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Balubhai G. Makwana v. State Of Gujarat & Ors.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner sought a mandatory writ directing respondent-authorities to (a) declare illegal and non est the respondents' practice of terminating and reappointing the petitioner by repeated 29-day appointment orders, (b) treat the petitioner’s services as continuous from his initial entry into service and regularise his employment, and (c) grant consequential reliefs including fixation of pay, arrears, status and seniority. By interim order dated 26-2-1991 the petition was admitted and ad-interim relief was granted to maintain status quo. The interim relief was confirmed by an order dated 8-7-1992 directing that the petitioner’s services were not to be terminated except in accordance with law, provided the petitioner remained actually working with respondent No. 2. During the pendency of the petition the petitioner continued to work under the respondents.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the practice of repeatedly appointing the petitioner on 29-day orders—creating artificial breaks—was illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, such that the petitioner’s service should be treated as continuous and regularised.
- Whether the petitioner, described as working continuously for long periods, had acquired any substantive right to regularisation or to benefits (pay fixation, arrears, seniority) arising from alleged continuous service.
- Whether the termination effected by expiry of the short-term (29-day) appointment orders amounted to "retrenchment" attracting the protections and retrenchment compensation obligations under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
- Whether relief in the nature of reinstatement, regularisation, or compensation was available to the petitioner where initial appointment was temporary, on a fixed-term basis, and/or allegedly not against a sanctioned post.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner asserted continuous and satisfactory service with respondents since 1986, disrupted only by artificial 29-day breaks deliberately created by respondents to deny him regularisation rights.
- Relied on decisions of this Court (Ghanshyam M. Pandya) and the Supreme Court (Surinder Singh and Gujarat Agricultural University v. Rathod Labhu Bechar) to contend that long continued service where work is of continuous nature must lead to regularisation; the practice of using daily/short-term appointments for long periods is an unfair labour practice and should be denounced.
- Contended that termination without payment of retrenchment compensation violated Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act because he was a "workman" under Section 2(j).
- Argued that non-regularisation would cause hardship (age-bar and other handicaps) making future government employment unlikely.
Respondents' Arguments (Respondent Nos. 2 and 3)
- The petitioner was appointed only on temporary, stop-gap basis according to requirement of work and the availability of grant from the State Government; accordingly he had no right to claim regularisation.
- No sanctioned permanent post for a Workcharge Clerk in the Road & Buildings Department had been created or sanctioned by the Development Commissioner (Panchayat), hence regularisation was not possible without sanction and budgetary provision from the State Government.
- All appointment orders expressly provided termination without notice; appointments were made in contravention of Government circulars and instructions which withdrew the power to make such stop-gap appointments to clerical/typist posts.
- Relied on Government circulars (27-4-1976, 3-2-1987 and 17-9-1990) instructing that irregular temporary appointments to certain clerical posts were not permissible and that officers making such appointments could be held personally responsible.
- Relied on case law (for example Rajendra v. State of Rajasthan and other authorities) to argue that posts created for temporary projects or scheme-limited work end with the project and cannot be the basis for a writ-directed continuation or regularisation when funds or sanctioned posts are absent.
Respondent No. 1
- The Assistant Government Pleader for respondent No. 1 supported the case advanced by respondent Nos. 2 and 3; no separate submissions were advanced.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ghanshyam M. Pandya v. State of Gujarat (1985 GLH (UJ-51) 41) | Relied on by petitioner to support the proposition that long continued temporary employment may require regularisation. | The petitioner relied on this decision to support his claim; the Court noted the reliance but analysed applicability in light of other facts and authorities. |
| Surinder Singh & Anr. v. The Engineer-in-Chief, C.P.W.D. and Ors. | Relied on by petitioner as authority supportive of regularisation where work is continuous. | The Court recorded that the petitioner placed reliance on this Supreme Court judgment as part of his argument for regularisation. |
| Gujarat Agricultural University v. Rathod Labhu Bechar and Ors. (Supreme Court) | Observations condemning long-term reliance on daily wage/ad hoc workers and indicating obligation to regularise when work is continuous; also endorsement of schemes to grant permanent status. | The Court examined Paras 16 and 26 relied on by petitioner but held the case was distinguishable: the University case involved a formal scheme to grant permanent status and was not analogous where appointments were contrary to government instructions and were unauthorised. |
| Rajendra & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 923 | Holds that when posts created temporarily for a project/scheme end, employer cannot be directed by mandamus to continue employing incumbents; administrative and financial considerations govern abolition of such posts. | The Court cited this decision as supporting respondents' position that temporary/project posts ending on account of funding or project completion do not attract a writ to continue employment. |
| Deputy Executive Engineer, Gujarat Maritime Board v. Hasmukh M. Jasani (this Court) | Set out guidelines for determining nature of appointment (appointment letter, documentary/oral evidence, nature of work, employer's intention, extensions etc.). | The Court relied on these guidelines to determine that the petitioner’s appointments were for a fixed period, accepted by the petitioner, and extensions were on the same terms—pointing toward temporary/fixed-term nature rather than substantive status. |
| Anvarkhan R. Makarani v. State of Gujarat and Ors., 2002 (1) GLH | Held that employment on specific job/work outside regular set-up and terminated in terms of last appointment order does not entitle to reinstatement or regularisation. | The Court referred to this decision in support of the proposition that employment entirely outside regular establishment, ended as per appointment terms, does not give rise to right to regularisation. |
| Ashwani Kumar v. State of Bihar, 1997 (2) SCC 13 | Where initial entry is unauthorised and not against a sanctioned vacancy, regularisation cannot survive; posts must be backed by budgetary provision. | The Court relied on this Supreme Court view to hold that an unauthorised initial entry on a non-existent vacancy cannot give rise to a right to regularisation. |
| Vithalbhai Babaldas Patel v. Chairman, Oil & Natural Gas Commission, 1987 (2) GLR 1308 | Workcharge employees appointed for short periods according to contingencies cannot claim permanent status; regular appointments must follow settled law/rules. | The Court relied on this authority to emphasize that allowing regularisation of ad-hoc/temporary appointments would undermine equality of opportunity under Articles 14 and 16. |
| Nilesh Bhatt v. Administrative Officer, Nagar Prathamik Shikshan Samiti, 1996 (1) GLH 108 | Where appointment is ad-hoc, temporary and for a fixed term and expressly liable to be terminated without notice, principles of natural justice for termination need not apply and prolonged ad-hoc service does not ripen into regular service. | The Court applied this principle to hold that mere prolonged continuous ad-hoc service does not automatically confer permanence or substantive rights on the employee. |
| M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, LIC of India; State of Rajasthan v. Rameshwarlal Gehlot (Supreme Court) | Once an appointment is for a fixed period, Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act does not apply (covered by Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo)); termination of fixed-term appointments does not attract Section 25F unless mala fides or colourable exercise of power is shown. | The Court cited these decisions to conclude that Section 25F is not attracted where appointment is for a fixed period; absent mala fide termination, neither reinstatement nor compensation under Section 25F is available. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by examining the pleadings, the affidavit-in-reply, attached documents and the authorities relied upon by the parties. The Court's analysis progressed along these lines:
- The Court considered the petitioner's reliance on Gujarat Agricultural University (Supreme Court) but found it distinguishable: that case involved a formal scheme adopted by the University to grant permanent status in a phased manner, whereas in the present matter there was no comparable scheme and the appointments were contrary to governmental instructions and circulars.
- The Court noted applicable Supreme Court authority (Ashwani Kumar) that regularisation cannot be permitted where the initial entry itself was unauthorised and not against any sanctioned vacancy, and that posts must be backed by budgetary provision; an appointment de hors budgetary grant is unauthorised and cannot create a right.
- The Court applied its own earlier guidelines (Deputy Executive Engineer v. Hasmukh Jasani) for determining the nature of appointment, focusing on the contents of appointment letters, documentary evidence, employer's intention and the nature of the work; the record showed that the petitioner was appointed for fixed short periods and accepted those terms.
- Relying on precedents (Vithalbhai; Nilesh Bhatt; Anvarkhan R. Makarani), the Court observed that temporary, ad-hoc or workcharge appointments for short or contingent periods—even if prolonged—do not necessarily mature into regular or substantive service and that natural justice requirements may not be engaged where appointments are expressly on fixed-term basis and liable to be terminated without notice.
- With regard to the contention under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Court relied on Supreme Court decisions (M. Venugopal and Rameshwarlal Gehlot) which hold that fixed-term appointments are covered by Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) and that Section 25F does not apply to such appointments; consequently, termination at the end of a fixed term is not "retrenchment" attracting Section 25F unless the termination is mala fide or a colourable exercise of power.
- The Court found no material on record to establish that the termination was mala fide or a colourable exercise of powers. Documentary material indicated appointment for a fixed period, extensions on same terms, and acceptance by the petitioner of those terms. Thus the appointment automatically ended on expiry of the specified period.
- Although rejecting the substantive claims, the Court noted the petitioner's cumulative service (more than 22 years, as stated) and kept open a non-judicial avenue: the petitioner may make a representation to respondents Nos. 2 and 3, who may consider it sympathetically and forward a proposal to the State taking into account service length, conduct, workload and financial aspects.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition is rejected. The rule is discharged with no order as to costs.
Direct implications for the parties (as stated in the opinion):
- The petitioner is not entitled, on the facts before the Court, to a declaration treating his services as continuous or to regularisation, fixation of pay, arrears, status or seniority based on the 29-day appointment practice.
- The Court held that the termination at the expiry of the fixed-term appointment did not amount to retrenchment under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, and therefore the petitioner is not entitled to retrenchment compensation under that provision, absent a finding of mala fide or colourable exercise of power.
- The Court left open administrative relief: the petitioner may submit a representation; respondents Nos. 2 and 3 may consider and, if thought fit, forward a proposal to the State Government for appropriate action, taking into account length of service, conduct, workload and financial considerations.
Broader implications: The opinion does not set out to create a new legal precedent; the Court applied established authorities to the facts and distinguished cases where there was a formal scheme for regularisation. The decision primarily resolves the parties' dispute on the particular facts and record before the Court.
1. The petitioner, in this petition, has sought the mandatory relief from this Court directing the respondent-authorities to treat the impugned action on the part of the respondents in not regularising the services of the petitioner and in terminating the services of the petitioner by adopting the modus operandi of 29 days appointment, as illegal, unjust, arbitrary, discriminatory, unconstitutional and non-est in the eye of law and has further sought directions to the respondents to treat the petitioner in continuous services of the respondents right from the initial entry of the petitioner in the service of the respondents. The petitioner has further prayed for a declaration from this Court to the effect that the Order s creating artificial break in the service of the petitioner, after his initial appointment, as illegal, non-est and of no effect whatsoever and to treat the services of the petitioner as continuous for all purposes. Lastly, the petitioner has prayed for directions to the respondents to confer upon the petitioner all benefit of regular service from his initial entry in the service of the respondents, such as fixation of pay, arrears of salary, status, seniority etc., treating the petitioner in me continuous service of the respondents. By way of an interim relief, the petitioner has prayed for injunction restraining the respondents from terminating the services of the petitioner in any manner whatsoever and permitting him to discharge his duties and to pay him his regular salary accordingly in the regular pay-scale. The petition was admitted by this Court on 26-2-1991 and while granting ad-interim relief, this Court has passed an Order to maintain status quo in respect of the work/service of the petitioner. While confirming the ad-interim relief, this Court has passed an Order on 8-7-1992 directing the respondents that the services of the petitioner were not to be terminated except in accordance with law, subject of course to the fact that the petitioner was actually working with respondent No. 2. Under this interim relief, the petitioner has been working with the respondents during the pendency of this petition before this Court.
2. The petitioner has urged in the petition that he has been rendering services to the utmost satisfaction of me respondent-authorities since 1986 regularly and continuously without any breaks, except the artificial breaks created by the respondent-authorities. It is further stated in the petition that there is nothing against the petitioner and his work has been appreciated by the respondent-authorities. The petitioner further stated that ever since his initial appointment, he was being served with the appointment Order of 29 days, though the petitioner has been continuously working. The petitioner has further alleged in the petition that the artificial breaks were given to the petitioner only with a view to disentitle the petitioner from claiming any right for the services rendered by him or any claim for the regularisation. The petitioner has filed a detailed list showing particulars of all appointment Orders and copies of certain appointment Orders, along with the petition.
3. The petitioner, in support of his contention raised in the petition, has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Ghanshyam M. Pandya v. State of Gujarat reported in 1985 GLH (UJ-51) 41, which was subsequently confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 326 of 1985. The petitioner has also relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Surinder Singh and Anr. v. The Engineer-in-Chief C.P.W.D. and Ors. . Based on these judgments, the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner has been working on a clear vacancy for the years' to come with the respondent authorities and that the act on the part of the respondent-authorities in not regularising his services and in terminating his services by adopting the modus operandi of 29 days appointment is absolutely) illegal, unjust, arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has further raised the contention that if his services were terminated and/or the same were not regularised by the respondent-authorities, the petitioner would be put in a miserable condition and that he would not be in a position to get any employment in any other Government organisation because of certain handicaps such as age-bar etc. It is further submitted that, after taking services of the petitioner for all these years, the respondent-authorities could not be permitted to play with the future of the petitioner by adopting the artificial break of 29 days' appointment. The petitioner has further raised the contention that the petitioner is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act and hence me termination of his services could not be effected without payment of retrenchment compensation as required Under Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, and hence, the termination of the services of the petitioner without payment of retrenchment compensation was bad, illegal, and violative of provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
4. At the time of hearing of this petition, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has reiterated the submissions which were made in the petition and over and above the judgments relied on in the petition, he has further placed reliance on the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Agricultural University v. Rathod Labhu Bechar and Ors. . He has invited my attention to Para 16 of the Judgment, wherein it is held as under:
16. ....It is also well settled, if work is taken by the employer continuously from daily wage workers for a long number of years without considering their regularisation for its financial gain as against employees' legitimate claim, has been held by this Court repeatedly as an unfair labour practice. In fact, taking work, from daily wage worker or ad hoc appointee is always viewed to be only for a short period or as a stop-gap arrangement, but we find new culture is growing to continue with it for a long time, either for financial gain or for controlling its workers more effectively with Sword of Damocles hanging over their heads or to continue with favoured one in the cases of ad hoc employee with stalling competent and legitimate claimants. Thus, we have no hesitation to denounce this practice. If the work is of such a nature, which has to be taken continuously, and in any case, when this pattern become apparent, when they continue to work for year after year, only option to me employer is to regularise them. Financial viability no doubt is one of the considerations but then such enterprise or institution should not spread its arms longer man its means. The consequent corollary is, where work is taken not for a short period or limited for a season or where work is not of part-time nature, and if pattern shows work is to be taken continuously year after year, there is no justification to keep such persons hanging as daily rate workers. In such situation, a legal obligation is cast on an employer if there be vacant post to fill it up with such workers in accordance with Rules if any and where necessary by relaxing the qualifications, where long experience could be equitable with such qualifications. If no post exists then duty is cast to assess the quantum of such work and create such equivalent post for their absorption.
My attention is also drawn to Para 26 of the said judgment, which reads as under:
26. ....We feel that daily rate workers who have been working on the aforesaid posts for such a long number of years without complaint on these posts is a ground by itself for the relaxation of the aforesaid eligibility condition. It would not be appropriate to disqualify them on this ground for their absorption, hence Clause 1(a), need modification to this effect.
On the basis of the aforesaid judgment, Mr. Yagnik, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has urged that since the petitioner has put in more than 12 years of service at the time when the petition was filed, and thereafter, he has put in another 10 years service under the Order of this Court, it is a fit case wherein this Court should direct the respondents to regularise the services of the petitioner.
5. Ms. Nita Panchal, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 has relied on the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondents and the documents attached along with the said affidavit. She has submitted that the respondent No. 2, Taluka Panchayat has appointed the petitioner on the basis of the requirement of the work and according to the grant given by the State Government. The petitioner was appointed only on temporary basis, and hence, the petitioner had no right to make any claim for regularisation. It is further submitted that the Development Commissioner (Panchayat) has not sanctioned the post of Workcharge Clerk for Road & Buildings Department, and therefore, the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have no right to make appointment of the petitioner. It was further contended in the affidavit-in-reply that the petitioner was appointed only on the basis of the availability of work and when it was necessary and especially when the grant was given by the State Government. All the appointments were temporary and it was made clear in each and every appointment Order that the services would be terminated without any notice. The learned Advocate has drawn my attention to the Circular dated 27th April, 1976 issued by the Government of Gujarat, General Administration Department, Gandhinagar, in respect of appointment of temporary staff on provisional and stop-gap arrangement basis outside the prescribed mode of recruitment, wherein it is clearly stated that any recruitment to the clerical posts and posts of typists in the governmental departments and offices within the purview of the Gujarat Public Service Commission, made otherwise than prescribed mode of appointment is irregular and the appointments made are liable to be terminated at any time and immediately as soon as the regular recruits from the select lists prepared under the requisite Rules become available. It is further stated in the said Circular that the powers of making temporary stop-gap appointments from candidates through Employment Exchange or otherwise till regular recruits are available, are totally withdrawn. A clear-cut instruction was given in the said Circular that no recruitment to the posts of Clerks, Clerk-Typists and Typists should at all be made from 1st April, 1976 onwards through the Employment Exchange or otherwise. It is also made clear in the said Circular that if it is found that any such irregular recruitment is made by departments/offices in spite of the above instructions, the officers who have made such irregular appointments will be personally held responsible for the default.
6. The learned Advocate for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 has further drawn my attention to another Circular dated 3-2-1987 issued by the Road & Buildings Department, Government of Gujarat, Gandhinagar, wherein it was pointed out that though there were restrictions imposed on the appointment of temporary staff or on making such appointments by way of stop-gap arrangement, certain offices and Government departments are not following the earlier instructions. It was, therefore, made clear that if any one was acting contrary to this instruction he was held to be personally liable and the disciplinary action would be taken against him. Lastly, my attention was drawn to the Circular issued by the Panchayat and Rural Housing Development Department, Government of Gujarat, Gandhinagar, on 17-9-1990 wherein also the earlier instructions given were reiterated and any person who violates the standing instructions of the Government, would be held personally responsible and disciplinary actions would be taken against him under the Gujarat Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. On the basis of all the three above referred circulars, it was urged before me that the petitioner's appointment as Workcharge employee was not in accordance with the Government instructions and statutory Rules. It was not a permanent sanctioned post. The respondent No. 2 has to obtain the necessary sanction from the State Government and for that purpose a proposal was to be forwarded to the State Government and only after the receipt of the sanction from the Government a person can be appointed on the regular establishment. Since no sanction was ever granted by the State Government, there was no question of regularising the petitioner and since the petitioner's services were not required the same came to an end after the expiry of the period stated in the appointment Order and it required no notice as contended by the petitioner.
7. In support of me case of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, the learned Advocate for the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. reported in AIR 1999 SC 923, wherein it is held as under:
13. In our opinion, when the posts temporarily created for fulfilling the needs of a particular project or scheme limited in its duration come to an end on account of the need for the project itself having come to an end either because the project was fulfilled or had to be abandoned wholly or partially for want of funds, the employer cannot by a writ of mandamus be directed to continue employing such employees as have been dislodged because such a direction would amount to requisition for creation of posts though not required by the employer and funding such posts though the employer did not have the funds available for the purpose. The decision taken by the respondent-State to abolish the posts was a bona fide decision taken after due application of mind by appointing an Expert Committee which went deep into all relevant considerations and made recommendations in the interest of rationalisation. The decision is based on administrative and financial considerations. There is nothing wrong in the societies having acted on the policy decision of the State Government. Really speaking there was hardly anything left to be done by the D.R.D.A. societies at their own end. Inasmuch as the societies did not have any funds of their own, independent of those made available by the State Government how could the societies have continued with the posts and the incumbents thereon though they were left with no merits to pay salaries attaching with the posts.
8. The learned Advocate for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 has also placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Deputy Executive Engineer, Gujarat Maritime Board v. Hasmukh M. Jasani , wherein certain guidelines were laid down by this Court, which are as under:
7. ....
(i) The nature of appointment, whether for a fixed period or otherwise is primarily determined on the basis of the contents of appointment letter;
(ii) Where there is no such letter of appointment, it can be determined from other documentary evidence if any produced by the parties;
(iii) If no documentary evidence is available or has been produced assistance of oral evidence on record can be taken for determining the real nature of appointment;
(iv) Admission of the employee in such matters will also be a material evidence for determining the nature of appointment;
(v) The nature of appointment, namely, whether on a permanent post or on work of permanent nature will also render some clue in determining the nature of appointment;
(vi) If the appointment is on a project for a fixed term this will also render assistance in coming to the conclusion about real nature of appointment;
(vii) The real intention of the employer is also a relevant factor to be taken into consideration. Instances are not rare where no appointment letter is issued for casual labourers. In such cases, real intention of the employer is certainly a material factor in determining the nature of appointment;
(viii) Acceptance of terms of appointment by the employee or the workman will also render assistance in determining the nature of appointment;
(ix) When after expiry of initial period of appointment extension is granted whether orally or through fresh appointment letters then such appointment letters or oral Orders will also have material bearing in determining the nature of appointment;
(x) The nature of work, namely, permanent or temporary or project type of work, will also give some indication as to what was the real nature of appointment;
(xi) The applicability of Rules of appointment for regular employees of the department, if made applicable to project work employees will also render some assistance in determining the nature of appointment.
This Court has held that the respondent was appointed for a fixed period of 3 months which was subsequently extended and continued for a further period of 3 months and his appointment came to an end automatically on 30th April, 1992. As such the provisions of section 25f of the Act were not applicable and the Order of reinstatement, in these circumstances suffers from manifest error of law and in these circumstances the Order directing the reinstatement of the respondent cannot be sustained. Based on this judgment, it was urged before me that the petitioner is not entitled to regularisation and that the petitioner's services were rightly terminated automatically on expiry of the period stated in the appointment Order.
9. The learned Advocate for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 has further relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Anvarkhan R. Makarani v. State of Gujarat and Ors. reported in 2002 (1) GLH, wherein it is held that the employment of the petitioner under the respondent all throughout remained outside the regular set-up and on a particular job or work as distinguished from being against any vacancy and the employment having been terminated in terms of the last appointment Order appointing him on scarcity relief work, the petitioner was neither entitled to reinstatement nor regularisation. The petitioner has failed to establish that he had in any way acquired the status of a temporary Government servant.
10. The learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondent No. 1 has not made any submission except supporting the case of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3.
11. I have heard at length the learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties. I have also gone through the pleadings made in the petition as well as the affidavit-in-reply, and I have also considered the authorities relied upon by the respective parties. The Supreme Court decision in the case of Gujarat Agricultural University (supra) relied upon by the petitioner does not help the petitioner in this wise that the scheme was framed in that case and it was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the larger issues inter-se between the University and its workers are no more contentions as the University has decided to grant permanent status to the contesting and other workers in a phased manner for which the aforesaid scheme has been finalised. The Hon'ble Supreme Court's attention was focused on the issue as to whether the scheme subserves the workers' aspirations and satisfies the judicial scrutiny, and in this context the aforesaid observations relied upon by the petitioner were made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the present case, there is no such scheme and the appointment was made contrary to the governmental instructions and circulars issued by the State Government. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken the view in the case of Ashwani Kumar v. Slate of Bihar reported in 1997 (2) SCC 13 that, where the initial entry itself was unauthorised and not against any sanctioned vacancy, the question of regularising the incumbent would never survive for consideration. It was held in that case that the posts or vacancies must be backed up by budgetary provisions so as to be included within the permissible infrastructure of the scheme, and that any posting which is de hors the budgetary grant and on a non-existing vacancy, would be outside the sanctioned scheme and would remain totally unauthorised. No right would accrue to the incumbent of such an imaginary or shadow vacancy.
12. This Court has also taken the view in the case of Vithalbhai Babaldas Patel v. Chairman Oil & Natural Gas Commission reported in 1987 (2) GLR 1308, that workcharge employees appointed for short periods according to contingencies could not claim that their appointments should be made permanent. It was held in that case that regular appointments under such authorities were required to be made in accordance with settled law or Rules or regulations governing such appointment and the prescribed procedure. It was further held that if employment or appointment on temporary or ad-hoc appointee is regularised, guarantee of equality and equality of opportunity in matters of public employment enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution would be infringed and such regularisation would encourage backdoor appointments denying equality of opportunity to those who were eligible for the post.
13. This Court has also taken the view in the case of Nilesh Bhatt v. Administrative Officer, Nagar Prathamik Shikshan Samiti reported in 1996 (1) GLH 108, that where the appointment was itself ad-hoc, temporary and for a fixed term and subject to further stipulation that it was liable to be brought to an end earlier without notice, me principles of natural justice did not have to be followed while terminating the services of such employees. It was also held that a person who was appointed on temporary basis did not acquire any substantive right to the post and that mere prolonged continuous ad-hoc service did not ripen into a regular service to claim permanent or substantive status.
14. With regard to the petitioner's contention regarding violation of the provisions contained in Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is relevant to refer to two decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M. Venugopal v. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India , and State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Rameshwarlal Gehlot , wherein it has been laid down that once the appointment is for a fixed period, Section 25F does not apply as it is cover by Clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) of the Act. It is further laid down that in cases of such appointment for a fixed period if the Order of termination is passed, the provisions of section 25f are not attracted. Hence, neither relief of fresh appointment nor that of reinstatement could be granted. Of course, if according to the Apex Court it is found that the Order of termination was a mala fide or passed, in colourable exercise of powers, such Order of termination can be struck down.
15. In the present case, mere is nothing on record to show that me Order of termination was mala fide or it was passed in colourable exercise of powers conferred on the respondent-authorities. From the documents furnished along with the petition, it is clear that the petitioner was appointed for a fixed period. Moreover, the intention of the respondent-authorities was to employ the petitioner for a fixed period and the petitioner accepted the appointment on such terms and conditions, as contained in the initial letter of appointment. Extension thereafter was also made on the said terms and conditions. The nature of work being purely temporary and for a fixed period, the appointment of the petitioner automatically came to an end after the expiry of the period of appointment and the extended period of appointment which was also for a fixed period. In these circumstances, if the petitioner was not continued after the expiry of the period of 29 days as stated in the last appointment Order, it cannot be termed as 'retrenchment' nor the provisions of section 25f of the Act can be made applicable. Hence, the petitioner is not entitled to claim any compensation on the ground of alleged retrenchment, by invoking the provisions contained in Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
16. Under the circumstances and for the reasons discussed hereinabove, I am of me view that mere is no substance in the contentions raised and the claims made by the petitioner in this petition. I, however, hold that since the petitioner has put up total service of more than 22 years either under the appointment Orders with artificial break or under the Order of this Court, it is open for the petitioner to make a representation to the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and it is also open for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to consider the representations sympathetically and forward its proposal to the respondent No. 1, i.e., State of Gujarat. While considering such proposal, the State Government would take into consideration the length of service of the petitioner, his conduct and necessary workload and the financial aspect and after taking overall view of the matter, the respondents shall take appropriate decision in the matter. With the above observations, the petition is rejected. Rule is discharged with no Order as to costs.
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