Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Manjit Singh v. Rattan Singh And Others

Himachal Pradesh High Court
Sep 27, 1996
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Manjit Singh (Owner) v. Rattan Singh & Jai Devi (Claimants) & National Insurance Company (Insurer)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from an award of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-II, Sirmour District at Nahan in Claim Petition No. 16-N/2 of 1991. The claim petition was filed by respondents Rattan Singh and Jai Devi (the claimants) seeking compensation of Rs. 1,00,000 for the death of their daughter Kumari Sunita. The claimants alleged that on 20-10-1990 at about 2:30 p.m. Kumari Sunita was travelling as a fare-paying passenger in a goods truck (registration No. HPN-1495) belonging to the owner (appellant Manjit Singh) and driven by Shamsher Ali (the driver). The truck allegedly struck a rock near village Khajurna, overturned and the deceased sustained fatal injuries on the spot. The claimants pleaded rash and negligent driving by the driver.

The driver was proceeded against ex parte. The owner contested the claim, denying that the deceased was a passenger or that any fare was charged and further denied rash/negligent driving and even denied that the accident occurred as alleged. The insurer denied liability on the ground that liability for passengers in a goods vehicle was not covered by the Motor Vehicles Act or the insurance policy and that its liability was limited.

The Tribunal found that the accident resulted from rash and negligent driving by the driver and awarded Rs. 30,000 with 12% interest from the date of filing (19-8-1991) plus costs of Rs. 500 in favour of the claimants against the owner. The owner (Manjit Singh) appealed that award.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the death of deceased Kumari Sunita was caused due to the rash and negligent driving on the part of respondent No. 1 (the driver)?
  2. If Issue No.1 is answered in the affirmative, what amount of compensation are the petitioners entitled to and from whom?
  3. Whether the insurer (respondent No.3) is not liable to pay compensation to the petitioners as claimed in its additional pleas?
  4. Relief.

Arguments of the Parties

Owner-Appellant (Manjit Singh) — submissions by Shri Gian Chand Gupta

  • The deceased was not travelling in the vehicle in question; therefore she was not a 'fare paying passenger'.
  • Alternatively, the accident was not the result of rash and negligent driving by the driver.
  • If liability arises, it is that of the insurer (i.e., the insurer should bear the liability).

Insurer (National Insurance Company) — submissions by Shri S.S. Kanwar

  • The insurer's plea was that liability for passengers in a goods carrier is not covered under the Motor Vehicles Act or under the insurance policy; hence the insurer is not liable as its liability is limited.
  • Argued that because the vehicle was a goods carriage adapted for carrying goods, passengers (fare-paying or gratuitous) were not covered under the policy contract.
  • Contended that the amendment to Section 140 (increasing no-fault compensation) which came into force on 14-11-1994 is not retrospectively applicable.

Claimants (Rattan Singh & Jai Devi) — submissions by Shri Sandeep Kaushik

  • The deceased was travelling as a fare-paying passenger and paid Rs.15 to the driver.
  • The impugned award of Rs. 30,000 is contrary to Sections 140 and 141 of the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly as interpreted in FAO(MVA) No.205 of 1995 — Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Khem Chand, which held the amendment to Section 140 to be retrospectively applicable.
  • Prayed for enhancement of the award to Rs. 50,000 (the amended no-fault amount) and for interest from the date of filing.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
FAO (MVA) No. 205 of 1995: Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Khem Chand (16-7-1996) Held that the amendment to Section 140 (raising no-fault compensation) is retrospectively applicable. The Court relied on this decision to hold that claimants are entitled to Rs. 50,000 (amended no-fault amount) instead of the Rs. 30,000 awarded by the Tribunal.
1996 ACJ 496: New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Lachhmi Devi (Division Bench) Held that insurer's plea that deceased/injured were gratuitous passengers and therefore insurer not liable was negatived; insurers may be liable even for gratuitous passengers. Cited to support the proposition that insurers cannot avoid liability merely because persons carried were gratuitous passengers; used to negate insurer's contention of non-liability.
1988 ACJ 176: Shingara Ram v. Balak Ram Walia Authority cited as being to similar effect (insurer liable despite passenger status). Relied on as supporting authority that insurer remains liable for passengers carried in goods vehicles.
1989 ACJ 685: New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satya Nath Hazarika Authority cited as being to similar effect (insurer liable for passengers). Used along with other authorities to demonstrate consistent judicial approach imposing liability on insurers in such circumstances.
1996 ACJ 367: New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Bhajni Authority cited as being to similar effect regarding insurer's liability. Referred to as further support for insurer liability despite passenger status.
1995 (2) Shimla Law Cases 134: Oriental Insurance Company v. Smt. Punni Devi Authority cited as being to similar effect. Referred to in the same group of cases supporting insurer liability for passengers.
1996 (6) JT (SC) 32 / 1996 AIR SCW 2466: B.V. Nagaraju v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Divisional Officer, Hassan (Apex Court) Guidance that carriage of passengers in a goods vehicle does not necessarily amount to a fundamental breach of the insurance policy and hence does not automatically deny indemnity. The Court invoked this apex court authority to hold that carrying the deceased did not constitute a fundamental breach that disentitled the owner to indemnity.
1987 (2) SCC 654 / AIR 1987 SC 1184: Skaindia Insurance Company v. Kokilaben Chandravadan Principle: read down exclusion clauses so they do not defeat the main purpose; court should prefer relieving victims over technical constructions that benefit insurers. The Court quoted and applied this reasoning to read exclusion clauses narrowly and to favour indemnification of victims rather than allow insurers to evade liability.
Glynn v. Margeston & Co. (1893 AC 351) Main purpose rule: construe contract in light of its main purpose and reject provisions inconsistent with it. Quoted (through Skaindia passage) to support the reading down of wide exclusion clauses inconsistent with the main purpose of the contract (i.e., protection of victims).
Suissee Atlantique Societe d' Armement Maritime S.A v. N.V Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale (1967 1 AC 361) Noted as authority where the doctrine of fundamental breach was rejected by the House of Lords. Cited to show the continuing approach of reading down exclusion clauses rather than allowing a purported fundamental breach to defeat main purpose.
Manjula Devi Bhuta v. Manjusri Raha (1968 ACJ 1) One of several authorities cited regarding appellate practice and the applicability of procedural powers (Order 41 rules) in appeals under special statutes. Used among a group of authorities to support the Court's view that Order 41, Rule 33 CPC and related appellate powers govern disposal of appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act where there is no specific statutory prohibition.
Phoenix Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kalpana Rajput (1974 ACJ 470 : AIR 1975 Gau 20) Authority concerning appellate practice and cross-objections under Order 41, Rule 22/33 CPC. Relied upon as part of the jurisprudence permitting the High Court to exercise powers under Order 41, Rule 33 CPC to alter awards in appeals under Motor Vehicles Act.
K. Chandrashekhara Naik v. Narayana (1974 ACJ 522 : AIR 1975 Ker 18) Authority concerning appellate practice and powers to entertain cross-objections and to apply Order 41 rules. Referenced to show established practice that the High Court's procedural rules govern such appeals in absence of statutory prescription.
National Insurance Co. v. Tulsi Devi (AIR 1988 Raj 191) Authority cited among cases on appellate practice and applicability of Order 41 provisions. Adduced as supporting precedent for application of appellate procedural powers in Motor Vehicles appeals.
Municipal Board, Mount Abu v. Hari Lal (1988 ACJ 821) Authority cited regarding appellate procedure (Order 41). Included in the series of cases relied upon to justify the Court's exercise of powers under Order 41, Rule 33 CPC.
Sonaram v. Jaiprakash (AIR 1986 MP 21) Authority cited on appellate practice. Referred to as part of the jurisprudential support for applying Order 41 provisions in this appeal.
Oriental Fire & General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rajendra Kaur (AIR 1989 All 221) Authority cited on appellate practice and Order 41 application. Used in the group of authorities to establish the High Court's power to alter awards under Order 41, Rule 33.
Velunni v. Vellakutty (1989 (2) Ker LT 227) Authority cited regarding appellate practice. Included among authorities relied on to support application of Order 41, Rule 33 CPC in Motor Vehicles appeals.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court applied the following sequential reasoning, drawn directly from the opinion:

  1. Evidence on rash/negligent driving and passenger status: The Court found no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's finding on Issue No.1 (rash and negligent driving). The driver had been proceeded against ex parte and was not examined by the owner-appellant; the owner failed to produce better evidence. The Court relied on the testimony of PW-5 Mohan Singh (who described the accident and observed the deceased beneath the truck) and on the F.I.R. (No.162 of 1992) proved by PW-1 (MHC Kundan Singh). These circumstances led to rejection of the owner's pleas that the deceased was not a fare-paying passenger, no fare was charged, or that the accident did not occur due to rash driving.
  2. Insurer's liability for passengers carried in a goods vehicle: The Court examined the insurer's contention that persons like the deceased were not covered under the Motor Vehicles Act or the insurance policy. The Court referred to a line of authorities (including New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Lachhmi Devi and related decisions) which negatived insurer pleas of non-liability for gratuitous passengers and supported indemnity in such situations. The Court further relied on the Apex Court decision in B.V. Nagaraju v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. to hold that carriage of the deceased did not amount to a fundamental breach entitling the insurer to deny indemnity.
  3. Failure to prove policy exclusions or lack of cover: The Court observed that the owner and insurer exhibited documents (registration certificate, fitness certificate, goods carriage permit, insurance policy) but had not proved Exts. RA to RC in accordance with law. More importantly, the insurer did not examine witnesses to establish the exact scope of risks covered or excluded by the policy (Ext. RD/Ext. DX). The Court held that to succeed, the insurer was obliged to prove breach of specified policy conditions and exclusion of risk, which it failed to do.
  4. Doctrinal approach to exclusion clauses: The Court invoked the reasoning in Skaindia Insurance Company v. Kokilaben Chandravadan (quoting Glynn v. Margeston & Co.) to emphasize that exclusion clauses should be read down where they would defeat the main purpose of the contract (relief to victims). The policy must not be construed technically to relieve insurers at the cost of victims' distress; the Court preferred an interpretation that harmonizes exclusion clauses with the policy's main purpose.
  5. Effect of amendment to Section 140 (no-fault compensation): The Court accepted the claimants' reliance on the Division Bench decision in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Khem Chand (FAO (MVA) No.205 of 1995) which held the amendment to Section 140(2) (increasing the no-fault death compensation from Rs.25,000 to Rs.50,000) to be retrospectively applicable. Consequently, the Court held that the compensation in the instant case could not be less than Rs.50,000.
  6. Appellate powers to enhance award (Order 41, Rule 33 CPC): The Court considered whether it could exercise powers under Order 41, Rule 33 CPC to enhance the award and concluded affirmatively. It reasoned that appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act are governed by the High Court's ordinary civil appellate practice unless specifically excluded and that Order 41, Rule 33 confers power on the appellate court to pass such orders as ought to have been passed by the tribunal. The Court relied on several precedents to support the applicability of these powers and held it was competent to bring the award into conformity with Sections 140 and 141.
  7. Conclusion on liability and quantum: On the combined basis of evidential findings, failure of the insurer to prove any policy exclusion, authoritative precedents, and retrospective application of the amended Section 140, the Court concluded that the insurer was liable to indemnify the owner and that the award should be enhanced to Rs.50,000 with interest at 12% per annum from 19-8-1991 until payment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED. The award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (II), Sirmour District at Nahan in Claim Petition No. 16-N/2 of 1991 dated 15-1-1994 is modified: the claimants are entitled to compensation of Rs. 50,000 (in place of Rs. 30,000), with interest at 12% per annum w.e.f. 19-8-1991 until payment. The liability of both the owner (Manjit Singh) and the insurer (National Insurance Company) is held to be joint and several; the insurer is directed to pay the compensation, interest and costs as assessed by the Tribunal.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The claimants receive an enhanced award of Rs. 50,000 plus interest at 12% p.a. from 19-8-1991 until payment.
  • The insurer (National Insurance Company) and the owner (Manjit Singh) are jointly and severally liable to pay the amount awarded and interest; the insurer must indemnify the owner.
  • Any amount already deposited by the owner will be refunded to him; if any such amount has been paid to or refunded to the claimants, the owner may recover the same from the insurer by executing this judgment.
  • Parties are left to bear their own costs (as ordered by this Court).

Broader implications and precedent: The Court applied established authorities to (a) hold that insurers cannot lightly avoid liability for persons carried in goods vehicles where the insurer has not proved policy exclusions or fundamental breach, (b) read exclusion clauses in a manner consistent with the main purpose of providing relief to victims, and (c) apply the retrospective effect of the amendment to Section 140. The Court also affirmed that it may exercise powers under Order 41, Rule 33 CPC when disposing appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act to bring awards into conformity with statutory provisions. The opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond these applications of existing precedent.

Appeal allowed.
Show all summary ...

Arun Kumar Goel, J.:— This appeal is filed by Manjit Singh (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Owner’) against the award passed by Shri B.D Sharma, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-II, Sirmour district at Nahan in Claim Petition No. 16-N/2 of 1991. Respondents Rattan Singh and Jai Devi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Claimants’) filed a claim petition against the owner Shamsher Ali (hereinafter referred to as the ‘driver’) and National Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Insurer’), wherein compensation in the sum of Rs. one lakh was claimed on account of death of the daughter of the claimants Kumari Sunita. According to claimants on 20-10-1990 at 2.30 p.m Kumari Sunita, deceased was travelling in a truck bearing registration No. HPN-1495 belonging to the owner and the said truck was being driven by the driver at the relevant point of time when it was insured with the Insurer. Further case of the claimants was that the deceased was a fare paying passenger in the truck and she paid Rs. 15/- to the driver. When the truck in question had reached near village Khajurna, it met with an accident after striking against a rock as a result of which Kumari Sunita sustained multiple injuries and breathed her last on the spot. Further plea of the claimants was that the truck was being driven in a rash and negligent manner by the driver which resulted in its overturning after striking with a rock and fell down beyond the road.

2. According to claimants, the deceased was earning Rs. 600/- per month by way of helping them in their household and agricultural work and she was their eldest child. As such they were dependent upon her for their livelihood. The driver was proceeded against ex parte, whereas the owner and the insurer contested the claim of the claimants. So far the owner is concerned, his case was that the deceased was not a passenger having travelled in the truck in question and further no fare was charged by the driver from her. Not only this, he further went on to the extent of saying that the truck in question did not meet with the accident as alleged and while doing so, it was also pleaded that the truck was not being driven by the driver in a rash and negligent manner. So far the insurer is concerned, its plea was that the liability in respect of passengers in a goods carrier is not covered in terms of the Motor Vehicles Act as well as under the policy of insurance. It was further pleaded that no liability is attached to the insurer in such a situation because its liability is limited.

3. Claimants filed rejoinders to the replies of owner as well as insurer and the parties went to trial on the following issues:—

1. Whether the death of deceased Km. Sunita Devi was caused due to the rash and negligent driving on the part of respondent No. 1? …OPP.

2. In case issue No. 1 is proved in affirmative to what amount of compenstion, the petitioners are entitled and from whom? …OPP.

3. Whether the respondent No. 3 is not liable to pay compensation to the petitioners as claimed in the additional pleas raised by it in its reply? …O.P.R-3.

4. Relief.

4. The Tribunal below while holding that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver awarded a compensation of Rs. 30,000/- together with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of filing of the petition i.e 19-8-1991 in favour of the claimants and against the owner — present appellant together with costs quantified at Rs. 500/-. It is this award dated 15-1-1994 passed by the Tribunal below which has been impugned in this appeal.

5. Under the provisions of Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, amount of Rs. 25,000/- in case of death is payable on the principle of ‘No Fault Liability’. This provision appears to have been enacted to provide immediate relief and respite to the dependents of the deceased person in respect of whom compensation is claimed by the claimants. By Section 43 of the Act No. 54 of 1993, provisions of Section 140 of the Act were amended thereby under Section 140(2) of the Act, amount of compensation in case of death on the principle of ‘No Fault Liability’ was enhanced from Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 50,000/- and the amount payable in case of ‘permanent disablement’ was enhanced from Rs. 12,000/- to Rs. 25,000/-. In accordance with the provisions of Section 141 of the Act, the amount of compensation payable has not to be less than the amount payable under ‘No Fault Liability’. For ready reference, provisions of Section 141 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are reproduced hereinbelow:—

“141. Provisions as to other right to claim compensation for death or permanent disablement.—(1) The right to claim compensation under Section 140 in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be in addition to (any other right, except the right to claim under the scheme referred to Section 163A (such other right hereafter) in this section referred to as the right on the principle of fault) to claim compensation in respect thereof under any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force).

(2) A claim for compensation under Section 140 in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where compensation is claimed in respect of such death or permanent disablement under Section 140 and also in pursuance of any right on the principle of fault, the claim for compensation under Section 140 shall be disposed of as aforesaid in the first place.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, the person liable to pay compensation under Section 140 is also liable to pay compensation in accordance with the right on the principle of fault, the person so liable shall pay the first-mentioned compensation and—

(a) if the amount of the first-mentioned compensation is less than the amount of the second-mentioned compensation he shall be liable to pay (in addition to the first-mentioned compensation) only so much of the second-mentioned compensation as is equal to the amount by which it exceeds the first-mentioned compensation;

(b) if the amount of the first-mentioned compensation is equal to or more than the amount of the second-mentioned compensation he shall not be liable to pay the second-mentioned compensation.”

6. Shri Gian Chand Gupta, learned counsel for the owner-appellant has raised three-fold submission that the deceased was not travelling in the vehicle in question. So, there is no question of her being a ‘Fare Paying Passenger’. Alternatively and without conceding he submitted that the accident was not the result of rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver. Lastly, liability, if any, for payment of compensation is that of the insurer.

7. On the other hand, Shri S.S Kanwar, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the deceased on the own showing of the claimants was travelling as a ‘fare paying passenger’ in the vehicle in question which was a goods carriage vehicle adapted for carriage of goods and thus, neither under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act nor under the contract of insurance subject to which the vehicle in question had been insured was covered in terms of the policy of insurance, Ext. RX and thus, the insurer is not liable for payment of compensation. According to him, the liability has been rightly fixed on the owner-appellant and thus, he has prayed for the dismissal of the appeal.

8. On behalf of the claimants, Sh. Sandeep Kaushik made two-fold submission that the impugned award is contrary to the provisions of Sections 140 and 141 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 when examined in the light of the judgment of this Court passed in FAO(MVA) No. 205 of 1995, titled as Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Khem Chand decided on 16-7-1996. According to Shri Sandeep Kaushik, the amendment has been held to be retrospectively applicable, as such in no case, the award in the present case can be less than Rs. 50,000/- in terms of Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as it stands amended w.e.f 14-11-1994. Thus, he has prayed for exercise of discretion in favour of his clients thereby enhancing the amount of compensation from Rs. 30,000/- to Rs. 50,000/- so as to bring the impugned award in consonance with the provisions of Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as it stood on the date of final hearing in this case.

9. So far the first two submissions of Shri Gian Chand Gupta are concerned, the findings recorded by the Tribunal below on issue No. 1 call for no interference. In this behalf, it is appropriate to point out that the driver of the vehicle was proceeded against ex parte and the owner-appellant did not care to examine him. There could be no better evidence that could be produced by the owner other than examining the driver of the vehicle in question. Statement of PW-5, Mohan Singh in this behalf is clear and there is no reason to discard the same. He has given a vivid account of the manner, in which the accident took place and all the passengers of the bus in which he was travelling and had witnessed the accident came out after the bus had stopped when it was noticed that the deceased was lying in a serious condition beneath the truck. This witness has withstood the test of cross-examination directed to him. In addition to this, there is another circumstance though a weak one i.e that a case has been registered vide F.I.R No. 162 of 1992, dated 20-12-1992 against the driver Shamsher Ali under Sections 279, 337/304, I.P.C (Section 304-A?). Copy of F.I.R has been proved by MHC Kundan Singh (PW-1). It may further be pointed out that the F.I.R was lodged by Asghar Ali, Conductor of the truck in question. In these circumstances, the pleas on behalf of the owner that the deceased was either not travelling as a ‘Fare paying passenger’ or no fare was charged and the accident being not the result of rash and negligent driving are rejected.

10. Now, the plea regarding the insuance company being not liable has to be considered in the light of the submission of Shri S.S Kanwar that the insurer is not liable for payment of compensation in respect of the persons like the deceased.

11. In 1996 ACJ 496, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Lachhmi Devi, a Division Bench of this Court has held that where the truck had been hired for carrying the members of a marriage party and dowry and met with an accident resulting in several persons sustaining injuries and some of them succumbing to those, the plea of the Insurance Company that the deceased/injured being gratuitous passengers, it is not liable for payment of compensation was negatived. At the same time, it was held by this Court that even gratuitous passengers are entitled to get compensation from the Insurance Company. To similar effect are the cases reported in 1988 ACJ 176, Shingara Ram v. Balak Ram Walia; 1989 ACJ 685, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satya Nath Hazarika; 1996 ACJ 367, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Bhajni; 1995 (2) Shimla Law Cases 134, Oriental Insurance Company v. Smt. Punni Devi connected cases.

12. Another question to be examined is that whether on account of carriage of deceased by the driver of the truck, it can be said that there was breach of policy of insurance, Ext. RD to such an extent that the owner of the vehicle i.e the present appellant being denied the indemnification due to such use which may be irregular but cannot be said to be so fundamental a breach to put an end to the contract of insurance. Carriage of the deceased was in no way a contributory factor to the accident in question. It is neither the plea raised by the owner nor by the insurer that in case the deceased had not been carried in the vehicle in question, the accident could be avoided. In taking this view, we are guided by the judgment of the apex Court reported in 1996 (6) JT (SC) 32 : (1996 AIR SCW 2466), B.V Nagaraju v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Divisional Officer, Hassan.. In the face of this position, the plea of the insurer that it is not liable for payment of compensation to the claimants on account of death of Kumari Sunita who, according to it, was a gratuitous passenger is hereby negatived. Further in order to succeed, the insurer was required to prove that at the time of accident the vehicle was used in breach of specified conditions giving rise to the claim by risk of the carriage of the passenger therein for hire or reward and there was a specified condition in the policy which excluded the use of insured vehicle for carriage of any passenger for hire or reward and at the time of insurance, the insured vehicle was expressly or impliedly not covered by a permit for hire or reward. In the instant case, though the Registration Certificate of the vehicle in question has been tendered in evidence and marked as Ext. RA, fitness certificate is marked as Ext. RB and Goods Carriage Permit is marked as Ext. RC. Besides these documents, insurance policy has been marked as Ext. RD. So far Exts. RA to RC are concerned, they do not stand proved in accordance with law. Simply because the documents had been exhibited would not dispense with the mode of proof through which such documents are required to be proved by a party wanted to take benefit of it. Further in case the insurer wanted to take benefit of insurance policy, Ext. DX, it was required to examine the witness to prove as to what was the risk covered in terms of it, what was the risk not covered and what was the amount of premium charged under what heads. This has not been done. In 1987 (2) SCC 654 : (AIR 1987 SC 1184), Skaindia Insurance Company v. Kokilaben Chandravadan, the Apex Court has observed as under:—

“….When the option is between opting for a view which will relieve the distress and misery of the victims of accidents or their dependents on the one hand and the equally plausible view which will reduce the profitability of the insurer in regard to the occupational hazard undertaken by him by way of business activity, there is hardly any choice. The Court cannot but opt for the former view. Even if one were to make a strictly doctrinaire approach, the very same conclusion would emerge in obeisance to the doctrine of reading down the exclusion clause in the light of the main purpose of the provision so that the exclusion clause does not cross swords with the main purpose highlighted earlier. The effort must be to harmonize the two instead of allowing the exclusion clause to snipe successfully at the main purpose. The theory which needs no support is supported by Carter's “Breach of Contract” vide paragraph 251. To quote:

Notwithstanding the general ability of contracting parties to agree to exclusion clauses which operate to define obligations there exists a rule, usually referred to as the “main purpose rule”, which may limit the application of wide exclusion clauses defining a promiser's contractual obligations. For example, in Glynn v. Margeston & Co. (1893 AC 351, 357), Lord Halsbury, L.C stated: It seems to me that in construing this document, which is a contract of carriage between the parties, one must in the first instance look at the whole instrument and not at one part of it only. Looking at the whole instrument, and seeing what one must regard….as its main purpose, one must reject words, indeed whole provisions, if they are inconsistent with what one assumes to be the main purpose of the contract.

Although this rule played a role in the development of the doctrine of fundamental breach, the continued validity of the rule was acknowledged when the doctrine was rejected by the House of Lords in Suissee Atlantique Societe d' Armement Maritime S.A v. N.V Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale, 1967 1 AC 361. Accordingly, wide exclusion clauses will be read down to the extent to which they are inconsistent with the main purpose, or object of the contract.”

13. In the face of the case law discussed hereinabove, the contention raised by Shri S.S Kanwar does not hold the ground and it is held that the insurer is liable to indemnify the owner for payment of compensation in the present case. Needless to clarify here that it is not in dispute that the vehicle in question was insured with the insurer i.e National Insurance Company at the relevant point of time vide policy No. 400108/6301342/91, Ext. RX. The vehicle in question stood insured with the Insurance Company and the vehicle being not insured is not the plea raised by the insurer in its reply.

14. Now remains the plea of Shri Sandeep Kaushik made on behalf of the claimants to bring the award in consonance with the provisions of Sections 140 and 141 of the Motor Vehicles Act referred to hereinabove. The parties are not at variance that the amount of compensation payable in case of claim made in no case be less than the amount under ‘No fault liability’. Shri S.S Kanwar has submitted that since the amendment came into force w.e.f 14-11-1994, therefore, the amended provision is not retrospectively applicable and he has contested the contention of Shri Kaushik. This question is no more res integra in view of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in FAO (MVA) No. 205 of 1955 (supra) wherein the amended provision of Section 140(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act has been held to be retrospectively applicable. As such it is held that the claimants are entitled to compensation of Rs. 50,000/- instead of Rs. 30,000/- as awarded by Tribunal below.

15. Now, the question that remains to be considered is whether the provision of Order 41, Rule 33, C.P.C is applicable to the present case and whether in exercise of such powers this Court is competent to enhance the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal below. In this behalf, it may be appropriate to point out that when the provisions of Sections 140 and 141 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are read together, then in that event, it has to be ensured that the amount of compensation payable in a claim petition should not be less than the amount payable under ‘No fault liability’. If that is so, then this Court is competent to bring the award in accordance with law and to make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to make further or other order as the case may require, and this power can be exercised by this Court in favour of all or any of the respondents although such respondents may not have filed an appeal or cross objections. Further there is no exclusion for the exercise of powers under Order 41, Rule 33, C.P.C by this Court or under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 or the rules framed thereunder.

16. When this Court is exercising its appellate jurisdiction conferred on it under a special statute i.e Motor Vehicles Act in the present case, then the rules of procedure and practice followed by this Court applicable to an ordinary civil appeal would govern unless, of course, there is a specific prohibition under the statute governing such appeal. Besides this, the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act are a beneficial piece of legislation for providing quick and substantial relief to the claimants, who are the victims of unfortunate accident for no fault of theirs. Further in such like circumstances, provisions of Order 41, Rule 33, C.P.C can be made applicable and being a beneficial legislation, technical meaning need not be given to the law. By giving such a meaning, the Court would be acting in the direction of achieving the object of the legislation for which it has been enacted.

17. If a pedantic or technical view is taken regarding applicability of the provisions of Order 41, Rule 33, C.P.C then the provisions of Order 41, Rule 22, C.P.C would not be applicable to the appeals under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act. Yet in cases where a party is unable to file the appeal comes up in cross-objections, then in such an eventuality the appeal so filed when cross-objections are filed has to be regulated by the practice and procedure of the High Court and it is on this basis that the cross-objections under Order 41, Rule 22, C.P.C are entertained. In taking this view, we place reliance on 1968 ACJ 1, Manjula Devi Bhuta v. Manjusri Raha; 1974 ACJ 470 : (AIR 1975 Gau 20), The Phoenix Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Kalpana Rajput; 1974 ACJ 522 : (AIR 1975 Ker 18), K. Chandrashekhara Naik v. Narayana; AIR 1988 Raj 191, National Insurance Co. v. Tulsi Devi; 1988 ACJ 821, Municipal Board, Mount Abu v. Hari Lal; AIR 1986 MP 21, Sonaram v. Jaiprakash; AIR 1989 All 221, Oriental Fire & General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Rajendra Kaur; 1989 (2) Ker LT 227, Velunni v. Vellakutty. It may be reiterated here that Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides right of appeal under Section 173 to this Court without indicating anything the manner in which the appeal is to be disposed of. In these circumstances what is necessarily implied is that the right of appeal will carry applicability of rules of practice and procedure of this Court with regard to its power to entertain and decide the appeal including its disposal and manner of exercise of that jurisdiction and all other incidences thereof. Needless to point out here that Order 41, Rule 33, C.P.C confers a special power on the appellate Court. In the face of this position, this Court is well within its legal authority to exercise jurisdiction vested in it under Order 41, Rule 33, C.P.C and to bring the Award in consonance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

18. As a result of the above discussion, the present appeal succeeds and the Award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (II), Sirmour District at Nahan in Claim Petition No. 16-N/2 of 1991, dated 15-1-1994 is modified thereby holding that the claimants Rattan Singh and Jai Devi are entitled to a compensation of Rs. 50,000/- instead of Rs. 30,000/- as awarded by the Tribunal below. They are also held entitled to interest on this amount at the rate of 12% per annum w.e.f 19-8-1991 till the date of payment and the liability of both owner Manjit Singh and insurer National Insurance Company is joint and several and the insurer is liable to pay this amount of compensation together with interest and costs as assessed by the Tribunal below. Parties are left to bear their own costs. Amount if any, deposited by the owner will be refunded to him and in case any part/whole of the same has been paid/refunded to the claimants, owner is held to be entitled to recover the same from the insurer on the strength of this judgment by executing it and without his being dragged to another round of litigation.

Appeal allowed.