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Shukla Malhotra v. Vyasa Bank Limited.
Structured Summary of the Opinion (D.K. Jain, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiffs sued for (1) possession of the 1st floor of premises No. E-34, Connaught Place, New Delhi (2230 sq. ft.), which had been let to the defendant bank under an unregistered agreement of lease dated 1 February 1980 at Rs. 10 per sq. ft., initially for five years with an option in favour of the bank to renew for a further five years on 20% enhancement of rent; and (2) mesne profits w.e.f. February 1995.
The parties record that the tenancy was extended in 1985 and 1990, and the plaintiffs served a notice dated 9 January 1995 terminating the tenancy w.e.f. midnight of 31 January 1995. The plaintiffs filed an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC seeking a decree for possession, relying on the defendant's admission (in the written statement) of tenant-occupation and receipt of the notice, and invoking section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 for termination.
The defendant admitted letting and possession and receipt of the notice, but resisted the application on several grounds: (a) it had replied to the notice on 23 January 1995; (b) the lease was for a fixed five-year term as per the 1 February 1980 agreement with valid renewals exercised in 1985 and 1990; (c) the parties had agreed in April 1991 to enhanced rent (Rs. 18 per sq. ft. w.e.f. 1 February 1990) and the defendant had performed by paying enhanced rent; and (d) therefore the termination was not legally effective.
The court heard counsel for both parties, examined the pleadings and documents, and issued a ruling allowing the plaintiffs' application: a decree for possession was passed in favour of the plaintiffs directing the defendant to put the plaintiffs in possession within four months. Issues requiring trial were directed to be framed on a later date (8 September 1998).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the unregistered agreement of lease dated 1 February 1980 (and alleged renewals/extensions) could operate as a valid fixed-term lease exceeding one year given the requirements of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
- Whether, in the absence of registration under section 107, the tenancy would be deemed a month-to-month tenancy governed by section 106 and terminable by 15 days' notice.
- Whether the doctrine of part performance (section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act) is applicable to a lease and, if so, whether the defendant could rely on it to resist eviction despite the unregistered instrument.
- Whether the notice dated 9 January 1995 complied with the requirements of section 106 and, if validly served, whether it lawfully terminated the tenancy under section 111 of the Act.
- Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for possession under Order XII Rule 6 CPC based on the record (admission of tenancy, receipt of notice, and termination).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The written statement of the defendant admitted that the defendant was in possession as a tenant and had received the plaintiffs' notice dated 9 January 1995; on that basis plaintiffs sought summary decree for possession under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
- The plaintiffs argued that section 53A does not apply to a lease, and even if it did, the defendant had not performed or shown willingness to perform its contractual obligations (notably the obligation to procure execution of a registered lease deed under clause 25), so the defendant could not claim protection under section 53A.
Defendant's Arguments
- The defendant accepted letting and possession and receipt of the plaintiffs' notice but replied to the notice on 23 January 1995.
- The defendant contended that the tenancy was for a fixed five-year term as per the lease dated 1 February 1980, with options exercised in 1985 and 1990 in accordance with the lease; therefore the termination notice was misconceived.
- The defendant claimed a written agreement in April 1991 consenting to enhanced rent to Rs. 18 per sq. ft. w.e.f. 1 February 1990 for five years, and said it had performed by paying the enhanced rent; alternatively, it relied on the doctrine of part performance (section 53A) to prevent eviction.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Khaja Midhat Noor and Ors (Burmah Shell Oil Distributing) — 1988 AIR SC 1470 | Holds that a fixed-term lease for a period exceeding one year, oral or in writing, if not registered, will be deemed a tenancy from month to month terminable by 15 days' notice. | The court relied on this Supreme Court decision to support the proposition that the 1 February 1980 agreement, being unregistered, could not operate as a fixed five-year lease and would be deemed month-to-month. |
| Punjab National Bank v. Ganga Narain Kapur — AIR 1994 All. 221 | Expressed doubt whether section 53A is available to lessees (agreements to lease) and held that even if section 53A applied, it would not help a fixed-term tenancy made in violation of section 107. | The court cited this All. HC authority to support the view that non-registration vitiates the asserted fixed-term lease and that section 53A would not validate a fixed-term tenancy made in violation of section 107. |
| Shyam Sundar Lal & Anr v. Din Shah & Ors — AIR 1937 Allahabad 10 | Held that although a lease is a transfer of the right to enjoy property, some provisions treat lease as transferring whole or part of the interest; the legislature intended lease to be treated as a transfer of property in certain contexts. | The court noted this authority as expressing a contrary view on whether a lease falls within the term "transfer of property" for the purposes of section 53A, but observed that no authoritative Supreme Court pronouncement was placed before it and that it need not decide the point on facts. |
| Mahadei Haluai v. Ram Krishna Singh & Anr — AIR 1960 Patna 354 | Patna High Court view consistent with the proposition that lease can be treated as a transfer for some purposes. | The court mentioned this decision as another High Court authority taking a view that a lease may be regarded as a transfer of property, but it did not treat the point as necessary to decide on the facts before it. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in distinct steps, applying statutory provisions and cited authorities strictly as recorded in the opinion.
-
Identification of the contractual instrument and registration requirement:
- The agreement dated 1 February 1980 purported to create a five-year lease with an option to renew for another five years and also contained clause 25 requiring the execution of a "regular lease deed" at the bank's request and its registration.
- Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act requires that a lease of immovable property for a fixed term exceeding one year be made only by a registered instrument; the use of the word "only" indicates strict compliance is required.
- Because no request by the defendant led to execution/registration of a regular lease deed as contemplated by clause 25, the registration requirement of section 107 was not complied with.
-
Consequence of non-registration — application of section 106:
- On failure to comply with section 107, any instrument purporting to lease for more than one year is void as a fixed-term lease and the presumption in section 106 applies: the tenancy is deemed to be from month to month and terminable by 15 days' notice.
- The court relied on the cited authorities (including the Supreme Court decision and All. HC) to support the principle that an unregistered fixed-term lease will be treated as a monthly tenancy.
-
Consideration of section 53A (doctrine of part performance) raised by defendant:
- The court set out the three essential limbs of section 53A: (i) a contract to transfer immovable property for consideration; (ii) the transferee has taken or continued in possession in part performance; and (iii) the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract.
- The court acknowledged conflicting High Court views on whether "transfer of property" (Section 5) includes an agreement to lease, and recorded authorities taking both sides, but observed no binding Supreme Court or this Court authority conclusively resolving the question was before it.
- The court proceeded on the assumption, for argument's sake, that section 53A might apply. Even on that assumption the court held that section 53A could not operate to validate or enforce the invalid (unregistered) lease as a source of title: it offers protection (a shield) for possession in part performance, not a sword to create or enforce title against the lessor.
- Critically, the court found the defendant had not satisfied the third limb of section 53A: there was no allegation, plea or proof that the defendant had called upon the plaintiffs to execute the registered lease deed (clause 25) nor that the plaintiffs had refused despite being called upon. Hence the defendant had not shown that it was ready and willing to perform its obligations; the defendant could not thus claim protection under section 53A.
-
Validity of the termination notice and effect under section 111:
- The court examined the notice dated 9 January 1995 and found it complied with the formalities of section 106 (writing, signature by/on behalf of the person giving it, and service by post/tender/delivery).
- Since the tenancy was deemed month-to-month under section 106, and the notice fulfilled statutory requirements, the tenancy was validly terminated w.e.f. 1 February 1995 as envisaged under section 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act.
-
Application of summary procedure (Order XII Rule 6 CPC):
- Given that the factum of tenancy and its valid termination under section 111 were not in dispute and the defendant's defenses were insufficient to defeat the application (particularly because the asserted fixed-term lease was invalid for non-registration and section 53A did not avail), the court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for possession under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The plaintiffs' application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC was allowed and a decree for possession was passed in favour of the plaintiffs; the defendant was directed to deliver vacant possession of the suit property within four months.
Implications (direct consequences for the parties and legal significance recorded in the opinion):
- Direct effect on the parties: The defendant must put the plaintiffs in possession of the premises within four months. Issues requiring trial on other reliefs (if any) were to be framed and listed for 8 September 1998.
- Legal significance as recorded by the court: The opinion applies the established principle that an alleged fixed-term lease for more than one year which is not executed as a registered instrument (section 107) will be treated as a month-to-month tenancy governed by section 106 and terminable by 15 days' notice; and it emphasizes that section 53A, even if applicable to leases, cannot be used to enforce an invalid, unregistered lease as a source of title — it is only a defence to protect possession and requires the transferee to have performed or to be willing to perform his contractual obligations.
- No new, sweeping precedent was expressly asserted by the court beyond applying statutory provisions and existing authorities to the facts; the decision's practical consequence was the grant of possession to the plaintiffs on the facts before the court.
Source: This summary is based exclusively on the content of the opinion authored by D.K. Jain, J., reproduced in the prompt. No additional facts or legal material beyond that opinion have been added.
D.K Jain, J.— In plaintiffs' suit for: (1) possession of their property, being Ist floor of the premises bearing no. E-34, Connaught Place, New Delhi, measuring 2230 Sq. ft., let out to the defendant bank, vide unregistered agreement of lease dated 1 February 1980 at a rental of Rs. 10/- per Sq. ft, initially for a period of five years with option to the defendant bank for renewal/extension for a further period of five years on 20% enhancement in rent, extended in 1985 and 1990, but terminated by notice dated 9 January 1995, w.e.f midnight of 31 January 1995, and (2) for mesne profits w.e.f February 1995, the plaintiffs have filed this application under Order XII Rule 6, CPC for a decree for possession against the defendant, directing it to deliver vacant peaceful possession of the premises on the plea that the defendant, in its written statement, had admitted its possession as a tenant and the receipt of notice dated 9 January 1995, under section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), terminating the tenancy, entitling the plaintiffs to a decree for possession of the premises.
Admitting letting of the premises to them by the plaintiffs as stated, their possession as tenant and the receipt of plaintiffs stated notice dated 9 January 1995, the defendant bank opposes the plaintiffs' application on the pleas that the said notice was duly replied by them on 23 January 1995; the tenancy was not a monthly tenancy but for a fixed term of five years as per lease dated 1 February 1980, with option to extend after five years; which was extended in exercise of the option in 1985 and 1990 per stipulations in the lease deed; the alleged termination of the tenancy by the plaintiffs is bad in law and the suit misconceived. The defendant claims that in April 1991 the plaintiffs had agreed in writing to the defendant's offer of enhancement in rent to Rs. 18 per Sq.ft w.e.f 1 February 1990 for a period of five years and thereafter by 25% to commence from 1 February 1995 on the terms in the agreement dated 1 February 1980; the defendant had performed their part by paying enhanced rent and, therefore, the plaintiffs' application is liable to be dismissed.
I have heard Mr. Sanjay Dua, learned counsel for the plaintiffs and Mr. M.S Dewan, learned counsel for the defendant, who have taken me through the pleadings and the documents filed.
It is common ground that the premises were initially let out by the plaintiffs to the defendant bank under agreement dated 1 February 1980 executed by the parties. Clauses 5 and 25 of the said agreement, relevant to the issue raised, are extracted below:—
“5. That the lease shall be initially for a period of five years from Ist February 1980 and the same shall be renewable at the option of the bank for a further period of five years subject to enhancement of rent by 20% of the last rent paid by the Bank to the lessor.
25. That at the request of the bank, lessors shall execute a regular lease deed in two sets and the cost of the stamp and the registration charges shall be borne by the bank. The original lease deed shall be kept with the lessors and the counter part thereof with the bank. However, the lessors shall whenever so requested produce the original lease deed to the bank.”
There is no gainsaying the fact that the agreement postulated property being let out initially for a period of five years w.e.f 1 February 1980, renewable at the option of the defendant bank for a further period of five years on enhanced rent, and the execution of the regular lease deed at the request of defendant bank. It appears that no such request for execution and registration of regular lease deed was made by the defendant and none was accordingly executed. Section 107 of the Act describes the mode of making leases. It lays down that a lease of immovable property for a fixed term or for a period exceeding one year can be made “only” by a registered instrument. The use of the expression “only” in the section indicates that the specific mode prescribed therein has to be adhered to strictly, failing which any instrument purporting to lease out the premises for a period exceeding one year or extend it likewise orally or in writing would be void and presumption about duration of lease under section 106 of the Act will apply. As per section 106 a lease from month to month or a lease other than a lease from year to year is terminable by fifteen days notice. Thus, in the present case, continuance of defendant's possession of the property for a period exceeding one year shall be deemed to be under a tenancy from month to month.
Support is lent to this view by a decision of the Supreme Court in Burmah Shell Oil Distributing now known as Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Khaja Midhat Noor and Ors 1988 AIR SC 1470 and Punjab National Bank v. Ganga Narain Kapur AIR 1994 All.221, wherein it has been held that a fixed term lease for a period exceeding one year - oral or in writing, if not registered will be deemed to be a tenancy from month to month terminable by 15 days notice. Thus, the lease dated 1 February 1980 cannot enure as a fixed term lease for five years and would be deemed to be one from month to month.
The exercise of option by the defendant for renewal in 1985 and 1990, or later, did not ipso facto extend the term of lease beyond one year. At best it only entitled the lessee to obtain a fresh lease, which again required registration. No, document of “regular deed” contemplated in clause 25 of the agreement or a “fresh” lease deed for the stated extensions was executed. Similarly no registered instrument has been placed on record to support defendant's plea of further extension w.e.f 1 February 1995. The plaintiffs letter dated 13 April 1991 agreeing to the said extensions, not being a registered document cannot create a tenancy for five years. The requirements of section 107 of the Act having not been complied with, the stated renewals were invalid and of no consequence and the tenancy continued to be a monthly tenancy right from inception in February 1980, determinable under section 106 of the Act by 15 days' notice expiring by the end of a month of tenancy.
Faced with this situation Mr. Dewan, learned counsel for the defendant, pressed into service the doctrine of part performance, stipulated in section 53A of the Act and urged that the defendant having taken possession under lease agreement dated 1 February 1980, executed by the parties; and being in possession as such, the plaintiffs landlords are debarred from enforcing any right to evict the defendant. Mr. Dua, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, controverted the contention with equal vehemence on the grounds; i) that section 53A of the Act does not apply to lease agreement and (ii) in any case the defendant lessee having failed to perform its obligations, envisaged in the lease agreement dated 1 February 1980, is not entitled to protection under the said section. According to the learned counsel the defendant having never moved for execution of a regular registered lease deed in terms of clause 25 of the lease agreement (supra) is not entitled to protection under section 53A of the Act. He maintains that there is no plea of the defendant having been or being ready and willing or to have called upon the plaintiffs to execute a regular lease deed in terms of clause 25 of the agreement dated 1 February 1980 or any alleged subsequent arrangement being completed or formalised under section 107 of the Act, the defendant is not entitled to seek protection under Section 53A of the Act.
To appreciate the contentions of the parties it would be convenient to reproduce section 53 A of the Act. It lays down:—
“Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty:
and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continue in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract,
and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract,
then, notwithstanding that the contract, though required to be registered, has not been registered, or, where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract:
Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.”
A perusal of the section would show that the three essential conditions precedent for applicability of the section are:
i) contract to transfer immovable property for consideration;
ii) transferee entering in possession of the property in part performance; and
iii) the transferee performing or willing to perform his part of contract.
On the first question whether the doctrine of part performance in section 53A of the Act is applicable to the lease agreement there has been a conflict of opinion in various High Courts. The term “transfer of property” postulated in the first condition is defined in Section 5 of the Act to mean an act by a living person to convey a property,.....(emphasis added). The term convey is not defined in the Act. The meaning of the term in Black's Law Dictionary is “ to transfer or deliver to another; to pass or transmit title to property from one to another; to transfer property or the title to property by deed, bill of sale or instrument under seal. Used popularly in sense of “assign”, “sale” or “transfer”.
“Lease” is defined in section 105 of the Act as “transfer of a right to enjoy the property”, which in common parlance is distinguished from the transfer of interest in the property to the transferee, like in sale, mortgage, exchange or gift, dealt with in chapters III, IV, VI and VII of the Act respectively. The transfer of property envisages transfer of corpus or its part conveying proprietary status to a transferee. Looked at from that angle, it appears that, lease of an immovable property, strictly speaking, may not fall within the ambit of the term ‘transfer of property’, envisaged in section 53A of the Act, making the said section inapplicable to a lease. But the matter is not free from doubt.
A similar view has been expressed by the Allahabad High Court in Punjab National Bank v. Ganga Narain Kapur (Supra). The learned Judge, deciding the said case, observed that in case of agreement to lease, the agreement to transfer being only of the right to enjoy the property, and not in fact a transfer of ownership along with corpus of immovable property, as in the case of sale, it is doubtful if protection of section 53A is available to a lessee. It was, however, held that even if the said section were applicable, it would not be of any avail in case of a fixed term tenancy made in violation of provisions of section 107 of the Act, as in the present case.
Earlier, in Shyam Sundar Lal and Anr v. Din Shah & Ors AIR 1937 Allahabad 10, a Bench decision, it was held that though a transfer of a right to enjoy property does not speak of the transfer of interest in the property, but in view of the fact that some sections in Chapter II of the Act speak of the lease transferring the whole or any part of the interest in the property, the legislature intended that lease be treated as transfer of property. Similar view has been expressed by the Patna High Court in Mahadei Haluai v. Ram Krishna Singh, & Anr AIR 1960 Patna 354. However, no authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court or of this court on the point has been brought to my notice, I do not propose to broach the subject further as on facts it is unnecessary.
Assuming Section 53A of the Act were applicable, the defendant herein cannot have the invalid instrument enforced under umbrella of section 53A of the Act because section 53A, if applicable, would be available only as a defence to it as a lessee, merely to protect his possession. At best, it can be used to show the nature and character of its possession. It does not create a title in the lessee, nor confers any right on the basis of which the lessee could claim any rights against the lessor. The unregistered lease cannot be used to prove the terms of the lease. The section only provides a shield for protection and not a sword to attack.
Further, in order to be entitled to the protection of section 53A of the Act, the lessee must perform or must be willing to perform his part of the contract. In the present case, clause 25 of the lease agreement specifically enjoined the defendant to have a ‘regular lease deed’ executed by the plaintiffs and have the same registered. This was stipulated to comply with the mandatory requirements of section 107 of the Act. There is no allegation much less a plea or proof that the defendant did call upon the plaintiffs to do so, nor that, despite it, the plaintiffs did not respond in which case also the defendant could seek legal remedy, if any, to have obligations under clause 25 of the lease agreement enforced. It cannot, therefore, be said that the defendant was ready and willing to perform its part of the obligation under the lease agreement thus negating compliance with the third limb of section 53 A of the Act. The defendant, as such, cannot claim protection under the said section.
Now reverting back to the main question, viz, assuming section 53 A of the Act were applicable to a case where a person entered into possession of the property pursuant to a lease agreement which was not registered, whether the presumption under section 106 of the Act would be attracted? I have no hesitation in holding it so. Though possession or the occupation of the property by that person may be lawful and permissive, but as regards duration of the tenancy, it will be governed by the provisions of section 106 of the Act, and, as in the present case, the tenancy would be deemed to be from month to month, terminable by a notice of 15 days by either side.
Having come to the finding that the lease in the present case was from month to month, the only question which remains to be considered is whether it was lawfully determined. Admittedly, legal, notice dated 9 January 1995, issued on behalf of the plaintiffs by their counsel, terminating the tenancy of the defendant w.e.f midnight of 31 January 1995 and asking the defendant to deliver the vacant possession of the subject premises, was duly served on the defendant. The defence in resistance taken in para 6 of the written statement, based on plea of fixed tenancy for 5 years and its extension is that the said notice is as such uncalled for and misconceived as communicated in defendants' reply dated 23 January 1995, received by counsel for the plaintiff. Nothing is pointed out in the written statement nor during the course of arguments to show that the said notice did not fulfil the requirements of section 106 of the Act. What is stipulated in section 106 of the Act is that a notice under the section has to be in writing which should be signed by or on behalf of the person giving it and is to be served on the party either by post or tendered or delivered in person. Consequently, I hold that notice dated 9 January 1995, terminating the tenancy and duly served on the defendant was valid and the tenancy stood lawfully terminated w.e.f 1 February 1995 as envisaged under section 111 (h) of the Act.
The factum of tenancy and its valid determination under section 111 of the Act not being in dispute, I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Consequently, I allow the application, and pass a decree for possession in favour, of the plaintiffs and against the defendant,, directing the defendant to put the plaintiffs in possession of the suit property within four months.
For framing of issues, if any, on the other relief prayed for, requiring trial, to come up on 8 September 1998.
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