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S.S Lal Petitioner v. Vishnu Mitter Govil
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant challenged an order passed by the learned Single Judge on March 23, 2004, which disallowed the appellant's application claiming that the probate petition was barred by limitation. The appellant had previously filed a suit in 1990 challenging the Will, which was dismissed for non-prosecution in 2003. The probate petition was filed in 1996 and was ordered to be taken up along with the 1990 suit. The appellant did not plead limitation in the probate proceedings either in the written statement or during witness examination. The appellant's plea of limitation was considered to be an attempt to delay the grant of probate.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to petitions for grant of probate.
- Whether the probate petition is barred by limitation in the circumstances of this case.
- The applicability of Section 3 of the Limitation Act in advancing a plea of limitation not raised earlier in the probate proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Relied on the Supreme Court decision in Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P Kunhaliumma (AIR 1977 SC 282) to argue that Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies to petitions filed under any Act to a civil court, including probate petitions.
- Invoked the Division Bench decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Hari Narain (deceased) through LRs. v. Subhash Chander & Ors. (AIR 1985 P & H 211) to contend that Article 137 applies where no other limitation period is prescribed.
- Relied on Pamela Manmohan Singh v. State & Ors. (83 (2000) DLT 469) where the ratio of Hari Narain's case was extended to grant of probate cases.
- Asserted that even if limitation was not pleaded in the probate proceedings, Section 3 of the Limitation Act would allow the plea to be raised.
Respondent's Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282 | Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court, not confined to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. | Appellant relied on this to argue applicability of Article 137 to probate petitions; court distinguished probate proceedings from such applications. |
| Hari Narain (deceased) through LRs. v. Subhash Chander & Ors., AIR 1985 P & H 211 | Article 137 applies to any petition or application filed where no other limitation is prescribed. | Appellant cited this case to support applying Article 137 to probate petitions; court held it applies to revocation suits, not grant of probate. |
| Pamela Manmohan Singh v. State & Ors., 83 (2000) DLT 469 | Extended the principle in Hari Narain's case to grant of probate cases. | Court disagreed with this extension, finding the reasoning incorrect for probate petitions. |
| Ramanand Thakur v. Parmanand Thakur, AIR 1982 Patna 87 | Support for limiting applicability of limitation in probate matters. | Noted by the court in support of impugned order disallowing limitation plea. |
| Vasudev Daulatram Sadarangani v. Sajni Prem Lalwani, AIR 1983 Bombay 268 | Support for limiting applicability of limitation in probate matters. | Noted by the court in support of impugned order disallowing limitation plea. |
| E. Devarajan v. E. Ramiah, AIR 1991 Madras 214 | Probate or letters of administration proceedings do not assert or claim a legal right but seek court recognition to perform a moral duty; thus, not actions under Article 137. | Adopted by the court to hold that grant of probate proceedings are not applications under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the nature of probate proceedings and distinguished them from other civil applications. It held that a petition for grant of probate or letters of administration does not assert a legal right but seeks recognition from the court to perform a moral duty, as established in E. Devarajan v. E. Ramiah. Therefore, such proceedings do not qualify as applications under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. The court further distinguished the present case from Hari Narain's case, which dealt with revocation of probate, where Article 137 is applicable. The appellant's failure to raise limitation as a plea during the probate proceedings and related suit, despite ample opportunity, indicated an abuse of process aimed at delaying probate. The court also rejected the appellant's reliance on Section 3 of the Limitation Act, noting that this section does not allow raising limitation pleas based on unadmitted facts at a late stage. Consequently, the court upheld the Single Judge's order dismissing the limitation plea and found no merit in the appeal.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the probate petition was not barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. The decision clarifies that proceedings for grant of probate or letters of administration are not applications asserting legal rights under Article 137 and thus limitation under this Article does not apply. The ruling reinforces that limitation pleas must be timely raised and cannot be used as a tool for delaying probate. There are no indications that this decision sets a new precedent beyond the facts of the case; it primarily affirms the established legal position regarding probate proceedings and limitation.
Vijender Jain, J.:— Learned counsel for the appellant has impugned the order passed by the learned Single Judge on March 23, 2004 disallowing the application of the appellant by which the appellant took the plea that the probate petition was barred by limitation.
2. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that in view of Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P Kunhaliumma, AIR 1977 SC 282, where the Supreme Court held as under:
“The conclusion we reach is that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court. With respect, we differ from the view taken by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Athani Municipal Council case (AIR 1969 SC 1335) (supra) and hold that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act is not confined to applications contemplated by or under the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition in the present case was to the District Judge as a Court. The petition was one contemplated by the Telegraph Act for judicial decision. The petition is an application falling within the scope of Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act.”
3. On the same analogy, Article 137 of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings for grant of probate. Learned counsel for the appellant on the basis of a decision of the Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Hari Narain (deceased) through LRs. v. Subhash Chander & Ors., AIR 1985 P & H 211 argued that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to any petition or application filed in a Court where no other period of limitation has been prescribed. On the aforesaid basis it was contended before us that in Pamela Manmohan Singh v. State & Ors., 83 (2000) DLT 469 one learned Single Judge of this Court extended the ratio of the decision in Hari Narain's case applying the same principle in a case of grant of probate mutatis mutandis to cases pertaining to grant of probate. However, in the judgment impugned before us learned Single Judge, apart from holding that right to apply for probate or letter of administration is a recurring one, held that it would be inappropriate to fall back upon Article 137 of the Limitation Act. He has also noticed in the impugned judgment Ramanand Thakur v. Parmanand Thakur, AIR 1982 Patna 87 and Vasudev Daulatram Sadarangani v. Sajni Prem Lalwani, AIR 1983 Bombay 268 in support of the impugned order.
4. In our considered opinion the approach of learned Single Judge in impugned order is correct. In E. Devarajan v. E. Ramiah, AIR 1991 Madras 214, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held:
“In a proceeding, or in other words, in an application filed for grant of probate or letters of administration, no right is asserted or claimed by the applicant. The applicant only seeks recognition of the Court to perform a duty. Probate or letter of Administration issued by a competent Court is conclusive proof of the legal character throughout the world. An assessment of the relevant provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 does not convey a meaning that by the Proceedings filed for grant of probate or letters of administration, no rights of the applicant are settled or secured in the legal sense. The author of the testament has cast the duty with regard to the administration of his estate, and the applicant for probate or letters of administration only seeks the permission of the Court to perform that duty. There is only a seeking of recognition from the Court to perform the duty. That duty is only moral and it is not legal. There is no law which compels the applicant to file the proceedings for probate or letters of administration. With a view to discharge the moral duty, the applicant seeks recognition from the Court to perform the duty. It will be legitimate to conclude that the proceedings filed for grant of probate or letters of administration is not an action in law. Hence, it is very difficult to and it will not be in order to construe the proceedings for grant of probate or letters of administration as applications coming within the meaning of an ‘application’ under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.”
5. The distinguishing feature on the basis of which Hari Narain's case (supra) was decided was that in the said case a suit was filed for revocation of a probate. Mutatis mutandis that principle cannot be applied to a petition for grant of a probate. In an application filed for grant of probate or letters of administration, no right is asserted or claimed by the applicant. The applicant only seeks recognition from the Court to perform a duty. Probate or letter of administration is a conclusive proof of the legal character of that right. In a petition for revocation of probate, it is after grant of probate or letter of administration, a suit is filed for revocation of probate or grant of letter of administration. Cause of action in such cases arises when probate or letter of administration has been granted. Therefore, in such cases Article 137 of the Limitation Act would come into play. But it is not vice-versa. Therefore, the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Pamela Manmohan Singh's case (supra) is not correct. Before parting with the case, we must observe that in this case our attention was drawn by learned counsel for the appellant to Section 3 of the Limitation Act to advance his plea that even if he has not taken it in the written statement to the probate proceedings filed by respondent, still Article 137 of the Limitation Act would apply. We have perused through the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge that a suit was filed by the appellant challenging the Will, that suit has been dismissed for non-prosecution. Restoration of that suit has not been sought by the appellant. The suit of the appellant was filed in the year 1990. Suit was dismissed on 12th February, 2003, petition for probate was filed in the year 1996 and that proceedings were ordered to be taken up along with Suit No. 644/90 which was filed by the appellant, neither in the written statement nor at the time of examination of witnesses it was pleaded by the appellant that probate petition is barred by limitation. For all these years it was not pleaded by the appellant that the probate proceedings suffered from delay and laches and law of limitation would be applicable. Plea of limitation in this case will be based on certain facts which have not been admitted by the respondent. Such a plea which is based on unadmitted facts cannot be advanced on the basis of Section 3 of Limitation Act. Section 3 of Limitation Act does not contemplate admission and adjudication of facts at any stage in order to determine the plea of limitation. In any case provisions in law are made for advancement of justice and it has to be applied with that objective. Having filed the suit in 1990 which was dismissed for non-prosecution, petition for probate having been filed in the year 1996, both these proceedings were tried together, no such plea having been taken by the appellant regarding limitation, it was sheerly to delay the grant of probate. Therefore, the application of the petitioner was an abuse of the process of law and has been rightly dismissed by the learned Single Judge.
6. There is no merit in this appeal.
7. Dismissed.
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