Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Punjab Tyre House & Ors. v. State Of Gujarat & Anr.

Gujarat High Court
Apr 19, 2002
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — D.P. Buck, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking quashing of Criminal Case No. 96 of 2002 filed by respondent No. 2 against the petitioners for offences alleged under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and offences under Sections 420 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 15, Ahmedabad City.

The complaint alleges that petitioner No.1 is a registered partnership firm and petitioners Nos.2 and 3 are its partners who carried on business in sale of tyres and allied products. The petitioners are alleged to have entered into a contract with respondent No.2 (complainant) for the supply of goods, received delivery of goods, but defaulted in regular payment. Initially payments were made; subsequently petitioners issued cheques (signed by petitioner No.2) which were dishonoured on presentation. The complainant alleged that the petitioners adopted a modus operandi to cheat, induced the complainant to deliver goods, and that the cheques were dishonoured, constituting offences under Section 138 NI Act and Section 420 IPC (cheating).

The learned Magistrate recorded verification of the complainant on oath, registered the complaint and issued process for offences punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and for the offence punishable under Section 420 read with Section 114 of the IPC. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the present Section 482 application before the High Court.

After notice and hearing, the High Court dismissed the Section 482 application as meritless and ordered the petitioners to deposit costs of Rs. 5,000 to be transmitted to the Gujarat High Court Bar Association Library Fund.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the complaint and issuance of process can be quashed in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC where cheques were allegedly issued and subsequently dishonoured (i.e., whether no prima facie case is made out under Section 138 NI Act and Section 420 IPC).
  2. Whether Section 219 CrPC (restricting trial to any number of offences not exceeding three of same kind within twelve months) prevents registration or cognizance of a complaint containing more than three cheque-related offences at the complaint/FIR stage.
  3. Whether alleged overwriting/revalidation of cheque dates and presentation after validity period renders the cheques invalid as a matter appropriate for quashing at the Section 482 stage.
  4. Whether petitioners Nos.2 and 3 (partners) are shown by the complaint to be responsible for the firm's business and thus liable under applicable provisions (including Section 141 of the NI Act implications) when the alleged offences were committed.
  5. Whether the notices sent under Section 138 were properly served (postal acknowledgements lacking post office stamps/dates) and whether limitation bars the complaint.
  6. Whether cheques were issued merely as collateral security (making the matter civil) or as payment against existing debt/liability.
  7. Whether the Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint (cause of action arising in Ahmedabad).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (Applicants') Arguments

  • Section 219 CrPC limits the trial to any number of offences not exceeding three of the same kind within a span of 12 months; because several cheques were said to have been issued, the trial Court could not have issued process for more than three offences.
  • The cheques were invalid because they were presented after the due date and/or the cheques showed overwriting (dates struck off and new dates rubber-stamped), suggesting fabricated/revalidated dates to bring presentation within limitation.
  • Petitioners Nos.2 and 3 were not responsible or liable to answer the complaint because the complaint did not expressly allege they were responsible on the date the offences were committed (i.e., questions about partner liability/responsibility on the date of dishonour).
  • The amounts stated in the cheques were not due on the dates of the cheques (argument that cheques were post-dated or intended as collateral security), hence no offence under Section 138 was made out.
  • Postal acknowledgements produced in support of service of Section 138 notices lack post office stamps/dates and do not indicate precise dates of posting/delivery, casting doubt on proper service and on limitation.
  • Because payment was contractually to be made within 45 days, the cheques cannot be said to have been issued against an existing debt/liability on the cheque dates (argument aimed at negating Section 138 liability).

Respondent's (Complainant's / State's) Arguments

  • The transactions constituted one series of connected acts forming the same transaction; under Section 220 CrPC, where acts are connected to form the same transaction, multiple offences can be charged together and the Section 219 limitation is not a ground to quash the complaint at this stage.
  • The alleged overwriting/revalidation of dates is specifically addressed in the complaint as having resulted from a concession requested by the accused (i.e., change of dates by agreement); the factual contention leads to a disputed question of fact unfit for resolution under Section 482.
  • Petitioners Nos.2 and 3 were alleged in the complaint to be running the partnership firm and were actively participating in negotiations and business; petitioner No.2 signed the cheques, so the complaint sufficiently alleges their responsibility on the relevant dates.
  • The complainant contends that notices were served (probably on 22-12-2001); petitioners do not deny receipt of notices and even replied — hence service and receipt are not realistically disputed for the purposes of the Section 482 application.
  • The cheques were, according to the complainant, issued on delivery of goods to meet payment obligations (not merely collateral), and thus prima facie Section 138 is attracted; whether debt/liability existed on particular cheque dates is a question of fact for trial.
  • The complainant alleges that initial payments were made to create trust and induce further supplies; subsequent revalidation and dishonour of cheques gives rise to prima facie cheating (Section 420 IPC), a matter of evidence for trial.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd. v. Jayswals Neco Ltd., 2001 (3) SCC 609 The opinion referred to this decision but did not elaborate its principle in the present text. The Court noted that this decision "will not help the petitioner" on the facts of the present case.
Alka N. Shah v. State of Gujarat, 2000 (3) GLH 468 : 2001 (2) GLR 1023 Where an accused had resigned before the offence was committed, Section 141 NI Act liability could not be fastened; offence committed on presentation/dishonour of cheque and issuance of notice. Distinguished: in the present case petitioners remained partners on dates in question, so that decision does not apply.
Gopishankar S. Vaid v. State of Gujarat, 2001 (1) GLR 267 When a company nominates a person under Section 17(2) to be responsible for conduct of business, other directors/officers are not to be prosecuted unless consent/connivance is alleged. Distinguished: petitioners are partners in a firm (not a company nominated person); signer of cheque is prima facie responsible.
Shanku Concretes Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 2000 (2) GLR 1705 Where cheques were issued merely as collateral security for future payment (no existing debt), the transaction was civil and complaint under Section 138 could be quashed. Distinguished on facts: here goods were delivered and cheques were issued to fulfil payment obligation; prima facie not merely collateral.
A.V. Murthy v. B.S. Nagabasavanna, 2002 (2) SCC 642 Supreme Court disapproved quashing of complaint where limitation plea was accepted prematurely; issues of debt/liability on cheque date are questions of fact. Cited to support the view that factual issues about existence of debt on cheque dates cannot be decided in Section 482 proceedings.
M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals & Ors., 2002 SCC (Cri.) 121 Complaint by a company employee without authorisation is maintainable and want of authorisation can be rectified subsequently; courts should not go into technicalities at the initial stage. Applied to reinforce that technical/formal defects should not be grounds for quashing at the complaint stage.
S.A. Nanjundeswara v. Varlak Agrotech (P) Ltd., AIR 2002 SC 477; State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa & Anr., AIR 2002 SC 671 If statements on face value do not make out any offence, criminal proceedings can be quashed; High Court should not sift material at initial stage. Cited to illustrate limits of High Court's power to quash when prima facie allegations exist; Court found prima facie case here.
Union of India v. Banwari Lal Agarwal, 1998 (4) Crimes 75 (SC) Case concerning quashing and jurisdiction under the Income Tax Act (specific legal and factual aspects). Found not relevant to present facts; Court said it is not applicable.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, AIR 1983 SC 67 Powers under Section 482 CrPC (read with Section 397(2)) are to be exercised sparingly and only where a complaint/FIR does not make out even a prima facie case. Applied: Court held that where prima facie allegations exist against petitioners, Section 482 should not be used to quash proceedings at this stage.
State of Haryana v. Brijlal Mittal & Ors., 1998 (5) SCC 343 Simply being a Director does not make a person vicariously liable for offences by the company. Distinguished: present complaint specifically alleges active involvement of partners; thus partners are not being held vicariously liable merely by position.
Harsukhbhai Lakshmanbhai v. State of Gujarat, 2001 (3) GLR 2271 Where cheque signed by one partner and other partner actively involved in transaction, both may be liable for return of cheque. Applied by analogy: supports view that partners involved in negotiations and cheque issuance may be proceeded against.
Dependra O. Choksi v. Dipak Chimanlal Patel, 1997 (2) GLR 1191 Magistrate has a duty to screen allegations and if prima facie cheating is made out, to issue process under Section 420 IPC. Applied: Court found prima facie allegations of cheating sufficient to justify issuance of process and to deny quashing at Section 482 stage.
Hridaya Ranjan Pd. Verma v. State of Bihar, 2000 AIR SCW 2077 Where complaint does not allege dishonest intention at the beginning of negotiations, quashing of criminal proceedings may be justified. Distinguished: in the present case the complaint contains allegations of initial fraudulent intention and inducement, so Hridaya Ranjan is not in favour of petitioners.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a structured analysis of the legal and factual contentions raised in the Section 482 petition, and applied statutory provisions and precedents to each contention. The central thrust of the reasoning is summarized below in the sequence addressed in the opinion:

  1. Section 219 CrPC (restriction to trying not more than three offences of the same kind within twelve months) — The Court observed that the limitation in Section 219 is a restriction relevant to trial; it does not prevent registration of FIR/complaint or investigation. If necessary, the Investigating Officer or the trial Court can split or separate trials or submit supplementary charge-sheets in conformity with Section 219. Therefore, Section 219 does not justify quashing of the complaint at the present stage.
  2. Section 218 and Section 220 CrPC (trying charges together; series of acts forming same transaction) — The Court considered that where a series of acts are so connected as to form the same transaction, Section 220 allows charging and trying all such offences together. The respondent's contention that the transactions amounted to one series of connected acts was a factual contention that cannot be decided in a Section 482 petition; accordingly, the complaint could not be quashed on this ground.
  3. Overwriting/revalidation of cheque dates and presentation after validity period — The Court noted specific cheques showing struck-off dates and later rubber-stamped dates. The complaint itself alleges that some cheques bear two dates and that dates were altered on the basis of a concession granted by the accused. This produces a disputed question of fact (who altered dates and why) which is not amenable to resolution in inherent jurisdiction proceedings. The Court held that this factual dispute militates against quashing.
  4. Liability of partners (petitioners Nos.2 and 3) on the date of the alleged offence — The Court examined the complaint's averments (use of "are" in Para 1 and allegations of active participation and signing of cheques) and found that the complaint sufficiently pleads that petitioners Nos.2 and 3 were actively engaged in the business and in the transaction. The Court distinguished precedents where accused had resigned prior to offence; here the partners remained in office and petitioner No.2 signed cheques — hence prima facie liability is alleged and is a matter for trial.
  5. Service and dates of notices (postal acknowledgements) — Although the postal acknowledgements may lack post office stamps or explicit dates, petitioners do not deny receipt; they admit receipt and that they replied. The question of precise dates can be examined by evidence at trial (including postal department records). On the present record it could not be said notices were not issued; the respondent's assertion of probable service on 22-12-2001 creates a triable factual issue and precludes quashing on limitation grounds.
  6. Whether cheques were collateral security (civil transaction) or payment against existing debt — The Court observed that the facts in Shanku Concretes (where cheques as collateral led to quashing) are different. Here the complainant alleges goods were delivered and cheques were given to meet payment obligations; whether debt/liability existed on each cheque date is a factual question for trial and not for disposal by Section 482.
  7. Allegation of cheating (Section 420 IPC) — The complaint alleges a modus operandi and that initial payments were made to create trust and induce further supply of goods, followed by revalidation and dishonour of cheques. The respondent's case is that dishonest intention crystallised at the time of revalidation and presentation. The Court held that these are questions of fact which cannot be resolved on a Section 482 petition; on the face of the complaint, prima facie ingredients of cheating are alleged, and the complainant should be permitted to lead evidence.
  8. Jurisdiction of Magistrate at Ahmedabad — The Court found that the complainant is resident of Ahmedabad, cheques were issued to the complainant and payments in the past were made at Ahmedabad; prima facie some cause of action has arisen at Ahmedabad. Jurisdiction objection does not warrant quashing at the complaint stage; if required, the trial Court can decide jurisdiction after evidence.
  9. Overarching principle — The Court repeatedly emphasized that Section 482 is a sparingly used, exceptional power. Where a complaint discloses prima facie offences, it is not appropriate to quash proceedings; disputed factual matters and technicalities should be left for investigation and trial. The Court relied on relevant precedents to support this restraining approach.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Section 482 application was DISMISSED. The Court held that the complaint prima facie discloses offences under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, and therefore it is not just, proper or legal to quash the complaint at the initial stage under Section 482 CrPC.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The criminal proceedings in Criminal Case No. 96 of 2002 remain live and may proceed in the trial Court.
  • The petitioners were ordered to deposit costs of Rs. 5,000 (Rupees Five Thousand only) in this Court, to be transmitted to the Gujarat High Court Bar Association Library Fund.

Broader implications: The Court did not lay down a new legal principle or overrule precedent; rather, it applied established doctrines that Section 482 powers are to be exercised sparingly and that disputed factual questions (e.g., revalidation of cheque dates, existence of debt on cheque dates, service dates) should be resolved at trial. The opinion thus leaves the relevant legal principles intact and limits its decision to the present facts.

Notice discharged. Application dismissed as meritless. Costs ordered (Rs. 5,000) as directed above.

Show all summary ...

JUDGMENT D.P. Buck, J.

1. This is an application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing Criminal Case No. 96 of 2002 filed by respondent No. 2, herein, against the petitioners for offences punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as well as for the offences punishable under Sections 420 and 406 of I.P.C. before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 15, Ahmedabad City. The facts of the case of the said Criminal Case No. 96 of 2002 may be briefly stated as follows :

2. That, petitioner No. 1 is a registered partnership firm and petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are the partners thereof. It is alleged in the complaint before the trial Court that petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 herein together and with the help of each other are running business in the name and style of petitioner No. 1. It is also alleged in the complaint that petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are carrying on business of sale of tyres and allied products from their business premises as mentioned in the complaint. It is further alleged in the complaint that petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 approached the Ahmedabad branch office of respondent No. 2 sometime in July, 1999 and presented themselves as sellers of products such as those of the complainant and asked that the complainant should sell its products through their business. Ultimately, a contract was entered into and sale was made. It is further alleged in the complaint that despite the delivery of goods, payment was not made regularly. It is alleged that at the first instance, payment was made, but thereafter, payments were not made but cheques were issued by petitioner No. 1 and signed by the second petitioner. However, the cheques were dishonoured when presented to the Bank concerned. Therefore, there is allegation that the petitioners herein have committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, 'the Act'). It is further alleged that the present petitioners have adopted a modus operandi designed and crafted to cheat the complainant and the entire chain of events shows that the accused did not have either resources or intention to make the payment to the complainant, even though under the terms and conditions, issuance of cheques against delivery of goods was agreed to by the accused. It is further alleged in the complaint that it was the intention of the accused to cheat the complainant and induce the complainant to part with the valuable goods. It is, therefore, contended that by such inducement, the contesting respondents have delivered the goods, and thereafter, the cheques issued were not honoured and, therefore, payments could not be realised and, therefore, according to the case of the original complainant, the complainant was cheated by the aforesaid action on the part of the petitioners. Therefore, offence punishable under Section 420 of I.P.C. has also been alleged against the petitioners.

2A. On receipt of the aforesaid complaint, the learned Magistrate recorded verification of the complainant on oath, and thereafter, he directed that the complaint be registered and process be issued for offences punishable under Section 138 of the Act and for the offence punishable under Section 420 read with Section 114 of I.P.C. Feeling aggrieved by the said order of the learned Magistrate, the applicants herein have preferred this application before this Court. It has been mainly contended here that since several cheques said to have been issued by the petitioners, the trial Court could not have issued process for more than three offences as indicated in section 219 of the said code. It is further contended that the cheques were invalid as they were presented after the due date. It is also contended that there was some overwriting with respect to the dates for the issue of cheques, and therefore, such cheques could not have been considered by the trial Court for any purpose. It is further contended that petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 were not responsible and liable to answer the complaint as there was no allegation in the complaint that they were responsible and liable for the alleged offence even on the date of which the offence was allegedly committed. It is further contended that the amount stated in the cheques were not due on the date of the cheques, and therefore, no offence can be said to have been made out against the petitioners. It is, therefore, contended that the learned Magistrate has committed grave error in issuing process after registering the complaint against the petitioners. That therefore, since no offence has been made out, the present application may be allowed and the aforesaid criminal case filed against the petitioners be quashed and set aside.

3. On receipt of the aforesaid application, notice was issued and in response to the service of notice, learned A.P.P., Mr. V. M. Pancholi appears for the State of Gujarat-respondent No. 1 and Mr. P. C. Kavina, learned Advocate appears for respondent No. 2. I have heard the learned Advocates for the parties and have perused the papers. In fact, learned Advocates for the parties have taken me through the complaint as well as the memo of the application submitted by the applicant herein. It is first contended by the learned Advocate for the applicants that under section 219 of the code, the trial Court could have dealt with only three offences if committed within a span of one year and if the offences are more than three, then in that event, for the remaining offences, the Court could not take cognizance of such offences. For this purpose, he has taken me through the provisions made in section 219 of the code which reads as under :

"Section 219. Three offences of same kind within year may be charged together :-- (1) when a person is accused of more offences than one of the same kind committed within the space of twelve months from the first to the last of such offences, whether in respect of the same person or not, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, any number of them not exceeding three.

(2) Offences are of the same kind when they are punishable with the same amount of punishment under the same section of the i.p.c. or of any special or local law :

Provided that, for the purposes of this Section, an offence punishable under Section 379 of the I.P.C. shall be deemed to be an offence of the same kind as an offence punishable under Section 380 of the Code, and that an offence punishable under any Sectionof the said code, or of any special or local law, shall be deemed to be an offence of the same kind as an attempt to commit such offence, when such an attempt is an offence."

While dealing with the provisions of Section 219 of the Code, it would also be relevant to consider the provisions made in section 218 of the said code, wherein it has been mentioned that when the accused person, by application in writing, so desires and the Magistrate is of the opinion that such person is not likely to be prejudiced thereby, the Magistrate may try together all or any number of the charges framed against such person. This is not a stage at which section 218 of the code can be brought into operation. However, the fact remains that it is not the intention of the legislature that more than one offence cannot be tried together or that more than three offences cannot be tried together. It is true that the provision of Section 218 of the Code is subject to the consent of the accused person. It is also based on the fact that the Magistrate has to find that no prejudice is likely to be caused to the accused, if he is tried for many offence at a time.

4. So far Section 219 is concerned, it is true that it has been mentioned in it that when a person is accused of more offences than one of the same kind committed within the span of twelve months from the first to the last of such offences, whether in respect of the same person or not, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, any number of them not exceeding three. At the same time, it is also relevant to refer to provisions of Section 220 of the Code wherein it has been stated that if one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, and if more offences than one are committed by the same person, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such offence. It has been argued by the learned Advocate for the petitioners that different bills have been issued, different cheques have been issued. Cheques have been issued on different dates, and therefore, it cannot be said that one offence has been committed. On the other hand, it has been argued on behalf of the contesting respondent, that, in fact, it is a series of one transaction and as and when the goods were required, they were supplied by the respondents. It is a matter of the same transaction and the dispute is between the same parties and therefore, it would not be open to this Court to quash the complaint on the basis of the aforesaid contention raised by the petitioners. This requires consideration, and hence, the complaint cannot be quashed on this count.

5. It is also required to be considered that the requirement of section 219 of the code for trying three offences in one case within a span of one year is restricted to the actual trial and not to the filing of complaint or F.I.R.. Even if a F.I.R. or a complaint has been filed consisting of more than three offences in one year, then also F.I.R. can be registered. It can be investigated also. However, if it is found that there is some defect touching the provisions made in Section 219, then the Investigating Officer can divide the cases in accordance with the provisions made in section 219 of the code. If he does not do it and submits one composite chage-sheet for more than three offences, then the Court may, separate the trial to be in conformity with the provisions made in section 219 of the code. In the alternative, even the Investigating Police Officer may also file supplementary chage-sheet so as to be in conformity with section 219 of the code. Therefore, the restrictions placed by section 219 of the code may not be an obstruction at the stage of filing of F.I.R. or a complaint. Therefore, even from this angle, the complaint filed by the contesting respondent cannot be thrown away on the ground of restriction of section 219 of the code.

6. It is next contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, that the cheques were invalid inasmuch as the period of presentation had expired, and therefore, there were some overwriting on the cheques with respect to the date of issue of those cheques. Learned Advocate for the petitioner has drawn my attention to a cheque at page No. 52 which shows that there is one date i.e. 7-12-2000 which has been struck off and rubber stamp showing the date of 29-11-2001 has been affixed. It is the argument of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that this type of overwriting in the date of cheque shows that the dates are not genuine and the rubber stamp has been placed on those dates by the contesting respondent with a view to show that the presentation of the cheque was within limitation. On this aspect of the case, it would be necessary to refer to the averments made in the complaint. In Para 4 of the complaint at page 16 it has been alleged by the contesting respondent that some of the cheques issued by the accused are bearing two dates. It is further mentioned therein that these dates were put on the cheques by the accused on the basis of concession granted by the complainant to the accused inasmuch as the accused had requested the complainant not to deposit the cheques within the validity period as per the earlier date. It is further stated in the said Para that all these cheques, which were revalidated, bear new dales. Any way there is an allegation on the part of the petitioners that there was overwriting in the cheques with respect to the dates of the cheque. On the other hand, the contesting respondent has submitted that this change was made by the petitioners while issuing the cheques. This shows that there is again a disputed question of fact which cannot be entered into in the proceeding under section 482 of the code. In the facts and circumstances of the case, Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd. v. Jayswals Neco Ltd., reported in 2001 (3) SCC 609 will not help the petitioner.

7. It is then contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioners that there is no mention in the complaint that the petitioners herein were and are the persons responsible for the offences said to have been committed on the date on which the offences were committed. It is his argument that the date of issue of the cheque would not be the date of commission of offence. It is his argument that the date of commission of offence would be the date on which the cheques have been dishonoured, the date on which the notices were issued and the date on which the period of notice expired. It is also his argument that there is no mention in the complaint that the present petitioners were responsible for the business of the firm i.e. petitioner No. 1 on the date on which the offence can be said to have been committed. Again on this point, the original complainant has stated in the complaint in Para 1 that petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 with the help of each other in the name and style of petitioner No. 1 are running the partnership firm. When the word 'are' is indicated in Para 1 of the complaint, it would mean that even on the date of the complaint, these two petitioners were allegedly running the business in the name of petitioner No. 1. It is also alleged in Para 1 of the complaint that petitioners and 2 and 3 are carrying on business of sale of tyres as mentioned above. In Para 2 of the complaint, it is alleged that petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 had approached the Ahmedabad branch of the complainant in July, 1999 and consequent upon the said approach the contract was effected between the parties. This shows that petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 were actively participating in the business of petitioner No. 1, the firm of which there are partners. It is found from the pleadings and arguments that petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are the only partners in petitioner No. 1 firm. It is also a matter of record that petitioner No. 2 has signed the cheque which shows that on the date of issue of the cheque he was partner of the firm and he was actively and effectively participating in the business of the said firm.

8. In Para 4 of the complaint again it has been alleged that the new dates have been put on the cheques by the accused on the basis of concession granted by the complainant to the accused. This would mean that even when the new dates were placed, petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 were effectively and actively participating in the business of petitioner No. 1. This can be inferred from this allegation also. In Para 4 again it has been alleged at page 17 that on petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 assuring the complainant that all the cheques would be honoured, the complainant deposited the cheques with the bank and they were not honoured, and therefore, even when the cheques were placed and presented to the Bank the assurance was given by petitioners Nos. 2 and 3, according to the allegations made in the complaint which again indicates that petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 both were actively and effectively participating in the business of petitioner No. 1 as per the allegations of the respondent. There is no dispute that petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 have yet not resigned from the firm and there is no allegation that these two petitioners were not dealing with the partnership business. These facts are required to be taken into consideration while dealing with the decision referred to by the learned Advocate for the petitioner on this aspect of the case. The first decision referred to by the learned Advocate for the petitioner is in the case of Alka N. Shah v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2000 (3) GLH 468 : [2001 (2) GLR 1023]. There, it has been observed by this Court that it is obvious that the offence could only be committed on the presentation of the cheques on due dates, on the dishonour of the cheques, and the consequential notice being issued under Section 138 of the said Act. There is no dispute with respect to the said observations made by this Court as aforesaid. The facts of that case were quite different. That can be drawn from Para 4 of the said decision wherein it has been observed that even according to the complainant, the offence was committed by the company and accused No. 1 was liable on account of her position as M.D. of the company. On a plain reading of Section 141 of the Act, it becomes obvious that every person "at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of and was responsible to the company" shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence. It is also observed that on the facts and circumstances of the case, it was an admitted position that the offence was committed when the cheques were dishonoured, and when a notice of dishonour was issued under Section 138 of the Act. It is further observed that this occurred in November and December of 1999 whereas the accused in that case had resigned both as Director and Managing Director of the Company as early as on 27th January 1999. It was therefore, found that this former Managing Director of the company could not be said to have committed the offence on the date on which the offence could be said to have been committed.

9. With respect to the facts of the case on hand, it is clear that the second petitioner, who has signed the cheques, was partner of the first petitioner on the date, on which the cheques were issued, he was again the partner on the dates of which the cheques were dishonoured. He was also partner when the notices were issued and even on the date of the complaint, he has continued to be the partner of the said firm. In that view of the matter, there is no case of retirement from the partnership, and therefore, the aforesaid decision cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case.

10. It has been contended that it has not been mentioned in so many words that petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 were partners and responsible for business of the firm on the date on which the offence was committed. When it has been specifically alleged in the complaint that the petitioners were and are responsible for the said business, it would mean that they were responsible in the past and even on the date of the offence as well as on the date of the complaint they had continued to be responsible for the said purpose. Therefore, we cannot pick and choose a particular word in the complaint. It cannot be insisted that the complainant should use a particular word in the complaint for satisfying the requirement of Sections 138 and 141 of the Act, Simply because it has not been mentioned that petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 were responsible and liable on the date of the offence, then in that event, it cannot be said that the requirement of Sections 138 and 141 of the Act have not been complied with. We have to go by the spirit of the complaint and not by any specific word thereof.

10.1. The second decision of this Court in the case of Gopishankar S, Vaid v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2001 (1) GLR 267 was also shown. There it was observed that when a company had nominated a person under Section 17(2) to be the one responsible for the conduct of the business of the company, then the other directors or officers cannot be prosecuted unless it is alleged that the offence is committed with the consent or connivance of such other director or officer. This will again not be applicable to the facts of the present case since petitioner No. 1 is a partnership firm itself and it is not explained as to why a person who has signed the cheque is not responsible for the offence in question. Even today, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have not resigned as partners. Therefore, the aforesaid decision again will not help the petitioners on the facts of the case before us. It is more so when petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 both have allegedly participated in the business of the firm and in the negotiation for the contract in question.

10.2. Another contention raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioner is with respect to the notice issued by the contesting respondent to the petitioners. It has been argued at length that the contesting respondent has produced postal acknowledgements at page 51 to this application. It is his argument that this postal acknowledgement did not bear stamp of the post office. They do not show the date on which the notices were actually presented to the post office. They do not show the date on which the post office had delivered the post to the addressee and there is no mention as to the date on which the notices were served. It is not the contention of the petitioners that they did not receive the notice at all. On the contrary, the petitioners have stated in the petition that they have received the notices and they have sent reply to the said notices also. Therefore, the fact of receipt of notice cannot be disputed by the petitioners for the purpose of this application before this Court. At the same time, it requires to be considered that the aforesaid copies of postal acknowledgements bear some signatures of the addressee and it will be open to the parties to produce evidence before the trial Court to prove the said postal acknowledgements. If the dates are not there on the postal acknowledgement, it would be open to the parties to bring evidence from postal department to prove or disprove their rival case. However, it cannot be said here that the notices were not issued at all. With respect to the dates also, the contesting respondents have stated that probably the notices have been served on 22-12-2001. This will again be a question of fact which can be dealt with by the trial Court as and when the trial commences and as and when the evidence is produced by the parties. This type of disputed question of fact cannot be entertained while exercising inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the code. The fact remains that there is an allegation that the notice has probably been served on the petitioners on 22-12-2001, and therefore, in view of the said statement, it cannot be said that the complaint is ex-fade barred by limitation as contemplated in the Negotiable Instruments Act. 1881.

11. It has also been contended that the cheques stood only as collateral security for the purpose of contract. For this purpose, the petitioners have relied upon a decision rendered in the case of Shanku Concretes Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2000 (2) GLR 1705. There it was observed that the complainant had advanced money to the accused Company repayable after six months. Post-dated cheques were given to the complainant which were bounced. There was agreement between the parties which indicate that the cheques Were issued as collateral security for due performance of contract. The payment was to be made on some future date and there was no debt or liability on the date of delivery of cheques. Therefore, it was found that the transaction was of civil nature and a complaint under Section 138 of the Act was required to be quashed. Again the facts before us are quite different. Delivery of goods was effected and cheques were issued, as per the case of the contesting respondent, to fulfil the obligation of the petitioners to make payment of the value of the goods received by the petitioners. Therefore, when the goods were delivered and cheques were issued, then prima facie, it cannot be said that it was simply a question of collateral security and there was no existence of debt or liability against the petitioner on the date on which the cheques were issued. On this aspect of the case, it would be worthwhile to refer to a decision in the case of A.V Murthy v. B.S Nagabasavanna., 2002 (2) SCC 642. There the Supreme Court has observed that the revisiona-1 Court had erred in quashing a complaint in proceeding on the ground that debt or liability was barred by limitation. Here also, it would be again a question of fact as to whether on the date of issuance of cheque, there was existence of debt or liability on the part of the petitioner to pay the amount of cheque to the respondent. The fact remains that the goods were delivered and cheques were issued. This Court may not go into minute discussion as to whether or not on a particular date of issue of cheques, the goods were delivered, or even after the delivery of the goods the amount was actually due to the respondent by the petitioners on that date.

12. In the case of M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals and Ors., reported in 2002 SCC (Cri.) 121 again it was a matter of an offence under Section 138 of the Act. There the complaint was filed in the name of the company by its employee without necessary authorisation. It was observed that such a complaint was nonetheless maintainable. Want of such authorisation can be rectified even at a subsequent stage. This shows that the Courts are not required to go into technical details at the initial stage till the matter goes for evidence.

12.1. In the case of S.A Nanjundeswara v. Varlak Agrotech (P) Ltd.., reported in AIR 2002 SC 477, it has been observed that if the statements taken on the face value do not make out any offence, criminal proceedings can be quashed and it is not proper for the High Court to sift the material on record. Almost similar view was taken in the case of State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and Anr., reported in AIR 2002 SC 671.

13. Again, it has been argued that the trial Court could not have taken cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 420 of I.P.C. On this, we can refer to the averments made in the complaint. In Para 7 of the complaint at page 18, the contesting respondent has alleged that the accused have adopted the modus operandi designed and crafted to cheat the complainant and the entire chain of events shows that the accused did not have either resources of intention to make the payment to the complainant, even though the terms and conditions of the contract provide for issue of cheques against delivery of goods. It is further alleged in the complaint that it was the intention of the accused to cheat the complainant and induce the complainant to part with the valuable goods. The argument of the learned Advocate for the petitioners is that payments were made regularly at the first instance, and thereafter, the petitioners could not make payment on account of certain circumstances. At this stage, learned Advocate for the contesting respondent has made it clear that till the payment was made there was no dishonest intention but when the cheques were issued and when they were revalidated, there was dishonest intention on the part of the petitioners to induce the contesting respondent to part with the goods, and therefore, the offence of cheating has been made out. Then again, this will be a question of fact. Simply because the process has been issued for some offences, it would not be necessary for the complainant to restrict evidence with respect to the offences for which process has been issued. At the same time, even when the process is issued for some offence and a different offence, alleged in the complaint, is made out, it would be even open to the trial Court to frame charge with respect to the offences which are prima fade shown by the complainant in his complaint and in respect of which evidence has been produced by him at the stage of framing of charge, and therefore, at this stage, it would be too early to say that no offence of cheating has been made out.

13.1. In the case of Union of India v. Banwari Lal Agarwal, reported in 1998 (4) Crimes 75 (SC), the matter related to quashing and jurisdiction of the Court. The said case was decided on certain legal and factual aspects under the Income Tax Act, 1961. Therefore, it is not found to be relevant on the facts of the case before us.

13.2. The case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, reported in AIR 1983 SC 67, relates to the exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code read with Section 397(2) of the said Code. It is required to be considered that despite the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 397, the powers of Section 482 of the Code can be exercised but they are to be exercised sparingly and in a rare case, for quashing the proceedings. It is very clear that such power can be exercised only when a complaint/F.I.R. does not make out even prima facie case for commission of offence. Again, when in view of the allegation against petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 referred to hereinabove has been made in the complaint itself, it cannot be said that there is no allegation of their involvement in the offence in question in complaint, and therefore, the observations made in the said decision will not apply on the facts of the case before us.

13.3. In the case of State of Haryana v. Brijlal Mittal and Ors., reported in 1998 (5) SCC 343, it has been laid down that simply because a person is a Director of a Company he does not vicariously become liable for offence committed by the company. Here, in the present case, it is not a case in the complaint that the partners of the firm are liable for the offence committed by the firm, simply because they are partners. It cannot be said that no offence has been constituted by or made out against petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 also, since their involvement has been specifically alleged in the complaint in so many words.

13.4. In the case of Harsukhbhai Lakshmanbhai v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2001 (3) GLR 2271, the facts were little similar. The cheque was signed by one of the partners. The other partner was shown to be actively involved in the transaction with the complainant. It is, therefore, observed that such other partner was liable to be prosecuted for return of the cheque. In the present case also, the involvement of petitioner No. 2 is there because of the fact that he has signed the cheque. So far as petitioner No. 3 is concerned, his involvement is also shown as said above. Therefore, the original complainant has a right to produce evidence to prove the said allegations. It, therefore, cannot be said that petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 should be exonerated by quashing the complaint against them.

13.5. In the case of Dependra O. Choksi v. Dipak Chimanlal Patel, reported in 1997 (2) GLR 1191, it has been observed that it is the duty of the Magistrate to screen and examine the allegation and if prima facie, the offence of cheating is made out, then to issue the process for an offence punishable under Section 420 of I.P.C. In the present case, we find that the original complainant has made allegation about the offence of cheating. In the present case, it is found that cheques were issued at the first instance. According to the case of the original complainant, he was requested not to present the cheques. Therefore, the cheques were not presented and thereafter, the cheques were revalidated, and therefore, they were presented before the Bank at the relevant point of time and they were returned. This shows that at the time when cheques were revalidated, there was trust and confidence allegedly given by the petitioners to the original complainant that the cheques would be honoured, and therefore, the respondent supplied goods to the petitioners. However, they were not honoured at that time also. According to the case of the original complainant, this amounts to an offence of cheating. Ultimately, this would be a matter of evidence and appreciation thereof and if the original complainant fails to prove the ingredients of cheating, the petitioners may not be convicted. But that does not mean that the original complainant should be deprived of his right to produce evidence with respect to the offence of cheating.

13.6. In the case of Hridaya Ranjan Pd, Verma v. State of Bihar, reported in 2000 AIR SCW 2077, the complainant had alleged that there was an agreement of sale of property entered into by the accused on behalf of himself and his brothers with the complainant. A complaint was filed for cheating. Allegation made was that the accused did not disclose that one of his brother, had filed partition suit which was pending. It was not alleged that the information was not disclosed intentionally by the accused in order to make the complainant part with the property. Dishonest intention of accused at the beginning of negotiation was not made out by averments in the complaint. It was found that the High Court was not justified in declining to quash criminal proceeding against the accused.

14. In the present case, I find that some allegations have been made against the present petitioners with respect to initial fraudulent intention on the part of the petitioners. It has been alleged that initially the goods were supplied and payments were made. However, subsequently despite the supply of goods, the payments were made. This shows that by making payment at the first instance, the petitioners tried to create a trust and confidence amounting to the matter of assurance that they would go on paying the amount being the value of the goods supplied to them. By this conduct, according to the case of the contesting respondent, the petitioners had induced the contesting respondent to part with the property. It is also submitted by the learned Advocate for the respondent that had there been a different conduct on the part of the petitioner, the contesting respondent would not have parted with the property. Therefore, it cannot be said that offence of cheating has not been made out in the complaint, prima facie.

15. In above view of the matter, it cannot be said that no offence has been made out prima facie. When the offence, under Section 138 of the Act and under Section 420 of I.P.C. have been prima facie made out, then in that event, it would not be just or proper or legal to quash the complaint at the initial stage. The contesting respondent is a resident of Ahmedabad. The cheques were issued to the said respondent. It is alleged that in the past cheques were received at Ahmedabad and payments were made at Ahmedabad. This shows that actually, payment of goods delivered was made to the contesting respondent at Ahmedabad, and therefore, some cause of action has arisen at Ahmedabad, and therefore, prima facie, the Court at Ahmedabad has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of the contesting respondent. Moreover, a complaint disclosing some offences prima facie, cannot legally be quashed on the ground of jurisdiction.

16. Even otherwise, on recording of evidence or otherwise, if the trial Court feels and finds that the cause of action does not fall within its jurisdiction, then the appropriate order can be passed by the Court concerned but the complaint cannot be thrown away at this stage on this count.

17. It is also contended that the payment was required to be made within 45 days, and therefore, it was not a case of debt and liability existing on the dates of the cheques. The argument is not well-founded. There is a clear allegation that the cheques were issued on delivery of goods and they were dishonoured. This shows that when the cheques issued on different dates, debt was there and it cannot be said that the cheques were not issued against existing debt. Again this is a question of fact which can be decided at the time of evidence.

In above view of the matter, it cannot be said that the complaint does not disclose, prima facie, the offence against the petitioners. In that view of the matter, the complaint cannot be dismissed or quashed by this Court at this stage in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the code. This shows that this is a meritless application.

18. For the foregoing reasons, this application deserves to be dismissed.

It is required to be observed here that huge amount of the contesting respondent has been held up on technicalities of law. Arguments have also occupied considerable time. The application is totally meritless. It would, therefore, be proper to saddle the present petitioners with cost which can be utilised for some other benefits also. In above view of the matter, the present application is ordered to be dismissed. Notice discharged. The petitioners herein shall deposit cost of Rs. 5000/- (Rs. Five thousand only) in this Court and on such deposit, the said amount shall be transmitted to the Gujarat High Court Bar Association Library Fund.