Manmohan Sarin, J.— Petitioner/tenant has preferred this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order dated 1.12.1995, passed by the Competent Authority (Slum), impleaded as respondent No. 1, granting permission to the respondent No. 2-landlord to institute proceedings against the petitioner under Section 19(1)(a) of the Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), for his eviction.

2. Respondent No. 2-landlord had applied for permission under Section 19 of the Act on 26.11.1990 The Competent Authority, as noted above, vide the impugned order granted the said permission, holding that the petitioner had sufficient means available to him to lake alternate accommodation in the event of eviction from the suit premises.

3. Petitioner is a dealer in motor spare parts and carries on business under the name and style of Kohli Motors India. Petitioner is a tenant under respondent No. 2 in respect of premises bearing No. 563/6, Gali Behl Sahib, Ganda Nala Bazar, Mori Gate, Delhi. Respondent No. 2-landlord has sought permission under Section 19(1)(a) of the Act, submitting that petitioner was a defaulter in payment of rent since 1989, the tenanted premises were unsafe and unfit for human habitation. Further it was claimed that petitioner had caused substantial damage to the premises and the same were required for repairs. Respondent No. 2 submitted that petitioner was engaged in the business of motor spare parts and his monthly income was Rs. 30,000/- per month. Besides, petitioner was said to be in possession of alternate premises, bearing No. A-2/257, Janakpuri and would, therefore, not create any slums, if evicted pursuant to the permission granted.

4. Petitioner in his written submissions disputed the very extent of the tenanted premises as well as the title of respondent No. 2-landlord. Petitioner claimed that he was a tenant in respect of the entire ground floor and not one room in the suit premises, as contended by the respondent No. 2. Petitioner claimed the petition to be one for partial eviction. Petitioner also disputed that there were any premises bearing No. 563-A, which the respondent No. 2 had claimed to be behind the tenanted premises on the ground floor, which were let out to the petitioner. Petitioner denied that the premises were unsafe or required for repairs. It was claimed that rent had been deposited under Section 27 of the Delhi Rent Control Act since respondent No. 2 was not accepting the same. As regards damage, petitioner averred that respondent No. 2 himself was digging holes in the roof to harass the petitioner. Petitioner denied that his income was Rs. 30,000/- per month or that the petitioner-firm was in a position to take on rent or acquire alternate suitable accommodation. Affidavits were filed by the parties. Petitioner also produced on record the income tax returns, to which I shall have the occasion to advert to later.

5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Yash Paul Ahuja urged before me that the Competent Authority had completely overlooked that the petition was one for partial eviction. He urged that the respondent was a tenant in respect of the entire ground floor and there were no such premises bearing No. 563-A. Learned Counsel further submitted that the Competent Authority had accommodation was a relevant and material consideration, even for determining whether the tenant who is sought to be evicted possessed the means for renting out an equivalent alternate suitable accommodation. Learned Counsel also submitted that the Competent Authority failed to notice that the alternate accommodation, viz. premises bearing No. A-2/257, Janakpuri, New Delhi, was the residential house, where the petitioner resided with his family and not the alternate premises available for carrying out the motor spare parts business. In this connection, learned Counsel submitted that it was a well-known fact that premises in the motor spare part market in Kashmere Gate were totally commercial and the market is a reputed market of India. The premises there, even for putting an almirah, were not available for a premium less than Rs. 6,00,000/- or so. Learned Counsel submitted that while there were guidelines and criteria available for assessing the means for providing alternate residential accommodation, no such criteria or guideline was available for commercial purposes.

6. Coming to the objection of the petitioner that he was a tenant in respect of the entire ground floor of House No. 563/6 and no such premises as 563/6-A existed, the respondent had placed on record before the Competent Authority the duly registered Sale Deed dated 15.1.1990 as well as the Registered Deed of Rectification dated 22.8.90 By the Sale Deed dated 15.1.1990 respondent No. 2 had acquired the premises No. 563/6. The Rectification dated 22.8.1990 mentions premises No. 563/6 and 563/6A. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 has clarified that petitioner was the tenant only in respect of one room in premises Nos. 563/6 on a rental of Rs. 200/- per month while premises No. 563/6-A were in occupation of M/s. Continental Automobiles. I do not think this controversy raised by the petitioner should detain us any longer. In case it is ultimately found that premises for which permission has been granted and eviction petition as filed, is for partial eviction, the respondent-landlord will suffer the consequences therefore.

7. The nature of enquiry to be carried out under Section 19 of the Act is a summary one. The Act has been enacted for the benefit of poor tenants, who do not have the means to find alternate accommodation and in case of eviction would create further slums. In the instant case, on petitioner's own showing the rates of premium are high. Besides, as would be seen in the later part of the judgment, in the facts of the instant case, the petitioner being possessed of sufficient means, the objection raised by the petitioner that the Competent Authority should decide the objection as to partial eviction by deciding the extent of accommodation, and not leaving it to the Rent Controller, does not appear to be tenable.

8. It is well-settled that at the time of granting or refusing permission, the Competent Authority is not to go into the merits and demerits of the grounds of eviction.

9. Coming to the question of sufficiency of means, petitioner's balance sheet as on 31.3.1992 disclosed a figure of Rs. 8,10,189.58 on account of transaction. Petitioner is, admittedly, a profit making firm and the ledger for the months of January, 1992 showed a credit of Rs. 48,904.78 and for February, 1992 the credit of Rs. 20,643.73. At this stage, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Bismillah Jan v. Jain Tractors & Auto Spare, 1985 RLR 477. In the cited case, permission to institute eviction proceedings against the respondent-firm, which was carrying on the business of auto spare parts in the tenanted premises had been sought. The Competent Authority had reached the conclusion that alternate accommodation available was a dingy, dusty, foul smelling premises and could not be used as alternate accommodation in place of the disputed premises, which were situated in the main tyre market. Reliance had also been placed by the Company on the balance sheet, profit and loss account and income tax return. The Competent Authority, taking note of the rent for premises, as prevalent in Delhi had computed the monthly income at Rs. 1,200/- per month, based on tax reports and balance sheets, and declined the permission. The learned Single Judge, reversing the decision of the Competent Authority observed as under:

“6. The object of the Slum Act is the orderly elimination of slums with the interim protection for the slum dwellers until they are moved into better dwelling. The Competent Authority are given sufficient discretion under the Slum Act to ascertain whether the tenant, who has accommodation in the Slum area, is likely to create further slums, if evicted. While exercising this discretion, however, the Competent Authority can take into account only the factors mentioned in Sec.19(4) of the Slum Act. It is well-settled that the two factors which have to be taken into consideration are: (a) the availability of alternate accommodation and (b) the financial status of the tenant in order to find out whether he would in a position to get alternate accommodation in case he was evicted or whether he was likely to create slums.”

13. In the case of a juristic person while determining the financial status, the standards have necessarily to be different. It is not unknown that in the present days some Companies continue to show losses either because of bad management or because the correct income is not shown in the balance-sheets and the income tax returns. In the present case, the conduct of the respondent-tenant was such that initially it was even denied that the Company was assessable to income tax. It was only when during the course of the evidence when confronted with the assessment returns and the balance-sheets that it was submitted in evidence that the Company was being assessed to tax. Even the question regarding the registered office being at another place at Queen's Road was denied originally in the affidavit but later admitted that the place was being shown as registered office in the calendar and the letter-heads though the accommodation belonged to Shri Paras Nath Jain in his individual capacity. If persons who have financial interest in a Pvt. Ltd. Co. own several other concerns and are sufficiently rich, no protection is contemplated under the Slum Act because even if the Company, which is a tenant, is going into losses, because even if eviction order is passed, the Company is not likely to create slums. The Slum Act was enacted for giving protection to poor individual tenants who have small means and cannot afford to get alternate accommodation outside the slum area or within the slums if evicted. If a couple of persons with substantial means float a Company which goes into losses, even if they are evicted from the premises, they cannot create slums, particularly when the same persons own other concerns which also have offices at different places. In the present case, the Competent Authority had come to the conclusion that the income of a firm was only Rs. 1,202/- and therefore, it would not be in a position to get alternate accommodation in the same area where the tyre market was situated. If this criteria is adopted no Company occupying tenanted premises in the notified slum area in the walled city of Delhi can be evicted by a landlord under the Delhi Rent Act, merely because the Company is making losses or makes meagre profits………”

10. Notice may also be taken of a recent judgment of a Single Judge of this Court in Dimple (P) Ltd. v. Harish Kumar Aggarwal. & Anr.,71 (1998) DLT 318. This Court, while dismissing the petition of the tenant Company held that the petitioner Company was a juristic and not a natural person and was not entitled to protection under the Slum Act, which was intended for poor tenants. The learned Single Judge observed as under:

“34. Admittedly, the petitioners are a Company. Thus, they are a juristic person. A Company is formed when certain persons join hands with a view to carrying on some commercial or industrial undertaking. Thus, it can naturally be formed by those persons who have got sufficient funds to carry on their business. A Company cannot be run by poor persons with no financial means to run the same. The object and the purpose for the enactment of the Slum Area (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956, was to clear the slums and to provide protection to poor tenants against harassment at the hands of landlord who bring forward and initiate proceedings for their eviction. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while anim-adverting on the said object of the Act opined in Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi and Others, AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1602, (para 15)…….” It is after this that we have Chapter VI whose terms we have already set out. This Chapter is headed Protection of ‘Tenants in Slum Areas from Eviction’. Obviously, if the protection that is afforded is read in the context of the rest of the Act, it is clear that it is to enable the poor who have no other place to go out, would necessarily create other slums in the process and live perhaps in less commodious and more unhealthy surroundings than those from which they were evicted, to remain in their dwellings until provision is made for a better life for them elsewhere………..”

11. Applying the principles and rationale, as set out in the aforesaid judicial pronouncements, it would be seen that the submission on behalf of the petitioner itself is that the premises are located in a highly lucrative commercial market, where the premium, even for an almirah, is to the tune of Rs. 6,00,000/- or so. Petitioner claims to be in possession of the entire ground floor while the respondent-landlord claims that it is only one room. Be that as it may, the premises indisputably carry a high commercial value. Petitioner-firm is also admittedly making profits, as noticed earlier. The tax returns and accounts may not always correctly reflect the total income that is earned. Besides admittedly, the petitioner's proprietor has built his own residential house from the earnings and profits of the business and may be repaying the loans. In these circumstances, having regard to even the disclosed income of the petitioner and the nature of petitioner's business in a high profile lucrative market, it cannot be said that petitioner falls in the category of poor tenants, who are not possessed of means to acquire alternate accommodation and require the protection of the Slum Act.

12. The petition is without merit and is dismissed.