Arun Kumar, J.— The question for consideration in this appeal is as to what should be the appropriate market value of the land in Village Poothkalan, Delhi as on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which is this case was published on 11th December, 1981. The declaration under Section 6 was issued on 11th April, 1984. The Land Acquisition Collector made his award being Award No. 20/85-86 on 11th November, 1985. By the said notification dated 11th December, 1981 under Section 4 of the Act large tracts of land falling in Village Poothkalan were acquired for planned development of Delhi. The Land Acquisition Collector categorised the acquired land into three categories and offered compensation for the acquired land as under:

Category A Rs. 12,100/- per bigha Category B Rs. 12,000/- per bigha Category C Rs. 6,000/- per bigha

2. The land owners were dissatisfied with the offer of compensation made by the Collector and sought reference under Section 18 of the Act. In this appeal the learned Addl. District Judge did not agree with the division of the acquired land into three categories by the Collector. Thus, the categorisation was discarded. He fixed the market value of land on the relevant date as Rs. 18,500/- per bigha. Another Addl. District Judge, Delhi in another set of cases pertaining to the same village the same notification under Section 4 of the Act and the same award, fixed the market value of the land at Rs. 15.700/- per bigha. Categorisation of land into three categories was again discarded.

3. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, the learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the land in Village Poothkalan had tremendous potential value for building activity. He relied on the award of the Collector itself to show the unique locational advantage of the acquired land. The Collector had observed in the award that land of Village Poothkalan is quite fertile and is situated on three sides of the village abadi. The main road from Delhi to Kanjhawla passes through the land and three minor roads are also at site which are from Village Poothkalan to Rithala; from village Poothkalan to Pehladpur Banger and from Village Poothkalan to Nangloi.

4. From this it is clear that the land in question was surrounded by village abadi and there was a net work of roads all around leading to important places.

5. The learned Counsel for the appellants next relied on the fact that the Rohini complex had been developed by the Delhi Development Authority in this very area which had all the civic amenities. The date of Section 4 notification in the present case is towards the end of the year 1981 and by that time lot of development had taken place all around the area. All the basic amenities like water, electricity, roads were available in the area. All these factors showed that the land had great potential as a building site which enhanced its market value.

6. So far as the evidence on record is concerned, the learned Counsel for the appellants brought to our notice the fact that there are three sale deeds on record pertaining to sale of land within the village. These are Ex. A-1 dated 10th September, 1981. This sale deed is regarding sale of one bigha of agricultural land sold for Rs. 30,000/- per bigha for use as agricultural land. The next sale deed is Ex. A-2 dated 21st December, 1979 regarding one bigha of land for a consideration of Rs. 28,000/- This was also a sale of agricultural land to be used for agricultural purposes as mentioned in the sale deed itself. The third sale deed is Ex. A-3 dated 22nd June, 1981 for 12 Biswas for a sum of Rs. 48,000/-. There are also Ex. A-5 to Ex. A-8 on record which are sale deeds all dated 7th September, 1981 for one bigha each for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- each. The learned Addl. District Judge appears to have worked out an average of all the sale deed excepting sale deed Ex. A-3 and has made certain deductions from the price arrived at on the basis of averages in order to arrive at the market value fixed by him. Sale deed Ex. A-3 was rejected by the learned Addl. District Judge because it was felt that it did not represent true market value of land.

7. Mr. Sanjay Poddar, learned Counsel appearing for the Government argued that all the sale deeds referred to above pertain to small pieces of land and should be ignored. According to him the market value of land should be fixed on the basis of a decision of this Court in R.F.A No. 427 of 1979 entitled Ram Swarup v. Union of India, decided on 9th December, 1997 in which the market value of land in village Poothkalan was fixed at Rs. 11,000/- per bigha for a notification under Section 4 of the Act dated 20th August, 1976. He submits that following the principle of giving an annual appreciation @ 12%, the market value can be worked out. According to him since the date of notification under Section 4 in the present set of appeals is December 1991, an appreciation @12% per year i.e total 60% can be allowed on the base figure of Rs. 11,000/- per bigha. He added that the learned Addl. District Judge has already given more than what will be worked out on this basis as the market value of land and, therefore, no case of enhancement in market value of land is made out.

8. We have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. We are unable to agree with the approach for determination of market value as suggested by the learned Counsel for the respondent. Firstly, the figure of Rs. 11,000/- per bigha for the notification dated 20th August, 1976 was arrived at on the basis of a Lok Adalat settlement. Secondly, when sale transactions for a period closer in point of time to the date of Section 4 notification from the same village are available, the Court need not go to the formula of adding at the rate of 12% per year to the base figure to arrive at the market value of the land as per the date of Section 4 notification in a given case, Such an approach may have to be adopted on account of sheer necessity arising on account of total absence of sale transactions in the village in question or in the adjoining village. In the present case such a situation is not there and we need not resort to the said method of arriving at the market value of land.

9. We are also not impressed with the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent that instances of sale of small pieces of land need not be taken into consideration for determining the market value of land in a particular village. In RFA 554 of 1982 entitled Dharamvir& Anr. v. Union of India, decided on 26th September, 1986, a Division Bench of this court relied on an instance of a small piece of land for arriving at the market value of land involved in the said appeal. The Supreme Court has recently approved placing reliance on instance of sale of a small piece of land in this connection, Land Acquisition Officer v. L. Kamalamma Etc., (1982) 2 SCC 385.

10. The sale transactions which are available on record in the present case and to which reference has already been made hereinbefore are near in point of time to the date of Section 4 notification. They are transactions from within the same village and we see no reason why the same cannot be relied upon for arriving at the market value of land in the village at the relevant time. The sale deeds Ex. A-1, A-2 and A-3 had been duly proved by producing the vendors who appeared as AW-1, AW-2 and AW-3 respectively. AW-1 who proved EX. A-1 stated that he received the entire sale consideration of Rs. 30,000/- before the Sub-Registrar. The date of the sale deed in 10th September, 1991 which is closest in point of time to the date of Section 4 notification in the case. This witness was the owner of the land subject matter of the sale and he stated that the land was agricultural and it was sold for agricultural purposes. Similar is the statement of Pirthi Singh AW 2, the owner of the land, who sole the land subject matter of Ex. A-2. He sold the land which was agricultural to the vendee for agricultural purposes. He stated that he received Rs. 7,000/- in advance and balance Rs. 21,000/- was received before the Sub-Registrar. The vendor of Ex. A-3 is Basant Lal, AW-3, who sold the same as a power of attorney holder. According to him, he sold 12 Biswas (6,000 sq.Yds) of land for Rs. 48,000/- He also stated he had already received the entire sale consideration in advance at his home. This transaction does not inspire confidence and was rightly rejected by both the Addl. District Judges who dealt with the cases of this Village at the relevant time. We agree with the learned Addl. District Judge concerned that this sale deed does not represent the true market value of the land. In the area and, therefore, has to be discarded.

11. This leaves us with the best evidence of Ex. A-1 which is a sale deed regarding sale of one bigha of land in the same village on 10th September, 1981 for Rs. 30,000/-. The land sold was agricultural and it was sold for agricultural purposes. The date of Section 4 notification under consideration in 11th December, 1981. Thus this sale deed was about three months prior to the date of Section 4 notification for which we have to fix the market value of land in the village.

12. Keeping all the facts and circumstances of this case in view we are of the opinion that this sale deed can be safely relied upon to fix the market value of land in the village at the relevant time. The learned Addl. District Judge had taken out averages of various sale deeds excluding Ex. A-3 to arrive at the market value of land at the relevant time. We do not consider that to be a strictly right approach in the matter. There was no reason to work out averages when reliable evidence by way of sale deeds was available. In this connection our attention has been invited to a Supreme Court decision in Sri Rani M. Vijaylakshmamma Rao Bahadur, Ranee of Vuyyur v. The Collector of Madras, 1969 (1) M.L.J 45 (S.C), wherein it was held:

“Whatever that may be, it seems to us to be only fair that where sale deeds pertaining to different transactions are relied on behalf of the Government, that representing the highest value should be preferred to the rest unless there are strong circumstances justifying a different course. In any case we see no reason why an average of two sale deeds should have been taken in this case.”

The judgment of the Supreme Court fortifies our view that the land owner is entitled to the best price available as per the evidence on record for his acquired land.

13. The learned Counsel for the respondent urged that whatever price by way of market value of land is arrived at by this Court, certain deductions ought to be made therefrom because the price is being worked out on the basis of sale transactions of small pieces of land. In our view for purposes of deductions we have to consider whether the two lands which are under comparison are of similar nature. If the price of developed land is being taken into consideration for purposes of arriving at the market value of undeveloped land certain deductions depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case may have to be made. But where the nature of the lands under comparison is the same deduction may not be necessary. Deduction is a measure of comparison i.e by making deduction the two lands under consideration are made comparable. Where, however, the two lands are already similarly circumstanced, deductions are not necessary. In the present case the sale deed being relied upon by this Court is a sale deed with respect to agricultural land which was sold for agricultural purposes. The land under acquisition was also agricultural land. Therefore, we do not consider it necessary that deductions must be made from the value of land in the sale deed under consideration to arrive at the market value of land for purposes of awarding compensation to the appellants. Both the lands under consideration in the present appeals for the purposes of arriving at the market value of the land were under-developed lands and, therefore, deductions need not be made.

14. On the question of deductions, learned Counsel on both sides placed reliance on various judgement. The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the learned Additional District Judge has committed a grave error in deducting the cost for development from out of the market value of the land acquired. He has also challenged the constitutional validity of the said doctrine of deduction for development costs. He further submitted that location of the land in question is such that it does not require any investment in the matter of development. Reliance has been placed on the following observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bhagwathula Samanna and Ors. v. Special Tehsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, Visakhapatnam Municipality, AIR 1992 SC 2298:

“The principal of deduction in the land value covered by the comparable sale is thus adopted in order to arrive at the market value of the acquired land. In applying the principle it is necessary to consider all relevant facts. It is not the extent of the area covered under the acquisition, the only relevant factor. Even in the vast area there may be land which is fully developed having all amenities and situated in an advantageous position. If smaller area within the large tract is already developed and suitable for building purposes and have in its vicinity roads, drainage, electricity communications etc., than the principle of deduction simply for the reason that it is part of the large tract acquired, may not be justified.

The proposition that large area of land cannot possibly fetch a price at the same rate at which small plots are sold is not absolute proposition and in given circumstances it would be permissible to take into account the price fetched by the small plots of land. If the larger tract of land because of advantageous position is capable of being used for the purpose for which the smaller plots are used and is also situated in a developed area with little or no requirement of further development, the principle of deduction of the value for purpose of comparison is not warranted. With regard to the nature of the plots involved in these two cases, it has been satisfactorily shown on the evidence on record that the land has facilities of road and other amenities and is adjacent to a developed colony and in such circumstances it is possible to utilise the entire area in question as house sites. In respect of the land acquired for the road, the same advantages are available and it did not require any further development. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court has erred in applying the principle of deduction and reducing the fair market value of land from Rs. 10/- per sq. yard to Rs. 6.50 paise per sq. yard. In our opinion, no such deduction, is justified in the facts and circumstances of these cases. The appellants, therefore, succeed.”

As against this, learned Counsel for the respondent has supported the doctrine of deduction on account of development costs. Reliance has been placed on a series of decisions of the Supreme Court, which approve deduction for development costs out of the market value determination. These decisions are reported in Smt. Tribeni Devi & Ors. v. The Collector, Ranchi, AIR 1972 SC 1417, P.S Krishna & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. The Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1992 SC 421, Spl. Tehsildar, Land Acgn., Vishakapatnam v. Smt. A. Mangala Gowri, AIR 1992 SC 666, Administrator Genl. of West Bengal v. Collector, Varanasi, AIR 1988 SC 943; and Brig, Sahib Singh Kalha v. Amritsar Improvement Trust & Ors., AIR 1982 SC 940.

In Tribeni Devi v. Collector, Ranchi, AIR 1972 SC 1417, 1/3 of the market value of the acquired land was deducted by way of development cost.

15. In Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Vishakapatnam v. A. Mangala Gowri, AIR 1992 SC 666, the Apex Court has approved the deduction by way of development costs at varying rates ranging between 25% to 33% as noticed in para No. 4 of the judgement which is to the following effect:

“In Tribeni Devi v. Collector of Ranchi (1972) 3 SCR 208 at p. 213 (AIR 1972 SC 1417 at p. 1421), this Court held that “in order to develop that area at least the value of 1/3 of the land will have to be deducted for roads, drainage and other amenities.” On this basis the value of the land at Rs. 2,08,135.70 per acre would, after the deduction of 1/3 comes to Rs. 1,38.757/- per acre. In Smt. Kaushalya Devi Bogra v. The Land Acquisition Officer, Aurangabad,(1984) 2 SCR 900 : (AIR 1984 SC 892). This Court held that deduction of 1/3 was held to be reasonable. In Vijay Kumar Motilal v. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 2 SCC 719; (AIR 1981 SC 1632) 1/3rd was deducted towards developmental charges in undeveloped area. In Vijay Singh Liladdhar v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, (1983) 3 SCC 760 : (AIR 1988 SC 1652) the deduction of 1/4th by the High Court which was not challenged in this Court was upheld. In Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. T. Adinarayan Setty (AIR 1959 SC 429) (supra), deduction of 25 per cent was held to be reasonable. It is to be noted that in building regulations, setting apart the lands for development of roads, drainage and other amenities like electricity etc., are condition precedent to approve lay out for building colonies. Therefore, based upon the situation of the land and the need for development the deduction shall be made. Where acquired land is in the midst of already developed land with amenities of roads drainage, electricity etc. then deduction of 1/3 would not be justified. In the rural areas housing schemes relating to weaker sections deduction of 1/4 may be justified. On that basis, this Court in R. Dharma Rao's case upheld deduction of 1/5 because the owner while obtaining the lay out had already set apart lands for road and drainage. Therefore, deduction of 1/3 would be reasonable. In fact in the Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Vishakapatnam v. P. Narasing Rao, (1985) 1 APLJ (HC) 99, a Division Bench of the High Court surveyed judgement of the High Court relating to housing schemes of Visakhapatnam upholding deduction of 1/3 to be reasonable. Accordingly we hold that 1/3 of the market value should be deducted for development of the lands. The High Court committed grievous error in giving a curious reasoning of valuing at Rs. 12 and upholding Rs. 10/- to be the market value after deduction, though the market value was determined at Rs. 10/- Accordingly the appeal is allowed. The market value is determined at Rs. 67- per sq.yard and after deducting 1/3 the market value is Rs. 4/- per sq. yard. The respondents are entitled to 15 per cent solatium on market value and 4 per cent interest thereon from the date of dispossession. But in the circumstances parties are directed to pay and receive their own costs.

16. In Brig. Sahib Singh Kalha v. Amritsar Improvement Trust, AIR 1982 SC 940, the Apex Court held that the deduction on account of development costs can range between 20 to 33% depending upon the situational factors pertaining to the land acquired. InAdminister General of West Bengal v. Collector, Varanasi, AIR 1988 SC 943, the Supreme Court by placing reliance on Brig. Sahib Singh's case (AIR 1982 SC 940) held that the deduction for development costs for arriving at potential market value of the land acquired can come up to as much as 53%. It was observed in para 6 of the judgement that:

“In Brig. Sahib Singh Kalha v. Amritsar Improvement Trust, (see (1982) I SCC 419, AIR 1982 SC 940) this Court indicated that deductions for land acquired for roads and other development expenses can, together come up to as much as 53%.”

17. Needless to say that the right to compensation is wholly regulated by the Act and Sections 23 and 24 of the Act lay down matters which should be considered in determining compensation and matters which ought not be considered in that process. Sections 23 and 24 form a complete Code and the principles specified therein for determining market value of the land acquired are conclusive. Section 23 of the Act recognises only two kinds or categories of compensation to the owner—namely, (i) for the market value of the acquired land, and (ii) a sum of 30% on such market value to be awarded as a conciliatory measure for the compulsory acquisition. It follows that compensation to be paid to an expropriated owner is the market value of the land acquired determined on principles set out in Section 23(1) of the Act and the statutory charge of 30% on that market value as provided for by Section 23(2). The object of the principles of valuation embodied in the aforesaid Section is to pay the expropriated owner for what he has lost including the benefit of advantages present as well as future. In State of Gujarat v. Shantilal, AIR 1969 SC 634, it was observed that in ordinary parlance the expression “compensation” means, anything given to make things equivalent; a thing given to or to make amends for loss, recompense,remuncration or pay. “In determining the amount of market value on the principles set out in Section 23(1) of the Act, it should be borne in mind that compensation under Section 23 is paid to idemnify a person and it should be an equivalent or substitute of equal values. In Hemchand v. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 720, it was held that compensation is paid to idemnify a person and it should normally be an equivalent a substitute of equal values. The principle of equivalence which is at the root of statutory compensation postulates that the expropriated owner shall be paid neither less nor more than his loss. We may, in this connection, usefully excerpt the following observations made in Horn v. Sudder Land Corporation, (1941) 1 ALL.E.R 480:

“The word ‘compensation ‘almost of itself carried the corollary that the loss to the seller must be completely made up to him, on the ground that unless he received a price which fully equalled his pecuniary detriment, the compensation would not be equivalent to the compulsory sacrifice.”

18. What emerges, therefore, is that the compensation should be the equivalent in terms of money of the property compulsorily acquired and the principles for determination of the market value are intended to award to the expropriated owner the value of the property acquired. Article 300 A of the Constitution of India mandates that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There is no express statutory provision in the Act enabling the Acquiring Authority or the Reference Court to make any deduction from the statutory compensation on account of development costs.

19. It is significant to mention here that none of the authorities cited above gives any statutory justification for deduction for development costs from the amount of compensation. If the deduction for development costs at varing rates ranging between 25 to 53% is made from the amount of compensation, it is bound to deprive the owner of some proprietary interest or the other, and every such interest or right is treated by the Courts as itself property. To state it in our Constitutional jargon, such deprivation is violative of Article 300A, which declares that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. This has also been the view expressed by a Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us (Siddiqui, J.) was a party, in Ram Kumar & Ors. v. Union of India &Anr. 66 (1997) DLT 236. We are, in respectful agreement with the view taken in Ram Kumar's case (supra).

20. Next question is whether interest can be allowed on the amount of solatium awarded under Section 23 (2) of the Act Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that interest can be allowed on the amount of solatium. Support was sought to be derived from the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in Narain Das Jain v. Agra Nagar Mahapalika, (1991) 4. S.CC 212 and Mamleshwar Prasad (Dead) by LRs & Anr. v. Union of India & (Civil Appeal No. 1995, arising out of S.L.P(C) Nos. 10567/85, 13732/85 and 2438/86 decided on 24.8.1995). On the contrary, learned Counsel for the respondent contended that interest cannot be allowed on the amount of solatium. Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Shri Ram Mehra & Ors, (1973) 1 SCC 109; Mr. Fazeelath Hussain v. Spl. Dy. Collector, (1995) 3 SCC 208 and (1997) 3 SCC 628.

21. In Mamleshwar Prasad's case (supra), the Apex Court, by placing reliance on Narain Das Jain (supra), held that an owner is also entitled to interest under Section 34 of the Act not merely on the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector but on the account of compensation finally determined by the Court. In the case of Narain Das Jain (supra) their Lordships have held that solatium in the scheme of Section 23(2) of the Act is part of the compensation and interest can be allowed on the amount of solatium awarded under Section 23(2). Reference may be made to the following observations:

“Before parting with the judgement, we need to clarify that solatium in the scheme of Section 23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act is part of the compensation and Sections 28 and 34 of the said Act provided payment of interest on the amount of compensation. This Court recently in Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. v. State of Kerala, has ruled that compensation is recompense or reparation to the loss caused to the owner of the land and that payment of interest on solatium is to recompensate the owner of the land for the loss of user of the land from the date of taking possession till date of payment into Court. Therein the land owner was held entitled to in-tere se on solatium. Attention, however, may be invited to Dr. Shamlal Narula v. CIT. The quality of the sum paid as interest was held somewhat different. It was ruled therein that the statutory interest paid under the Act is interest paid for the delayed payment of compensation amount and in no event can that be described as compensation for owner's right to retain possession, for he has no right to retain possession after possession was taken under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act. The quality of the receipt of interest can be left by us here whether it be a recompense for the loss of user of land or is a sum paid for the delayed payment of compensation. Solatium being part of compensation must fetch statutory interest from the date of dispossession of the land owner till date of payment”

22. Their Lordships placed reliance on the opinion expressed in another case, Periyar & Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1990 SC 2192. It is worth mentioning that in Periyar and Preekanni Rubbers Ltd.'s case (supra) the question that came up for consideration was whether Section 25(3) of the Travancore Land Acquisition Act contemplates payment of interest on solatium and in construing the said provisions their Lordships held that Section 25(3) contemplates payment of interest on solatium. But Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act does not contain any such provision for payment of interest. The relevant provisions for payment of interest have been incorporated in Section 4(3) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, and Section 28 and 34 of the Act. The aforesaid provisions came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Union of India v. Ram Mehra, (1973) 1 SCC 109 and it was held that interest should be payable on the market value of the land and not on the amount of compensation. In Ram Mehra's case (supra) the question arose whether the expression “market value” in Section 4(3) of the Amending Act will take in the additional amount of solatium which is to be awarded on the market value of the land acquired, and after analysing relevant provisions of the Act, their Lordships held that since under the Act it is only the market value of land on which interest has to be paid solatium cannot form part of the market value of the land. It will be advantageous to extract the following passage in the judgement:

“It seems to us that the term ‘market value’ has acquired a definite connotation by judicial decisions. Any addition to the value of the land to the owner whose land is compulsorily acquired which addition is the result of such factors as are unrelated to the open market cannot be regarded as a part of the market value. It is significant and has been noticed at an earlier stage also that according to the other sections which appear in the principal Act interest is payable on such amount which is either a part of compensation or is the total compensation which is payable itself. If market value and compensation were intended by the Legislature to have the same meaning it is difficult to comprehend why the word “compensation” in Sections 28 and 34 and not “market value “was used. Section 23(1) and that consists (a) of the market value of the land and (b) the sum of 15% on such market value which is stated to be the consideration for the compulsory nature of the acquisition. Market value is, therefore, only one of the compensation in the determination of the amount of compensation. If the Legislature has used the word “market value” in Section 4(3) of the Amending Act of 1967 it must be held that it was done deliberately and what was intended was that interest should be payable on the market value of the land and not on the amount of compensation otherwise there was no reason why the Parliament should not have employed the word ‘compensation’ in the aforesaid provision of the Amending Act.”

23. In Mir Fazeelath Hussain & Ors v. Special Deputy Collector, (1995) 3 S.C.C 208 it was held that solatium is not a part of the award. The basis of the said dictum of law is to be found in the proposition that Sub-section (1) of Section 26 specially states that award shall specify the amount awarded under each clauses of Sub-section (1) Section 23, whereas solatium is dealt by Sub-section (2) of Section 23. It is worth mentioning that the decisions rendered in the cases of Ram Mehra & Mir Fazeelath Hussain (supra) are by larger Banches of the Apex Court. In Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1933, it was held that the statement of the law by a Division Bench is considered binding on a Division Bench of the same or lesser number of Judges. We would accordingly govern ourselves by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ram Meher & Ors., and Mir Fazeelath Hussain (supra) and Hold that interest cannot be allowed on the amount of solatium awarded under Section 23 (2) of the Act. This view finds support from the latest decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Joginder Singh, (1997) 3 SCC 628.

24. This aspect of the matter may be examined from another angle. In Inglewood Pulp & Paper Co. Ltd. v. New Brunswick Electric Power Commission, AIR 1928 P.C 287, it was held that upon the expropriation of land under statutory power, Whether for the purpose of private gain or for good to the public at large the owner, is entitled to interest upon the principal sum from the date when possession was taken, unless the Statute clearly shows a contrary intention, “This principle has been followed by the Supreme Court in National Insurance Corporation of India, AIR 1963 S.C 1171: Satinder Singh v. Amrao Singhxyo, AIR 1961 SC 908; Hira Chand Kothari (dead) through LRs v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1985 SC 988 and Abhay Singh v. Secy, Ministry of Communication, AIR 1987 SC 2177,

25. In Abhay Singh's case (supra), it was observed that the claim for interest proceeds on the assumption that when the owner of immovable property loses possession of it, he is entitled to claim interest in place of his right to retain possession. On a bare reading of Section 23 of the Act, it becomes clear that the principal sum to be awarded to an expropriated owner is the market value of the land acquired. Sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the Act empowers the Court to award interest on the market value of the land, Sections 28 and 34 of the Act empower the Collector to award interest on compensation in certain circumstances. There is no express provision in the Act enabling the Court to award interest on solatium under Sub-section (2) of section 23 of the Act. In this view of the matter we may reasonably infer that the Act intends to exclude the application of the general rule enunciated by the aforesaid authorities in the matter of payment of interest on the award of solatium under Section 23(2) of the Act. Thus the claim of interest on solatium is rejected.

26. The result of the above discussion is that the market value of the land in Village Poothkalan is fixed at Rs. 30,000/- per bigha as on 11th December, 1981, the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act. The appellants will get compensation for their acquired land on the basis of the said market value of land. Besides this, the appellants/land owners are entitled to solatium @ 30% of the market value of land. The appellants will also be entitled to interest @ 9% per annum from the date the Collector took possession of land till the expiry of one year from that date and thereafter @ 15% per annum till the date of payment. The appellants will also be entitled to an additional amount @ 12% per annum under Section 23 (1-A) of the Act on the market value of land for the period commencing from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4 till the date of award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land whichever is earlier. The appellants will be entitled to proportionate costs.

Ordered accordingly.