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Shri Ajaib Singh Petitioner v. Delhi State Industrial Corpn. Ltd. & Ors. S

Delhi High Court
May 29, 1984
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.S. Chadha, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenged (a) the constitutional validity of Rule 26 of the Delhi State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (Staff Service) Rules, 1978 ("Rule 26") and (b) an order dated 22 January 1982 terminating the petitioner’s services with immediate effect without enquiry under the said Rule. The petitioner had been employed by the Corporation since 1974, promoted to Senior Cashier in May 1981, and was an office-bearer (General Secretary at several points) of the duly recognised D.S.I.D.C. Employees Union. The termination order stated that the petitioner "has been indulging in activities which are against the security and interest of the Corporation resulting in loss of confidence in him by the Management" and invoked Rule 26.

The Corporation (initially incorporated in 1971 as M/s Delhi Small Industries Development Corporation Private Ltd., later renamed) is a company formed under the Companies Act, 1956, with all shares held by the President of India (and substantial state funding and control). The Corporation framed the Staff Service Rules, 1978, which include Rule 26 (termination without enquiry in certain situations) and detailed disciplinary and procedural provisions elsewhere in the Rules (notably Rules 43–51 providing for disciplinary procedure and principles of natural justice).

In its counter-affidavit the Corporation alleged that the petitioner and others engaged in acts of lawlessness, intimidation, threats and assaults on officers on several occasions (including incidents in September 1980, November 1980, July 1981 and January 1982), that an FIR dated 24 September 1980 under Sections 342/506 IPC was lodged and that accused persons were standing trial. The writ petition was contested on grounds including that the appointment was contractual and that Rule 26 permitted termination consistent with the contract.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Corporation is an instrumentality/agency of the State (an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12) so that its employees are in public employment and entitled to constitutional protections.
  2. Whether Rule 26 of the Delhi State Industrial Development Corporation (Staff Service) Rules, 1978 is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution and/or otherwise unconstitutional for permitting termination without enquiry or natural justice safeguards.
  3. Whether the termination order dated 22 January 1982, passed under Rule 26 without giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing, was valid or should be quashed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Contentions

  • The petition sought a declaration that Rule 26 is ultra vires and unconstitutional and that the termination order dated 22 January 1982, which dismissed the petitioner without enquiry under Rule 26, is void.
  • The petitioner relied on the argument (implicit in the petition) that as an employee of a State instrumentality he was entitled to protection of principles of natural justice and constitutional equality before being dismissed.

Corporation's (Respondent's) Contentions

  • The Corporation alleged that the petitioner (with named associates) had engaged in intimidation, threats, physical assault and interference with administrative functions; it referred to specific incidents and to an FIR and criminal trial (Sections 342/506 IPC).
  • The Corporation contended the petitioner’s appointment was contractual (and thus termination could be enforced under contractual terms) and relied upon Rule 26 as a basis for termination. Counsel for the Corporation (Mr. A. B. Saharya) conceded amenability to writ jurisdiction (i.e., the Corporation being a State instrumentality for that limited purpose) but disputed that this necessarily converted the employment into public employment with all attendant protections.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India (AIR 1979 S.C. 1628) Tests to determine when a corporation is an instrumentality/agency of the State (e.g., shareholding by State, financial assistance, pervasive control, public importance of functions). Used to apply the instrumentality tests to the Corporation (all shares held by the President, State funding, deep control, public functions) and conclude it is an instrumentality within Article 12.
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib (AIR 1981 SC 487) Enquiry into "why" a juristic person was created; instrumentality concept applies irrespective of the juridical form; Article 12 coverage for agencies performing governmental functions. Reinforced the conclusion that the Corporation is an authority under Article 12 because of its objects, state control and public purpose.
Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram (AIR 1975 S.C. 1331) Regulations of certain corporations were treated as having the force of law; employees of such bodies have statutory status and protection under Articles 14 and 16. Cited to support that employees of State instrumentalities/public corporations obtain status entitling them to constitutional protections in employment matters.
U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan (AIR 1980 S.C. 840) Corporations set up or owned by Government should observe equality clauses; employees in such bodies should enjoy protection akin to public employment; public employment extends constitutional safeguards. Quoted (especially Chinnappa Reddy, J.) to show that employees of government agencies/corporations should receive protection under Articles 14 and 16 and that public employment must be free from arbitrary action.
Som Parkash Lekhi v. Union of India (AIR 1981 S.C. 292) Affirmation of the view that public employment of such instrumentalities attracts administrative-law protections. Noted as a three-Judge Bench affirmation of the observations in Vijay Narain Vajpayee, supporting the proposition that constitutional protections apply in public-sector employment.
Raghunandan Prasad v. Institute for Physically Handicapped (C.W.P. 118/80, April 4, 1984) Public employment is governed by administrative law; in public employment, dismissal without natural justice can be quashed; three irreducible minimums of natural justice noted. Adopted to hold that employment with the Corporation is public employment and that principles of natural justice apply; used to reject purely contractual characterization.
Ved Prakash Malhotra v. State Bank of India (I.L.R. 1974 Delhi 660) Earlier Full Bench view referenced by counsel that the question turns on whether a right is contractual or statutory/constitutional. Not followed: the court observed that subsequent Supreme Court decisions have undermined the authority of Ved Prakash Malhotra and related earlier decisions in this Court.
H. M. Joshi v. Reserve Bank of India (I.L.R. 1980 (1) Delhi 291) Earlier Full Bench decision aligned with Ved Prakash Malhotra on contractual/statutory distinction. Not followed for the same reason: earlier local precedents were said to be shaken by later Supreme Court authorities.
Indian Institute Of Technology… v. Mangat Singh (ILR 1973 (11) Delhi 6) Earlier decision treating employment rights in certain institutions as contractual or otherwise. Mentioned as one of the earlier authorities not followed in light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
Mohd. Khan Durrany v. The Principal (Shri Tulsi Ram) Shivaji College (I.L.R. 1970 (11) Delhi 914) Earlier Full Bench decision on contractual/statutory distinction in employment disputes. Mentioned among earlier authorities whose authority was challenged by later Supreme Court rulings.
A. M. Aggarwal v. Union of India (1981 (2) S.L.R. 407) Division Bench decision treating some public-sector employment as contractual (Steel Authority of India case). Criticised by this Court as following earlier Full Bench (Y. P. Gupta) and subsequently weakened by the Supreme Court in P. K. Ramachandra Iyer; not followed as good law here.
Dr. Y. P. Gupta v. Union of India (1975 (2) S.L.R. 560) Earlier Full Bench decision relied upon by subsequent cases to treat certain employment as contractual. Noted that this Court’s Full Bench decision was set aside by the Supreme Court in P. K. Ramachandra Iyer, thus eroding its authority.
P. K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India (AIR 1984 S.C. 541) Supreme Court decision setting aside the earlier Y. P. Gupta decision and clarifying that prior Full Bench authority was incorrect. Relied upon to demonstrate that the earlier Full Bench approach treating certain public employment as merely contractual is not good law.
M/s. Kasturi Lal v. State of J. & K. (AIR 1980 S.C. 1992) Test of "reasonableness" under Article 14; reasonableness pervades constitutional scheme (Maneka Gandhi and related cases referenced). Applied to insist that Rule 26 must satisfy reasonableness and non-arbitrariness; used to support conclusion that Rule 26 is unconstitutional.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ((1978) 2 SCR 621; AIR 1978 SC 597) Principle that due process under Article 21 requires procedure established by law to be reasonable, fair and just; interaction with Article 14's non-arbitrariness. Cited (via Kasturi Lal) to underline that reasonableness is a constitutional requirement and that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness.
R. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 1974 SC 555) Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness; reasonableness and rationality are essential components of equality. Invoked to emphasise that arbitrary state action in employment is forbidden by Article 14.
State of A.P. v. Nalla Rajja Reddy (AIR 1967 S.C. 1458) Official arbitrariness is particularly subversive of equality doctrine and Article 14; statutory discrimination is clearer to locate than arbitrary executive conduct. Quoted to stress that arbitrariness in administrative action (including employment dismissal) violates Article 14.
Manager, Govt. Press v. D. B. Balliappa (1979 (1) S.L.R. 351) Noted transformation of master-servant doctrine in public employment; constitutional protections (Articles 14, 15, 16, 311) apply more fully in public employment. Used to support the view that public employment is not merely contractual and that public employees are entitled to safeguards of administrative law.
John v. Rees ((1970) 1 Ch. 345) Quotation/authority for the phrase that natural justice is a "distillate of our process of law." Referred to in support of the characterization of natural justice in the Court’s reasoning (quotation used by the court).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in distinct steps, each applying legal principles and precedents expressly recorded in the opinion:

  1. Characterisation of the Corporation: The court applied the established tests (Ramana Dayaram Shetty and Ajay Hasia) — focusing on ownership of share capital (all shares held by the President), substantial State funding (loans and grants-in-aid), deep and pervasive State control (appointment and removal of Chairman and Directors by the President; Board bound by presidential directives), and public-purpose functions (promotion of small industries and industrial development) — to conclude the Corporation is an instrumentality/agency of the State and thus an "authority" within Article 12. Because of this, the State is, in effect, the employer and the Corporation's employees occupy public employment.
  2. Public employment and the reach of constitutional protections: Relying on authorities (Sukhdev Singh, U.P. Warehousing/Vijay Narayan, Som Parkash Lekhi, and Raghunandan Prasad), the court held that where an employer is a State instrumentality, employment is public in character and governed by administrative law. Employees in such establishments are entitled to protection against arbitrary dismissal and to the guarantees of Articles 14 and 16 (and related constitutional safeguards).
  3. Examination of Rule 26: The court reproduced Rule 26 and contrasted it with the detailed disciplinary and procedural safeguards elsewhere in the Rules (Rules 43–51), which embody the elements of natural justice (notice of charges, opportunity to defend, impartial adjudicator, and reasoned action). Rule 26 confers on Management an unfettered power to terminate services (on specified grounds such as "loss of confidence" or "possible threat to the security and interest of the Corporation") without in-built procedures ensuring notice or a hearing.
  4. Application of Article 14 and reasonableness: Drawing on the doctrine that Article 14 proscribes arbitrariness and imposes reasonableness (Maneka Gandhi, R. P. Royappa, Kasturi Lal), the court found Rule 26 discriminatory and arbitrary in effect. Even where Rule 26 names certain grounds, the court held that excluding the requirements of natural justice for public employment is inconsistent with Article 14. The court emphasised that the principle of reasonableness is essential to equality and that Rule 26 fails this test because it permits summary termination without the procedural safeguards provided elsewhere in the Rules and without the strict, narrowly tailored safeguards that Article 311(2) permits in the context of State servants concerned with State security.
  5. Distinction from Article 311(2): The court considered whether Rule 26 could be equated with the proviso to Article 311(2), which allows dismissal without enquiry where the President/Governor is satisfied that holding an enquiry is not expedient in the interest of the security of the State. The court concluded Rule 26 deals with the "security and interest of the Corporation," not the security of the State, and thus cannot be justified by Article 311(2). Moreover, even where security is invoked, courts may inquire into the factual basis and good faith of such satisfaction; Rule 26 contains no such safeguards.
  6. Result on the termination order: Because the court declared Rule 26 ultra vires Article 14 for excluding natural justice and permitting arbitrary summary termination in public employment, the termination order passed under Rule 26 (22 January 1982) had to fall as consequentially invalid. The court therefore quashed the impugned termination order. The court expressly did not decide on whether the misconduct alleged in the counter-affidavit would, if processed under a valid disciplinary procedure, merit dismissal — because the power under which termination was effected (Rule 26) was held invalid.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Rule 26 of the Delhi State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (Staff Service) Rules, 1978 is declared ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution and is struck down.

Consequential Disposition: The impugned termination order dated 22 January 1982 is quashed. On the facts and circumstances the court ordered that the parties bear their own costs and the writ petition was allowed.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is reversal of the petitioner's summary termination under Rule 26 and the invalidation of Rule 26 for being inconsistent with Article 14 (for excluding natural justice and permitting arbitrary dismissals in public employment).
  • The court expressly limited its remedial order to striking down Rule 26 and quashing the specific termination order; the court did not adjudicate on the substantive merits of the misconduct allegations against the petitioner because the termination was effected under an ultra vires provision.
  • Broader doctrinal implication in this opinion: employment in a State instrumentality is public employment and cannot be made subject to summary dismissal powers excluding procedural safeguards; however, the opinion confines relief to the present rule and termination order. The opinion does not purport to announce any broader new principle beyond application of established authorities; accordingly, the direct consequence on the parties is the practical relief stated above.

Order: Petition allowed. Parties to bear their own costs.

Show all summary ...

S.S Chadha, J.:— This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeks a declaration that Rule 26 of the Delhi State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (Staff Service) Rules, 1978 is ultra vires and unconstitutional and the order dated January 22, 1982 terminating the services of the petitioner with immediate effect without enquiry in terms of the said Rules alleging that the petitioner has been indulging in activities which are against the security and interest of the Corporation resulting in the loss of confidence by the Management is void.

2. M/s. Delhi Small Industries Development Corporation Private Ltd., the name of which was subsequently changed to M/s. Delhi State Industrial Development Corporation Limited (hereinafter called the Corporation) is a company originally incorporated on 15th day of February, 1971 under the Companies Act, 1956. The main objects of the Corporation to be pursued by it on its incorporation are given in the Memorandum of Association. The object is to aid, counsel, assist, finance, protect and promote the interests of small industries in the Union Territory of Delhi and to provide them with capital, credit, means, resources and technical and managerial assistance for the prosecution of their work and business, to enable them to develop and improve their methods of manufacture, management and marketing and their technique of production. With a view to promote industrial growth, the Corporation is to undertake procurement and distribution of raw materials; to operate upon import licences/releases orders issued to small scale industries; to establish and maintain trade centres to serve as a clearing house far dissemination of information regarding small scale industries; to establish and maintain export houses to promote export trade and participate in export trade for the benefit of small scale industries; to undertake and provide marketing facilities to the small scale industries of Delhi; to acquire lands develop them suitably; to effect coordination between large industries and small industries; to promote and operate schemes of the small industries development of Delhi; to guarantee to the National Small Industries Corporation, in respect of moneys to be paid by an entrepreneur to the National Small Industries Corporation; to promote and operate schemes in collaboration with Delhi Administration for the dispersal of the small scale industries; to enter into arrangement with Government of India. Delhi Administration or any other Government, or States, or Local Authority for the purpose of carrying out the objects of the Corporation; to procure capital for or to provide machinery, equipment and other facilities; to seek for and secure openings for the employment of capital in Delhi and elsewhere and to promote and develop industries of all types including wholly public sector and joint sector undertakings and to improve and develop infrastructure for promotion of industrial complexes in the Union Territory of Delhi. There are other ancillary or incidental objects. In the nutshell, it is meant to promote industrial growth, and encourage industrial development of small industries.
3. The share capital of the Corporation was initially Rs. 20 lacs divided into 20,000 equity shares of Rs. 100/- each and has now been raised to Rs. 1,000 lacs divided into 10 lacs shares of Rs. 100/- each. The Memorandum of Association filed under the Companies Act, 1956 was subscribed by the Secretary (Industries) on behalf of the Lt. Governor of Delhi, Under Secretary (Industries), and Dy. Director of Industries (Planning and Technical) of the Delhi Administration. Out of the shares of 5,000 issued initially, 4998 were subscribed by the Lt. Governor and one each by the other subscribers to the Memorandum of Association. According to the advice given by the Bureau of Public Enterprises, the Corporation has now become a Central Government company after acceptance of the shares by the President of India. Clause 4 (b) of the Article of Association of the Corporation provides that any invitation to the public to subscribe for any shares in or debentures stock of the company is prohibited.
4. According to Article 53 all the Directors on the Board of Directors of the Corporation shall be and are appointed by the President. The Directors hold office at the pleasure of their appointing authority or until their office become vacant in terms of provisions of Section 283 of the Companies Act, whichever is earlier and they are not liable to retirement by rotation. The Chairman of the Board of Directors is also appointed by the President. The Chairman of the Directors appointed by the President hold office until removal by the President. By virtue of Article 63, the Board of Directors are bound by the directives from the President from time to time. Article 94 provides that Lt. Governor of Delhi will exercise all the administrative powers with regard to the Corporation on behalf of the President of India as the latter's nominee. The accounts of the Corporation are admitted by chartered accountants appointed by the Government. The amounts advanced to the entrepreneurs are financed by the Government, partly by way of loans to the Corporation carrying interest and partly as grant-in-aid. There is material on the record which shows various amounts have been received from the Delhi Administration on account of grant-in-aid by the Corporation.
5. The tests for determining as to when a Corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of the Government have been considered by this High Court and the Supreme Court. In “Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and others”, A.I.R 1979 S.C 1628 (1), various tests have been brought about, if the entire share capital of the Corporation is held by the Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the Government. All the shares of the Corporation in this case are held by the President of India. The second test is where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet out all the expenditures of the entire Corporation, it would afford some indication of the Corporation being impregnated with Governmental character. This test is also fulfilled as the amounts required by the Corporation are advanced by the Government either as loan or as grant-in-aid. Another test is the existence of deep and pervasive control and it may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. In case of the Corporation here, the appointment of the Chairman and the Directors on the Board of Directors of the Corporation is by the President. The Board of Directors is bound by the directives from the President from time to time. This shows that the Corporation is entirely State controlled. Another test is that if the functions of the Corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor for classifying the Corporation as an instrumentality or agency of the Government. I have referred to in detail to the objects of the Corporation and it shows that it is meant to promote industrial growth and encourage industrial development which is closely related to governmental functions. These tests are again reiterated by the Supreme Court in “Ajay Hasia V. Khalid Mujib” AIR 1981 SC 487 (2). As laid down, there the enquiry has to be not as to how the juristic person is born but why it has been brought into existence. The Corporation may be a statutory Corporation created by a statute or it may be a Government company or a company formed under the Companies Act, 1956 or it may be a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or any other similar statute. Whatever be its genetical origin, it would be an authority within the meaning of Article 12 if it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government the concept of instrumentality or agency of the Government is not limited to a corporation created by a statute but is equally applicable to a company. Shri A. B. Saharya, the learned counsel for the Corporation fairly conceded that in view of the objects of the Corporation disclosed in the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Corporation and the State control on management and finance and the trend of the decisions, it is not possible for him to contend that the Corporation would not be an instrumentality or agency of the State and it is an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. He, however, concedes this for the purposes of amenability of the Corporation to the writ jurisdiction of this Court and not that there is any element of public employment. Before dealing with this aspect, I may notice certain facts.
6. The Corporation has framed Delhi State Industrial Corporation (Staff Service) Rules, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). These Rules came into force on August 9, 1978. They apply to all employees of the Corporation including those on contract or on deputation in respect of all matters not regulated by the contract or by the terms of the deputation, as the case may be. It is apposite to reproduce Rule 26 here:—
“26. Termination of Service:
(i) Not withstanding anything contained in any of the rules of these regulations, the Management may terminate the services of any employee other than the Managing Director at any time by giving him notice in writing for a period not less than that prescribed in Rule 25, if the Management in its considered opinion is satisfied that it is expedient to terminate the service of such employee on account of:
(i) Non availability of the service arising out of prolonged or irregular absence without permission of the Management or any other reasons.
(ii) Loss of confidence in the employee.
(iii) Possible threat to the Security and the interest of the Corporation. Provided that the Corporation shall give to an employee whose services are so terminated, pay for the period by which the notice actually given falls short of the prescribed period.
(ii) The Corporation may at any time and without assigning any reasons, terminate the services of any employee who has not completed his probation.
(iii) The power to terminate the service shall be exercised by the Appointing Authority as defined in Rule 10 (i).”
7. The Rules further provide the Code of Conduct and Discipline. Rule 44 provides that the term misconduct shall deem to include the following:—
“44. Misconduct:
The term misconduct shall deem to include the followings:
(i) Wilful insubordination or disobedience, whether or not in combination with others, or any lawful and reasonable order of his superiors.
(ii) Wilful slowing down in performance of work, whether or not in combination with others, even arising out of malingering.
(iii) Unwarranted interference with the work of other employees.
(iv) Theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the business or property entrusted with the Corporation the property belonging to any other employees within the premises of the Corporation.
(v) Taking or giving bribes in cash or in kind.
(vi) Habitual negligence or neglect of work.
(vii) Habitual late attendance.
(viii) Wilful damage or loss to the Corporation's goods or property.
(ix) Habitual absence without leave or absence without proper authorisation for more than 10 days.
(x) Holding meeting inside the premises without permission of the Management.
(xi) Wilful act or commission on the part of an employer which is derogatory to the image of the Corporation or its Management.
(xii) Furnishing at the time of appointment, false or misleading information or wilfully suppressing of any information regarding any of the particulars required or called for from the employee.
(xiii) Abetment of or attempt to commit any of the above acts of misconduct.
(xiv) Riotous or disorderly behavidur inside or outside the premises of the Corporation or commissioning of any act subversive or discipline or good behaviour.
(xv) Breach of any rule or proviso of these regulations or any other rules as may be prescribed from time to time.
(xvi) Striking work or inciting others to strike work in contravention of any law.
(xvii) Distribution or exhibition of any handbills, pamphlets or posters in and outside the premises without the sanction of the Management.”
Penalties are provided in Rule 45. The procedure for imposing the punishments is provided in Rule 46. The power of suspension is contained in Rule 47. The issue of the charge-sheet is provided in Rule 48. The order of suspension has to be communicated to an employee in writing and has to be followed as soon as by a charge-sheet against the employee unless the services of such employee are terminated under Rule 26. The management of the Corporation cannot impose on any employee any penalty other than censure, fine or stoppage of increment without future effect for any of the misconducts mentioned at serial No. (i) to (v) quoted above, without communication to the employee, the charge or charges in writing and without giving him a reasonable opportunity for defending himself against such charge or charges and/or to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. The management may itself enquire into the charges reported against the employee or if it considers necessary may appoint Enquiry Committee or Enquiry Officer for the purpose.
8. The petitioner was appointed as Junior Assistant in the year 1974 by the Corporation. He was promoted as Cashier in 1976 and further prompted as Senior Cashier in May, 1981. The petitioner was elected as the General Secretary in 1977, 1979-80 and again 1981-82 of the D.S.I.D.C Employees Union which is a registered body, duly recognised by the Corporation. At the time of impugned termination order dated January 22, 1982, he was working on the post of Assistant Grade I (Ministerial) in Overseas and Assistant Division. The impugned order says that “it has been found that Shri Ajaib Singh has been indulging in activities which are against the security and interest of the Corporation resulting in loss of confidence in him by the Management”. The order of termination is passed in exercise of the powers under Rule 26 (i), (ii) and (iii).
9. In the counter-affidavit, it is averred that the termination is substantiated by the fact that the petitioner along with Shri K. S. Bisht and Shri K. S. Negi had been indulging in acts of lawlessness, intimidating the senior officers, threatening them with dire consequences and even assaulting them to get their demands conceded to. It is further pleaded that the petitioner and his associates had been interfering in the administrative work of the management whenever there are transfers, postings or promotions and they had been indulging in intimidation and threats in order to suit their ends, hurling threats and abuses to the officers was the order of the day. The counter-affidavit then refers to the series of incidents which took place. It is stated that on September 24, 1980 when the aforesaid persons resorted to unlawful acts, abused Dy. Commissioner of Police on deputation with the Corporation and physically dragged him out of the office. The Managing Director of the Corporation was also abused threatened and an attempt is alleged to have been made to assault him as well An FIR dated September 24, 1980 was lodged and the case under Section 342/506 I.P.C was registered and the petitioner and other accused persons are standing trial. Another incident of July, 1981 is then narrated when the petitioner and his other associates entered the room of former officer on Special Duty and abused, threatened and physically assaulted him. Another incident of first week of November, 1980 is also mentioned when the petitioner along with other office-bearer of the union entered the room of the Managing Director and threatened him to accept the illegal and unlawful demands and intimidated him. Yet another incident of January 19, 1982 is mentioned when the Managing Director was alleged to have been gheraoed and the petitioner and other office-bearers forcibly prevented the Managing Director from discharging his official duties.
10. The main question for consideration is whether in fact the appointment of the petitioner is purely contractual as is contended and the Corporation has a right to terminate his services in accordance with the terms of the contract including Rule 26 which is applicable to all employees of the Corporation including those on contract. An employee in a case of master and servant contractual relationship, enforces breach of the contractual term. The remedy for illegal termination in such cases of contractual relationship of master and servant is damages because personal contract of service is not capable of being enforced but the case of public employment stands at a different footing. I have already set out in detail the objects of the Corporation to be pursued to come to the conclusion that the Corporation is an agency or instrumentality of the State performing an important element of the Governmental function, namely, industrial development and growth. The interest of small scale industries in the Union Territory of Delhi is promoted and this affects the people as an organised community. The Corporation is performing its duties and pursuing its objects for the benefit of the public and not for any private profit. The grant-in-aids are paid by the Government to the Corporation as also the loans for financing its activities. The degree of the control by the State is deep and pervasive. The Corporation is entrusted with certain duties in public interest. The employees of such a Corporation would be in public employment.
11. In “Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram”, A.I.R 1975 S.C 1331 (3), the question arose as to the rules and regulations framed by the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Life Insurance Corporation and the Industrial Finance Corporation as having the force of law. It was ruled to use the words of Ray, C.J that voice is that of the State and hands are also of the State and thus the said three juristic entities are instrumentality or agency of the State. It was then held that the employees of these statutory bodies have a statutory status and they are entitled to declaration of being in employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of statutory provisions and that they are also entitled to claim protection of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Mathew, J. who have his concurring judgment expressed that even assuming that the regulations have no force of law, his Lordship felt that since the employment under those Corporations is public employment, an employee would get a status which would enable him to get declaration for continuance in service if he was dismissed or discharged contrary to the regulations. His Lordship also expressed that employment under public Corporations of the nature under consideration in that case is public employment and, therefore, the employee should have the protection which appertains to public employment.
12. “U.P Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan”, A.I.R 1980 S.C 840 (4) related to a statutory Corporation and the writ petition was by an employee for wrongful dismissal on the ground that it was violative of the principles of natural justice, inasmuch as he had not been given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and to establish his innocence. Chinnappa Reddy, J. gave a concurring note in which the question of public employment was dealt with in these words:—
“. . . . . The Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, Corporations set up by the Government under statutes and Corporations incorporated under the Companies Act but owned by the Government have thus become the biggest employers in the country. There is no good reason why, if, Government is bound to observe the equality clauses of the Constitution in the matter of employment and in its dealings with the employees, the Corporations set up or owned by the Government should not be equally bound and why, instead, such Corporations could become citadels of patronage and arbitrary action. In a country like ours which teems with population, where the State, its agencies, its instrumentalities and its Corporations are the biggest employers and where millions seek employment and security, to confine the applicability of the equality clauses of the Constitution, in relation to matters of employment, strictly to direct employment under the Government is perhaps to mock at the Constitution and the people. Some element of public employment is all that is necessary to take the employee beyond the reach of the rule which denies him access to a Court to enforce a contract of employment and denies him the protection of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. After all employment in the public sector has grown to vast dimensions and employees in the public sector often discharge as onerous duties as civil servants and participate in activities vital to our country's economy. In growing realisation of the importance of employment in the public sector, Parliament and the Legislatures of the States have declared persons in the service of local authorities, Government companies and statutory corporations as public servants and extended to them by express enactment the protection usually extended to civil servants from suits and prosecution. It is, therefore, but right that the independence and integrity of those employed in the public sector should be secured as much as the independence and integrity of civil servants.”
These observations enjoyed the affirmation of a three Judges' Bench of the Supreme Court in “Som Parkash Lekhi v. Union of India”, A.I.R 1981 S.C 292 (5).
13. The question was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in C.W.P 118/80 “Raghunandan Prasad v. Institute for Physically Handicapped and Others”, decided on April 4, 1984 (6). It was held that public employment has become for all purposes a subject of administrative law. The public employment is so mixed in it that it ceases to be a contractual employment. The cardinal development in this branch of law is that in public employment the employer is required to observe the principles of natural justice. The State must be fair, just and reasonable, because in fact the State is the employer. Fairness demands that the employee must be heard. In that case the termination order gave no reason as to why the Director of the Institute had been dismissed. It rested itself on the contractual term of three months' notice or three months' pay in lieu thereof. It was expressed that the State is the employer and it is for the Court, having regard to the course of proceedings, to decide whether there has been a result, reached by fair method, such as the servant must have legitimately expected to receive at the hands of the master when he joins the service. If the Court finds that it is a fair decision, the servant shall be refused relief. If there has been no fair decision it would, no doubt, be right to quash the dismissal order. It was ruled:—
“The difficulties came from the historical development of the law of master and servant. It has built up not logically but empirically. It is this empirical development which has so often baffled efforts to systematise the law. A contract of service in the beginning was in a high degree personal and it constituted a personal and private relationship between the parties. There was no public element in this relationship. Then came the public sector and big corporations. The public element at once emerged. The personal element became an impersonal bond of union. The individual who was previously non-public assumed a public character. The private rights and duties were replaced by status. A new test was propounded which focused upon the common quality which unites those within the class concerned and asks whether the quality is essentially impersonal or essentially personal. This was a new trend in public law.
“In public law on the purported exercise of power of dismissal can be declared to be ineffective and inoperative. What the Court does is that it quashes a de facto dismissal order which was in law a nullity. The present case can be decided on the simple ground that there has been a violation of natural justice. Three features of natural justice stand out:— (1) a right to be heard by an unbiased tribunal; (2) to have notice of charges of misconduct; (3) the right to be heard in answer to those charges. These three features constitute the irreducible minimum of the requirements of natural justice. Meggary, J. called natural justice ‘a distillate of our process of law’, a term we find so often on American lips [John v. Rees (1970) 1 Ch. 345, 399]. Our Constitution does not guarantee right to work, it is true. But it does guarantee that no one shall be deprived of his livelihood under the State, except in accordance with the procedure established by law. There is a perpetual quest for security. The law therefore has jurisfied the act of dismissal in public employment. It is now a juristic act. (Tony Honors — Quest for Security, Hamlyn Lects.).
“The public element in the law of employment brought in legislation and judgments law. The public corporations and other ‘authorities’ which are emanations of the State came into existence. In their veins life flows from the corridors of power. These had to be subjected to the rule of law. Their employees needed protection so that these corporations do not become ‘citudels of patronage and arbitrary action’. (Vijay Narain Vajpayee supra at p 469).”
14. Mr. A. B. Saharya questioned the authority of the decision in Raghunandan Prasad's case (supra) for the reason that it has not noticed some earlier Full Bench decisions of this Court, namely, “Ved Prakash Malhotra v. State Bank of India”, I.L.R 1974 Delhi 660 (7), approved by the Full Bench in “H. M. Joshi v. Reserve Bank of India”, I.L.R 1980 (1) Delhi 291 (8), “Indian Institute Of Technology… v. Mangat Singh…”, ILR 1973 (11) Delhi 6 (9) and “Dr. Mohd. Khan Durrany v. The Principal (Shri Tulsi Ram) Shivaji College”, I.L.R 1970 (11) Delhi 914 (10). The view taken in those cases is that the question whether a servant of the ‘State’ (used in the sense of Article 12) or of statutory authority can enforce his rights against the employer under Article 226 depends upon whether he is a contractual employee seeking to enforce a merely contractual right or whether the particular right is statutory or constitutional. I cannot accede to this argument of the counsel. Raghunandan Prasad's case was referred to the larger Bench because of some conflict of judicial opinion in this Court. “A. M. Aggarwal v. Union of India”, 1981 (2) S.L.R 407 was a case of an employee of the Steel Authority of India. A Division Bench of this Court held that the employment was contractual and since the contract of employment was terminated in accordance with the conditions of service the question of natural justice does not arise. The weakness of this decision is that it followed the Full Bench case of “Dr. Y. P. Gupta v. Union of India”, 1975 (2) S.L.R 560 (11) and also based on V. P. Malhotra's case (supra) and Y. P. Gupta's appeal was allowed by the Supreme Court and the judgment of the five Judges of this Court was set aside. The case is reported as “P. K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India”, A.I.R 1984 S.C 541 (12). All these cases were noticed by the Division Bench and the view was expressed that the authority of V. P. Malhotra on which subsequent decisions of this Court referred to by the counsel were based has been completely shaken and no longer good law in view of the three Supreme Court decisions in Ajay Hasia (supra), Vijay Narain Vajpayee (supra) and Dr. Y. P. Gupta (supra). I am in respectful agreement.
15. The Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the State and it is an authority within meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The State is the employer. The employees would be in public employment. It is in this light that I now proceed to determine the constitutional validity of the impugned Rule 26. An elaborate procedure has been provided in the Rules 45 to 51 noticed earlier. This is in consonance with the rule of natural justice in dealing with the cases of misconduct of an employee. The principles of natural justice include the right of a person whose civil rights are affected by the State action of having the notice of the case he has to meet. He must have a reasonable opportunity of representing against and/or of being heard in his defence. The heaving must be by an unbiased/impartial authority. The authority must act reasonably and not arbitrarily. These safeguards are absent in the archiac power conferred on the Management in Rule 26 to terminate the services of the employees on account of three specified eventualities. So far as the ground of non-availability of the service arising out of prolonged or irregular absence is concerned, it is also a misconduct under Rule 44. There is a clear demonstration of discrimination between one employee and another similarly placed, which cannot be reasonably explained as to why resort to one out of the two is made. The Rule is discriminatory. As the impugned action is not under Rule 26 (i) though erroneously mentioned in the impugned order, I wish to say no more. Even if there may be no discrimination under Rule 26 (ii) and (iii), the conditions of termination of the service of an employee are so unreasonable and arbitrary that they violate Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 14 secures equal protection to employees in public employment and Government servants. Government servants have an additional protection under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The principle of reasonableness is an essential element of equality and thus the procedure contemplated by Rule 26 must answer to the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. What is the test of reasonableness was laid down by the Supreme Court in “M/s. Kasturi Lal v. State of J. & K.”, A.I.R 1980 S.C 1992 (13) noticing the earlier decisions:—
“The concept of reasonableness in fact pervades the entire constitutional scheme. The interaction of Articles 14, 19 and 21 analysed by this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCR 621: (AIR 1973 SC 597) clearly demonstrates that the requirement of reasonableness runs like a golden thread through the entire fabric of fundamental rights and, as several decisions of this Court show, this concept of reasonableness finds its positive manifestation and expression in the lofty ideal of social and economic justice which inspires and animates the Directive Principles. It has been laid down by this Court in R. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 2 SCR 348: (AIR 1974 SC 555) and Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and since the principle of reasonableness and rationality, which is legally as well as philosophically an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness, is projected by this article, it must characterise every governmental action, whether it be under the authority of law or in exercise of executive power without making of low. So also the concept of reasonableness runs through the totality of Article 19 and requires that restrictions on the freedoms of the citizen, in order to be permissible, must at the best be reasonable. Similarly Art. 21 in the full plenitude of its activist magnitude as discovered by Maneka Gandhi's case, insists that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except in accordance with procedure established by law and such procedure must be reasonable, fair and just. . . . . . .”
In an earlier case “State of A.P v. Nalla Rajja Reddy”, A.I.R 1967 S.C 1458 (14) it was observed that official arbitrariness is more subversive of the doctrine of equality than statutory discrimination. In respect of a statutory discrimination one knows where he stands, but the wand of official arbitrariness can be waved in all directions indiscriminately. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The Sate action must be “right and just and fair”. In public employment the employer is required to observe principles of natural justice, because in fact the State is the employer. Any rule which does not provide a right to the employee of being heard before termination of his service under the Corporation which is a State, would be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution and thus ultra vires. In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib (supra), the Supreme Court re-stated the law:—
“. . . . . . It must therefore now be taken to be well settled that what Article 14 strikes at is arbitrariness because an action that is arbitrary, must necessarily involve negation of equality. The doctrine of classification which is evolved by the Courts is not paraphrase of Article 14 nor is it the objective and end of that Article. It is merely a judicial formula for determining whether the legislative or executive action in question is arbitrary and therefore constituting denial of equality. If the classification is not reasonable and does not satisfy the two conditions referred to above, the impugned legislative or executive action would plainly be arbitrary and the guarantee of equality under Article 14 would be breached. Wherever therefore there is arbitrariness in State action whether it be of the legislature or of the executive or of an “authority” under Article 12, Art. 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such State action. In fact, the concept of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness pervades the entire constitutional scheme and is a golden thread which runs through the whole of the fabric of the Constitution.”
16. Fairness founded on reasons is the essence of the guarantee as enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. The common law concept of employment which is a master and servant only has transformed into public employment “to bring it in tune with vastly changed and changing socio economic conditions and more of the day, much of this old antiquated and unjust doctrine has been eroded by judicial decisions and legislation, particularly in its application to persons in public employment to whom the Constitutional protection of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 of the Constitution” (See Manager, Govt. Press v. D. B. Balliappa”, 1979 (1) S.L.R 351 (15). The impugned Rule 26 gives power to the Management to terminate the service of employee on account of loss of confidence in the employee or possible threat to the security and interest of the Corporation. It is an act of dismissal in public employment. In public employment, the employer is required to observe the principles of natural justice.
17. Rules 43 to 51 provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard before an employee is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or any other major penalty is imposed. The impugned Rule 26 completely abrogates the principles of natural justice embodied in Rules 43 to 51. Rule 26 cannot be equated with the principle underlying in proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution which engrafts three exceptions. The third exception is where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such enquiry. A dismissal of a Government servant without giving him an opportunity of hearing may be made in the interest of the security of the State. What impugned Rule 26 says is that the termination of the services of an employee can be made on account of “possible threat to the security and the interest of the Corporation”. The interest of the security of State is paramount and for this reason the framers of the Constitution reserve that power. Even in those cases the Court is entitled to enquire whether conditions precedent to the formation of such satisfaction have any factual basis, whether the executive has acted in good faith and whether the existence of the relevant materials upon which the validity of exercise of executive power is predicated are present. In the impugned Rule, it is not the interest of the security of the State but only a possible threat to the security and the interest of the Corporation. In this context, the Corporation in this case cannot be equated with the interest of the security of the State. As the impugned Rule does not contain or in-built rules of natural justice, it violates Article 14 of the Constitution and is ultra vires.
18. Rules 26 cannot be intra vires merely because the exercise of the power is conditioned by the expression of the satisfaction and the expediency to terminate the services of an employee. The power may be guided discretion in the sense that the Management has to express its considered opinion and then record its satisfaction. A power which excludes the rule of natural justice in the matter of termination of service of an employee in public employment is itself bad, even though the exercise of power is conditioned.
19. In view of my finding that the impugned Rule 26 is ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution, I am not going into the question that the misconduct alleged in the counter-affidavit amounts to punishment as the power of termination of services has been exercise under Rule 26 and the Rule is declared ultra vires, the consequential effect is that the impugned order is also quashed.
20. For the above reasons, the writ petition is allowed. Rule 26 of the Delhi State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (Staff Service) Rules, 1978 is declared ultra vires and is struck down. The consequential effect is that the impugned order dated January 22, 1982 is also quashed. On the facts and circumstances, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.
Petition allowed.