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Delhi Development Authority. v. Maj.(Retd) I.S Rekhi & Sons.

Delhi High Court
Mar 1, 1995
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Structured Summary of the Court Opinion (Usha Mehra, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Delhi Development Authority (D.D.A.) sought appointment of an arbitrator for its counterclaims, asserting that these counterclaims arose out of the same cause of action and facts as the claims of the respondent that had already been referred to arbitration.

Procedural history as stated in the opinion: The respondent initially filed a petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act asking for reference of disputes to arbitration. By an order dated 8 August 1988 the respondent's disputes were directed to be referred to an arbitrator within eight weeks. Because the D.D.A. failed to appoint an arbitrator within eight weeks, this Court appointed Shri J.D. Goel as sole arbitrator by order dated 27 April 1989. The present petition by the D.D.A. seeks reference of its counterclaims to an arbitrator.

The parties framed issues on the pleadings. The court directed that Issues No. 2 and 3 (whether the petition is barred by time; whether it is barred by res judicata under Section 11 and Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C.) be taken up as preliminary legal issues. The court heard arguments on these two issues and disposed of them in a single order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petition discloses a cause of action?
  2. Whether the petition is barred by time (limitation)?
  3. Whether the petition is barred by the principles of res judicata under Section 11 and by Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.)?
  4. Whether the petitioner deliberately delayed the preparation of the final bill and if so, to what effect?

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Dalip Singh)

  • The D.D.A.'s counterclaims should have been raised in response to the respondent's original petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act (Suit No. 2379-A/87); failure to do so bars the present petition by res judicata and under Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C.
  • The contract was rescinded by the D.D.A. on 21 May 1986; Article 137 of the Limitation Act provides three years from the date the contract was rescinded, so the limitation period expired on 20 May 1989. The D.D.A.'s petition filed in December 1990 is therefore time-barred.
  • Relied on Union of India & ors. v. Vijay Construction Co. (AIR 1981 Delhi 193) to support the proposition that the right to apply under Section 20 accrues from the date of rescission and that limitation runs from that date.
  • Relied on K.V. George v. Secretary to Government (1989) 4 SCC 595 to contend that counterclaims arising out of termination should have been raised in the first petition and that raising them subsequently is barred under Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C. and Section 11 C.P.C.
  • Asserted that the D.D.A. had already defended the respondent's claims before the arbitrator (arguing breach, defective or incomplete work, and levy of compensation) and thus the D.D.A.'s present counterclaims are barred because those matters were adjudicated or should have been raised earlier.

D.D.A.'s Arguments (as presented by Ms. Anusuya Salwan)

  • Admitted that Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies, but contended that the three-year period should run from the date the cause of action actually accrued — namely when the D.D.A. completed the balance work at the respondent's risk and cost (alleged to be 7 November 1989), because only then could the D.D.A. ascertain how much money was recoverable.
  • Relied on Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi v. Delhi Development Authority (AIR 1988 SC 1007) to support the proposition that for entitlement to ask for an arbitrator there must be a dispute (a claim and its denial) and that limitation may run from the date a dispute crystallizes (i.e., when the final bills or a determination shows an enforceable claim).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India & ors. v. Vijay Construction Co., AIR 1981 Delhi 193 Supports that the right to apply under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act accrues from the date the contract was rescinded and that limitation is counted from that date. The court relied on the Division Bench's observations in this case to hold that the limitation period under Article 137 begins from the date of rescission (21 May 1986) and not from a later date when balance work was executed.
K.V. George v. Secretary to Government, Water and Power Department, Trivandrum & Anr., (1989) 4 SCC 595 Supports the principle that claims and counterclaims arising out of the same termination should be raised together and that raising remaining disputes subsequently can be barred by Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C. and Section 11 C.P.C. The court accepted the Supreme Court's observations as supporting the view that the D.D.A. ought to have filed its counterclaims when the respondent filed under Section 20; the opinion uses this authority to reinforce that subsequent raising of those counterclaims is barred.
Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi v. Delhi Development Authority, AIR 1988 SC 1007 Held that entitlement to appointment of an arbitrator requires an existing dispute (a claim and its denial) and that the cause of action for limitation may arise when the dispute crystallizes (e.g., when final bills are not finalized and a claim is denied). The D.D.A. relied on this case to argue limitation should run from completion of balance work / when amounts became ascertainable. The court considered this authority but rejected the D.D.A.'s application of it to the present facts, distinguishing it and declining to accept that limitation should begin upon completion of the balance work.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court dealt with Issues No. 2 and 3 together as preliminary legal questions. The material facts were undisputed: the contract was rescinded on 21 May 1986. The central question for limitation was when the three-year period under Article 137 of the Limitation Act began to run — from the date of rescission (21 May 1986), or from a later date when the D.D.A. allegedly got the balance work done at the respondent's risk and cost (alleged to be 7 November 1989), or from the date of payment of the final bill to the other contractor.

The court examined the respondent's submission that Article 137 provides three years from the date of rescission and relied on Union of India v. Vijay Construction Co. which held that the right to apply under Section 20 accrues from rescission. The respondent's argument was that if limitation were to be counted from the date the D.D.A. later completed the work, the limitation period would be dependent on the D.D.A.'s discretion and could lead to perpetual uncertainty and prejudice against the contractor.

The court also considered the respondent's reliance on K.V. George (Supreme Court) to argue that counterclaims arising from termination should have been raised in the initial petition or would be barred subsequently under Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C. and Section 11 C.P.C. The respondent pointed out that the D.D.A. had already defended the respondent's claims before the arbitrator by alleging breach, defective work, and incomplete work (and by arguing levy of compensation), which suggested the matters were either adjudicated or ought to have been raised earlier as counterclaims.

The D.D.A. argued that Article 137 applied but that the three-year period should run from the date the cause of action actually accrued (when D.D.A. completed the balance work and could determine recoverable sums), relying on Major Inder Singh Rekhi.

The court analyzed these submissions and concluded:

  • Accepting the D.D.A.'s position would create continuing uncertainty because the D.D.A. could postpone completion of balance work and thereby delay the accrual of limitation — an outcome contrary to legislative intent and the need for finality.
  • Article 137 indicates the three-year period must be counted from the date the contract was rescinded. The counterclaims arose out of termination; therefore the limitation period began on 21 May 1986.
  • On the question of res judicata/Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C./Section 11 C.P.C., the court noted that the D.D.A. had admitted in its petition that its counterclaims were "inextricably mixed" with the respondent's claims and that the D.D.A. had argued breach, defective/incomplete work and levy of penalty as defences before the arbitrator. Given that, these counterclaims ought to have been raised earlier and are barred under Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C.

Applying these legal principles to the facts — rescission on 21 May 1986 and the D.D.A.'s petition filed in December 1990 — the court found the petition to be time-barred and also barred by Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court concluded that Issues No. 2 and 3 are decided against the D.D.A. and that the present petition is barred by limitation. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The D.D.A.'s application seeking appointment of an arbitrator for its counterclaims was dismissed as time-barred and barred by Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C.; the counterclaims are not referred to arbitration pursuant to this petition.
  • Broader implications: The opinion does not discuss broader legal consequences beyond the direct effect on this petition. The court relied on existing authorities (as summarized above) to reach its conclusion; the decision disposes of the present application rather than announcing a novel legal principle.

Show all summary ...

Usha Mehra, J.— The Delhi Development Authority (in short DDA) has sought for appointment of an arbitrator for its counter claims. According to the D.D.A these disputes arose out of the same cause of action/facts on which basis claimes of the respondent were referred to the arbitration.

2. The facts of the case are that when the dispute arose between the respondent here with the D.D.A, he sought for referring his disputes to arbitration and accordingly filed a petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. Vide the order of this Court dated 8th August, 1988, those disputes as mentioned in the petition were directed to be referred to an arbitrator within eight weeks. Since the D.D.A failed to appoint an arbitrator within eight weeks, hence this Court vide order dated 27th April, 1989 appointed Shri J.D Goel as the sole arbitator. By the present petition, the D.D.A wants its counter claim to be referred to an arbitrator.

3. This petiton has been contested by the respondent, inter alia, on the grounds that the counter claim of the D.D.A now sought to be raised ought to have been raised in response to the petition filed by the respondent under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act listed as Suit No. 2379-A/87. Having not done so, the present petiton is barred by the principle of resjudicata as well as under Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C Further the contract in this case was rescinded by the D.D.A on 21st May, 1986 in which it was mentioned that the balance work would be got done from another contractor at the risk and cost of the respondent here. The respondent had challenged the rescission of the contract before the arbitrator by raising claim in that regard. The D.D.A having failed to file its claim within three years from the date of rescission of the contract, the present petiton is barred by time. On merits respondent denied that the counter claims are admissible. Moreover, these have already been argued before the arbitrator. The D.D.A participated in the proceedings before the learned Arbitrator Shri J.D Goel and got these claims adjudicated. Therefore, the present petiton is not maintainable.

On the pleadings of the parties following issues were framed:

1. Whether the petition discloses a cause of action?

2. Whether the petition is barred by time?

3. Whether the petition is barred by the principles of resjudicata under Section 11 and By order 2 Rule 2 of C.P.C?

4. Whether the petitioner deliberately delayed the preparation of the final bill and if so, to what effect?

4. Vide order dated 7th March, 1995, it was decided that issues 2 and 3 would be taken up as preliminary issues being purely legal and do not require any evidence. I have heard arguments on these two issues. Since, these issues are inter-connected hence disposed of by one order. My finding on these issues is as under.

Issues No. 2 And 3:

5. So far as material facts are concerned, these are not in dispute. This contract was rescinded on 21st May, 1986. The question for consideration is from which date the period of three years has to be counted? Whether from the date the contract was rescinded i.e 21st May 1986 or from the date the balance work was got completed by the D.D.A at the risk and cost of the respondent which in this case is alleged to be 7th November, 1989 or from the date the final bill was paid to the other contractor? Mr. Dalip Singh, appearing for the respondent contended that the limitation has to be counted from the date the contract was terminated. The cause of action accrued on the date the rescission took place and not when the DDA choose not to get the work done at the risk and cost of the respondent. If this assertion of the D.D.A is accepted then the respondent's fate will always hang and would depend on the mercy of the D.D.A That is not the intention of the legislature. Article 137 of the Limitation Act says three years from the date the contract was rescinded and not when D.D.A got the balance work done. To support his arguments, he placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Union of India & ors. v. Vijay Construction Co., AIR 1981 Delhi 193. In that case, the Division Bench was considering a similar point i.e from which date the limitation would be counted. After considering various provisions of the law, the Court came to the conclusion that the right to apply under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act would accrue to the party from the date the contract was rescinded. The limitation would be counted from that date. So relying heavily on these observations of the Division Bench, Mr. Dalip Singh contended that the limitation to file this petition by D.D.A expired on 20th May, 1989 i.e three years from 21st May, 1986. Whereas the present petition has been filed in December, 1990, which is much beyond the limitation period. Having not filed the petition within three years from that date, the present petition is barred by time.

6. To urge that principle of resjudicata are applicable, he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in K.V George v. Secretary To Government, Water and Power Department, Trivandrum and anr. (1989) 4 SCC 595. In that case the aggrieved party got his disputes referred to arbitration. The arbitrator made the award. On objection being raised the award was remitted to the arbitrator as he had not considered the counter claims of the department. After remittance when counter claims were taken up by the arbitrator the appellant therein filed second claim petition before the arbitrator challenging the wrongful termination of the contract and also raised 13 items of claims therein. Arbitrator made award against the second claim petition preferred by the appellant. This was challenged by the respondent on the ground the second claim petition before the arbitrator was barred under Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C and under Section 11 C.P.C Supreme Court upheld these contentions and observed that since the contract was terminated by the respondent/department on 26th April, 1980 and as such all the issues arose out of the termination of the contract and they could have been raised in the first petition before the arbitrator, raising the remaining disputes subsequently is barred. Mr. Dalip Singh relying on these observations of the Apex Court contended that the D.D.A ought to have filed its counter claims pertaining to termination of contract when the respondent filed his petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. As per D.D.A's own showing in para No. 12 of this petiton, the counter claims were in extricably mixed and arose out of the same cause of action/facts on the basis of which claims were filed by the respondent and defended by the D.D.A before the learned Arbitrator. It has also been stated in this para that the D.D.A defended the claims of the respondent before the arbitrator alleging that it was the respondent herein who committed breach of contract, did defective work and left the work incomplete, which was got executed at the his risk and cost. Even the levy of compensation under Clause 2 was also argued before the arbitator. Shri Dalip Singh, therefore, contended that having admitted that all these facts were urged before the learned arbitrator as a defence by the D.D.A and the matter having been adjudicated, the present counter claim sought to be referred to arbitrator are clearly barred. The D.D.A in response to the petiton filed by the respondent ought to have raised all these claims. Having not done so, the present claim petiton is barred under Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C and also under Section 11 C.P.C

7. On the other hand Ms. Anusuya Salwan, appearing for the D.D.A admitted that Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies to a petition filed under the Arbitration Act, but according to her the period of three years has to be counted only from the date cause of action accrued i.e when the work was got completed at the risk and cost of the respondent. Otherwise how could the D.D.A know how much money was to be recovered from the respondent. To support her argument that limitation would run from the date balance work was got done, she placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi v. Delhi Development Authority, AIR 1988 SC 1007. In that case Mr. Rekhi constructed houses for the D.D.A and the work was completed in April, 1980. Appellant sent letters of request to the D.D.A between 1983 to 1985 requesting for finalising the bills. When the D.D.A failed to do so, he asked for the appointment of an arbitrator by filing a petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. The single Judge of this High Court dismissed the application considering it to be barred by time. That decision was upheld by the Division Bench. Reversing the decision of this Court, Supreme Court held that for the entitlement to ask for an arbitrator under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act there must not only be an entitlement to money but there must be a difference or a dispute which must have arisen. In the facts of that case observed that though on completition of the work a right to get payment arose but when the final bills had not been prepared and the right was asserted in February, 1993 and denied by the D.D.A by not making payment, the cause of action arose to that appellant in February, 1983. Hence his petition filed in January, 1986 was within time. It was further observed that a dispute arises when there is a claim and denial or repudiation of the same. The existence of dispute is essential for appointment of an arbitrator. How these observations are applicable to the facts of this case, I have failed to understand? It is nobody's case that the dispute arose when the respondent filed the petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act challenging the rescission of the contract. This Court appointed the arbitrator to go into that dispute. As per the petitioner's own showing the counter claims were in extricably mixed and arose out of the same cause of action/facts on the basis of which the respondent preferred his claims before the arbitrator. It has already been admitted in para 12 of the petition that the petitioner argued the claims of the respondent, namely, breach of contract, defective work and incomplete work left by the respondent which was got completed by the petitioner at the risk and cost of the respondent and the levy of penalty. Having argued these before the learned arbitarator, it cannot be said that the cause of action arose in favour of the D.D.A only when it got the balance work completed at the risk and cost of the respondent. If what Mrs. Salwan contends is accepted then there will always be uncertainty hanging for the parties regarding their claims. For example, D.D.A may not be able to get the balance work completed for number of years, that means the sword of counter claims would always hang on the other party even after five years even though contractor's claims stand adjudicated and at times award also in his favour. Keeping in view such eventuality, the arguments of Mrs. Salwan cannot be accepted. Moreover, Article 137 makes it clear that period of three years has to be counted from the date contract was terminated. The counter claims of the D.D.A arose out of the termination of the contract hence the period of three years has to be counted from 21st May, 1986. Hence, relying on the observation of the Division Bench judgment in Union of India v. Vijay Construction Co. (supra) it can conclusively be held that the cause of action arose when the D.D.A rescinded the contract in May, 1986. Since the petition has been filed in December, 1990 i.e beyond the period of three years, therefore, the same is barred by time. Even otherwise these counter claims ought to have been preferred or right reserved when the respondent filed his petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, having not done so these counter claims are barred under Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C

8. For the reasons stated above, these issues are decided against the D.D.A In view of my above finding the present petition is held to be barred by limitation hence dismissed.