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Siri Krishan Bhardwaj Petitioner v. Manohar Lal Gupta & Another S

Delhi High Court
May 18, 1977
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Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arises from a reference to a larger bench because of a conflict between two single‑Judge decisions: B.C. Misra, J. and D.K. Kapur, J., in Civil Revision No. 20 of 1973 (Lachhman Singh etc. v. C.D. Taneja etc.) and Civil Revision No. 355 of 1973 (Ramesh Chander Jain v. Sarvdeshik Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and others). The conflicting issue is whether a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is maintainable against an order of a trial court refusing leave to a defendant to appear and defend in a suit under Order 37 C.P.C., when a decree has also been passed against that defendant (an option contended by one view to be displaced by an appeal from the decree).

The reference is limited to the question of competency of revision and does not decide the petition on merits. The particular petition was initially filed under Article 227 of the Constitution (as it stood prior to the 42nd Amendment), and the petitioner later applied to treat that petition as a revision petition under Section 115 C.P.C. The impugned order in the underlying suit was passed on March 14, 1974, and the Article 227 petition was filed on May 13, 1974.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether in a suit brought under Order 37 C.P.C., when a trial court refuses leave to a defendant to appear and defend and a decree is subsequently passed against that defendant, the order refusing leave to appear and defend is revisable under Section 115 C.P.C., or whether the defendant's sole remedy is to challenge the order only by filing an appeal against the decree.
  2. Whether a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution (as it then stood) can be treated as a revision petition under Section 115 C.P.C., given the facts and timing of the petition and the impugned order.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • An order refusing leave to appear and defend under Order 37 is analogous to an order under Order 23, rule 3 C.P.C., and therefore a revision petition should lie as of right.
  • Revision is a procedural remedy analogous to appeal; if a statute provides a remedy it correlates to a right to invoke it, and litigants therefore have a right to bring errors to the High Court's notice by way of revision under Section 115.
  • The High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, must be able to rectify errors falling within clauses (a), (b) or (c) of Section 115(1) C.P.C., and a litigant has the right to seek such rectification where appropriate.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Once a decree has been passed, the appropriate remedy is an appeal from the decree and not a revision; an observation by Hidayatullah, J. in S.S. Khanna suggested that where decrees are passed there would be appeals and no revision would lie.
  • Revising the order refusing leave to appear and defend would be futile because the decree would remain effective until it is set aside on appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hari Shankar and others v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 698 Illustrates the distinction between appeal and revision and supports the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction. Used to support the proposition that revisional powers are distinct and limited compared to appellate powers.
Smt. Kalwant Kaur v. Hazari Lal and another, I.L.R. (1973) II Delhi 88 Clarifies that appeal and revision are conceptually different; appeal is a right while revision is discretionary. Cited to confirm that revision is not a remedy available as of right and to explain the nature of the litigant's "right" to invoke revision.
Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1 Support for distinguishing appellate jurisdiction from revisional jurisdiction. Referred to in explaining the separate nature of revisional jurisdiction within the High Court's powers.
Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dilon, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 497 Interprets "any case which has been decided" in Section 115 and discusses scope of revisional jurisdiction. Relied upon heavily: the court took the majority view (Shah, J. and Sarkar, J.) that "case" includes parts of proceedings so revisional jurisdiction may be exercised irrespective of whether an appeal lies from the ultimate decree.
Buddhulal v. Mewa Ram, A.I.R. 1921 Allahabad 1 Represents a more restricted interpretation of "case" (disapproved by the Supreme Court majority in S.S. Khanna). Not approved; cited to contrast with the broader interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court and in the present opinion.
Jakkampati Rangiah v. Kunala Peddireddi, A.I.R. 1957 Andhra Pradesh 330 Principle that subordinate/dependent orders or decrees remain effective only so long as the earlier orders on which they depend are not reversed. Applied to hold that if the earlier order refusing leave is set aside, the consequential decree must also fall or be modified.
Shama Purshad Ray Chowdry v. Hurro Purshad Roy Chowdry, 10 Moo Ind App. 203 (Privy Council) Authority referenced for the principle that dependent orders are governed by the fate of the orders on which they depend. Used (via Jakkampati Rangiah) to support the proposition that a consequential decree will be affected if the antecedent order is reversed.
Chamber of Colours and Chemicals (P) Ltd., Delhi v. Trilok Chand Jain, 1973 D.L.T. 510 Illustrates that an appeal against an interlocutory or preliminary order, if successful, may require modification of a subsequent final order passed in the meantime. Relied on to show that a final decree cannot render an earlier interlocutory remedy (if found competent) futile.
Lachhman Singh etc. v. C.D. Taneja etc., Civil Revision No. 20 of 1973 One of the conflicting single-Judge decisions referenced (position not detailed in full in the opinion). Serves as one side of the conflict which prompted the reference to a larger bench; the judgment itself is part of the context but its reasoning is not restated in detail here.
Ramesh Chander Jain v. Sarvdeshik Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and others, Civil Revision No. 355 of 1973 The other conflicting single-Judge decision referenced (position not detailed in full in the opinion). Serves as the other side of the conflict prompting the reference; its detailed reasoning is not reproduced in this opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise fashion, grounded on the text of Section 115 C.P.C. (as amended) and relevant authorities:

  1. Section 115 was set out and its proviso and explanation examined. The court accepted that the impugned order (refusing leave to appear and defend) is not an appealable order; therefore, if Section 115 applies, a revision petition could be the appropriate remedy.
  2. The court emphasised the legal distinction between appeal and revision: an appeal ordinarily carries a right to rehearing on law and fact, whereas revision is limited to correcting jurisdictional errors or illegal or materially irregular exercises of jurisdiction (clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 115(1)). The court relied on existing Supreme Court authority (Hari Shankar etc.) and prior decisions of the Delhi High Court (Smt. Kalwant Kaur) to underline that revision is discretionary and not a remedy available as of right.
  3. The court accepted the petitioner's submission that a litigant has a corresponding right to bring an error to the High Court's notice under Section 115; but emphasised that this is not a right to file revision "as of right" — rather, a right to have alleged illegality or material irregularity considered within the time prescribed by limitation law.
  4. Interpreting the phrase "any case which has been decided" in Section 115, the court adopted the broader view (endorsed by the majority of the Supreme Court in Major S.S. Khanna). The word "case" can include parts of proceedings or orders deciding issues in the course of a suit, not merely the entire proceeding; a restricted interpretation would deny relief in situations where revisional supervision is most needed.
  5. The court considered the practical legal effect of an order refusing leave under Order 37 Rule 2 C.P.C.: that the plaint's allegations are deemed admitted and a decree follows as a consequence. Because the decree is consequential upon the earlier refusal, the earlier order falls within "any case which has been decided" for the defendant and therefore is revisable.
  6. The argument that allowing revision would be futile because a decree remains in force until set aside was rejected. The court reasoned that a decree that is consequential on an antecedent order must yield if that antecedent order is reversed; dependent orders are governed by the fate of the order on which they depend (citing Jakkampati Rangiah and the Privy Council authority).
  7. The court addressed the proviso to Section 115(1) (as recently amended). It found the impugned order did not fall under clause (a) of the proviso but did fall under clause (b) — i.e., letting the order stand would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury. Hence the proviso does not bar revision in the circumstances.
  8. The court concluded that the amendment to Section 115 and the newly added explanation (clarifying the meaning of "any case which has been decided") support the broader interpretation and do not detract from the conclusion that a revision is competent in the facts of the case.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that a revision under Section 115 C.P.C. is competent in the circumstances where a trial court refuses leave to a defendant to appear and defend a suit under Order 37 C.P.C., even though a decree has been passed consequentially.

Immediate procedural consequence: The civil revision is to be laid before a Single Judge for disposal. No costs were awarded at this stage. P.S. Safeer, J. agreed with the opinion.

Broader implications: The opinion explains and applies settled principles about the distinction between appeal and revision, the scope of Section 115 C.P.C., and the effect of dependent/consequential orders. The judgment does not expressly state any further broader policy or precedent‑setting consequences beyond its application to the present reference.

Show all summary ...

Prakash Narain, J.:— This matter comes before us on a reference made by me to a larger bench on account of a conflict of opinion between B.C Misra, J. and D.K Kapur, J. in their respective judgments deciding Civil Revision No. 20 of 1973, Lachhman Singh etc. v. C.D Taneja etc. and Civil Revision No. 355 of 1973, Ramesh Chander Jain v. Sarvdeshik Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and others. In point of time the decision of Kapur, J. was earlier than the decision of B.C Misra, J. but it seems that the decision of Kapur, J. was not brought to the notice of Misra, J.

2. The two learned Judges have differed on the question of the maintainability of a revision petition against an order of a trial Court declining leave to the defendant to appear and defend a suit under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure if a decree has also been passed against the said defendant. B.C Misra, J. is of the opinion that the mere fact that the court below at the time of or after refusing to grant leave to the defendant to appear and defend has passed a decree does not have the effect of depriving the said defendant of his right to have the order refusing leave to appear and defend revised by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction merely because a decree has been passed from which ah appeal lies. Kapur, J. on the other hand, takes the view that a decree having been passed, the order refusing leave to appear and defend cannot be revised under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and an appeal must be filed against the decree and in that appeal the tenability of the order refusing leave to appear and defend can be questioned. We are, therefore, only called upon to decide whether in a suit brought under Order 37 C.P.C if leave to appear and defend the suit is not granted to a defendant and a decree is passed, would the order of the trial Court refusing leave to appear and defend the suit be revisable or whether the defendant in such a case must file an appeal against the decree and in that appeal challenge the order refusing him leave to appear and defend the suit by either invoking the provisions of Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure or otherwise.
3. I would like to make it clear that the reference made to the larger bench is restricted only to answering the above question and not deciding the petition on merits.
4. Before I proceed to deal with the question referred to us, it will be necessary to deal with another point. The present petition was filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as it existed prior to the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution of India. In view of Article 227 of the Constitution having been amended, the petitioner has moved C.M 399 of 1977 praying that this petition may be treated as a revision petition under Section 115 C.P.C The question is whether it can be done.
5. The impugned order was passed on March 14, 1974. The petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, as then in force, was filed on May 13, 1974. So, the bar of limitation cannot be pleaded if the petition is to be treated as a revision petition under Section 115 C.P.C
6. Section 115 C.P.C as amended now reads as under: —
“115 (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears —
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity,
the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit.
7. Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where —
(a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings, or
(b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made.
(2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto.
Explanation. — In this section, the expression “any case which has been decided” include any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding”.
8. Reading the above section and since, admittedly, the impugned order is not an appealable order, if a case is made out a revision petition under Section 115 C.P.C could be filed instead of a petition under the unamended Article 227 of the Constitution. This is subject, of course, to the main question which we are called upon to decide. If that be the situation, we see no impediment in creating the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, as a revision petition under Section 115 C.P.C
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that an order like the one in question is analogous to an order passed under Order 23, rule 3 C.P.C and, therefore, a revision petition would lie as of right. He further submits that a revision is entertained by the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction and just as an appeal is a procedural remedy, so is a revision petition. The contention is that if a statute has provided a remedy it must be correlated to a right. The High Court it is submitted, has power in appeal to uphold, reverse or modify the judgment or decree or order. Similarly, the High Court has power in its revisional jurisdiction to rectify an error, if it falls within clauses (a) or (b) or (c) of Section 115 (1) C.P.C Thus, it is the right of a litigant, it is submitted, to bring the error to the notice of the High Court which then exercises its power. In short, the argument is that a litigant has a right to file a revision petition or has a right to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court either by way of the appeal or revision petition and the High Court is under duty to exercise the power conferred upon it and interfere if the circumstances so warrant.
10. In my opinion, appeals and revisions cannot be equated. There is au obvious distinction between the two. A right of appeal carries with it a right of rehearing on law as well as on fact, unless a statute conferring the right of appeal limits the rehearing only to questions of law, as has been done in the case of second appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure. In a revision the High Court is only required to satisfy itself that a particular case has been decided according to law or that a particular order does not suffer from the infirmity of having been passed without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, in denial of jurisdiction, or is otherwise not illegal or suffering from material irregularity. Indeed, revisional powers conferred upon the High Court or for that matter any other superior court or Tribunal have to be exercised within the limits of the powers conferred. In the case of Section 115 C.P.C it is restricted to exercise, non-exercise, illegal exercise or exercise with material irregularity of jurisdiction and jurisdiction alone. This distinction is well-settled and if any authority is needed, one has only to look at the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Hari Shankar and others v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, A.I.R .1963 Supreme Court 698 (1).
11. I am inclined to agree with the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner that if the power has been conferred upon the High Court to revise orders of courts inferior to it, as postulated by Section 115 C.P.C, there is a corresponding right in a litigant to bring to the notice of the High Court any error committed by the inferior court and to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere under Section 115 C.P.C if the circumstances of the case so warrant. But that does not mean that a revision petition can be filed as of right. The right is only to bring an “error” to the notice of the High Court. In. Smt. Kalwant Kaur v. Hazari Lal and another, I.L.R (1973) II Delhi 88 (2), a bench of this court, to which I was a party, clearly pointed out the distinction between an appeal and a revision and also laid down what was the nature of the right in invoking the revisional jurisdiction conferred by Section 115 C.P.C As was observed in that case: —
“It may be true that in invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court the aggrieved party may be asking the court to exercise its appellate powers but the concept of appeal and revision in the Code of Civil Procedure are wholly different. The nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court does not place the two proceedings at par to justify the assumption that an appeal is the same as a revision . . . . . . Further it will also be seen that while ordinarily an appeal is continuation of a suit this is not true in case of a revision . . . . . Appeal can be filed as of right but revision is a discretionary remedy depending on the facts of the case. The scope of interference by the High Court in the two proceedings is also not the same . . . . . .”
In view of the above rule of law, it has to be held that there is an independent right with a litigant to file an appeal but there is no right as such to file a revision petition. There is, however, a right to bring an illegality or material irregularity to the notice of the High Court which in its turn would exercise the power conferred upon it, as warranted by the circumstances of the case. The right to invoke the jurisdiction of the court under Section 115 C.P.C may be invoked not at any time but only within the period stipulated by Article 131 of the Limitation Act.
12. The various authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention that the provisions of Order 37, rule 3 C.P.C are analogous to the provisions of Order 23, rule 3 C.P.C need not be noticed in view of my conclusion about the nature of .the right in a litigant to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C The High Court's revisional jurisdiction is no doubt a part and parcel of the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court but ail the same the nature of the two jurisdictions, namely, the appellate and the revisional, have to be distinguished, as noticed earlier. (See Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat, A.I.R 1970 Supreme Court 1) (3).
The crux of the problem is what is the scope of Section 115 C.P.C That section has already been read earlier. As was observed in Major S.S Khanna v. Brig. F.J Dilon, A.I.R 1964 Supreme Court 497 (4), Section 115 C.P.C consists of two pails, namely, one prescribing the conditions in which jurisdiction of the High Court arises, i.e there is a case decided by a subordinate court in which no appeal lies to the High Court and the other which sets out the circumstances in which the jurisdiction may be exercised. The power of the High Court is exercisable in respect of “any case which has been decided.” The expression “case” is not defined in the Code nor in the General Clauses Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed that meaning of this expression must be sought in die nature of the jurisdiction conferred by Section 115 C.P.C and the purpose for which the High Courts were invested with it. According to the views of Shah, J. and Sarkar, J.,: “The expression ‘case’ is a word of comprehensive import: it includes civil proceedings other than suits, and is not restricted by anything contained in the section to the entirety of the proceeding in a civil court. To interpret the expression ‘case’, as an entire proceeding only and not a part of a proceeding would be to impose a restriction upon the exercise of powers of superintendence which the jurisdiction to issue writs, and the supervisory jurisdiction are not subject, and may result in certain cases in denying relief to an aggrieved litigant where it is most needed, and may result in the preparation of gross injustice.” Their Lordships did not approve of the restricted view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Buddhulal v. Mewa Ram, A.I.R 1921 Allahabad 1 (5). Therefore, it the impugned order is one which falls within the ambit of the phrase “any case which has been decided” it would be revisable.
13. The next question which arises is whether the High Court has power to set aside an order which does not finally dispose of the suit and when from the decree or from the final order passed in the proceedings an appeal is competent. In the present case the order revising to grant leave to appear and defend did not finally dispose of the suit and an appeal is competent from the decree that has been passed, but it must be kept in view that the effect of the impugned order is as given in clause (2) of Order 37, rule 2 C.P.C, namely that in case leave to defend and appear is not granted, the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted. Therefore, an order like the present one has far-reaching consequences and would clearly fall within the ambit of the phrase “any case which has been decided” for as far as the defendant is concerned, the controversy has really come to an end. If that is the correct proposition and if the expression “case” includes a part of a case, then, as was observed in S.S Khanna's case by the Supreme Court, “there is no escape from the conclusion that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court may be exercised irrespective of the question whether an appeal lies from the ultimate decree or order passed in a suit.” In my view the only interpretation that one can give is that in the present case irrespective of the decree that has been passed, a revision is competent.
14. On behalf of the respondents reliance has been placed on an observation of Hidayatullah, J. (as his lordship then was) in the case of S.S Khanna, mentioned above which is, “if the trial Judge had dismissed the suits and passed decrees, there would undoubtedly have been “appeals and no revision would lie”. In my view the reliance on this observation is misplaced. In the context in which this observation was made, it could not be said that the learned Judge was disagreeing with the majority view in S.S Khanna's case. Even if it could be said that the view of Hidayatullah, J. is different, then I say with respect that it is the minority view.
15. In view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court, I consider it unnessary to dilate upon the correctness or otherwise of the views expressed in various cases cited by learned counsel.
16. It has been urged on behalf of the respondent that there is one other important reason why it should be held that in a case like the present one a revision is not competent and the petitioner's only remedy is to file an appeal against the decree. The argument is that a decree once passed remains effective till set aside and so, revising the order by which leave to appear and defend has been refused would be an exercise in futility because the decree will still subsist. There is a fallacy in this contention. When leave is refused to the defendant to appear and defend a suit under Order 37 C.P.C, the effect of the refusal of leave to appear and defend is that the allegations in the plaint by a deeming provision stand admitted. The allegations in the plaint being admitted, a decree has to follow. This means that the decree follows as a consequence of the earlier order of refusal to grant leave to appear and defend. In my opinion, when a subsequent order, even if it be a decree, is a consequential order to an earlier order and the earlier order is set aside the latter order must also fall and directions to that effect have to be given. In Jakkampati Rangiah v. Kunala Peddireddi, A.I.R 1957 Andhra Pradesh 330 (6), Subba Rao, C.J (as his lordship then was) observed following the dicta of the Privy Council in Shama Purshad Ray Chowdry v. Hurro Purshad Roy Chowdry, 10 Moo Indian Appeal 203 (7) observed: “It is a well-settled principle of law that certain orders and decrees which are subordinate and dependant upon earlier orders and decrees could only remain in force so long as the order or decree on which they were dependent are not reversed or superseded.” The same view was expressed by S.N Andley, C.J in The Chamber of Colours and Chemicals (P) Ltd., Delhi v. Trilok Chand Jain, 1973 D.L.T 510 (8). His lordship observed, construing the effect of Section 38 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, observed that “it cannot be doubted that the appeal when filed was competent; if so, it cannot be rendered incompetent merely because a final order has been passed. If the appeal against the order under sub-section (7) of Section 15 which may be described as an interlocutory order or even as a preliminary order succeeds the final order even if passed in the mean time will have to be suitably modified.” I, therefore, hold that if the impugned order is reversed or modified the consequential order or decree will also have to be modified or directions will have to be given that the same is of no effect.
17. There is another aspect which I may advert to and that is the effect of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 115 C.P.C added by the recent amendment to Section 115 C.P.C
18. Obviously, the impugned order in this case does not fall under clause (a) of the Proviso. In my opinion it, however, does fall under clause (b). It will be a great failure of justice if revision is barred at the threshold on account of the proviso because under Order 37 Rule 2 the effect of refusal to grant leave to appear and defend can be the automatic passing of a decree against the defendant. I should not be taken to mean that I am making any observations on the merits as to whether the impugned order should or should not have been passed by the trial Court. The above observations are being made by me only in the context of the competency of the revision petition. The amendment to Section 115 C.P.C, therefore, does not detract from the principles enunciated above. Indeed, it will be worth noticing that the explanation to the newly added sub-section (2) of Section 115 C.P.C makes it clear that the expression “any case which has been decided” is to be given the meaning which their Lordships of the Supreme Court had given to the phrase in S.S Khanna's case.
19. The result is that I am of the opinion that the revision in the circumstances of the case is competent. The civil revision be now laid before a Single Judge for disposal. No costs at this stage.
P.S Safeer, J. — I agree.
Ordered accordingly.