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M/S Aster Publishing Petitioner v. Sh. Niwas Aggarwal & Others. S
Judgment Summary — Revision Petition under Section 25-B, Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner (tenant) filed a revision petition under section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 challenging the order dated 02.08.2010 of the Additional Rent Controller (the Controller). The Controller had dismissed the tenant's application for leave to defend/contest the eviction petition and passed an eviction order under section 14(1)(e) read with section 25-B of the Act.
The tenant stated that he had filed the application under section 25-B for leave to contest on 27.11.2009, and that he had not been personally served; he alleged that summons were thrown near his shop on 14.11.2009. The landlord/respondent contended that the leave application was filed beyond the prescribed period and therefore an eviction decree should be passed.
The service details in the eviction proceedings involved multiple addresses provided by the landlord. The process server reported that service at one address (20/4 Shakti Nagar) found the premises locked; another address (11096 Doriwalan) was reported incorrect; the process server then visited 11090 Doriwalan where a lady Meena (also described as Meenu Bhatia) received the summons after speaking by telephone with the petitioner/tenant. The Controller accepted the service report and declared service to be valid, and held that the application for leave to defend filed on 27.11.2009 was barred by limitation because summons had been served on 11.11.2009.
Aggrieved by the Controller's order, the tenant filed this revision petition. The High Court heard counsel for both parties, considered the process server's report and authority of precedent, and dismissed the revision petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the summons in the eviction petition were validly served on the petitioner in accordance with section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
- Whether the application for leave to defend filed by the petitioner was within the period prescribed (i.e., whether it was time‑barred).
- Whether the Rent Controller has power to condone delay in filing the leave to defend application under the Act or apply the Limitation Act to extend time.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner alleged he was not personally served; a summons was allegedly thrown near his shop on 14.11.2009 and he filed the leave to defend application on 27.11.2009.
- The petitioner argued that summons were not served at his correct address and that the landlord provided an incorrect address in the eviction petition.
- He contested the reliability and correctness of the process server's report and the purported service said to have occurred through an employee (Meena/Meenu Bhatia), asserting that such service cannot be treated as valid.
- Counsel for the petitioner relied on H.S. Gandhi v. Abha Arora (AIR 1983 Delhi 288) to press into service the principle under Order 5 Rule 15 CPC that service on an adult member of the household may be treated as service on the person concerned.
- Counsel also relied upon Manoj Kumar v. Bihari Lal ((2001) 4 SCC 655 : AIR 2001 SC 2176) for the proposition that section 25-B is a drastic provision and requires strict interpretation to protect tenants from arbitrary eviction.
Respondent's (Landlord's) Arguments
- The respondent contended that the leave to defend application was filed beyond the period of limitation and thus rightly dismissed by the Controller.
- Reliance was placed on Pritpal Singh v. Satpal Singh through LRs (2010 RLR 15 SC) to the effect that the Rent Control Act is a specific statute and the Limitation Act's provisions are not applicable to the controller's power to extend time.
- The respondent relied on Om Prakash v. Ashwani Kumar Bassi (2010) (reported in Rent Control Reporter and cited by the Court) to contend that the Controller has no power to condone delay and that even delay of a single day cannot be condoned.
- The respondent pointed out that the petitioner did not deny any connection to the property 11096 (as set out in the leave to defend application), implying no adequate challenge to the service particulars as recorded by the process server.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| H.S. Gandhi v. Abha Arora, AIR 1983 Delhi 288 | That provisions of Order 5 Rule 15 CPC can be used to treat service of summons on an adult member of the household as service on the person sought to be served. | Cited by the petitioner; the Court recorded the petitioner's reliance on this authority as part of his challenge to the validity of service. |
| Manoj Kumar v. Bihari Lal, (2001) 4 SCC 655 : AIR 2001 SC 2176 | Held that section 25-B (and analogous provisions) are drastic measures for eviction and therefore require strict interpretation to protect tenants. | Cited by the petitioner; the Court acknowledged the need for strict interpretation of section 25-B but applied the principle in concluding that the statutory scheme does not permit condonation of delay by the Controller. |
| Pritpal Singh v. Satpal Singh through LRs, 2010 RLR 15 SC | Support for the proposition that the Rent Control Act is a specific statute and that provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to confer power on the Controller to condone delay. | Cited by the respondent; the Court considered this line of authority when addressing the Controller's lack of power to condone delay. |
| Om Prakash v. Ashwani Kumar Bassi, (2010) 9 SCC 183 : AIR 2010 SC 3791 | Held that a Rent Controller has no power to condone delay in filing the leave to defend application under the statutory scheme; delay even of a single day cannot be condoned. | Relied upon by the Court as the controlling precedent: the Court applied this authority to hold that the Controller could not condone the delay and therefore dismissal of the leave to defend application as time‑barred was correct. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a fact-based and precedent-informed analysis focused on two linked questions: (i) whether service had been validly effected; and (ii) whether the leave to defend application was time‑barred such that the Controller had no power to condone delay.
On the facts, the Court examined the process server's report and the sequence of addresses attempted for service. The landlord had initially provided two addresses in the eviction petition: (i) 20/4 Shakti Nagar (tenanted premises) and (ii) 11096 Doriwalan. The process server reported 20/4 Shakti Nagar as locked and found 11096 to be incorrect; he was informed of a corrected address 11090 Doriwalan where he met a lady Meena (Meenu Bhatia). The process server's report recorded that Meena received the summons after telephonic instructions from the petitioner/tenant and the report bore the signature of 'Meenu Bhatia'.
The petitioner contested this account, claiming either non-service or that summons had been thrown near his shop. The Court rejected the petitioner's contention because the process server's report expressly recorded that the summons were handed over to Ms. Meena/Meenu Bhatia, who had acted after telephonic communication with the petitioner. The Court noted that the petitioner had not disputed the name of the agent (Meenu Bhatia) by way of application or counter-affidavit, and that a registered AD with signatures had been received by the court.
On limitation, the record showed service was effected on 11.11.2009 and the petitioner's application for leave to defend was filed on 27.11.2009, i.e., beyond the 15-day period prescribed in the form specified by the Act. The Court cited Om Prakash v. Ashwani Kumar Bassi for the legal proposition that the Rent Controller is a statutory creature and is not vested with power to condone delay under the Limitation Act; accordingly the Controller cannot extend the time for filing the leave application.
The Court further observed that section 25-B of the Act constitutes a complete code for the relevant proceedings and must be applied as enacted, reinforcing that the Controller lacked the statutory authority to condone even a single day's delay. Based on the reported service, and in light of binding Supreme Court authority, the Court concluded that the Controller's factual findings and legal conclusion — that service was proper and that the leave to defend application was time‑barred — were supportable and did not call for interference.
Holding and Implications
Final Holding: The revision petition is DISMISSED. The Court upheld the Controller's order dismissing the petitioner's application for leave to defend as barred by limitation and held that service of summons upon the petitioner/tenant on 11.11.2009 was proper.
Implications:
- The eviction order passed by the Controller under section 14(1)(e) read with section 25-B stands; the leave to defend application was correctly dismissed as time‑barred.
- The Court applied binding Supreme Court authority (notably Om Prakash) to conclude that the Rent Controller does not have power to condone delay in filing the leave to defend application under the statutory scheme; thus, statutory timelines for filing under section 25-B and the form in Schedule II are mandatory.
- No broader new precedent was created by this decision; the Court found the Trial Court's order to be reasoned and free of jurisdictional error and therefore declined to interfere. The Court also ordered that there would be no order as to costs.
S.L Bhayana, J.— The present revision petition under section 25-B(8) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short as “the Act”) has been filed by the petitioner against the order dated 02.08.2010 passed by Additional Rent Controller (for short as “the Controller”) Delhi, whereby leave to defend/contest the eviction petition has been dismissed and an eviction order is passed under section 14(1)(e) read with section 25(B) of the Act against the petitioner in respect of suit premises.
2. The facts, necessary to be highlighted in the present petition as alleged by the petitioner/tenant, are that the petitioner/tenant has filed an application under section 25-B of the Act for leave to contest on 27.11.2009 wherein it is also stated that he was not served personally and someone threw summons of the case near his shop on 14.11.2009 and accordingly he filed an application for leave to defend. The respondent raised an objection that the said application is beyond the period of limitation of one day as such the decree for the eviction of the tenant should be passed. The petitioner/tenant has also raised an objection that the alleged service of the summons has not been effected at the correct address of the petitioner and the respondent/landlord has given the wrong address of the petitioner in the petition where the summons were alleged to have been served. The learned Controller, without considering the facts, as stated by the petitioner/tenant, has passed an eviction order in respect of the suit property vide order dated 02.08.2010
3. Aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred this petition.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that on facts it is very much apparent on the face of the record, that the petitioner was never served with summons in the eviction petition either by the ordinary process or by registered A.D post, which is a mandatory requirement of section 25-B of the Act.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the declaration of the ARC that valid service of summons has been effected on the petitioner is contrary to the mandatory provisions of law laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that in the memo of parties filed in the eviction petition two addresses were provided by the respondent/landlord on which service was to be effected on the petitioner/tenant. These addresses are: (i) 20/4, Shakti Nagar, Delhi-110007 (Tenanted premises) and 11096, Dori Walan, East Part Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-110005. The service report in respect of Shakti Nagar premises was that it was found locked by the process server on 10.11.2009 and in respect of Doriwalan address it was found by him to be incorrect. However, the process server was told by someone that the correct address of the petitioner/tenant was 11090 Doriwalan and not 11096 as mentioned above. Thereafter, the process server has visited 11090, Doriwalan, Delhi where he met with a lady Meena who talked with the petitioner on telephone about the summons and the petitioner directed his employee Meena @ Meenu Bhatia to receive the summons from the Process Server. Ms. Meena who was an employee of the petitioner received the notice on his behalf and it bears the signatures of ‘Meenu Bhatia’. Thus any service purportedly effected on such an address cannot be treated as valid service in the eyes of law.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the service of the summons upon which the learned Controller has relied is not trustworthy and cannot be treated as service in the eyes of law. Therefore, it cannot be deemed that the petitioner was served in accordance with law on 11 November 2009 and therefore his application for leave to defend before the ARC cannot be treated filed beyond the period of limitation. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment in the matter of H.S Gandhi v. Abha Arora, AIR 1983 Delhi 288, in which it is held that provisions of Order 5 Rule 15 of the CPC can be pressed into service to treat the service of summons on an adult member of the person sought to be served.
8. Further learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment delivered by Supreme Court in Manoj kumar v. Bihari Lal, (2001) 4 SCC 655 : AIR 2001 SC 2176, para 11, wherein it was held that provision of law as contained in section 25-B of the Act is a drastic measure for the eviction of tenants particularly in a statute intended to provide protection to tenants against arbitrary and whimsical action of unscrupulous landlords for their eviction. Therefore, strict interpretation of the provision is necessary.
9. Per contra learned counsel for the respondent/landlord has submitted that the application for leave to defend has been dismissed by the learned ARC on the ground that the leave to defend application has filed beyond the period of limitation. By relying upon the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pritpal Singh v. Satpal Singh through LRs, 2010 RLR 15 SC, in which it is held that the Act is a specific act and the provisions of limitation act are not applicable. Further learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Om Prakash v. Ashwani Kumar Bassi, 2010 (2) Rent Control Reporter Pg. No. 244 (SC), in which it was also held that delay of even a single day cannot be condoned by the controllers.
10. Learned counsel for the respondent/landlord has submitted that in the entire leave to defend application, the petitioner has not stated anywhere that he does not have any relation with the property No. 11096, Doriwalan, East Park Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-5.
11. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the record carefully. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that in the eviction petition two addresses were provided by the respondent/landlord on which service was to be effected on the petitioner and both the addresses were wrong. When the process server reached at 11096, Doriwalan, East Part Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-110005 there he was told by someone about the correct address of the petitioner herein was 11090 Doriwalan. Thereafter, the process server reached there and found Ms. Meena who received the notice on behalf of the petitioner/tenant after having telephonic instructions from the petitioner/tenant. The report of the process server bears the signatures of Ms. Meenu Bhatia.
12. Therefore, the contention of the counsel for the petitioner/tenant cannot be believed that someone has thrown the summons near the shop of the petitioner. As per report of the process server the summons were properly handed over by the process server to Ms. Meena @ Meenu Bhatia who received summons only after taking the telephonic instructions from the petitioner/tenant. Address given by the respondent/landlord in the application filed under Order 37 Rule 4 read with Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 151 of CPC, is the same address i.e 11090, Doriwalan, East Park Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, on which the summons were served by the process server on 11.11.2009 and that fact is not disputed anywhere in the eviction petition by the petitioner/tenant.
13. The application for leave to defend was filed on 27.11.2009 The record shows that there was a valid service of the summons upon the petitioner/tenant on 11.11.2009 From perusal of the record, it is also evident that the application under section 25-B of DRC Act was not filed before the Trial Court within the stipulated period of 15 days.
14. In Om Prakash v. Ashwani Kumar Bassi, (2010) 9 SCC 183 : AIR 2010 SC 3791, the Supreme Court while deciding the question of condonation of delay in filing the leave to defend application has held that the Rent Controller has no power to condone the delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the law as under:-
“Section 13B is a power given to a Non-Resident Indian owner of a building to obtain immediate possession of a residential building or scheduled building when required for his or her use or for the use of any one ordinarily living with the dependent on him or her. The right has been limited to one application only during the life time of the owner. section 18a(2) of the aforesaid act provides that after an application under Section 13B is received, the Controller shall issue summons for service on the tenant in the form specified in Schedule II. The said form indicates that within 15 days of service of the summons the tenant is required to appear before the Controller and apply for leave to contest the same. There is no specific provision to vest the Rent Controller with authority to extend the time for making of such affidavit and the application. The Rent Controller being a creature of statute can only act in terms of the powers vested in him by statute and cannot, therefore, entertain an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay since the statute does not vest him with such power.
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In such case, neither the Rent Controller nor the High Court had committed any error of law in rejecting the petitioner's application for seeking leave to contest the suit, since the same had been filed beyond the period prescribed in the form in Schedule II of the Act referred to in Section 18A(2) thereof.”
15. Keeping in view the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, I am of the opinion that section 25-B of the Act is a complete Code by itself and other provisions could not, therefore, be brought into play in such proceedings. In the instant case, the same principle would apply having regard to the fact that the Rent Controller had not been conferred with power to condone the delay even for one day. The Rent Controller has rightly observed on submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, which is reproduced as under:
“I find that as per the recorded statement of process server Sh. Bijender Singh, summons of this eviction petition were duly served on the ‘Agent’ of the respondent on 11.11.2009 On enquiry, respondent has failed to explain as to how he got the summons or that who had received the summons of this eviction petition on behalf of the respondent. Respondent also did not make any submission on the said agent named Ms. Meenu Bhatia. He did not counter the service on these aspects. Further, as per sec. 25-B of DRC Act, if the acknowledgement purporting to be signed by the tenant or his tenant is received by the controller, then service may be declared as a valid service of summons by the controller.
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In the present case, name of the agent i.e Ms. Meenu Bhatia has not been disputed by way of filing any application or counter affidavit. Besides that, registered A.D with signatures also has been received back by this court.”
16. For the aforesaid reasons, the Rent Controller has dismissed the leave to defend application being barred by limitation and has held that the service of summons was proper on the petitioner/tenant.
17. Thus, the Trial Court has given a detailed and reasoned order which does not call for any interference nor the same suffers from any infirmity or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction.
18. The present petition is hereby dismissed accordingly. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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