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Quality Steels And Forgings Ltd., And Another v. Gujarat Electricity Board And Another
Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioner No.1 is a company engaged in steel castings (registered under the Companies Act, 1956) and Petitioner No.2 is a director of that company. The company received electricity supply from the Gujarat Electricity Board under an agreement dated 7 February 1986. On 6 August 1986 the Board's head office checking squad inspected the petitioner's premises and found allegedly wrong wiring; the meter was found to be under-recording by 35.18%. As a result, the Board revised bills covering the period from June 1985 to July 1986 by a letter dated 6 September 1986 demanding Rs. 31,22,280.52, and issued a separate bill for August 1986 dated 5 September 1986 for Rs. 9,55,075.60 (together about Rs. 40,77,356.12).
The petitioners filed a Special Civil Application in the High Court on 13 September 1986 challenging the legality and validity of the revised bills and later amended to challenge notices issued under S.24(1) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (produced at Annexure K). The petitioners contended there was a bona fide dispute as to the dues and that the Board could not invoke S.24(1) to discontinue supply. The Board resisted, arguing there was no bona fide dispute, that the test-sheet and diagrams prepared at the time of checking were signed by the petitioner's director, expert and electrician, and that the petitioner failed to follow the dispute-resolution procedure under S.24(2) (i.e., to refer the dispute to the Electrical Inspector). The Board also argued the writ petition under Article 226 was not maintainable.
The High Court examined the documentary record (including test-sheet and diagrams signed on 6 August 1986, a rechecking letter dated 14 August 1986, correspondence of 18 September 1986, a partial cheque tendered by the petitioner, and the notices dated 22 September 1986 issued under S.24(1)). The Court ultimately rejected the petition and vacated earlier interim relief.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether merely raising a dispute (not referred to the Electrical Inspector under S.24(2) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910) prevents a licensee (the Board) from invoking the coercive power under S.24(1) to issue a notice and discontinue electric supply for non-payment.
- Whether, on the facts of this case, the petitioners had raised a genuine or bona fide dispute as to the dues claimed by the respondent Board.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- There exists a bona fide dispute about the dues claimed by the Board; the petitioner-company had been paying bills regularly before the checking and any mistake was the Board's in wiring or meter reading.
- The Board cannot invoke S.24(1) to discontinue supply if a bona fide dispute is raised; raising a bona fide dispute should be sufficient to prevent disconnection without requiring a referral to the Electrical Inspector.
- The revised demand is retrospective and would cause hardship (petitioner contended it had manufactured and sold goods based on prior bills and could not recover additional amounts from its customers).
- Arguments based on estoppel and commercial expediency: the petitioner suggested that correcting the Board's mistake by demanding additional payment now would be unfair or commercially inequitable.
- Reliance on case law (including Bombay High Court and other decisions) where courts found bona fide disputes and denied disconnection.
Respondent Board's Arguments
- The checking on 6 August 1986 was conducted in presence of the petitioner's director, an expert called by the company, and the company's electrician; test-sheet and diagrams prepared then were signed by those persons, showing the wrong wiring and calculations.
- The petitioner did not raise any objection immediately after the checking (a recheck on 14 August 1986 confirmed the wiring and no objection to the calculations was made then).
- The petitioner's later complaints (requests for diagrams and calculation parameters, and claims of threats) were afterthoughts invented to delay payment; there was no bona fide dispute.
- Even if a bona fide dispute existed, the petitioner failed to refer the dispute to the Electrical Inspector as required by S.24(2); failure to do so indicates lack of bona fides and makes the writ petition inappropriate.
- The Board relied on authorities holding that the Court must scrutinize the genuineness of reasons offered and that false or frivolous disputes should not prevent the Board from invoking S.24(1).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shantial R. Desai v. P. N. Vyas, AIR 1968 Guj 179 | Interpretation of S.24: where dispute was referred to Electrical Inspector, the Inspector asked licensee not to resort to S.24(1); question whether the dispute was referable to the Inspector. | The Court noted that in that case the Electrical Inspector was held to have no jurisdiction because the dispute was not referable; the natural corollary is that where a dispute is referable and is referred to the Electrical Inspector before notice, the licensee would not be entitled to cut off supply under S.24(1). |
| State Electricity Board, U.P., Banda v. Prakash Talkies, AIR 1977 All 460 | Where a dispute is covered by sub-clause (3) of Clause VI of the Schedule, it is for the consumer (not the licensee) to refer the dispute to the Electrical Inspector; S.24(1) empowers disconnection where consumer neglects to pay. | The Court expressed respectful agreement with this Division Bench view and relied on it to hold that, where disputes are referable to an Electrical Inspector, the consumer must make that reference; otherwise the licensee may invoke S.24(1). |
| Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, AIR 1978 Bom 369 | Where reasons offered by consumer are not genuine (indicative of desire not to pay), the dispute is not bona fide; courts must scrutinize the consumer's attitude and reasons. | The Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that the petitioner's dispute was not bona fide and that the Board could invoke S.24(1). |
| Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Nagpur Electric Light and Paper Co. Ltd., AIR 1958 Bom 498 | Where parties have not agreed as to mode of ascertaining charges (no basis for charging), the dispute may be bona fide and disconnection under S.24(1) may not be appropriate. | The Court distinguished this case: in Nagpur the factual situation (no agreed mode of charging) differed and S.24(2) was not considered; therefore it did not assist the petitioner in the present case. |
| Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Madhusudandas and Brothers, AIR 1966 Bom 160 | Dispute over change in tariff can amount to a bona fide dispute (court allowed suit remedy rather than disconnection). | The Court noted this decision but observed that S.24(2) was not considered there and the case was not directly helpful to the petitioner. |
| Orissa Fibre v. The Orissa State, AIR 1973 Orissa 104 | Consideration of whether the consumer had neglected to pay; in that case both sides conceded S.24(2) did not apply. | The Court observed that because S.24(2) was conceded not to apply in that case, it does not assist the petitioner in the present matter where S.24(2) does apply. |
| Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. v. The U.P. State Electricity Board, AIR 1973 All 263 | Following Nagpur, held that where a consumer raises a bona fide dispute as to amount payable there is no neglect to pay and supply cannot be cut off (S.24(2) not considered). | The Court noted this authority but held it did not help the petitioner because the applicability of S.24(2) was not considered in that decision. |
| Maritime Electric Company Ltd. v. General Dairies Limited, (1937) AC 610 (Privy Council) | Where a statute imposes a positive duty to charge and pay, that duty cannot be defeated by the defense of estoppel arising from a mistake; a consumer cannot rely on estoppel to avoid statutory obligations. | The Court relied on this Privy Council decision to reject the petitioner's estoppel and commercial expediency arguments and held that the Board was entitled to correct its billing mistake and recover amounts due under statute. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in a sequence of factual examination and statutory interpretation:
- Statutory framework: The Court set out the relevant provisions of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (S.22, S.22A, S.22B, S.23 and especially S.24). It explained that S.24(1) permits a licensee to discontinue supply after giving seven clear days' written notice where a consumer neglects to pay any sum due, but S.24(2) curtails this power where the difference or dispute is required to be determined by an Electrical Inspector and has been referred to the Inspector before the S.24(1) notice is given.
- On the facts: The head-office checking squad inspected the petitioner's premises on 6 August 1986 and prepared a test-sheet and diagrams showing wrong wiring and calculations of under-recording; these documents were signed by the petitioner's director (Shri D. K. Maheshwari), the petitioner's expert (Shri B. G. Nair) and the petitioner's electrician (Shri H. B. Patel). The rechecking on 14 August 1986 (by Executive Engineer, Resident Engineer and a manufacturer’s representative) confirmed wiring connections and did not complain about calculations; the petitioner thereafter installed an additional meter for reference.
- Petitioner's post-billing actions: After receiving revised bills (issued on 5–6 September 1986), the petitioner requested details on 18 September 1986 and tendered a partial cheque of Rs. 7,88,997.25 which the Board did not accept because it did not cover the full amount. Since the full demanded amount was not paid, the Board issued notices under S.24(1) on 22 September 1986.
- Credibility and timing of objections: The Court emphasized timing and consistency. It found that the petitioner's immediate conduct (signing the test-sheet and diagrams without reservation; confirming the recheck of 14 August) was inconsistent with later objections. The Court regarded the subsequent claims—particularly, the allegation in an affidavit-in-rejoinder that signatures were obtained under threat—as an afterthought introduced only after the Board filed its affidavit-in-reply. The Court concluded that, had such threats or objections existed, they would have been asserted immediately in the letters of August or September or in the petition itself.
- Definition and application of "bona fide": The Court relied on the definition of "bona fide" (citing Black's Law Dictionary as recorded in the opinion) and applied it to the facts. It enumerated reasons demonstrating that the petitioner did not act honestly or genuinely: (a) signatures and acceptance at the time of checking; (b) confirmation on rechecking; (c) lack of referral to the Electrical Inspector under S.24(2) despite available remedy; and (d) failure to pay even the undisputed portion while seeking an absolute stay of recovery of the entire amount.
- Statutory design and policy considerations: The Court explained the legislative design behind S.24(2) — disputes of technical nature are to be determined by an Electrical Inspector, not by immediate invocation of S.24(1) or by a writ petition under Article 226. The Court reasoned that allowing a consumer simply to raise a dispute in the High Court without referring it to the Electrical Inspector would undermine the statutory machinery and nullify S.24(1). The Court also emphasized pragmatic reasons: technical disputes are better resolved by the expert Electrical Inspector.
- Treatment of alternative remedies and precedent: The Court stressed that where the statute prescribes a specific remedy or forum (Electrical Inspector under S.24(2)), the High Court should not ordinarily entertain an Article 226 petition that bypasses the statutory mechanism. The Court reviewed and applied relevant authorities to support its interpretation and specific factual conclusions.
- Estoppel and equity arguments: Relying on the Privy Council decision (Maritime Electric Co.), the Court rejected estoppel and commercial-expediency defenses when statutory obligations to charge and pay are involved and where a mistake in computation is being corrected by the licensee under statutory powers.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition is rejected.
Direct effects and immediate consequences:
- The High Court found there was no bona fide dispute raised by the petitioner-company regarding the dues claimed by the Board.
- The petition is rejected; the Court discharged notice (as stated in the order) and vacated any earlier ad-interim relief previously granted.
- The Board retains the statutory remedies available under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (including S.24(1)), subject to the requirement that a dispute referable to the Electrical Inspector must be referred under S.24(2) prior to the S.24(1) notice if the consumer wishes to avoid disconnection on the grounds of such a dispute.
Broader implications articulated by the Court:
- Where disputes are referable to an Electrical Inspector under S.24(2) of the Act, it is incumbent on the consumer to make that reference to demonstrate bona fides; failure to do so undermines the claim that the dispute is bona fide and prevents the consumer from relying on mere assertion of a dispute to avoid statutory consequences.
- The statutory machinery (referral to Electrical Inspector for technical disputes and the licensee's power to disconnect under S.24(1)) must not be bypassed by invoking writ jurisdiction; technical disputes are ordinarily for the Electrical Inspector, given the specialized expertise required.
The opinion resolved the dispute on the facts before the Court and applied existing authorities to those facts. The decision enforces the statutory scheme under S.24 and S.24(2) and limits the circumstances in which a consumer's mere assertion of a dispute will block the licensee's statutory remedies.
1. Under S. 24(2) of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 certain differences or disputes are required to be determined by the Electrical Inspector. Before notice under S. 24(1) of the Act is given by licencee, if reference is made to the Electrical Inspector, the licensee cannot invoke the provisions of S. 24(1) of the Act and discontinue the electric supply on failure to pay the charges demanded by it. Without taking recourse to the provisions of S. 24(2) of the Act, merely by raising a dispute, may be a genuine and bona fide one (which in this case- it is not), can a consumer deprive the licensee or the board, as the case may be, from effecting recovery of its dues by resorting to the provisions of S. 24(1) of the Act This is the principal question which has surfaced for decision in this petition.
2. Petitioner No. 1 is a Company registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. It is engaged in the business of steel castings. Petitioner No. 2 is a director of the Company. The petitioner company receives electric supply from petition. He has not argued the case as regards respondent No. Gujarat Electricity Board, as per agreement dated Feb. 7, 1986 with the respondent-Board. After commencement of the supply of electricity there were cert am checks by the officers of the Board, but the defect could not be found out. On August 6, 1986 the premises of the petitioner-Company were checked by the head office checking squad and it was found that there was wrong wiring and due to wrong wiring the petitioner-company s meter was found under-recording 35.18%. Therefore the bills from June, 198-S onwards were revised. By letter dated Sept. 6, 1986, (Ann. 9") revised bill for the period commencing from June, 1985 to July, 1986 was issued by the Board and the petitioner Company was called upon to pay an amount of Rs. 31,22,280-52 ps. within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the letter. By bill dated Sept. 5, 1986, (Ann. 1) for the month of Aug., 1986 for an amount of Rs. 9,55,075-60 ps. was issued. Thus the total amount covered by both the aforesaid documents is Rs. 40,77,356-12 ps. The petitioners filed the special civil application in this High Court on Sept. 13, 1986 and challenged the legality and validity of the aforesaid documents. Later on by way of amendment the petitioner-Company has challenged the legality and validity of the notices dated Sept. 22, 1986 produced at Annexure K to the petition. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that there is bona fide dispute between the parties as regards the dues payable to the Board; that prior to the checking which took place on Aug. 6, 1986 the petitioner-Company had paid the bills regularly, mistake, if any; was that of the Board in fixing the wires: and the petitioner-Company has not neglected to pay the amount due to the Board. In short it is submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case there is bona fide dispute between the parties. Therefore, the Board cannot invoke the provisions of S. 24(1) of the Act. and issue notice calling upon the petitioner-Company to pay up the dues. Even on failure to pay the dues, as demanded, the Board cannot discontinue the supply of electric energy. At the time of hearing of the petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of notices under S. 24(1) of the Act (Ann. 'K') to the petition .He has not agued the case as regards revised bill (ann.'G') and Ann.I.
3. The petition is resisted by the Board on of facts as well as on law points. It is inter alia contended that initially there was no dispute as regards the dues of the Board. The checking was carried out in presence of a director of the Company and other officers as well as an expert called by the Company; that the petitioner Company has pot raised a genuine dispute. It has tried to avoid payment or at' any rate makes delay in making payment of the bills. In substance it is submitted that there is no bona fide dispute and the Board is entitled to issue notice under S. 24(1) of the Act. It is also submitted that even if it is held that there is a genuine dispute between the parties, since the petitioner-Company has not raised the dispute as provided under S. 24(2) of the Act, it should be held that the dispute is not bona fide, the petition should not be, entertained. On other grounds also it is contended that the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable and therefore the same should be rejected.
4. Hence the moot question is there a bona fide dispute between the parties as regards the dues claimed by the respondent Board ? The question may be examined in further details.
5. Together with the affidavit-in-reply dated Sept. 16, 1987 a copy of the test sheet which was recorded at the time of checking, which took place on Aug. 6, 1986 has been produced. The test-sheet has been signed by Shri D. K. Maheshwari, one of the Directors of the Company. It is also signed by one Shri B. G. Nair, who, according to the respondent Board, was called as an expert by the petitioner-Company. One Shri H. B. Patel, Electrician of the petitioner- Company, was also present. Together with the test-sheet two diagrams are attached showing as to how the wrong wiring had taken place and as to how the same is set right. The aforesaid test sheets as well as the diagrams have been signed by the Director of the petitioner-Company, Shri D. K. Maheshwari, Shri H. B. Patel, Electrician of the Company and Shri B. G. Nair. In column 16 of the test-sheet the arithmetical calculations have been noted. In the remarks column, how the wrong wiring has been set right has been stated. The last sentence of the remarks column reads, "additional bill may be issued to the party". Below this writing the parties have put their signatures.
6. The aforesaid checking took place on Aug. 6, 1986. The revised bills have been issued on Sept. 6, 1986. The bill for the month of Aug., 1986 Annexure I to the petition has, been issued on Sept. 5, 1986. After the checking took place, the petitioner-Company has written a letter to the Board on Aug. 14, 1986. The letter has been written after rechecking of the wiring by the Executive Engineer, Resident Engineer and representative of M/s. Jyoti Limited, Baroda. Be it noted that as mentioned in Para 4.9 of the petition, M/s. Jyoti Limited, Baroda, are the manufacturers of relevant electrical implements. The result of the rechecking has been noted in the letter as follows :
"The wiring and the polarities of C.T.S. and P.T. are found connected correctly to the Boards trivectometer (L & G). Hence no change is carried out in present wiring."
Thereafter it is mentioned that the petitioner Company has installed an additional meter on its panel for its reference. Thus, in the letter dt. Aug. 14, 1986 there is no complaint with regard to the calculations noted down in the test-sheet nor with regard to the additional bills to be sent to the party. By this letter, the petitioner-Company indicated two things - (1) on rechecking by the Executive Engineer, Resident Engineer and the representative of M/s. Jyoti Limited, Baroda, it was found that the present wiring was not required to be changed and the, wiring was connected correctly to the Board's trivectometer; (2) that the petitioner-Company Wanted to install an additional meter on its panel for its own reference. There is not even a murmer with regard to the genuineness or accuracy of the calculations made in the test-sheet and the diagrams attached with the test-sheet.
7. The Board issued revised bill on Sept. 6, 1986 in respect of the period covering from June, 1986 to July, 1986. An amount of Rs. 31,22,280-52 ps. has been demanded as per the revised bills.The bill Annexure I for the month of Aug, 1986 is for an amount of Rs. 9,,55,075-60 ps. and it has been issued on Sept. 5, 1986. After the receipt of the revised bill, the petitioner- Company requested the Board by letter dated Sept. 18, 1986 (Annexure H) to furnish the details with regard to the wiring diagrams before and after revised connections. The petitioner-Company also requested to furnish the details regarding the parameters on the basis of which the calculations were made to the effect that there was under-recording to the extent of 4.18% and on the basis of which the calculation for maximum demand was made. In this letter the petitioner-Company requested to extend the time for payment so as to enable the petitioner-Company to verify the calculations and find out the amount payable to the Board.
8. The Executive Engineer of the Board at Godhra replied to the petitioner-Company that for the details asked for by it, the Company may approach the Head Office at Baroda. In that letter it is specifically mentioned that the request for extension of time for payment cannot be considered. The petitioner-Company made similar request in respect of the bills for the month of Aug., 1986, by letter dated Sept. 18, 1986. However, together with that letter the petitioner-Company sent a cheque for Rs. 7,88,997-25 ps. The petition ex-Company had also sent a calculation sheet narrating the charges payable by it in respect of the month of Aug., 1986. The Board has not accepted the cheque because it did not cover the full amount of the bill. Since the amount as demanded was not paid within the specific time limit, two separate notices dated Sept. 22, 1986 have been issued under the provisions of S. 24(1) of the Act. They are produced at Annexure K to the petition collectively. One notice is ii, respect of the amount of Rs. 31,22,280-52 ps. and another notice is in respect of the amount of Rs. 9,55,675-60 ps. covered by the bill for the month of Aug., 1986, Annexure I to the petition.
9. When the test was carried out by the Head Office checking squad on Aug..6,1986 the Director of the Company Shri Maheshwari was present. An expert of the Company Shri B. G. Nair was also called and he was present. Electrician of the Company Shri H. B. Patel was also present. The officers of the Board as well as the aforesaid persons put their signatures in the. test-sheet as well as in the diagrams prepared at. that time. On Aug. 14, 1986 the petitioner-Company wrote a letter to the Board and did not make any complaint with regard to setting right of the wrong wiring. On the contrary it confirmed that on rechecking what was found was correct and the rechecking was done by representative of Ws. Jyoti Limited Baroda. After receipt of the revis6d bill, in letter dated Sept. 18, 1986 the petitioner-Company made grievance that when the signature on the diagrams was taken it had requested the officers of the Board to furnish copies of the said diagram but the same was not furnished and hence a request was bonafiade to furnish the documents. Similarly, clarification was sought with regard to the basis of calculation for the first time by this letter dated Sept. 18, 1986. Be it noted that the test-sheet. is signed by no less a person than the Director of the Company, wherein, it is also written that additional bill be iss4ed to the party.
10. In the letter dated Aug. 14,1986 which has been written immediately after the rechecking no complaint whatsoever is made with regard to the copies of the diagrams or with regard to the basis of the calculations. Shri. B. G. Nair has written in the test-sheet that the connections were changed in front of him as per the attached diagrams. Neither in the test-sheet nor in the diagrams it is mentioned the a copy of the same was demanded by or on behalf of the petitioner-Company and the same was not furnished. Therefore, on scrutiny it becomes clear that from Sept. 18, 1986 onwards the petitioner-Company started inventing reasons for delaying the payment. Had there been any doubt either with regard to the correctness of 1he calculations made in the test-sheet or with, regard to the setting right of the wiring as reflected in the diagrams, the petitioner-Company would have on the same day raised' objection. Instead of raising objection, it agreed that additional bill be issued to the party or at any rate it would have raised objection when it wrote letter dated Aug. 14, 1986.
11. Now it is interesting to note that in the petition which has been filed on sept. 30,1986 in Para 4.9 it is averred as follows"They prepared necessary working sheet and diagrams in this behalf and got the same signed by the petitioner company also.
It is not stated that on behalf of the Company copy of the diagrams was demanded and the same was not supplied. It is neither mentioned in the petition nor in the letter dated Aug. 14, 1986 or the subsequent letters dated Sept. 18, 1986 that the Director of the Company and the technical expert Shri B. G. Nair as well as the electrician of the Company were required to sign the test-sheet and the diagrams on account of the threat given by the officers of the Board. It is for the first time that in the affidavit- in-rejoinder filed on behalf of the petitioner-Company on Sept. 21, 1987 that the story of threat having been given by the -officers of the Board finds its place. This has been denied by officers of the Board in their affidavit. This story cannot be accepted for the simple reason that had it been true, the petitioner-Company would have immediately put in writing in the letter dated Aug. 14, 1986 or at any rate in the letters dated Sept. 18,1986.
12. Moreover, there is no reason why these averments could not have been made in the petition. It is only after filing of the affidavit-in-reply by the respondent-Board that for the first time in the affidavit-in- rejoinder the story of threat having been administered by the officers of the Board finds its place. For the first time therein it is alleged that on account of the threat the test-sheet as Well as the diagrams were signed by the Director of the Company without understanding the same. This story is nothing but an afterthought. It appears to have been invented only with a view to show that there existed a dispute between the parties as regards the dues claimed by the revised bill Annexure G and the bill for the month of Aug., 1986 Annexure I. Thus on over-all consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and on scrutiny of the attitude of the company an irresistible inference has got to be drawn that the reasons sought to be canvassed by the petitioner-Company for not making the payment are not genuine. On the contrary the reasons are indicative of an attempt to show that-there existed a bona fide dispute between the parties.
13. According to Black's Law Dictionary the term 'bona fide' would mean (1) in or with good faith; (2) honestly, openly and sincerely; (3) without deceit or fraud, (4) truly, (5) actually; (6) without simulation or pretence; (7) innocently; (8) in the attitude of trust and confidence; (9) without notice of fraud, etc., (1) real, actual, genuine and not feigned. In the context it should mean genuine, honest and without simulation or pretence. In the facts and circumstances of the case it would be difficult to hold that the petitioner-Company has raised a genuine and honest dispute with regard to the dues claimed by the respondent-Board. This conclusion is irresistible, for the following reasons : (1) At the initial stage on Aug. 6, 1986 the petitioner--Company was represented by its Director Shri D. K. Maheshwari, its expert and electrician and they signed the test-sheet and diagrams without any reservation whatsoever. In the test-sheet the calculations have been made and in the diagrams the wrong wiring is depicted and position of wires after setting right the same is also shown. In the remarks column of the test-sheet it is stated that the additional bill be issued to the party; (2) No dispute is raised as regards the correctness of the calculations and the, diagrams, in letter dated Aug. 14, 1986 written by the petitioner-Company. On the contrary, it stated that on rechecking, what has been done by the checking squad on Aug. 6, 1986 has been confirmed as correct; (3) Only after the receipt of the bill the petitioner-Company has tried to invent reasons for the purposes of delaying the payment. After advancing the aforesaid reasons in the letters dated Sept. 18, 1986 the petitioner-Company sat silent and did not take any step to refer the dispute to the Electrical Inspector as provided under S. 24(2) of the, Act. Had the petitioner-Company been genuinely disputing the correctness of the bills, it could have and should have referred the dispute to Electrical Inspector as provided under S. 24(2) of the Act. In the petition there is no explanation whatsoever as to why the, petitioner-Company did not raise the dispute as provided under S. 24(2) of the Act; (4) The petitioner-Company did not show willingness to pay even the undisputed amount of Rs. 7,88,997-25 ps. for which a cheque dated Sept. 19, 19 1 86 was issued by the petitioner Company and the Board did not accept the same because it did not cover the full amount of the bill Annexure I. Had the petitioner Company been not lacking in bona fides it would have not prayed for absolute stay against recovery of the, entire amount (Rs. 9,55,075-60 Ps.) covered by the bill for the month of Aug., 1986 Annexure I to the petition. It would not be open to the petitioner Company or for that matter to any litigant to say that it had mentioned the relevant facts in the petition regarding the tender of the amount by cheque.1f the petitioner wanted to show its bona fides it was incumbent upon petitioner to tell the Court that it did not pray for stay in respect of the undisputed amount of Rs. 7,88,997-25 ps.
14. For the aforesaid reasons an irresistible inference has got to be drawn that a pretense has been made by the petitioner-Company to show that there is a genuine dispute and the veil of innocence put on by the Company is nothing but a devise to delay the payment. Had it not been so, the petitioner-Company would not have prayed for stay even with regard to the undisputed amount of Rs. 7,88,997.25 ps. The aforesaid discussion clearly shows that there was complete lack of good faith and honesty on the part of the petitioner-Company and, therefore, it can never be said that there was a bona fide dispute between the parties.
15. The learned counsel for the petitioner-Company submitted that the Board cannot invoke the provisions of S. 24(1) of the Act. If the Board feels that certain amount remains due to the petitioner-Company it will be open to the Board to recover its dues by filing a suit or by any other lawful means, but not by adopting coercive methods as provided under S. 24(1) of the Act. In his submission, once a dispute - and a bona fide dispute is raised, it should be held that there is no neglect to pay and the Board cannot issue notice calling upon the consumer to pay its dues and cannot cut off the supply of electricity on failure to make payment, as might have been mentioned in the notice. In his submission all that is required for the consumer is to raise a bona fide dispute and the consumer is not obliged to refer the dispute to the Electrical Inspector as provided under S. 24(2) of the Act. Assuming that I am wrong in my finding regarding the nature of dispute, the contention raised by the petitioner be examined
16. In order to examine the contention, the provisions of the Act maybe seen. S. 22 of the Act imposes an obligation upon the licensee to supply energy to every person within the area of supply who makes an application requesting for supply of electrical energy. S. 22A confers power on the State Government to give directions to a licensee in regard to supply of energy to certain class of consumer. S. 22B empowers the State Government to control the distribution and consumption of energy. S. 23 of the Act prohibits the licensee from showing undue preference to any person in making any agreement for-the supply of energy. It may be noted that reference to licensee would in the context be applicable to the Board. S. 24 provides for discontinuance of supply to a, consumer who neglects to pay the charges. 'Sub-section (1) of S. 24 confers power upon the licensee to cut off supply of electrical energy in certain circumstances after giving notice A seven clear days in writing. These circumstances are that if the consumer neglects to pay any sum due from him either Jn respect of charge for electric energy or any sum Other than the charge for energy, in respect of the energy supplied. The licensee ,is bound to restore the supply of electric energy as soon as the amount demanded is paid. Sub-s. (2) of S. 24 is very much material. The power conferred upon the licensee under S.24(1) of the Act is curtailed or' circumscribed to a certain extent by sub ,section (2) of S. 24. It provides that in cases of disputes between the licensee and the consumer which is required to be determined .by or under the provisions of the Act by an Electrical Inspector and if the same has been ,referred to the Electrical Inspector before ,the notice under S. 24(1) is given, the licensee 'shall not be entitled to cut off the electric supply till the decision is given by the Electrical Inspector. Thus, this is a fetter placed on the right to cut off the electric supply. Provison to sub-section (2) of S24 is enacted for dual purposes. One is to relieve the licensee from the vigour of provisions of S. 22 and the legislature has given some further choice or option to the licensee to ask the consumer to deposit the amount claimed by it with the Electrical Inspector. In case the consumer fails to deposit the amount as instructed by the licensee, the licensee would be entitled to enforce it by coercive measures.
17. In the case of Shantial R. Desai v. P. N. Vyas, AIR 1968 Guj 179, provisions of S. 24 of the Act came up for consideration. In that case, the dispute was referred to the Electrical Inspector. The Electrical Inspector had asked the licensee not to resort to provisions of S. 24(1) of the Act. This action' of the Electrical Inspector Was challenged by the licensee on the ground that the dispute referred to the Electrical Inspector was not a dispute referable to him under the provisions of S. 24(2) of the Act. The dispute was with regard to the payment of electricity charges for which supplementary bills were issued by the licensee. In view of the provisions of the Act and the Rules as then existed, it was held that the dispute was not referable to the Electrical Inspector and, therefore, the Electrical Inspector had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute and direct the licensee not to proceed further pursuant to the notice issued under S. 24(1) of the Act. The natural corollary of the aforesaid decision is that wherever the dispute is referable to the Electrical Inspector under S. 24(2) of the Act and once the dispute is refer the licensee would not be entitled to invoke the provisions of S. 24(1) of the Act. In such circumstances it would not be open to the licensee to issue notice calling upon the consumer to pay up its dues within prescribed time limit, failing which to discontinue the electric supply.
18. In the instant case the reverse is the position. The notice under S. 24(1) of the Act is issued, and the consumer dispute's the legality and validity of the notice. While disputing the legality and validity of the notice, the only ground raised by the petitioner Company is that there is bona fide dispute and, therefore, notice, cannot be issued. The petitioner-Company does not contend nor it is argued before averred anywhere in the petition, that the dispute raised by the petitioner Company is not referable to the Electrical Inspector. It. is also not shown that even if the dispute is held to be referable to the Electrical Inspector as provided for under S. 24(2) of the Act, it is not for the petitioner to raise the dispute before the Electrical Inspect and it can sit silent after raising the dispute. This later contention is raised only during the course of arguments.
19. Now, if the contention raised by the petitioner-Company is accepted, all that the consumer would be required to do would be to raise the dispute and give a simulation or pretext to the same of being genuine. In a given case there may be a genuine and bona fide dispute raised by the consumer. But to show the bona fides it will be for the consumer to refer the dispute to the Electrical Inspector as provided under S. 24(2) of the Act. If this course is not adopted by the consumer and if the scheme of the Act is not interpreted to mean that it is obligatory upon the consumer to refer the dispute to the Electrical Inspector, the entire provisions of S. 24 of the Act would become nugatory. Particularly the provisions of S. 24(1) of the Act would become meaningless. When the Board makes the demand of the amount as contemplated under S. 24(1) of the Act the Board would proceed on the footing that the demand made by it is genuine and correct. According to the Board there would be no room for dispute, much law a genuine or bona fide dispute. However, this belief of the Board may be mistaken. In such a case, if the Consumer feels that there is a genuine difference or dispute he must refer the dispute to the Electrical Inspector any time before the notice under S. 24(1) of the Act Is given. This can be done by the consumer immediately after the receipt of the bill and before the issuance of the notice. In the instant case the petitioner-Company did not refer the dispute a to the Electrical lnspactor but attempted to invent reasons for delaying payment
20. Now the contention of the petitioner be examined from yet another angle. If the contention of the petitioner is upheld, it would not be necessary for consumers of electricity to refer the bona fied disputes to Electrical Inspector. In. such cases the Board can not live the provisions of .S . 24(1) of the Act, therefore it may restore, to any, other lawful remedy available to it.. Thus in all the cases of "bona fide" disputes between the parties the provisions of S. 24(1) of the Act would be excluded. Then question arises, are the powers under S. 24(1) of the Act meant to be exercised by the Board only in cases wherein the consumers withhold the amount due to the Board by raising false and frivolous disputes? Another question that arises is, are the bona fide disputes and differences not to be referred to Electrical Inspector under S. 24(2) of the Act and only the false and frivolous disputes are to be referred to him? If reasonable interpretation to the provisions of the section is to be given, the answer would be in negative. Otherwise it would amount to re-writing S. 24(2). At the appropriate place before the words disputes and/or differences, the phrase except bona fide" will have to be inserted and/or read. This is neither warranted nor If permissible to the Court. Moreover, such interpretation would be absurd in as much as it would make the provision of S. 24 meaningless. In cases where S. 24(2) does riot apply, different consideration may arise, which it is not necessary to spell out since the question does not arise before me.
20-A. In the instant case, it may be noted that the dispute is with regard to the revision of bills which has been necessitated on account of wrong wiring. Such a dispute is covered by the provisions of sub-clause (3) of CL VI of the Schedule to the Act. Sub-clause (3) of C1 VI inter alia refers to any difference or dispute arising out of the defect in any wires, works or apparatus, etc. Such a dispute is required to be referred to an Electrical Inspector, as provided in this sub-clause. It is not the case of the petitioner-Company that the dispute is not referable to Electrical Inspector, under the provisions of S. 24(2) of the Act. On behalf of the respondent-Board it is positively shown that the dispute is referable to Electrical Inspector. This is so in view of the provisions of sub-clause (3) of clause vi of the Schedule to the Act.
21. Here reference may be made to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of State Electricity Board, U.P., Banda v. Prakash Talkies, AIR 1977 All 460. The dispute arose between the Board and the respondent cinema talkies, as regard the demand of energy charges' in respect of running of fans. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, after referring to the ' provisions of S. 24 of the Act observed in para 5 of the judgment as follows
"On a plain reading of this provision it appears to us to be clear that there was no duty cast on the licensee to refer a dispute covered by sub-clause (3) of CL VI of the Schedule of the Act for determination to the Electrical Inspector. If a dispute of that character is raised by the consumer, in our opinion, it k for him to make a reference to the Electrical Inspector for determination thereof. S. 24(1) of the Act gives power to licensee, where a consumer neglects to pay any charge for energy or any sum other than a charge for energy due from him to licensee in respect of the supply of energy to him to disconnect the electric supply after giving one week's notice in writing, to the consumer for I)payment of the amount due."
22. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court. In above view of the. matter it is clear that in cases where the difference or dispute is referable to the Electrical Inspector and the provisions of S. 24(2) of the Act are applicable, it is for the consumer to raise the dispute. before the Electrical Inspector. This will be a clear indication of the bona fides of the consumer. Once the dispute is raised and referred to the Electrical Inspector, the Board will -not be in 4 position to disconnect the electric supply. At the most the Board may resort to the provisot6S. 24(2) of the Act and may ask the consumer to deposit the amount in dispute with the Electrical Inspector and there by protect its own interest. Thus, the legislature has provided for drastic powers which may be exercised by the Board. The powers are circumscribed also. In cases where that is a bona fide dispute and the same is referred to the electrical Inspector, the Board cannot exercise its power. This power is conferred upon the Board because the Board is under obligation to supply electric energy and it cannot withdraw the supply on any whimsical ground or on, any other unreasonable considerations. Just as the Board is under obligation to supply electricity, the consume is also under obligation to make regular payments. In case of dispute it will be for the consumer to raise and refer the dispute before the Electrical Inspector.
23. It is note worthy that the legislature has thought it fit to provide that difference or dispute. be referred to an Electrical Inspector. Why Electrical Inspector? Why not a District Magistrate or a District Judge or even a court of Civil Judge, Senior Division? The reason is obvious. The disputes which are made referable or which may be made referable in future will be of highly technical nature. Technical knowledge and expertise will be necessary to resolve such disputes. The dues of the licensee - in this case the Board cannot be kept in doubt for unreasonably long time, inasmuch as certain disputes may be with regard to recurring charges. The technical questions which may arise in such disputes can be easily resolved by a person who has necessary technical expertise. That is the reason why such disputes are. Required to be referred to an Electrical Inspector as provided for under S. 24(2) of the Act. When the legislature has clearly expressed, in no uncertain terms, its intention that such disputes be referred to an Electrical Inspector, it would not be wise and proper to entertain a dispute of this nature in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Moreover, even if the consumer makes out a case and prima facie shows th0, the difference or dispute existing between the parties is genuine and bona fide, the petition at the instance of such a consumer cannot be entertained for two reasons - (1) that the consumer can approach the Electrical Inspector and refer his dispute to the Electrical Inspector as provided under S. 24(2) of the Act; and (2) normally it would not be possible for the High Court to examine. the facts requiring technical expertise. It would be difficult in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution to examine the experts and call for their aid and assistance in arriving at a just conclusion. Such a course may be adopted in a civil suit. Therefore, even if it is assumed that a bona fide dispute, exist between the parties, petition under r Art. of the Constitution of India is a proper remedy for resolving such dispute.
24. It is true that existence of alternative remedy does not create absolute bar against entertaining a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. But it cannot be forgotten that resort to jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained by pursuing the course prescribed under a statute. Wherever it is open to an aggrieved person to move another authority prescribed under the relevant provisions of the statutes it would not be proper for the High Court to entertain petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. To do so would amount to permitting a party to by-pass the machinery created by the statutes. In the instant case, as indicated hereinabove, the legislature has created the machinery under S. 24 itself. This machinery cannot be permitted to be bypassed ' simply because the petitioner has raised some dispute, may be genuine and bona fide dispute (however, which it is not in the instant case as discussed hereinabove). Simply because a dispute is raised and the dispute is genuine and bonafide if petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is entertained, it would amount to rendering useless the machinery created by the statute. On the other hand the High Court would be arrogating to itself the role of an Electrical Inspector. The dangers of adopting such a course cannot be ignored. Howsoever industrious, intelligent and able assistance may be received by the High Court in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the very nature of the proceedings have their limitations. On account of the expertise, that which could be done by an Electrical Inspector within an hour or so, may not be achieved by the High Court even after investing time for days together, Therefore, even on account of pragmatic considerations it is neither wise nor proper to entertain the petition for resolving disputes for which a separate machinery has been created by the statute itself.
25. The learned counsel for the respondent-Board has relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, AIR 1978 Bom 369. In that case the dispute rose on account of erroneous reading, .of the meter. Consequently the consumer, was undercharged to the extent of. 1/2 (one half) When the mistake was detected the licensee issued notice to the consumer for making payment of the amount due. That was challenged before the High Court. In para 21 of the judgment the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court inter alia observed that if the reasons offered by the consumer are not genuine indicative of a mere desire not to pay, the dispute raised by the consumer ought not to be regarded as bona fide. It is further observed that in each case the Court will have to scrutinise the attitude of the consumer and consider ' the reasons given by him to the licensess for not meeting with the demand made by the licensee. On consideration of the facts of the case the Bombay High Court came to the conclusion that the dispute raised by the consumer was not bona fide. In that very judgment, earlier decisions of the Bombay High Court in the case of Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Nagpur Electric Light and Paper Co. Ltd., AIR 1958 Bom 498 and Maharashtra State Electricity Board v, Madhusudandas and Brothers, AIR 1966 Bom 160 were considered. It is observed by the Bombay High Court that the nature of dispute raised in the earlier cases was entirely different. Relying upon the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court it is submitted by the learned counsel for the Board that in the instant case also the dispute raised by the petitioner-Company cannot be said to be bona fide. Therefore it is submitted that the Board is entitled to invoke the powers conferred upon it under S. 24(1) of the Act. As discussed hereinabove, the dispute raised by the petitioner cannot be said to be bona fide. The petitioner-Company has invented the reasons subsequently. It appears that the reasons advanced by the petitioner-Company are indicative of the desire of the petitioner not to make -payment immediately. It also appears that the attempt of the petitioner is to delay the payment and not to comply with the demand made by the revised bill at Annexure-G and the bill for the month of Aug., 1986, Annexure-I.
26. The learned counsel for the petitioner-Company relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Corporation of the City of Nagpui (AIR 1958 Bom'498) (supra).In that case the parties had not even agreed as regards the mode in which. the charges Were to be ascertained. There were no basis for charging. The dispute was with regard to the electric energy supplied for public lamps and -other charges connected therewith. In such a situation Clause XII of the Schedule to the Act is attracted. In view of these facts of the case the Bombay High Court held that there was bona fide dispute and therefore the Board could not have invoked powers under S. 24(1) of the Act. However, it may be noted that in that case no question arose as regards the applicability of the provisions of S. 24(2) of the Act. In the instant case the provisions of S. 24(2) of the Act do apply. In above view of the matter, reliance placed on the aforesaid decision of the Bombay High Court does not help the petitioner.
27. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Maharashtra State Electricity Board-v. Madhusudandas and Brothers, AIR 1966 Bom 160, In that case the dispute arose on account of the change in the tariff. The Court held that there was bona fide dispute. Again, the dispute was raised by filing a civil suit and not by way of writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Moreover, no question as regards applicability of S. 24(2) of the Act has been considered in that judgment also. Therefore, the aforesaid decision also does not help the petitioner.
28. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Orissa High Court in the case of Orissa Fibre v. The Orissa State, AIR 1973 Orissa 104. Therein the Court has considered as to whether the consumer had neglected to pay or not. But in para 3 of the judgment it is clearly observed that both the sides conceded that the provisions of S. 24(2) of the Act did not apply. In view of this position the reliance placed on this judgment also does not help -the petitioner.
29. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. v. The U.P. State Electricity Board, AIR 1973 All 263. Therein the Allahabod High Court has followed the' decision of the Bombay High Court in the' case of Corporation of the City of Nagpur (AIR 1958Bom498)(supra) and it is held that where the consumer had raised a bona fide dispute as to the amount payable there is no neglect to pay and the supply of energy cannot be cut off. In the instant case it is held that there is no bona fide dispute. Moreover, in that case also the question as regards the applicability of S. 24(2) of the Act has not been considered. It may be that dispute or difference which arose between the parties, might not be referable to Electrical Inspector' under S. 24(2) of the Act. Be that as it may. The fact remains that this aspect has not been considered at all in the judgment. Therefore, the aforesaid decision also does not help the petitioner.
30. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Board has made demand with retrospective effect. The period covered is from June, 1985 to July, 1986. In his submission the petitioner has manufactured goods and thereafter marketed the same on the basis of the payment of electricity charges as per the bills received by it. Now, if the petitioner is asked to pay an amount of Rs. 31,22,280/- as additional amount, the petitioner would suffer untold hardship inasmuch as the petitioner-Company would not be able to recover the same from its consumer.
31. At the first blush the argument seems to be attractive. But with little scrutiny it becomes clear that there is no merit in the argument. It is not shown in the petition that the petitioner was obliged to market its finished goods at a lower rate than the prevailing market rate. On account of the wrong wiring and under-recording of the meter all that had happened was that the petitioner was charged much low. As the petitioner was charged less, the petitioner, cost for manufacturing the end product must have gone down. The cost of the finished product which the petitioner manufactured would have been much lower than what it would have been in case of other similarly situated units. As a result of- wrong wiring, and under-recording of the meter. The petitioner was charged less than what it ought to have been charged. The resultent effect would be larger margin of and not an losts to the petitioner. It would be absurd to infer that because the cost of production of the, petitioner's unit alone goes down, the prevailing market rate at " 'which: the commodity can be sold in the market would also go down. At any rate there is no evidence to show that the petitioner had sold its product at a price lesser than the prevailing market rate.
32. Thus an irresistable inference has to be drawn that the petitioner-Company's margin of profit was enlarged on account of the wrong wiring and under-recording of the meter. This is not a case I of retrospective demand. it is a case of less payment made by. the petitioner-Company on- account of mistake common to both, i.e. the petitioner-Company as well as the respondent-Board. 'The mistake was discovered after a period of about 14 months. Hence the Board demand by revised bib. All that has been done by the Board by making the demand is to ask. The petitioner-Company to pay something which the petitioner-Company was not entitled to retain with it. This money did not belong to the petitioner. The petitioner-Company would have been made to pay all this amount long back had there not been wrong wiring and the under-recording of the meter. Now, when the petitioner is asked to pay up this amount, all that would happen will be that its profit margin would get shrunk to some extent. The petitioner-Company. will have to pay to the Board some thing- which never belonged to it, It is just and proper that a party does not retain anything -which does not belong to it. In such a situation, it can never be said that the demand is made. with retrospective effect.
33. Me learned counsel for the respondent-Board contended that the petitioner was not entitled to invoke the principles of estoppel and/or that of commercial expediency. In support of this submission reliance is placed on the decision .of the Privy Council in the case of Maritime Electric Company Ltd.. v. General Dairies Limited, (1937) AC 610. In that case the consumers were charged with only l/10th of the electric energy supplied Later on when Me mistake was detected the balance of 9/10th of the amount was demanded by the electric company. Repelling the argument based on estoppel, it is observed that the relevant provisions of the statute imposed duty on the electric company to charge and on the consumer to pay at the scheduled rates. In; that background the question was posed "can the duty so cast by the statute upon both the parties to this action, be defeated or avoided by a mere mistakes in the computation of accounts?". And were' the question, the Privy Council observed that where the statute imposes a duty of a positive kind, not avoidable by the performance of any formality, it is not open to the consumer ' to set up an estoppel to prevent performance of the duty. It is also observed "it is immaterial whether the obligation is onerous otherwise, to the party suing. The duty, of each party is to obey the law". Thereafter it is observed that if the electric company does, not collect and receive from the consumers the amount remaining due, it would be acting in direct violation of the provisions of the, statute. It is evident that in the instant case also the same will be the position. If the Board does not collect the amount due from the petitioner-Company, the petitioner Company would be availing the obligation arising out of the contract as well as under the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act. The petitioner-Company is bound to pay the electric charges at the same rate applicable to all other consumers. The Board is under a statutory obligation to charge for the electricity supplied to all the consumers at the same rate. If payment of electric charges can be avoided on account of mistakes, this would open a new vista for malpractices and corruption., In above of the matter the same argument based on estoppel and or commercial expediency has no merits and the same is required to be rejected;
34. The contention that the petitioner-Company is situated in a backward area and therefore in view of the Government policy to develop industries in backward areas the respondent Board should not be permitted to enforce the demand also cannot be accepted. There is no Government polity to the effect that 'industries started in backward areas should be allowed to reap benefits oil account of mistakes. It cannot be the policy of the Government nor can there be any such direction that mistakes cannot be corrected. No one can claim to retain the benefits received, by it under mistake common to both. It would be both immoral and illegal. Powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution cannot be exercised to support either immorality or illegality.
35. It is contended that the petitioner consumer was required to pay the charges every month as provided in Clause 8 of the agreement between the parties. The petitioner has made payment of electric charges every month as and when the bill was tendered. Therefore the revised bill cannot be issued. C1. 8 of the agreement cannot be pressed in service by the petitioner. Clause 8 refers to the charges for supp of electric energy in regular course. Had there been no wrong wiring or, no- under-recording the meter reading and the bill 'which would have been tendered would have shown higher amount than what has been paid by the petitioner. Clause 8 does not preclude the Board from making demand in case of discovery of mistake at, a later stage.
36. No argument has been advanced with regard to the correctness and/or reasonableness of the demand made by revised bill sent together with Annexure-G and bill for the month of Aug., 1986 produced at Annexure-I to the petition. Therefore, it is not necessary to consider as to whether the demand made by Annexures-G and I is reasonable or not. In the facts and circumstances of the case -ix cannot be said that demand made by the aforesaid documents is in any way' unreasonable or arbitrary.
37. No other contention is raised. There is no substance in the petition. Hence the, petition stands rejected. Notice discharged. Ad-interim relief granted earlier stands vacated.
38. Petition rejected.
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