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Ramesh Pande And Others v. State Of Karnataka And Others
Judgment Summary — Venkatachala, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal, heard by consent, arises from an order dated 31 August 1981 of Chandrakantaraj Urs, J., in the Writ Petition of Ramesh Pande and others (1981) concerning the court fee payable on that petition. Thirteen petitioners, each independently engaged in vending liquor in different towns of Karnataka, filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the constitutional validity of newly substituted Section 6-B of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (the "impugned taxing provision") enacted by the Karnataka Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1981. The petition carried a court fee of Rs. 100. The Registry objected that the correct court fee for thirteen joined petitioners was Rs. 1,300 (Rs. 100 each) and that a deficiency of Rs. 1,200 remained; the single Judge sustained that objection. The present appeal challenges that ruling on the quantum of court fee payable.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the thirteen petitioners who have each separately been affected by the impugned taxing provision should be regarded as persons having a common or joint interest in the subject matter of the writ petition (so as to justify a single court fee), or as persons each having a separate and distinct interest (so as to attract aggregate court fees).
- Whether the filing of a common or joint writ petition under Rule 7 of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977, relieves multiple petitioners from payment of the aggregate court fees that would be payable under sub-section (3) read with sub-section (4) of Section 6 of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958, if they had filed separate petitions.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (learned Counsel Shri Kashinathrao Patil)
- The petitioners have a common interest because they have together challenged the constitutional validity of Section 6-B of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act; therefore sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 (as it stood when the petition was presented) applies.
- The explanation to sub-rule (2) defines "common interest" to include situations where a declaration of invalidity in a petition by one petitioner would benefit the others even if they had not joined, and so the petitioners are entitled to present a single writ petition and pay the single fee of Rs. 100.
- The proviso to sub-rule (2) (which bars final individual relief) does not operate to deny them the benefit of sub-rule (2) merely because they sought interim relief for each of them.
Respondent/Government's Arguments (learned Additional Government Advocate)
- Each petitioner is separately aggrieved because each carries on his own business; therefore each has a separate and distinct interest though similar to others, and sub-rule (1) of Rule 7 applies rather than sub-rule (2).
- Even if Rule 7(2) permits a common petition, that procedural permissibility does not obviate the statutory requirement under sub-section (3) read with sub-section (4) of Section 6 of the Court Fees Act that aggregate court fees be paid where separate causes of action/individual interests are embraced; the petitioners therefore must pay the aggregate court fees (Rs. 100 each).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rainbow Dying Factory v. Industrial Tribunal, A.I.R. 1959 Mad. 137 | Where entities have similar but several and distinct interests, each must file a separate writ petition and pay court fees accordingly. | The Court cited it as authority that similar interests can still be several and distinct, requiring separate petitions/fees. |
| Mount Corporation v. Director of Industries and Commerce, A.I.R. 1965 Mysore 143 | Multiple petitioners who have distinct and separate interests (not common) cannot maintain a common writ petition to avoid separate fees. | Cited to support the proposition that petitioners with separate interests must pay separately and cannot avoid that by joining. |
| Chandumal v. State, A.I.R. 1968 Rajasthan 20 | When injury to each petitioner is separate, it is not a common injury; joint filing does not convert it into a common interest. | Used to illustrate that multiple individuals suffering separate injuries cannot be treated as having a common interest for fee purposes. |
| Vasudevan v. C.S. Co-operative Bank, A.I.R. 1977 Kerala 203 | If several petitioners/appellants have separate and individual interests, court fee must be paid separately by each despite a single filing. | Relied upon to show that plurality of persons with individual interests entails separate fee liability even when joined in one action. |
| Mohan Singh v. State of Haryana, 1980 Supp SCC 600 | Where each person has his own independent cause of action (e.g., each liable to pay an impugned tax), each petition is distinct; joining does not reduce fee liability to a single payment. | The Court treated this Supreme Court pronouncement as decisive that each petitioner has a distinct cause of action and must therefore bear separate court-fee liability. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by first identifying the statutory and procedural provisions relevant to the dispute:
- Clause (s) of Article I of Schedule-II to the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 prescribes Rs. 100 as the fee for a petition under Article 226.
- Rule 7 of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977 (as it stood when the petition was filed) contains two sub-rules: sub-rule (1) treats a common petition by several persons with similar but separate and distinct interests as equivalent to filing separate petitions and indicates court-fee liability accordingly; sub-rule (2) permits a single petition where several persons have common or joint interest but are not seeking individual reliefs (with an explanation and a proviso limiting final individual relief).
- Section 6(3) and (4) of the Court Fees Act make plaints (and, mutatis mutandis, petitions) chargeable with the aggregate of fees where a suit (or petition) embraces two or more distinct and different causes of action and separate reliefs are sought.
The Court then analyzed whether the petitioners had a "common" interest or "separate and distinct" interests. It distinguished "common interest" (examples given: village grazing rights, religious immersion rights) from "similar interest." The petitioners, being separate liquor vendors each carrying on business individually and each standing to suffer an individual injury from the impugned taxing provision, were held to have separate and distinct interests even though those interests were similar in nature.
The Court acknowledged that the explanation to sub-rule (2) might, by a deemed meaning, treat persons as having a "common interest" in a narrow procedural sense where a declaration in favor of one would benefit all; counsel for petitioners relied on that deeming provision to justify a single fee. However, the Court held that even if Rule 7(2) allowed presentation of a single petition, that procedural permission did not displace the statutory requirement under Section 6(3) read with Section 6(4) that aggregate fees be paid where a petition embraces multiple separate causes of action and separate reliefs.
The Court relied on precedent, notably the Supreme Court decision in Mohan Singh v. State of Haryana, which held that each owner liable to pay the impugned tax has his own independent cause of action and cannot be treated as sharing a single cause of action merely because they join in one petition. Applying this principle, the Court concluded the present petition embraces multiple distinct causes of action (one for each petitioner) and therefore attracts aggregate court-fee liability under the statute.
Holding and Implications
Final Disposition: The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the single Judge's order that the petitioners are liable to pay the aggregate court fees.
Principal Legal Holding: Under clause (s) of Article I of Schedule-II to the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 read with sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 6 of that Act, each petitioner who has a separate and distinct cause of action in a common/joint writ petition challenging a taxing provision is liable to pay the court fee applicable to a separate petition (here, Rs. 100 each). Consequently, the aggregate court fee for thirteen petitioners is Rs. 1,300.
Consequences for the Parties: The ruling (i) upholds the registry's objection and the single Judge's decision regarding the deficient court fee, (ii) requires payment of court fees as if each petitioner had filed a separate petition, and (iii) results in dismissal of the appeal. The Court directed the parties to bear their own costs.
The opinion applies established principles from prior decisions (including the Supreme Court in Mohan Singh) and enforces statutory court-fee rules; it does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond the application of those principles to the facts before the Court.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Venkatachala, J.:— By consent of learned Counsel, this appeal was treated as having been posted for hearing and we heard them.
2. This appeal is from the order dated 31st August 1981 of Chandrakantaraj Urs, J., in Writ Petition of Ramesh Pande and others of 1981 regarding the court fee payable on that petition. The petitioners therein have presented this appeal and for the sake of convenience, they will hereinafter be referred to as the petitioners.
3. Petitioners, thirteen in number, who are individually engaged in vending liquor in different towns of Karnataka, presented a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, impugning the constitutional validity of new Section 6-B of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, substituted by the Karnataka Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the impugned taxing provision’). On that petition, a court fee of Rs. 100 had been paid. The office of this Court raised an objection to the effect that proper court fee payable on that petition in which thirteen petitioners had joined, was Rs. 1300 and the petitioners had to make good the deficient court fee of Rs. 1200. The learned single Judge, who heard that office objection, upheld it.
4. The question as to the Court fee payable on a writ petition filed by more than one petitioner, impugning a taxing provision imposing tax upon them, arises for our decision in this appeal.
5. The court fee payable on a petition under Article 226, is prescribed by clause (s) of Article I of Schedule-II to the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), which reads:
“Petition to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ other than the writ of Habeas Corpus……………….. one hundred rupees.”
6. Material portion of Rule 7 of the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’), which deals with the procedure for filing common or joint writ petition in this Court, as that Rule stood when the instant writ petition was presented, read thus:
“7 Procedure for filing Common or joint petitions:—
(1) Several persons having similar but separate and distinct interest in the subject matter of controversy involving common questions of law and facts may file a common petition. Such a petition shall be treated as equivalent to the filing of such number of writ petitions as there are petitioners and shall be numbered accordingly and the Court Fee payable on such writ petition shall be the same as payable on the number of writ petitions, when filed separately……………………………………
(2) Several persons having common on joint interest but not seeking any individual relief may file a single petition.
Explanation—For the purpose of this sub-rule, persons shall be considered to have common interest if the relief sought for by a single petitioner, if granted, would ensure to the benefit of the other petitioners, even if they had not jointed as petitioners, irrespective of the interim relief sought for by the petitioners.
Provided that no final individual relief, consequential or otherwise, is sought for in the petition.”
7. Shri Kashinathrao Patil, learned Counsel for the appellants-petitioners, contended that the petitioners have a common interest in the subject matter of controversy in the writ petition inasmuch as they have all challenged therein the constitutional validity of the impugned taxing provision and that this is not a case where each of them has a separate and distinct interest in such subject matter. He maintained that it is sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 of the Rules and not sub-rule (1) thereof, as it stood when the writ petition was presented which governed the matter. He strongly relied on the explanation to sub-rule (2) and submitted that in view of that explanation, the petitioners must be regarded as having a common interest in the subject matter of controversy in the writ petition because, as contemplated therein, if the impugned taxing provision is declared to be invalid in a writ petition presented by only one of the petitioners, such declaration would ensure to the benefit of all other petitioners therein even if they had not joined as such petitioners. Sri Patil further contended that in view of the proviso to sub-rule (2), the mere fact that the petitioners had also sought for an interim order in respect of each of them, did not deprive them of the benefit of that sub-rule.
8. The learned Additional Government Advocate, on the other hand, contended that each of the petitioners is separately aggrieved by the levy of the impugned taxing provision as each of them is carrying on business separately and not jointly with the other/s and has a separate and distinct interest though similar or identical. He also contended that the present writ petition is governed by sub-rule (1) and not by sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 of the Rules and that hence the explanation to sub-rule (2) was not attracted. He maintained that the court fee payable on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, is since prescribed under clause(s) of Article I of Schedule-II to the Act, the filing of a joint or a common writ petition by more than one person as permitted under the Rules made by the High Court, by itself, is not sufficient to relieve them of their liability to pay aggregate amount of court fees under sub-section (3) read with sub-section (4) of Section 6 of the Act as if they had filed individual and separate writ petitions.
9. Whether the petitioners in the present writ petition, should be regarded as those who have a common or joint interest in the subject matter of controversy therein or as those each of whom has a separate and distinct interest in such subject matter, is a point which requires our decision before we can proceed to deal with the question as to whether sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 of the Rules, applies to the present case.
10. As there are decided cases which throw light on this point, we shall refer to them at the out set.
11. In Rainbow Dying Factory v. Industrial Tribunal . A.I.R 1959 Mad. 137. the facts were these: By its order, the Government of Madras had referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, for adjudication, various issues relating to conditions of service of employees in 30 industrial concerns engaged in dyeing yarn and cloth. That Tribunal's common award was impugned in a single writ petition by those 30 concerns.
The Madras High Court, on consideration of the said facts, ruled that the interests of 30 concerns although similar, were several and distinct and therefore, each of them had to file a separate writ petition and pay the court fee thereon.
12. The above ruling was followed by this Court in Mount Corporation v. Director of Industries and Commerce . A.I.R 1965 Mysore 143.. There, the petitioners had sought to challenge in one writ petition, the actions of the State Government on the basis of which their applications for licences for import of stainless steel, were rejected. This Court held that each of the petitioners had distinct and separate interest as distinguished from common or joint interest, in the subject matter of controversy in the, writ petition and hence could not maintain a common or joint writ petition.
13. In Chandumal v. State . A.I.R 1968 Rajasthan 20., 41 petitioners had filed a joint writ petition praying for a mandamus restraining the State of Rajasthan from enforcing the levy imposed upon them by the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961. Dave, C.J, who spoke for the Bench, said that the injury which each of the petitioners might suffer by the impugned levy, could only be said to be separate and not common.
14. In Vasudevan v. C.S Co-operative Bank . A.I.R 1977 Kerala 203., 7 petitioners had filed a writ petition challenging a decision of the Co-operative Appellate Tribunal. On the question of court fee payable on such petition, the Kerala High Court held that where a plurality of petitioners or appellants, having separate and individual interest in the subject matter of the petition or the appeal, join in one action, although only one petition or appeal may be filed, court fee has got to be paid separately on the petition or the appeal by each one of the petitioners/appellants, having an individual interest.
15. Coming to the case of petitioners in the present writ petition, all of them are not carrying on business of vending liquor jointly but each of them is carrying on his own business of vending liquor separately. Can it be said that such petitioners have a common interest? Common interest is not the same as similar interest. Where several persons claim an interest in the subject matter of controversy, as members of a class or community or residents of a locality, they can be said to have a common interest in respect of such subject matter. An example of such common interest is the interest of the villagers to graze their cattle in the village pasture or Gomal land. Another example of such common interest is the interest of members of a religious denomination to immerse a diety in a particular tank.
16. Petitioners in the present writ petition, do not claim to have any common interest in the subject matter of controversy as members of a class or community or residents of a locality or the like. Each of them carrying on his individual business of vending liquor, has joined in the present writ petition, for challenging the impugned taxing provision. Each of them has so joined as he stands to suffer an individual injury under the impugned taxing provision. The injury which each of them suffers, can only be regarded as a separate and distinct injury though it may be similar to the one suffered by other/s. Hence, each of the petitioners has only a separate and distinct interest and not common or joint interest, in the subject matter of controversy in the writ petition, that is, the impugned taxing provision. Thus, though on the authority of the decided cases and on principle, the interest of each of the petitioners in the subject matter of controversy in the writ petition, should be regarded as separate and distinct and not common, the explanation to sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 of the Rules speaks to the contrary. Shri Kashinathrao contended that if the impugned taxing provision is declared to be unconstitutional in a writ petition presented by one of them, that provision cannot be enforced against other petitioners even if they had not joined as petitioners because of the deemed meaning given by the explanation to the term ‘Common interest’. Shri Kashinathrao is right in relying on that explanation to contend that the petitioners should be regarded as having a common interest in the subject matter of controversy in the writ petition and that hence they are entitled to present a single writ petition.
17. But, what was argued by the learned Additional Government Advocate was this: Even if the deemed meaning given to common interest in the explanation to sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 of the Rules, has enabled the present petitioners to present a single or common or joint writ petition under sub-rule (2) thereof, challenging the impugned taxing provision, it does not, by itself, relieve them of their liability to pay the aggregate amount of the court fees payable by each of the petitioners on that petition as required under sub-section (3) read with sub-section (4) of Section 6 of the Act. The argument of the learned Additional Government Advocate in our view merits acceptance.
Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 6 of the Act read:
“(3) Where a suit embraces two or more distinct and different causes of action and separate reliefs are sought based on them, either alternatively or cumulatively, the plaint shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees with which plaints would be chargeable under this Act if separate suits were instituted in respect of the several causes of action.
(The proviso is omitted as it is not relevant for the present purpose).
(4) The provisions of this Section shall apply mutatis mutandis to memoranda of appeals, applications, petitions and written statements.”
(The explanation is omitted as it is not relevant for the present purpose).
18. As already pointed out by us, each of the petitioners has a separate and distinct interest in the subject matter of controversy in the writ petition, that is, the taxing provision impugned therein, because of the individual injury which each of them stands to suffer under the impugned taxing, provision. From this, it follows that each of the petitioners has a separate and distinct cause of action in respect of the impugned taxing provision. Therefore, if a writ petition embraces two or more separate and distinct interests (causes of action) of several petitioners, who seek separate reliefs based on those interests (causes of action), it (the writ petition) becomes liable to be charged with aggregate amount of court fees with which petitions would be chargeable under the Act if separate writ petitions had been presented in respect of several separate and distinct interests (causes of action), as provided for in sub-section (3) read with sub-section (4) of Section 6 of the Act.
19. The question whether it can be said that a common writ petition embraces two or more causes of action as would make the petitioners therein liable for payment of separate court fees as if each of them had presented separate writ petitions, having come up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Mohan Singh v. State of Haryana . 1980 Supp SCC 600, it has answered that question thus:
“Having regard to the nature of these cases where every owner of a truck plying his truck for transport of goods has a liability to pay tax impugned in the petition, each one has his own independent cause of action………………..But it is too much to expect that different truck owners having no relation with each other either as partners or any other legally subsisting jural relationship of association of persons would be liable to pay only one set of court-fee simply, because they have joined as petitioners in one petition. Each one has his own cause of action arising out of the liability to pay tax individually and the petition of each one would be a separate and independent petition and each such person would be liable to pay legally payable court-fee on his petition. It would be a travesty of law if one were to hold that as each one uses high way, he has common cause of action with the rest of truck pliers.”
The above pronouncement of the Supreme Court in our view, puts it beyond doubt that each of the petitioners in the present writ petition, has his own distinct and separate cause of action arising out of his liability to pay the tax individually under the impugned taxing provision. Since the present writ petition embraces more than one of such causes of action and the separate reliefs sought therein, namely, to restrain the respondents from enforcing the impugned taxing provision against each of the petitioners, are based on them (such causes of action), it (the present writ petition) is chargeable with the aggregate amount of the court fees with which the petitions would be chargeable under the Act, if separate writ petitions have been presented in respect of several causes of action, as required by sub-section (3) r/w sub-section (4) of Section 6 of the Act.
20. Hence, we uphold the contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate that under clause (s) of Article 1 of Schedule-II to the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958, read with sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 6 of that Act, each of the petitioners in the present writ petition, is liable to pay thereon a separate court fee of Rs. 100 as if he had presented a separate writ petition. Consequently, we uphold the ruling of the learned single Judge, as regards the aggregate amount of court fees payable on the present writ petition.
In the result, we dismiss this appeal.
However, in the circumstances of this appeal, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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