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Sanjay Singh v. M/S. Corporate Warranties Pvt. Ltd. Respodent

Delhi High Court

Sep 9, 2013

Judgment

Subsequent
References

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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent/plaintiff instituted CS No. 12/2010 seeking recovery of possession (ejectment) of property No. D-129, Saket, New Delhi and mesne profits of Rs. 3,96,000/-. The plaintiff pleaded that it acquired the property from Sh. A.K. Rangaswami by Sale Deed dated 29.12.2009 and that the appellant/defendant had been a tenant under Sh. A.K. Rangaswami pursuant to lease deeds dated 27.11.2007 and 10.11.2008. The earlier landlord (Sh. A.K. Rangaswami) had purportedly asked the defendant to vacate by communication and tendered refund of security deposit; after the sale to the respondent, the respondent gave a legal notice dated 28.01.2010 determining the tenancy and asking the defendant to vacate.

The defendant filed a written statement denying the plaintiff's position and asserting (inter alia) that Sh. A.K. Rangaswami had agreed to sell the property to the defendant by an Agreement to Sell dated 30.11.2009 for Rs. 3,90,00,000/-, that the defendant paid Rs. 10,00,000/- as advance and continued in possession in part performance invoking Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. The replication by the plaintiff denied any Agreement to Sell in favour of the defendant.

Issues were framed on 21.02.2011. The trial proceeded with the plaintiff examining two witnesses (its director and Sh. A.K. Rangaswami); the defendant repeatedly failed to lead evidence despite multiple opportunities and ultimately did not appear when directed. The Trial Court by judgment and decree dated 15.05.2013 decreed ejectment in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. This appeal challenges that judgment and decree.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Court has jurisdiction to try the suit?
Whether the suit of the plaintiff is maintainable?
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the possession as claimed?
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profit? If so at what rate?
Whether the defendant is a tenant under the plaintiff?
Reliefs.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments

The defendant contended that Sh. A.K. Rangaswami had promised to renew the lease and to sell the property to the defendant and that an Agreement to Sell dated 30.11.2009 was executed in favour of the defendant for Rs. 3,90,00,000/-, with Rs. 10,00,000/- paid as advance.
The defendant claimed to be in possession in part performance of the Agreement to Sell and invoked Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.
The defendant argued that upon execution of the Agreement to Sell, his possession changed from tenant to purchaser such that he could not be sued as a tenant for ejectment and, if sued, court-fees should be on market value rather than rent-based valuation; authorities were cited in support.
The defendant contended that the Sale Deed in favour of the plaintiff was not properly proved because only a certified copy was produced and not the original.
It was also contended that the Director of the plaintiff who instituted the suit was not authorized to do so.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Position

The plaintiff's replication denied any Agreement to Sell in favour of the defendant and maintained that it purchased the property from Sh. A.K. Rangaswami and thereafter determined the tenancy and sought possession.
The plaintiff proved the Sale Deed in its evidence and produced the sale transaction before the Trial Court.
The plaintiff produced Sh. A.K. Rangaswami as a witness who denied having executed the Agreement to Sell dated 30.11.2009 and stated he was not in India on that date; he also stated that the document relied upon by the defendant was forged.
The plaintiff relied on the position that on transfer of tenanted premises the transferee steps into the shoes of the transferor-landlord and becomes landlord by operation of law.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ahamadali Fakruddin Bohri v. Mulla Fidaali Sultanali Bohri, AIR 1938 Nagpur 162	Cited by appellant for the proposition that possession/character may change such that a tenant becomes a purchaser for certain purposes (relied upon in support of argument on court-fees/character of possession).	The court treated reliance on this authority as misplaced because the appellant failed to prove the Agreement to Sell and the factual foundation for invoking such principles was absent.
R. Kanthimathi v. Mrs. Beatrice Xavier, AIR 2003 SC 4149	Cited by appellant in support of the contention regarding change of character of possession / implications for valuation.	The court held that the position in R. Kanthimathi was not applicable in the facts of the case, particularly after the insertion of Section 17(1A) to the Registration Act in 2001, and because the Agreement to Sell was not proved.
Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656	Relied on by appellant to argue that the Agreement to Sell was not compulsorily registrable.	The court observed that Suraj Lamp is relevant only where possession in part performance is not handed over; on the facts here (possession was that of a tenant and clauses did not transfer purchaser possession), the appellant's reliance was misplaced.
Food Corporation of India v. Babulal Agrawal, (2004) 2 SCC 712	Relied on by appellant in relation to proof/admissibility of documents (original vs certified copy).	The court found the reliance misconceived: the original Sale Deed had been shown to the Court and to the appellant's counsel; certified copy was exhibited as marked; no objection or cross-examination was taken.
Smt. Rekha Rana v. Smt. Ratnashree Jain, AIR 2006 MP 107	Relied on by appellant concerning proof of documents (original vs certified copy).	The court concluded the reliance was not justified on the facts because the original had been inspected and the certified copy exhibited with no objection from the appellant.
Nalakath Sainuddin v. Koorikadan Sulaiman, (2002) 6 SCC 1	Cited for the principle that on transfer of tenanted premises the transferee becomes landlord by operation of law.	The court applied this principle to hold that the plaintiff, having purchased the property, stepped into the shoes of the transferor and was entitled to maintain the suit for ejectment.
Mahendra Raghunathdas Gupta v. Vishwanath Bhikaji Mogul, (1997) 5 SCC 329	Same principle cited: transferee of tenanted premises becomes landlord by operation of law.	The court relied on this line of authority to reject the defence that the plaintiff could not claim eviction without overt act by the tenant; the landlord-tenant relationship arises by operation of law.
Mohar Singh v. Devi Charan, (1988) 3 SCC 63	Same principle regarding transferee becoming landlord / irrelevance of title contest in a landlord-tenant suit.	The court cited this as supportive authority for the proposition that in a landlord-tenant suit the title to the property is not the core issue; the transferee becomes landlord by operation of law.
Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, (1976) 4 SCC 184	Historic authority for the proposition that, in suits between landlord and tenant, the question of title to the leased property is generally irrelevant.	The court referred to this authority to underscore that only the title as landlord is relevant in landlord-tenant suits and the question of absolute ownership is not decisive for eviction claims based on termination of lease.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. D. Raghukul Pershad, (2012) 8 SCC 584	Authority holding eviction of a tenant is not based on the title of the landlord and that courts need not decide title when eviction is sought after termination of lease.	The court applied this principle to confirm that the plaintiff need not establish absolute title to maintain a suit for eviction where only eviction on termination of tenancy is claimed.
Sanjiv Pathak v. Somnath, RFA No. 324/2013 (judgment of this Court dated 6 August, 2013)	Referred to by the court for discussion of the rights of an agreement purchaser (remedy of specific performance).	The court relied on its prior reasoning in that judgment (not reproduced in full here) to underscore that an agreement purchaser's primary remedy is specific performance and that tenancy status does not automatically vanish without delivery of purchaser-possession.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded along the following principal steps, strictly as recorded in the opinion:

Evidence and burden: The appellant/defendant repeatedly failed to lead any affirmative evidence despite multiple opportunities; the appellant also failed to appear personally when directed and the court noted absence of cross-examination on key points. The plaintiff produced two witnesses and closed evidence.
Credibility of the Agreement to Sell: Sh. A.K. Rangaswami, produced as a witness for the plaintiff, denied execution of any Agreement to Sell dated 30.11.2009 in favour of the appellant and stated he was not in India on that date; he described the document relied upon by the appellant as forged. The appellant's counsel did not confront him with the original Agreement to Sell or test his denial by cross-examining him on the document or his passport entries.
Failure to prove the Agreement: The appellant never proved the Agreement to Sell in evidence. On the record, the alleged Agreement was suspicious in view of Rangaswami's testimony and passport entries; further, no steps for specific performance had been taken by the appellant, despite the terms providing for completion within 12 months (on or before 30.11.2010).
Effect of Clauses 11 and 13 of the Agreement (if assumed to be genuine): The court examined the specific clauses relied upon and concluded they did not show that possession had changed from tenant to purchaser. Clause 11 suspended payment of rent but envisaged further lease deeds until the sale deed; Clause 13 envisaged symbolic delivery of possession only upon execution and registration of the sale deed. Thus, even if the Agreement were genuine, the appellant's status would remain that of a tenant until completion of sale and delivery of possession as purchaser.
Registration point: The court applied Section 17(1A) of the Registration Act to note that an Agreement to Sell which is compulsorily registrable cannot be relied upon for taking plea of possession in part performance where it is not registered; appellant's argument on non-compulsory registration was addressed with reference to Suraj Lamp and the factual distinction drawn.
Proof of Sale Deed: The Director of the plaintiff proved the sale; the original Sale Deed had been shown to the Trial Court and the appellant's counsel when the affidavit was tendered and a certified copy was exhibited. No objection or cross-examination was taken by the appellant on that point. The sale deed was therefore held to be proved in accordance with law.
Relevance of title and landlord-tenant relationship: The court applied settled authorities to hold that upon transfer of a tenanted premise the transferee steps into the shoes of the transferor and becomes landlord by operation of law; in a landlord-tenant suit only the title as landlord is relevant and not absolute title. The court relied on several precedents to this effect.
Procedural conduct and abuse of process: The court found the appellant's conduct — failing to advance evidence, failing to appear when directed, and attempting to rely on precedent without evidential foundation — amounted to an abuse of process.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The Trial Court judgment and decree for ejectment and recovery of possession in favour of the respondent/plaintiff stand affirmed; the appellant/defendant is directed to pay costs of Rs. 20,000/-.

Implications:

The direct effect is that the decree for ejectment and recovery of possession passed by the Trial Court in favour of the respondent/plaintiff is sustained and the appellant's challenge fails.
The plaintiff's sale-deed was held to be proved in evidence and the plaintiff was held entitled to maintain the suit as transferee stepping into the shoes of the landlord.
The court emphasized that, absent proof of an Agreement to Sell and in the absence of steps for specific performance, a tenant cannot avoid ejectment by merely asserting purchaser status; the available remedy for an agreement purchaser is specific performance.
No broader new legal principle or precedent was announced by the court; the decision applied existing statutory provisions and case law to the facts of the case. The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel rule beyond the application to these facts.

Order: Decree sheet to be drawn up as recorded in the opinion.

Show all summary ...

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J

1. This appeal impugns the judgment and decree (dated 15th May, 2013 of the Court of Addl. District Judge-02 (South) in CS No. 12/2010 (Unique Case ID No. 02406C0365612010)) of ejectment of the appellant from property No. D-129, Saket, New Delhi and for recovery of mesne profits of Rs. 3,96,000/-.

2. The appeal came up before this Court first on 26 August, 2013 when the counsel for the appellant being unable to answer the queries raised by this Court had sought adjournment. While so adjourning the appeal, the Trial Court record was also requisitioned and has been received.

3. The counsel for the appellant has been heard.

4. The respondent/plaintiff instituted the suit from which this appeal arises, pleading:

(i) that it was the then owner/landlord of property No. D-129, Saket, New Delhi, having acquired the same from Sh. A.K Rangaswami vide Sale Deed dated 29.12.2009;

(ii) that the said Sh. A.K Rangaswami had leased out the said property to the appellant/defendant at a rent of Rs. 30,000/- per month vide lease deed dated 27.11.2007 for a period of eleven months commencing from 10.12.2007 and ending on 09.11.2008; on the request of the appellant/defendant a fresh lease dated 10.11.2008 for a period of eleven months commencing from 11.11.2008 and ending on 10.10.2009 was granted at a rent of Rs. 33,000/- per month;

(iii) that the said Mr. A.K Rangaswami vide communication dated 28.08.2009 and legal notice dated 07.10.2009 asked the appellant/defendant to vacate the property on or before 10.10.2009 and also tendered to the appellant/defendant Rs. 90,000/- in refund of the security deposit earlier paid by the appellant/defendant;

(iv) that the appellant/defendant however failed to vacate the property; and,

(v) that upon sale of the property by Sh. A.K Rangaswami to the respondent/plaintiff on 30.12.2009 as aforesaid, the respondent/plaintiff also vide legal notice dated 28.01.2010 determined the tenancy of the appellant/defendant and asked him to vacate the premises.

Upon the failure of the appellant/defendant to comply, the suit aforesaid for recovery of possession/ejectment was filed.

5. The appellant/defendant contested the suit, by filing written statement, on the grounds:

(i) that Sh. A.K Rangaswami had promised the appellant/defendant that the lease would be renewed from time to time and further that he would sell the property to the appellant/defendant;

(ii) that Sh. A.K Rangaswami had vide Agreement to Sell dated 30.11.2009 expressly agreed to sell the property in favour of the appellant/defendant for a sale consideration of Rs. 3,90,00,000/- and the appellant/defendant in part performance of the said Agreement to Sell had paid a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- as advance to the said Sh. A.K Rangaswami;

(iii) that the provisions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1982 are attracted and the appellant/defendant in part performance of the Agreement to Sell continued in possession of the premises;

(iv) that the said Sh. A.K Rangaswami by selling the property to the respondent/plaintiff had violated the Agreement to Sell dated 30.11.2009 with the appellant/defendant;

(v) that there was no jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent/plaintiff and the appellant/defendant;

(vi) that the respondent/plaintiff was not entitled to claim the relief of recovery of possession without seeking declaration of his title to the property;

(vii) that the title of Sh. A.K Rangaswami himself was suspect and it was not certain whether Sh. A.K Rangaswami or his wife Smt. Malathi Rangaswami had title to the property; and

(viii) that Sh. A.K Rangaswami was a necessary party to the suit.

6. The respondent/plaintiff filed a replication denying that Sh. A.K Rangaswami had ever agreed to sell the property to the respondent/plaintiff.

7. On the pleadings aforesaid of the parties, the following issues were framed on 21.02.2011:

“1. Whether the Court has jurisdiction to try the suit? OPP

2. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is maintainable? OPP

3. Whether plaintiff is entitled to the possession as claimed? OPP

4. Whether the plaintiff entitled to mesne profit? If so at what rate? OPP

5. Whether the defendant is a tenant under the plaintiff? OPP

6. Relief.”

8. The appellant/defendant filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC for rejection of the plaint on the ground of the court fees thereon having been paid not on the basis of market value of the property but on the basis of the last paid rent and which application was dismissed vide order dated 20.04.2011

9. The respondent/plaintiff examined two witnesses i.e its Director Mr. Anand Singh and Sh. A.K Rangaswami aforesaid and closed its evidence in affirmative. The appellant/defendant failed to lead any evidence inspite of repeated opportunities and his evidence was closed on 28.07.2012 However on the application of the appellant/defendant one more opportunity was given to lead evidence. The appellant/defendant still failed to avail of the said opportunity and his evidence was again closed vide order dated 17.08.2012 Thereafter, one Mr. Mahendra Bikram Singh filed an application for impleadment on the basis that the appellant/defendant had executed an Agreement to Sell the property in his favour and which application was dismissed vide order dated 29.11.2012 holding the same to be in abuse of the process of the Court. Vide order dated 05.04.2013, the appellant/defendant was directed to appear in person along with his identity and residential proof. The appellant/defendant however failed to appear and on the concession of the counsel for the respondent/plaintiff for expeditious disposal of the suit, his presence was dispensed with and final arguments heard.

10. The learned Additional District Judge has in the impugned judgment found/observed/held:

(i) that the suit had been correctly valued for the purpose of court fees and jurisdiction and the Court of the Additional District Judge had jurisdiction to entertain the same notwithstanding the fact that the respondent/plaintiff had purchased the suit property from Sh. A.K Rangaswami for a consideration of Rs. 4,60,00,000/-;

(ii) that Sh. A.K Rangaswami appearing as a witness on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff had denied having ever entered into an Agreement to Sell the property to the appellant/defendant or having executed any Agreement to Sell dated 30.11.2009 and had from his passport demonstrated that he was not even in India on that date;

(iii) that the counsel for the appellant/defendant in cross-examination of Sh. A.K Rangaswami neither challenged the entries in the passport nor confronted him with the alleged Agreement to Sell dated 30.11.2009;

(iv) that the Director of the respondent/plaintiff had proved the execution of the Sale Deed by Sh. A.K Rangaswami in favour of the respondent/plaintiff;

(v) that the appellant/defendant on the contrary had failed to lead any evidence;

(vi) that the Sale Deed executed by Sh. A.K Rangaswami in favour of the respondent/plaintiff had been proved in accordance with law;

(vii) that the appellant/defendant as a tenant could not argue about the ownership and title of Sh. A.K Rangaswami;

(viii) that the appellant/defendant had failed to prove the Agreement to Sell dated 30.11.2009 under which he was claiming to be in possession;

(ix) that in the face of Sh. A.K Rangaswami having proved that he was not in India on 30.11.2009, the Agreement to Sell relied upon by the appellant/defendant was highly suspicious;

(x) that no steps for specific performance of the said Agreement to Sell had been taken by the appellant/defendant; rather the appellant/defendant was claimed to have executed another Agreement to Sell in favour of Mr. Mahendra Bikram Singh aforesaid;

(xi) that the Agreement to Sell dated 30.11.2009 in any case could not be admitted into evidence being compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1A) of the Registration Act, 1908 and being not registered; and

(xii) that the respondent/plaintiff having by virtue of the Sale Deed stepped into the shoes of Sh. A.K Rangaswami, was entitled to maintain the suit.

Accordingly, a decree for ejectment/recovery of possession in favour of the respondent/plaintiff and against the appellant/defendant was passed.

11. The counsel for the appellant/defendant has at the outset argued that the possession of the appellant/defendant of the property, after the Agreement to Sell dated 30.11.2009 executed by Sh. A.K Rangaswami in his favour, changed from as that of a tenant and became as that of a purchaser and the appellant/defendant could not have been sued for recovery of possession as a tenant and if at all, could have been sued for possession as an unauthorized occupant, by paying court fees on the market value of the property. Reliance in this regard is placed on Ahamadali Fakruddin Bohri v. Mulla Fidaali Sultanali BohriAIR 1938 Nagpur 162 and R. Kanthimathi v. Mrs. Beatrice XavierAIR 2003 SC 4149.

12. The aforesaid argument of the counsel for the appellant/defendant loses sight of the fact that the same is without any foundation being laid therefor by leading evidence. As aforesaid, the appellant/defendant failed to lead any evidence despite repeated opportunities and even failed to appear before the Court when he was directed to appear along with proof of his identity.

13. I have nevertheless perused the cross examination done by the counsel for the appellant/defendant of the Director of the respondent/plaintiff company and of Sh. A.K Rangaswami. The counsel for the appellant/defendant is not found to have put any questions in the cross-examination of the Director of the respondent/plaintiff company qua the Agreement to Sell dated 30.11.2009 Sh. A.K Rangaswami in his affidavit by way of examination-in-chief unequivocally stated that he had never entered into any Agreement to Sell the property to the appellant/defendant and he was not in India on 30.11.2009 of which date the appellant/defendant claimed an Agreement to Sell in his favour and the document dated 30.11.2009 relied by the appellant/defendant was a forged and fabricated document. The counsel for the appellant/defendant in cross-examination only gave a suggestion to Sh. A.K Rangaswami of having entered into the Agreement to Sell with the appellant/defendant on 30.11.2009 and of having received an amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- in cash as earnest money towards sale consideration from the appellant/defendant and which suggestion was denied. The counsel for the appellant/defendant shied away from even putting the Agreement to Sell dated 30.11.2009, original of which is found on the Trial Court record, to Sh. A.K Rangaswami in his cross-examination or to confront Sh. A.K Rangaswami with his purported signatures thereon. The same shows that the counsel for the appellant is making arguments and citing judgments without even proving the Agreement to Sell.

14. Be that as it may and even though the Agreement to Sell has not been proved, for the sake of completeness, I deal with the contention of the counsel for the appellant/defendant that upon the execution of the said Agreement to Sell, the possession of the appellant/defendant of the property changed from that of a tenant and became as that of a purchaser in possession.

15. The counsel for the appellant/defendant in this regard has relied on Clauses 11 and 13 of the said Agreement to Sell which are as under:

“11. That as mentioned hereinabove, the above said property is under tenancy of second party and since a considerable amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lacs only) has been received by the first party from the second party as advance pursuant to this agreement to sale, and as such, from the date of execution of this agreement to sale, the second party shall not be liable for any payment of lease rent for the said property, which is being occupied by the second party, as lawful tenant. However, the lease deed, if required, with respect to the said property will be executed by the first party in favour of the second party from time to time as the case may be upto the date of execution of sale deed.

13. That the second party is already in possession of the said property being a lawful tenant and on the execution and registration of the sale deed the symbolic possession will be delivered by the first party to the second party and the second party will become the owner in possession of the second party as a lawful owner thereof.”

16. The aforesaid Clauses nowhere show that the possession of the appellant/defendant of the property in pursuance to the aforesaid Agreement if any changed from that of a tenant to that of a purchaser. Though Clause 11 of the Agreement provides that the payment of rent would stop but merely because a landlord suspends the rent payable by the tenant does not bring the relationship of landlord and tenant to an end. This is also evident from Clause II supra envisaging execution of further Lease Deed only in favour of the appellant/defendant till the execution of Sale Deed. Further, Clause 13 provides for delivery of possession of the property to the appellant/defendant only at the time of execution of the Sale Deed. Thus the said clauses of the Agreement to Sell nowhere provide for delivery of possession of the property to the appellant/defendant as purchaser, in pursuance to and in part performance of the Agreement to Sell.

17. Thus the status of the appellant/defendant even if the execution of Agreement to Sell were to be believed, remained as that of a tenant and did not change to as that of a purchaser. The only rights of an agreement purchaser (as discussed by me in detail in the recent judgment dated 6 August, 2013 in RFA No. 324/2013 titled Sanjiv Pathak v. Somnath and attention to which of the counsel for the appellant/defendant was drawn during the hearing on 26.08.2013 and which the counsel for the appellant/defendant has failed to distinguish) are of specific performance of the said agreement. As per the terms of the said Agreement to Sell, sale in pursuance thereto was to be completed within a period of 12 months therefrom i.e on or before 30.11.2010 I have enquired from the counsel for the appellant/defendant whether the appellant/defendant has taken any steps for specific performance. The counsel fairly admits that no steps have been taken. A tenant in the property, even if enters into an agreement for purchase thereof, cannot avoid his/her ejectment therefrom as a tenant and only has a remedy of specific performance of the Agreement to Sell in his favour.

18. In fact the contentions of the counsel for the appellant are contradictory. He on the one hand contends that the appellant/defendant is in possession of the property in part performance of an Agreement of Sale but upon his attention being invited to Section 17(1A) of the Registration Act providing that no plea of being in possession in part performance can be taken when the Agreement to Sell is not registered (and which the Agreement to Sell relied upon by the appellant/defendant is not), on the other hand states that the Agreement to Sell in his favour is not compulsorily registrable and in this regard relies on Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana(2012) 1 SCC 656. Only an Agreement to Sell immovable property, whereunder possession in part performance is not handed, can be said to be not compulsorily registrable. If that is so, the possession of the appellant/defendant did not change from that of a tenant to that of a purchaser.

19. In the aforesaid view of the matter, reliance placed by the counsel for the respondent/plaintiff on Ahamadali Fakruddin Bohri & R. Kanthimathi (supra) is misconceived. Moreover, in view of the amendment to the Registration Act in the year 2001 by insertion of Section 17(1A), the position as discussed in R. Kanthimathi relating to agreement of a date prior thereto, is not applicable.

20. The counsel for the appellant/defendant has next contended that the Sale Deed by Sh. A.K Rangaswami in favour of the respondent/plaintiff was not proved as only a certified copy thereof was proved and not the original.

21. The said argument also is without reference to the records. The Director of the respondent/plaintiff company in his affidavit by way of examination-in-chief claimed the respondent/plaintiff having purchased the property vide the Sale Deed. The Trial Court record shows that at the time of tendering of the said affidavit into evidence, the original Sale Deed was seen by the Court and by the counsel for the appellant/defendant and returned to the said witness and exhibit mark put on the certified copy thereof. The counsel for the appellant/defendant neither raised any objection to the Sale Deed being so admitted into evidence nor cross-examined the Director of the respondent/plaintiff company with respect thereto. The sale has been so affirmed by Sh. A.K Rangaswami also.

22. The counsel for the appellant/plaintiff however relies on Food Corporation of India v. Babulal Agrawal(2004) 2 SCC 712 and on Smt. Rekha Rana v. Smt. Ratnashree JainAIR 2006 MP 107 in this regard.

23. The said reliance is also misconceived and the counsel for the appellant/defendant is himself unable to justify the same. This is a classic case where the appellant/defendant, without laying any foundation in evidence, neither in the cross examination of the witnesses of the respondent/plaintiff nor by leading his own evidence, is just wanting to cite precedents which turn on their own facts.

24. The counsel for the appellant/defendant has lastly contended that the Director of the respondent/plaintiff company who had instituted the suit and signed and verified the plaint and who appeared as a witness was not authorized. The said Director in his affidavit by way of examination-in-chief has deposed that he is the Director and principal officer of the respondent/plaintiff company and was fully aware of the facts and circumstances of the case and had been duly authorized by the Board of Directors of the respondent/plaintiff vide Resolution dated 11 February, 2010 of its Board of Directors extract whereof was proved as Ex.PW1/1 to institute the suit and give evidence therein. He has also proved the certificate of incorporation and the copy of the Memorandum of Articles of Association of the respondent/plaintiff company.

25. Again, there is no cross examination whatsoever. Not even a suggestion has been given that he was not a Director or was not aware of the facts and circumstances of the case. No objection was taken to the proof of the extract of the Resolution of the Board of Directors of the respondent company. The said Resolution shows the said Director to be authorized to sign, verify pleadings, affidavits, to engage counsel and to make statements before the Court. The argument is again found to be made in a vacuum.

26. The counsel for the appellant/defendant now states that he be given time to further study the matter.

27. Finding that the respondent/plaintiff has not even been awarded future mesne profits, though the appellant/defendant is not entitled to any indulgence but the counsel was informed that one week's adjournment subject to payment of costs can be given. Though the counsel agreed but subsequently on taking instructions from the appellant/defendant has stated that the appellant/defendant does not want any adjournment.

28. Though the counsel for the appellant/defendant has not urged, but the defence in the written statement to title of the respondent/plaintiff and of Sh. A.K Rangaswami and of the appellant/defendant having not attorned to respondent/plaintiff as landlord, is also meritless. It has been held in Nalakath Sainuddin v. Koorikadan Sulaiman.(2002) 6 SCC 1, Mahendra Raghunathdas Gupta v. Vishwanath Bhikaji Mogul(1997) 5 SCC 329 and Mohar Singh v. Devi Charan(1988) 3 SCC 63 that on transfer of tenanted premises by the landlord, the transferee automatically becomes the landlord of the tenant by operation of law and the coming into being of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the transferee and tenant is not dependent upon any overt act on the part of the tenant. Similarly, it is the settled position in law that in a suit between landlord and tenant, it is only the title as landlord which is relevant and not the title as owner. As far back as in Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath(1976) 4 SCC 184 it was held that under the general law, in a suit between landlord and tenant, the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant. Recently also, in State of Andhra Pradesh v. D. Raghukul Pershad(2012) 8 SCC 584 it was held that relief of eviction of a tenant is not based on the title of the landlord to the leased premises and even if an averment to the said effect, of landlord being owner, is made in the plaint, as long as no relief of declaration of title is claimed and only the relief of eviction of tenant on the ground that lease has come to an end is claimed, the Court is not called upon to decide the question of title.

29. No merit is thus found in the appeal; rather the entire conduct of the proceedings by the appellant/defendant is found to be in abuse of the process of law. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs of Rs. 20,000/- on the appellant/defendant.

Decree sheet be drawn up.