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S.G Thimmappa v. T. Anantha
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, husband of Respondent-4 A. Lakshmi, challenged an order dated 27-1-1982 by the XII Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, which rejected his application seeking permission to file a suit as an indigent person. The rejection was based on the ground that the suit was barred under Order 23 Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C). The original suit (O.S No. 187 of 1979) was filed by Respondent-4 on behalf of herself and her two minor sons against the petitioner for partition and related reliefs. The suit was compromised on 19-9-1979, with the compromise decree made part of the record. The present suit was filed alleging that the compromise decree was vitiated by fraud and undue influence. The petitioner’s application to file the suit as an indigent person was resisted by the defendants, who contended the suit was barred by Order 23 Rule 3A C.P.C. The Trial Court accepted this contention and rejected the application, prompting the present appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a suit challenging a compromise decree on grounds of fraud, undue influence, or coercion is barred under Order 23 Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- The interpretation of the term "lawful" in Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3A C.P.C, specifically whether it includes agreements or compromises that are voidable due to fraud or undue influence.
- The scope and effect of the amendment introducing Rule 3A to Order 23 and the deletion of appeal provisions against the recording of compromise.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Trial Court erred in holding the suit barred under Order 23 Rule 3A C.P.C.
- The word "lawful" in the rule excludes agreements or compromises that are void or voidable due to fraud, undue influence, or coercion.
- The Explanation to Order 23 Rule 3 clarifies that void or voidable compromises are not considered lawful, and parties can bring a suit to cancel such decrees.
- The bar in Rule 3A applies only to compromises opposed to law, public policy, or that are void ab initio, not to voidable compromises.
Respondents' Arguments
- The words "not lawful" in Order 23 Rule 3A are broad enough to include challenges based on fraud, undue influence, and coercion.
- Once a decree is passed, it becomes unassailable, and no separate suit challenging it on these grounds is permissible due to the bar in Rule 3A.
- Relied on precedents such as Anant Mahadeo Godbole v. Achut Ganesh Godbole (AIR 1981 Bombay 357) and Sri Sri Iswar Gopal Jew v. Bhagwandas Shaw (AIR 1982 Calcutta 12) to support this position.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Anant Mahadeo Godbole v. Achut Ganesh Godbole, AIR 1981 Bombay 357 | Interpretation of Order 23 Rule 3A regarding challenge to compromise decrees | Respondents relied on this case to argue that compromise decrees are unassailable once passed, even on grounds of fraud or undue influence |
| Sri Sri Iswar Gopal Jew v. Bhagwandas Shaw, AIR 1982 Calcutta 12 | Validity and challenge to compromise decrees under Order 23 Rule 3A | Respondents cited this case to support the bar against separate suits challenging compromise decrees |
| Bhima Rama Jadhav v. Abdul Rashid, 1960 Mys. L.J 554 and 1967 2 Mys. L.J 509 | Duty of Court to refuse decree containing illegal terms and finality of decisions | Used to explain the scope of lawful agreements and the principle that decrees not set aside operate as res judicata |
| Qadri Jahan Begam v. Fazel Ahmed, AIR 1928 Allahabad 494 | Meaning of "lawful" agreements including voidable contracts | Supports that "lawful" may include agreements voidable due to undue influence or fraud |
| Husain Yar Beg v. Radha Kishan, AIR 1935 Allahabad 137 | Reiteration of the principle regarding voidable agreements | Affirms that agreements voidable for fraud or undue influence are included in "lawful" |
| Western Electric Co. Ltd. v. Kailash Chand, AIR 1940 Bombay 60 | Scope of "lawful agreement" excluding unlawful and void agreements | Clarifies that "lawful" excludes agreements void on their face but not necessarily voidable ones |
| Harbans Singh Chauhan v. Bawa Singh Chauhan, AIR 1952 Calcutta 73 | Application of Order 23 Rule 3 regarding lawful agreements and voidable contracts | Supports that fraud or undue influence makes a contract voidable, not void, and the proper remedy is a suit |
| A. Mohiuddin v. Abdurrahman, AIR 1953 Hyderabad 62 | Requirement to record lawful agreements and remedy for voidable compromises | Held that setting aside a compromise on undue influence requires a separate suit |
| Putto Lal v. His Highness Maharaja Dhiraj Sumersinghji of Kishengarh, AIR 1963 Rajasthan 63 | Definition of “lawful” in Order 23 Rule 3 and distinction between void and voidable agreements | Clarifies that agreements voidable due to fraud or undue influence are lawful for limited purposes until set aside by suit |
| Rama Krushna Swain v. Smt. Fulamani Kamila, AIR 1975 Orissa 166 | Challenge to compromise on grounds of undue influence and fraud | Held such challenges are voidable and must be decided by independent suit |
| Sumitra Devi Agarwalla v. Sulekha Kunda, AIR 1976 Calcutta 196 | Enquiry into fraud, undue influence under Order 23 Rule 3 | Supports that courts may enquire into allegations of fraud or coercion in interlocutory proceedings |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the statutory provisions of Order 23 Rules 3 and 3A of the C.P.C and the legislative intent behind their amendment. The Court noted that the term "lawful" in Rule 3 excludes agreements that are void or opposed to law or public policy, but does not extend to agreements that are merely voidable due to fraud, undue influence, or coercion. The Court examined various High Court decisions which consistently held that while a compromise decree is final and binding, it can be challenged in a separate suit if it is voidable on such grounds. The Court emphasized that Rule 3A was introduced to resolve conflicts regarding the finality of compromise decrees containing unlawful terms, not to bar all challenges including those based on voidable grounds. The Court rejected the respondents' argument that the decree becomes unassailable on any ground once passed. It distinguished the cited precedents as either dealing with different facts or not addressing the precise issue of voidable compromises. The Court concluded that the Trial Court erred in rejecting the application on the basis that the suit was barred under Rule 3A, since challenges based on fraud or undue influence remain open to the party by filing a suit.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed. The order dated 27-1-1982 passed by the XII Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, rejecting the petitioner’s application to file the suit as an indigent person is set aside. The matter is remitted to the Trial Court to consider the application afresh and determine whether the petitioner has sufficient means to pay the Court fee.
The decision clarifies that Order 23 Rule 3A C.P.C does not bar suits challenging compromise decrees on grounds of fraud, undue influence, or coercion, which are voidable but not void. This preserves the remedy of filing a separate suit for setting aside such decrees and prevents an overly broad interpretation that would render compromise decrees unassailable on all grounds. No new precedent is established beyond the application of existing principles to the facts of this case.
Murlidher Rao, J.:— This appeal is filed by the petitioner in P. Mis. No. 666 of 1980, on the file of the XII Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, challenging the order passed on 27-1-1982. The said application was filed for seeking permission to file the suit as an indigent person. The same has been rejected on the ground that the suit brought by the plaintiff is barred under 023 R3A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The order of rejection is passed under Cl. (f) of O. 33 R. 5 C.P.C
2. Few facts which are necessary to appreciate the points in controversy are as follows:
Petitioner is the husband of Respondent-4 A. Lakshmi; Respondents-2 and 3 are his minor sons; and Respondent-1 is his father-in law, who is an Advocate. The petitioner was an adopted son in an affluent family. The adoptive mother died on 2-1-1979. During her life time, petitioner and Respondent 4 were married on 8-5-1970. After the death of the adoptive mother, Respondent-4, on her behalf and also acting on behalf of her two minor sons namely, Respondents 2 and 3, instituted a suit in O.S No. 187 of 1979, on the file of the Principal Civil Judge, Bangalore District, Bangalore. The defendant in the said suit was the petitioner namely, the husband of the first plaintiff. The father-in-law (advocate) was not a party to the said suit but the suit was filed by him acting as an advocate on behalf of the plaintiffs who were his daughter and grand children. The said suit was filed on 29-8-1979. In the prayer portion, the following reliefs were claimed in the said suit:
“(a) for partition of the plaintiff's share by metes and bounds and also 5/6 of the plaintiffs be separated in the schedule mentioned immovable properties and allotted to the share of the plaintiffs with the exclusive possession of the same;
(b) to hold an enquiry under Order 20 Rule 12 for future mesne profits from the date of suit till the date of allotment of the share of the plaintiff.
(c) to pay the costs of the suit with such other reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit to grant under the circumstances of the case.”
3. The schedule given to the plaint mentions three houses situated in Arcot Srinivasachar Street, Chamarajpet and Maistry Yellappa Galli, Chickkamavalli in Bangalore City and Survey No. 33 measuring 6 acres of Anugondanahalli Hobli, Hosakote taluk. These three houses in Bangalore town and the agricultural land measuring 6 acres, were valued at Rs. 10,000/- and a fixed Court fee of Rs. 200/- was paid under Section 35(2) of the Karnataka Court Fee and Suits Valuation Act. It is to be mentioned that the first plaintiff-mother did not file a separate application to permit her to act as next friend nor did she make any specific allegation against the defendant who was the father of the minor children, indicating his adverse interest. The said suit was posted to 22-9-1979. On 19-9-1979, the plaintiffs, through their advocate, who was no other than the father of the first plaintiff and grand-father of plaintiffs 2 and 3 in that suit, filed an application to advance the date of hearing. Thereafter the date was preponed, and on 19-9-1979 itself a compromise petition was filed, signed by the plaintiff, her father who acted as an advocate, and the defendant and his advocate. The advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, gave a certificate to the effect that the compromise was in the interest of the minors. On the said date namely, 19-9-1979, the matter was posted before the Court and it was ordered that the decree in terms of the compromise be drawn up and the compromise was made part of the record. It is thereafter that the present suit is filed alleging that the compromise decree was vitiated by fraud and undue influence.
4. Along with the plaint, the plaintiff filed a petition under O. 33 R. 1 C.P.C seeking permission to file the suit as an indigent person.
5. The defendants in the present suit and petition, were the decree holders in the previous suit namely the wife and children of the present petitioner, and plaintiff's father in law is impleaded as defendant-1, who is an advocate, and had appeared in the earlier suit for the plaintiffs. The application was resisted by the defendants by filing the objections. The main contention putforward by the objectors was that the present suit was barred by O. 23 R. 3A, C.P.C The Trial Court accepted this contention and has rejected the application. This M.F.A is filed under O. 43 R. 1 (na) of the C.P.C
6. In this appeal Mr. Srinivasa Iyer appearing for the appellant contended that the view taken by the Court below that the suit is barred under O. 23 R. 3A C.P.C is not correct. He contended that the word ‘lawful’ occurring in the said rule does not include the challenge to a compromise decree on the basis of fraud, undue influence etc. He submitted that the Explanation to O. 23 R. 3 C.P.C makes it clear that an agreement or compromise which is void or voidable, shall not be deemed to be lawful. In other words, where the agreement or compromise is void or voidable, the said agreement cannot be treated as lawful. The agreement and compromise being voidable, it is open to the parties to bring a suit for cancellation of decree. It was his contention, that the bar contained in O. 23 R. 3A C.P.C is applicable only in cases where the compromise is opposed to law, is prohibited by law or contains a term which is opposed to public policy.
7. Mr. V. Krishna Murthi appearing for the respondents contended that the words ‘not lawful’ occurring in the said rule are wide enough to embrace a challenge to the said decree on the basis of fraud, undue influence and coercion. Whether the agreement is void or voidable, once a decree is passed it becomes unassailable, no challenge can be made, by way of a separate suit in view of the bar contained in O. 23 R. 3A C.P.C For this submission he depended on the judgment of Masodkar, J. Anant Mahadeo Godbole v. Achut Ganesh Godbole . AIR 1981 Bombay 357. and Sri Sri Iswar Gopal Jew v. Bhagwandas Shaw . AIR 1982 Calcutta 12..
8. To examine the contentions urged in this appeal, it is necessary to find out the relevant provisions of the C.P.C, the objects and reasons for the amendment to these provisions.
Order 23 Rule 3 has been amended by Act No. 104 of 1976. Rule 3A has also been added by the said amendment Similarly, appeal provision contained in Cl (m) of O. 43 R. 1 which permitted filing of appeal against recording of compromise has been deleted by the said amendment. Rule 1A has been added to O. 43 R. 1; sub-rule (2) there of provides for an appeal being filed against a deeree passed in a suit after recording a compromise or refusing to record a compromise. In otherwords, so far as this rule is concerned, since a specific rule in sub-rule (2) is provided in Rule 1A, the retention of Cl (m) in O. 43 R. 1 became redundant. This is clear from the statement of objects and reasons while introducing the amendment Bill. The objects and reasons for these provisions and for the Explanation found in O. 23 R. 3 and for the amend-men tin the said rule, are as follows:
“Sub-clause (iii) —It is provided that an agreement or compromise under Rule 3 should be in writing and signed by the parties. This is with a view to avoiding the setting up of oral agreements or compromises to delay the progress of the suit.
The words “lawful agreement or compromise” in Rule 3 have given rise to a conflict in the matter of interpretation. One view is that agreements which are voidable under Section 19A of the Contract Act are not excluded. While this stand has been taken by the High Courts of Allahabad Calcutta, Madras and Kerala, a contrary view has been expressed by the High Courts of Bombay and Nagpur. An Explanation has, therefore, been added to the rule to clarify the position. A proviso has also been added to clarify that no adjournment should ordinarily be granted where a decision is necessary as to whether an adjustment or satisfaction has or has not been arrived at.
In view of the words “so far as it relates to the suit” in Rule 3, a question arises whether a decree which, refers the terms of a compromise in respect of matters beyond the scope of the suit is executable or whether the terms of the decree relating to the matters outside the suit can be enforced only by a separate suit. The amendment seeks to clarify the position.”
The statement of objects and reasons for the introduction of Rule 3A is as follows:
“Sub-clause (iv).— In a recent Mysore case, it was held that where a compromise decree passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction contains a term which is opposed to law or public policy, but the decree has not been set aside in proper proceedings, the decree operates as res judicata. The Madras and Patna High Courts have, however, taken a different view. New Rule 3A seeks to resolve the conflict between the decisions of the different High Courts.”
The statement of objects and reasons for deleting Cl (m) in O. 43 R. 1 reads thus:
“Clause (m) provides for an order under Rule 3 of O. XXIII recording or refusing to record an agreement, compromise or satisfaction. The Clause is being omitted because in an appeal against the decree the aggrieved party can take the point that the compromise ought not to have been recorded or ought to have been recorded, as the case may be.”
These being the objects and reasons, it becomes necessary to find out the meaning of the words ‘lawful’ and ‘not lawful’ occurring in the Explanation to O. 23 R. 3 and Rule 3A. Before the introduction of the above Explanation, there was conflict of views with regard to the interpretation to be placed on the word ‘lawful’ occurring in O. 23 R. 3 C.P.C
9. The decisions of this Court referred to above in the objects and reasons for introducing Rule 3A are Bhima Rama Jadhav, Plaintiff,… v. Abdul Rashid, Defendant,…. . 1960 Mys. L.J 554. and Bhima Rama Jadhav, Plaintiff,… v. Abdul Rashid, Defendant,…. . 1967 2 Mys. L.J 509.. The Learned Single Judge Hegde, J., who delivered the judgment in the first referred case observed thus:
“……….. As observed by Gajendragadkar, J. In Govind Waman's case, it is the duty of the Court to see whether the compromise in question contains any illegal terms; if it does contain such terms the Court has not only the right but has the duty to refuse to make it a decree of Court. It is not the law that the Court is bound to accept every compromise and make it a decree of Court. If it has accepted a compromise and made it a decree of the Court then the compromise ceases to be a contract simpliciter; it becomes a decree of Court. The oft quoted observation that a Court of competent jurisdiction can decide a thing rightly as well as wrongly though might look odd at first sight, embodies an important principle of law i.e, the finality of decisions. It is human to err and Judges are human. Their errors may be errors of facts as well as errors of law. If they commit any error either of fact or of law, the same can be corrected only by following the procedure laid down by law. No one can ignore a decree of a competent Court unless it is void under law. It is true that a compromise decree is open to attacks which are available against a contract and as such, it may be got set aside within the period of limitation prescribed, on grounds which may be sufficient to invalidate a contract. But the fact remains that it must be got set aside and that is what has not been done in this case …………”
10. In Letters Patent Appeal, while granting leave to appeal, Hegde, J, framed the following question:
“Where a compromise decree passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction contains a term which is opposed to law or public policy, and that decree has not been set aside in proper proceedings, can that decree be pleaded as constituting estoppel by res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties.”
After examining several decisions of various High Courts, it was held that where a compromise decree passed by a competent jurisdiction contains a term which is opposed to law or public policy and that decree has not been set aside in proper proceedings, it operates as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the same parties.
It is to give effect to this pronouncement that O. 23 R. 3A is enacted; in other words, the lawfulness of the decree cannot be agitated in a subsequent suit. By lawful, it means it is not contrary to law, public policy or void ab initio, or unlawful, but it cannot include the grounds like fraud, undue influence, coercion, by which the decree can be avoided, treating it as voidable. Till it is avoided and displaced it can be treated as lawful, for the limited purpose of Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C
11. In Qadri Jahan Begam v. Fazel Ahmed . A.I.R 1928 Allahabad 494. it was indicated that the word ‘lawful’ refers to agreements which in their very terms or nature are not ‘unlawful’ and may therefore include agreements which are voidable at the option of one of the parties thereto, because they have been brought about by undue influence, coercion or fraud. The same view was reiterated in Husain Yar Beg v. Radha Kishan . A.I.R 1935 Allahabad 137..
12. In Western Electric Co. Ltd. v. Kailash Chand . A.I.R 1940 Bombay 60. Kania, J., observed as follows:
“…. Therefore, the term “lawful agreement” as used in Order 23, Rule 3, excludes not only unlawful agreements, i.e, the object or consideration for which is unlawful as defined in the Contract Act, but all agreements which on the face of them are void and therefore will not be enforced by the Court. For this purpose, no inquiry is necessary because the terms of the agreement themselves will show the defect. The Court therefore has to consider whether on the face of the agreement it is lawful or not as stated above. With that reservation 1 respectfully agree with two Allahabad decisions mentioned above.”
Thereafter, the Learned Judge proceeded to observe thus:
“….But that will not be a sufficient answer to refuse to take into consideration the plea whether an agreement is voidable or not. That contention must stand or fall by reason of the wording of Order 23 Rule 3. I am unable to construe the word “lawful” as wide enough to include an inquiry whether the agreement is voidable at the instance of one party. In my opinion, it includes only two classes of agreements: those which are unlawful and those which on their face are void and therefore not capable of being enforced. Under the circumstances the opposition fails. If the plaintiffs have any grievance in respect of the agreement their remedy is to file a suit to set aside the agreement and the decree………”
(underlining is mine)
13. It follows therefore that according to Justice Kania, the word ‘lawful’ cannot be construed as wide enough to include whether the agreement is voidable or not.
14. In Harbans Singh Chauhan v. Bawa Singh Chauhan . A.I.R 1952 Calcutta 73. the Learned Judge after referring to the Bombay and Allahabad High Courts decisions, observed thus:
“Under the provisions of Rule 3 of Order 23 the Court must order a compromise to be recorded where it is proved to its satisfaction that a suit had been adjusted wholly in or part by any ‘lawful agreement or compromise.’ Fraud, undue influence or coercion makes a contract voidable and not void. The question arises whether, in an application under Order 23 Rule 3 the Court must consider the contract as not a lawful agreement or compromise because one party seeks to avoid it on the ground of fraud, undue influence or coercion….”
15. A Bench of the Hyderabad High Court in A. Mohiuddin v. Abdurrahman . AIR 1953 Hyderabad 62. held that the words of O. 23 R. 3 C.P.C signify that where a suit has been adjusted by lawful agreement, it is obligatory on the Court to order such agreement or compromise to be recorded. Where, therefore, one of the parties applies for setting aside a compromise filed by both the parties on the ground that his signature on the petition was obtained by undue influence, his remedy is to file a regular suit for avoiding the compromise which is voidable at his option. He cannot move the court to set it aside in the same proceedings.
16. In Putto Lal v. His Highness Maharaja Dhiraj Sumersinghji of Kishengarh . AIR 1963 Rajasthan 63. a Division Bench examined the legal position at length and held thus:
“The meaning of the word ‘lawful’ in the phrase “any lawful agreement or compromise” occurring in O. 23 R. 3 is that the agreement or compromise must not be unlawful by the nature of its terms or on the face of it. In other words, it would be unlawful if the consideration or the object of the agreement is forbidden by law, or is of such a nature that if permitted it would defeat the provision of any law, or is fraudulent, or involves or implies inquiry to the person or property of another, or the Court regards it as immoral or opposed to public policy as provided by Section 23 of the Contract Act. Again, the agreement would be unlawful if it is void on the very face of it at law such as where it may be by way of wager or in restraint of the marriage of any person or for any other similar reason. Thus it would certainly be the duty of the Court where it is asked to record a compromise under this provision to see that the compromise is or is not lawful in this sense; and if it is not so lawful it must refuse to record it. But where the contention is not that the object or the consideration of the agreement was unlawful in the sense indicated above, or that it was void on the face of it, but that it was brought about by undue influence or fraud or coercion, then such an agreement, provided ofcourse it is proved to have been made, should not be condemned as unlawful within the meaning of this provision for it is only voidable and not void. And being voidable it could be avoided and displaced only after proper investigation and adjudication in a proceeding appropriate for the purpose, that is a suit; and until that is done, such agreements should be lawful for the limited purposes of Order 23 Rule 3. The reason is that any full fledged investigation in this regard in what after all is said and done is an interlocutory proceeding would be highly inconvenient and the result there of could by no means be properly accepted as conclusive for all purposes. Therefore, the Courts have heavily leaned towards the view that a party disputing the compromise on any such ground should be left free to seek its remedy in this behalf by means of a separate suit …………”
The above cases were considered by a Bench of the Orissa High Court in Rama Krushna Swain v. Smt. Fulamani Kamila . AIR 1975 Orissa 166. and it was held as follows:
“Challenge on ground of undue influence, fraud, or misrepresentation make an agreement voidable and not void and when a compromise is challenged on such ground, the matter is not within the ambit of Rule 3 and must be left to be decided by an independent suit.”
17. The above decisions of various High Courts make it clear that where the decree is challenged on the ground of fraud, undue influence, etc., it becomes voidable at the instance of the party who makes these allegations.
In Sumitra Devi Agarwalla v. Sulekha Kunda . AIR 1976 Calcutta 196., a Bench of the Calcutta High Court was dealing with the words ‘lawful agreement’ under O. 23 R. 3 C.P.C The Court observed thus:
“………… It has been already observed that if the consent of one party is obtained by fraud, undue influence or coercion, it cannot be said that he has agreed to the term to which his consent has been so obtained and consequently the Court has to come to the finding that there is no agreement. If it is required under Order 23, Rule 3 that the Court has to be satisfied as to whether an agreement has in fact been reached as held by the Allahabad High Court in the above two decisions, we are of the opinion that an enquiry by the Court for such satisfaction will include also an enquiry into the allegation of a party that his consent to the terms of the agreement has been procured by fraud, undue influence or coercion. It is true that fraud, undue influence or coercion makes a contract a Voidable one and not void. But as soon as a party complains about the practice upon him of fraud, undue influence or coercion by another party, he avoids the contract. If the party complains to Court that his signature to a document containing the terms has been obtained by the other party at the point of a revolver, would the Court refuse to make an enquiy into the same on the ground that the agreement is only voidable and not void? With due respect, we are unable to subscribe to such a bold proposition and, in our opinon, to consider whether or not an agreement has been reached between the parties, the Court will of necessity embark upon an enquiry as to the allegation of a party that his consent to the agreement or his signature on the document containing the terms, has been obtained by fraud, undue influence or coercion. It is true that the party complaining has his remedy by way of suit. He can obtain a declaration that the contract is vitiated by fraud, undue influence or coercion and, as such, is not binding upon him. In our opinion, to drive such a party to a separate suit will be against justice, equity and good conscience.”
The above statement makes it clear that the party who challenges the compromise on the basis of fraud, undue influence or coercion, has two remedies open to him - firstly by filing a suit, secondly, making an application under Section 151 C.P.C The fact that the Courts can exercise their inherent powers under Section 151 does not mean that there is a bar for filing a suit which remedy is available to the party.
18. A contract or agreement may be lawful but it can still be challenged on the ground that it was entered into or achieved by exercising fraud, undue influence or coercion and can be avoided. This aspect of the matter is not covered by the words ‘not lawful’ occurring in Rule 3A of Order 23 C.P.C Therefore, to hold that the compromise decree cannot be challenged on the ground of fraud, undue influence or coercion under R. 3A would not be correct. In my opinion, the Court below has erred in holding to the contrary.
19. Coming to the two decisions cited by Mr. Krishna Murthi, it has to be mentioned that in first of these cases rendered by Masodkar, J., of Bombay High Court, the Learned Judge was examining the case where the compromise was entered by persons who had no authority. The Learned Judge was not dealing with a case, where the challenge was based on grounds of fraud, undue influence etc. It would not be correct to say that under the amended provision, the compromise decree becomes unassailable, on any grounds what soever. The case reported in A.I.R 1982 Calcutta page 12, was one where compromise decree was passed on oral agreement, quite contrary to the amended provision, which requires it to be in writing. The Court held that it could be challenged under Section 151 C.P.C The statement of objects and reasons make it clear that O. 23 R. 3A was incorporated only to resolve the conflict of decisions of this Court in Bhima Rama Jadhav's case and the decisions of other Courts, taking a different view.
20. The object was not to make the compromise decree unassailable on any ground whatsoever. Therefore, I am of the view that the rejection of the application on this ground is clearly unsustainable.
21. For the aforesaid reasons, I allow this appeal and set aside the order dated 27-1-1982 passed by the XII Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, and remit the case to the Court below to consider and decide the application filed by the appellant and find out whether he has sufficient means to pay the Court fee or not.
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