satisfy the Court that their application was within time.”

It has been further stated in the same book on page 299, as-

“Having made the reference on a time barred application for reference, can it be said that he must be regarded as having waived his right or the right of his principal, the Government, to dispute that the reference was unauthorised and therefore illegal? The Collector's authority to make the reference as an agent of Government is restricted by the statutory conditions prescribed in Section 18. The claimants can not plead ignorance of those conditions and the restricted nature of the Collector's authority. He cannot bind the Government by stepping outside the limits of the power given by Section 18. If he does step outside, then his action is illegal and no waiver on his part can ever atone for the failure which the law required him to fulfil before his right to require the Collector to make a reference could come into existence. In the matter of the Government and Nanu Kothare, 30 B 275; Collector of Akala v. Anand Rao, 7 N.L.R 88; 11 I.C 690 it is not open to a Collector to waive the objection of limitation and it is always open to the Court to hold that an application to a Collector for reference could not form the basis of reference under Sections 18 and 19 inasmuch as it was barred by time.”

It has been further stated on page 300, as—

“The L.A Act gives exceptional powers to the Collector and Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to proceedings under the L.A Act. So it has been held that the final determination of the question whether an application under Section 18 L.A Act is barred by the time or not must be made by the District Judge.”

It has been stated on page 301, as—

“The Court has power when a reference is made under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act to go into the question of limitation. This is specially so in a case where the Collector himself has included the question of limitation as a part of the reference to his letter accompanying the reference and has not decided the question himself. When the Land Acquisition Officer purports to Act under Part III of this Act he acts as a judicial officer and not merely as an agent or mouthpiece of the Government, Subramania Chettiar v. The Collector of Coimbatore, 1945 MWN 775. The District Judge has got jurisdiction to decide whether the reference was made upon an application beyond the time limit and if it finds that it was so made, dismiss the reference.”

9. The Supreme Court in Mohammed Hasnuddin v. State Of Maharashtra. . 1979 2 SCC 572, has laid down in para 9, as—

“The short question that falls for determination in the appeal is whether the Court can go into a question that the application for reference was not made to the Collector within the time prescribed in Section 18 sub-section (2) of the Land Acquisition Act; and if so, can it refuse to entertain the reference if it finds it to be barred by time. There was at one time a great divergence of judicial opinion on the question. But almost all the High Courts have now veered round to the view that the Court has the power to go into the question of limitation. It not only has the power but also the duty to examine whether the application for reference, was in accordance with law i.e, whether it was made within time prescribed under the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act or not.”

The Supreme Court in unmistakable terms has laid down that the Civil Court has power to satisfy itself that the reference, which it is called upon to hear, is a valid reference.

10. The Supreme Court has further stated in para 24, as-

“The Word ‘require’ in Section 18 of the Act implies compulsion. It carries with it the idea that the written application makes it incumbent on the Collector to make a reference. The Collector is required to make a reference under Section 18 on the fulfilment of certain conditions. The first condition is that there shall be a written application by a person interested who has not accepted the award. The second condition is as to the nature of the objections which may be taken, and the third condition is as to the time within which the application shall be made. The power of the Collector to make a reference under Section 18 is thus circumscribed by the conditions laid dawn therein, and one condition is the condition regarding limitation to be found in the proviso.”

It has been stated in paras 25 and 26, as—

“The conditions laid down in Section 18 are ‘matters of substance and their observance is a condition precedent to the Collector's power of reference’, as rightly observed by Chandavarkar, J. in Re Land Acquisition Act (Supra). We are inclined to the view that the fulfilment of the conditions, particularly the one regarding limitation, are the conditions subject to which the power of the Collector to make the reference exists. It must accordingly be held that the making of an application for reference within the time prescribed by proviso to Section 1-8, sub-section (2) is a sine qua non for a valid reference by the Collector.”

“From these considerations, it follows that the Court functioning under the Act being a tribunal of special jurisdiction, it is its duty to see that the reference made to it by the Collector under Section 18 complies with the conditions laid down therein so as to give the Court jurisdiction to hear the reference.”

Further the Supreme Court has stated in para 28, in unmistakable and unambiguous words, as—

“If an application is made which is not within time, the Collector will not have the power to make a reference. In order to determine the limits of his own power, it is clear that the Collector will have to decide whether the application presented by the claimant is or is not within time and satisfies the conditions laid down in Section 18. Even if a reference is wrongly made by the Collector the Court will still have to determine the validity of the reference because the very jurisdiction of the Court to hear a reference depends on a proper reference being made under Section 18, and if the reference is not proper, there is no jurisdiction in the Court to hear the reference. It follows that it is the duty of the Court to see that the statutory conditions laid down in Section 18 have been complied with, and it is not debarred from satisfying itself that the reference which it is called upon to hear is a valid reference. It is only a valid reference which gives jurisdiction to the Court and, therefore, the Court has to ask itself the question whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the reference.”

It is further stated in para 29, as—

“In deciding the question of jurisdiction in a case of reference under Section 18 by the Collector to the Court, the Court is certainly not acting as a Court of appeal; it is only discharging the elementary duty of satisfying itself that a reference which it is called upon to decide is a valid and proper reference according to the provisions of the Act under which it is made. That is a basic and preliminary duty which no tribunal can possibly avoid. The Court has, therefore, jurisdiction to decide whether the reference was made beyond the period prescribed by the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act, and if it finds that it was so made, decline to answer reference.”

(Underlining is mine)

In para 30, the Supreme Court has stated as—

“Beaumont C.J, delivering the judgment of the Division Bench in Mahadeo Krishna v. Mamlatdar of Alibad, ILR (1944) Bom 90 : (AIR 1944 Bom. 200), agreed with the view of Chandavarkar J. and observed (at page 201 of AIR):—

‘It seems to me that the Court is bound to satisfy itself that the reference made by the Collector complies with the specified conditions, so as to give the Court jurisdiction to hear the reference. It is not a question of the Court sitting in appeal or revision on the decision of the Collector; it is a question of the Court satisfying itself that the reference made under the Act is one which it is required to hear. If the reference does not comply with the terms of the Act, then the Court cannot entertain it. I have myself some difficulty in seeing on what principle the Court is to be debarred from satisfying itself that the reference, which it is called upon to hear, is a valid reference.”

11. Thus, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court and in view of the decision of Full Bench of this Court, I am of the view that the prescription of ninety days imposed on the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference, debars the Deputy Commissioner from making a reference after the expiry of ninety days from the date of receipt of the application under sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.

12. In these cases, as already stated above, the references have been made after the lapse of few years from the date of receiving the application under sub-section (1) of Section 18. Therefore, the Court below was justified in holding that the references made by the Land Acquisition Officer in all these cases beyond the period of limitation prescribed by Section 18(3)(a) of the Act, were illegal and thus it rightly rejected all these applications.

13. In the result, all the revision petitions are dismissed.