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Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. Petitioners v. Municipal Corporation Of Delhi And Others S
Judgment Summary — S. Rangarajan, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner is The Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd., which filed a writ petition on 9-5-1967 under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking to quash two notices of demand issued on 31-12-1966 by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (respondent No.1) through the Assistant Assessor & Collector (respondent No.2). The principal demand was Rs. 29,13,170.56 for electricity tax alleged to be leviable under section 113 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 for the period 1-7-1959 to 31-3-1966. The Union of India was impleaded as respondent No.3; respondents 1 and 2 contested the petition.
Background: In February–June 1959 the Corporation passed resolutions (and obtained Central Government sanction with modifications) purporting to levy taxes on consumption/sale of electricity from 1-7-1959. The petitioner previously litigated aspects of this levy in writ petitions and appeals (including C.W. 291-D of 1960 and related L.P.A. proceedings). Parliament later enacted the Delhi Municipal Corporation (Validation of Electricity Tax) Act No. 35 of 1966 (Validation Act), which purported to validate the levy from 1-7-1959 to 31-3-1966. Fresh demands followed and the petitioner made a representation on 27-1-1967 contesting the rate charged for electricity consumed in its Caustic Soda Plant (claiming the lower "electro-chemical" rate applied).
Procedural course: The petitioner received an unsatisfactory response from the Corporation's electrical department and, having received no further rectification, filed the present writ petition on 9-5-1967. The petition was heard with factual inquiry (including appointment of a Commissioner to inspect the factory and review meter records) and with consideration of prior related writs and appeals concerning the levy and the Validation Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the notices of demand (dated 31-12-1966) for electricity tax should be quashed or restrained from enforcement under Article 226, given the petitioner's contention that the assessment was excessive.
- Whether energy generated by the petitioner and consumed in its Caustic Soda Plant qualifies as consumption for an "electro-chemical industry" and therefore attracts a lower rate (1/3 Paise per unit) rather than the higher rate (3/4 Paise per unit).
- Whether the High Court should entertain the writ petition when statutory remedies of appeal under Sections 169 and 170 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act exist (i.e., maintainability of the writ without first filing the statutory appeal).
- Whether the present writ petition is barred by res judicata or the doctrine of constructive res judicata because of earlier related proceedings (notably C.W. 104 of 1967 and other writs challenging the validity of the levy or Section 150 of the Act).
- Whether the statutory scheme requires an opportunity to be heard (audi alteram partem) before the Corporation issues or enforces a demand for an optional tax like electricity consumption.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The notices of demand are excessive in that electricity consumed in the Caustic Soda Plant is part of an electro-chemical process and should be taxed at 1/3 Paise per unit rather than at 3/4 Paise per unit.
- The petitioner had been submitting month-wise returns (Form D.1) to the Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (D.E.S.U.) showing separate consumption for the Caustic Soda Plant and other plants; the D.E.S.U. had accepted those returns and had at times pressed for their timely submission.
- The petitioner made a formal representation on 27-1-1967 about excessive assessment; no substantive inquiry was conducted by respondents into that representation.
- Earlier proceedings challenged the constitutional validity of the Validation Act and Section 150; those proceedings and the circumstances (including judicial stays and conflicting outcomes) justified proceeding under Article 226 rather than pursuing the statutory appeals.
- Factual proof (meter-reading records, Commissioner’s inspection, and authoritative literature) established that the Caustic Soda Plant is an electro-chemical industry and that separate metering and returns were maintained.
- The petitioner asked alternatively that the notices be amended or the assessments be heard and determined after inquiry — relief which was sought in the petition if quashing was not granted.
Respondents' Arguments
- The writ petition is not maintainable because the petitioner failed to file the statutory appeal available under Sections 169 and 170 of the Act.
- The present petition is barred by res judicata/constructive res judicata because prior litigation (C.W. 104 of 1967 and related matters) raised related issues and could have included the present complaint about excessive assessment.
- The respondents denied receipt of the disputed documentary returns (photostat copies) and asserted that the original documents were not on their record.
- The respondents disputed that the Caustic Soda Plant qualified as an "electro-chemical" plant entitled to the lower tariff rate.
- Respondents suggested that the petitioner should be put to proof of the documentary evidence which the respondents contended they did not possess.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills (1968) 3 SCR 251 | Used as contextual and procedural background regarding similar writ petitions against the levy. | The judgment was referred to for succinctly stating facts and noting that the petitioner's judgment followed the Birla Mills judgment; it formed part of the factual/procedural matrix. |
| Government of Mysore v. J.V. Bhat & Others (decided 14-10-1974, reported 1975 1 S.C.C. 111) | Authority for reading the requirement of audi alteram partem into statutes where silence exists and nothing prohibits hearing; emphasis on justice and fairness. | The court relied on this decision to hold that the respondents had a duty to consider the petitioner's representation about excessive assessment and that an inquiry could be read into the statutory scheme. |
| King v. Electricity Commissioner (1924) 1 K.B. 171 | Discussed in the context of historical development of the audi alteram partem principle. | The decision was cited (via explanation in Government of Mysore) to show continuity of law on fairness requirements; used to support inference that a hearing is appropriate where statute is silent. |
| Cooper v. Board of Works for the Wandsworth District (14 C.B. (N.S.) 180) | Early articulation of the general principle of giving a person an opportunity to answer before a decision affecting him is made. | Referred to as part of the lineage of audi alteram partem authority; the court used related reasoning to infer a duty to inquire into the petitioner's representation. |
| Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. D.P. Dube (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 549) | Explains the scope of Article 226 jurisdiction where statutory appeal remedies exist — High Court normally refrains but may intervene for constitutional issues, jurisdictional error, serious procedural errors, or where taxing authority threatens recovery on erroneous interpretation. | The court invoked these principles to justify entertaining the petition under Article 226 despite the availability of statutory appeals in appropriate circumstances. |
| New Delhi Holy Family Hospital Society v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (C.W. 1114/71) (decided 12-12-1973) | Principle that availability of alternative remedy is a matter of discretion (not jurisdiction) and the High Court may decline jurisdiction in suitable cases; consideration of onerous conditions attached to appeals (e.g., deposit requirement). | The decision was relied upon to show that the onerous condition of depositing disputed amounts under Section 170 may justify recourse to Article 226 without pursuing the statutory appeal. |
| Himatlal Hiralal Mehta v. State of M.P. & Ors. (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 403) | Authority referenced concerning recourse to Article 226 where statutory remedies are onerous or inadequate. | Used to support the court's view that Article 226 may be invoked without exhausting statutory appeals in appropriate circumstances. |
| Desh Bandhu Gupta & Co. v. Judge Small Cause Courts (C.M. No. 161/72) (decided 31-10-1973) | Decision of the court (cited by the judge) discussing limits on exercising Article 226 jurisdiction notwithstanding alternative remedies. | Referred to for the proposition that limitations on jurisdiction are self-imposed and that interference under Article 226 may be proper in suitable cases. |
| Daryao v. State of U.P. & Others (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1457) | Considered the applicability of res judicata (including in writ proceedings) and discussed the doctrine's object (finality/minimising litigation) and limits. | The court relied on Daryao's analysis to examine whether constructive res judicata barred the petition; it used Daryao's distinctions (e.g., speaking orders, finality) to reject the respondents' plea here. |
| Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P. (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1621) | Followed Daryao on res judicata principles in constitutional/writ contexts. | Referenced in the court's review of res judicata authorities to frame limitations on applying res judicata to writ petitions. |
| Naresh v. State of Maharashtra (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1) | Authority on inappropriateness of applying res judicata to decisions affecting fundamental rights without careful consideration. | Used in the court's discussion to show caution in applying res judicata principles to writ petitions involving constitutional rights. |
| Ghulam Sarwar v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1335) | Distinguished Daryao and considered limits of res judicata when prior dismissal did not address certain constitutional questions or when an order is not a 'speaking order'. | Invoked to demonstrate that res judicata does not automatically bar subsequent writs where prior proceedings did not decide the relevant issues on merits. |
| Virudhunagar Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. v. Government of Madras (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1196) | Explained the effect of a dismissal in limine and whether that constitutes a bar by res judicata depending on whether a speaking order on merits was given. | Used by the court to support the proposition that a summary dismissal may not create res judicata where no reasoned decision on the merits exists. |
| Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. Janapada Sabha Chhindwara & Others (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1013) | Held that the principle of constructive res judicata is a special/artificial form and suggested it should not apply to writ petitions. | Cited as authority resisting the blanket application of constructive res judicata to writ proceedings; court weighed it against contrary authorities. |
| Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer (A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1150) | Applied constructive res judicata to prevent successive writs raising new grounds about the same assessment period; emphasised preventing piecemeal litigation. | The court distinguished Devilal Modi on the facts and used it to explain limits of successive challenges for the same period; nevertheless, the court found Devilal does not control the present case's outcome. |
| Union of India v. Nanak Singh (A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1370) | Discussed extension of res judicata principles where an 'express decision' in prior writ could bar subsequent proceedings. | Referred to in analysing whether prior express decisions could bar the petition; court treated the "express decision" principle as distinct from constructive res judicata. |
| Kameswar Pershad v. Rajkumari Ruttan Koer & Others (I.L.R. 20 Cal. 79) | Explained that the test for "ought" (in the "might and ought" formulation of Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC) is cumulative and that a matter that would be inconsistent with or destructive of the previous title need not have been raised. | Quoted to support the court's conclusion that the petitioner "ought" not to have been expected to raise excessive-assessment grounds in earlier constitutional challenges to the taxing power. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a step-by-step manner combining factual findings with legal analysis:
-
Factual inquiry and evidence:
- The court summarised the legislative and administrative events: the Corporation's resolution(s) under Section 150, Central Government sanction with rate modifications effective 1-7-1959, the Corporation's determination of actual rates, and subsequent demands based on those actions.
- It considered the petitioner's documentary evidence (monthly Form D.1 returns, meter reading books, covering letters and annexures), inspection by an appointed Commissioner and a contemporaneous slip in DESU meter reading books showing separate figures for "Caustic" and "Other plant." The Commissioner’s inspection described separate feeders and KWH meters, regular meter-reading practice, monthly reconciliation and submission of Form D.1 to DESU.
- The court also accepted expert/technical literature presented by petitioner showing that caustic soda production is an electro-chemical industry, supporting the petitioner's classification argument.
-
On the requirement of a hearing (audi alteram partem):
- The court observed there is no express provision in the statutory Chapter VIII requiring a hearing before a demand for an optional tax like electricity consumption is made. However, relying on Government of Mysore v. J.V. Bhat and the established principle of fairness, the court held that where the statute is silent and nothing prohibits a hearing, an opportunity to be heard may be read into the statute.
- Accordingly, when the petitioner made a representation about excessive assessment, the respondents had a duty to inquire; the court found they failed to do so.
-
On maintainability (failure to exhaust statutory appeal):
- The court rejected the respondents' contention that the writ petition was impermissible because the petitioner had not filed an appeal under Sections 169/170. The court gave multiple reasons:
- Related writ petitions (e.g., C.W. 104/67 challenging the Validation Act and earlier petitions) were pending or had been filed; the litigation context and prior stays/decisions made appealing not the only or reasonable route.
- The petitioner had made a representation on 27-1-1967 which was not inquired into, leading to the filing of the present petition.
- At one stage the tax was declared invalid by a bench of the Punjab High Court (on 10-12-1964) and recovery had been stayed; the Validation Act affected the legal status only later.
- Section 170-B required deposit of the disputed amount with an appeal — an onerous condition which, along with other factors, justified recourse to Article 226.
- Authorities (Bhopal Sugar and New Delhi Holy Family) were invoked to show Article 226 may be used where constitutional questions, jurisdictional errors, or onerous appeal conditions exist.
- The court rejected the respondents' contention that the writ petition was impermissible because the petitioner had not filed an appeal under Sections 169/170. The court gave multiple reasons:
-
On res judicata/constructive res judicata:
- The respondents raised the plea of constructive res judicata belatedly in an affidavit; the court found procedural impropriety in injecting the plea at that stage and analysed the legal merits.
- The court considered relevant Supreme Court precedents (Daryao, Ghulam Sarwar, Virudhunagar, Amalgamated Coalfields, Devilal Modi, Nanak Singh) and the Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC ("might and ought") to determine whether excessive-assessment grounds should have been raised in earlier writs challenging the power to tax.
- Applying the "might and ought" test (cumulative), the court concluded it was not reasonable to expect the petitioner to raise excessive-assessment grounds in a earlier petition that challenged the constitutionality of the statute empowering the tax. The court emphasised distinctions between an "express decision" and "constructive res judicata" as applied to writs and noted that dismissal in limine without a speaking order may not produce a res judicata bar.
- Therefore, the court rejected the res judicata/constructive res judicata objection to the present writ petition.
-
Credibility of documentary proof and conduct of respondents:
- The court accepted that the petitioner had been regularly submitting Form D.1 returns and that DESU had both requested and accepted monthly statistics, sometimes warning of prosecution for failure to supply them. Given the course of conduct, the court held respondents were not in a position to deny the returns at this late stage.
- Because respondents denied the existence of records and resisted the petition on that basis, the court found them disentitled (by their conduct) to fairly adjudicate on whether returns had been sent or whether the Caustic Soda plant attracted the lower tariff.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court accepted the Writ Petition and granted relief on the bases described below.
Direct ruling and relief ordered:
- The impugned notices of demand (copies at Annexures E & F) were quashed to the extent they were in excess of the amounts admitted by the petitioner.
- The respondents and their agents were restrained from collecting any tax at a rate higher than 1/3 Paise per Kwhr for energy generated by the petitioner and consumed in the Caustic Soda plant, as claimed by the petitioner.
- The petitioner was awarded costs, including counsel fee of Rs. 500 (Rupees Five Hundred only).
Implications: The decision directly affected the parties by (a) quashing the excessive portion of the demands; (b) restraining collection above the lower rate for the Caustic Soda plant; and (c) awarding costs. The court's reasoning relied on factual findings about separate metering and regular returns, on reading a duty to inquire (audi alteram partem) into the statutory scheme where appropriate, and on established authorities delimiting the application of res judicata in writ proceedings. The opinion applied established principles rather than announcing a novel binding precedent.
Petition accepted.
S. Rangarajan, J.:— The petitioner is the Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd., which filed this petition on 9-5-1967, under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notices of demand served on behalf of respondent No. 1 (Municipal Corporation of Delhi) by respondent No. 2 (Assistant Assessor & Collector of the Corporation), to restrain them from enforcing the aforementioned notices of demand or to collect the amount specified therein in any manner, and alternatively, to direct amendment of the said notices of demand (copies of which are Annexures E and F to the petition) by hearing and determining them. The demand dated 31-12-1966 is for a sum of Rs. 29,13,170.56 P. due on account of electricity tax on energy generated by the petitioner, leviable under section 113 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, for the period 1-7-1959 to 31-3-66. The Union of India has been impleaded as the third respondent but this petition has been contested by respondents 1 and 2.
2. It will be necessary to notice a few facts which have been succinctly stated in the judgment of K.N Wanchoo, C.J in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills (1968) 3 SCR 251) (1). There were similar Writ Petitions filed by the petitioner as well as the Birla Mills; the judgment in the case filed by the petitioner followed the judgment rendered in the above case. On the 9th of February, 1959 the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (hereinafter called the Corporation passed a resolution purporting to be under-sub-section 1 of Section 150 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (66 of 1957) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for levy of three taxes including a tax on consumption of sale of electricity. Section 113 of the Act which confers powers on the Corporation to impose taxes divided them into two kinds, namely, obligatory taxes and optional taxes which may be imposed under sub-sections (1) and (2) respectively, of Section 113 of the Act. Section 150 (1) of the Act provides that the maximum rate of tax to be levied in the case of optional taxes (tax on generation of electricity is an optional tax) will be specified by a resolution of the Corporation. After the maximum rate which has thus been specified, the resolution has to be submitted to the Central Government for sanction under Section 150 (2) of the Act and if sanctioned by the Government, the rate comes into force on and from such date as may be specified in the order of sanction. Subsequently the Corporation passed another resolution under sub-section (3) of section 150 determining the actual rates at which the tax is levied and the tax comes into force on the first day of the quarter of the year next following the date on which such second resolution is passed. The Corporation forwarded the resolution, dated 9th February, 1959 which was somewhat defective, to the Government for sanction. The Central Government sanctioned, on 20th June, 1959 the tax on consumption or sale of electricity with effect from 1st July, 1959 with certain modifications regarding the rates. On 23rd June, 1959 the Standing Committee took the Government sanction into consideration and recommended to the Corporation the rates of tax as sanctioned by Government for being determined under sub-section (3) of section 150 as the actual rates at which the tax would be leviable for the year 1959-60. On 24th June, 1959 the Corporation resolved that the recommendations of the Standing Committee regarding tax on consumption or sale of electricity be approved. Then followed demands by the Corporation on the basis of the imposition of tax from 1st July, 1959.
3. When the tax was demanded from the petitioner it filed a Writ Petition (Civil Writ No. 291-D of 1960) on the file of the Punjab High Court challenging the levy of the tax and the same was dismissed by a learned single Judge on 27-2-1963. The appeal (L.P.A 47-D of 1963) against the said decision was allowed by a Division Bench on 10-12-1964 holding, inter alia, (i) that the Central Government could not modify the rates specified in the resolution under Section 150 (1), but could only either withhold sanction thereto or sanction them, and (ii) that the liability to pay tax could not commence earlier than 1st April, 1960 in view of the provisions contained in Section 109 (2) read with Section 150 (4) of the Act. On 3-12-1966 the Parliament passed the Delhi Municipal Corporation (Validation of Electricity Tax) Act No. 35 of 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Validation Act). But this Act, it purported to validate the levy of electricity tax from 1-7-1959 to 31-3-1966 (both days inclusive). In view of the Validation Act fresh demands were made by the Corporation. On 31-12-1966 two notices of demand, as noticed above, were issued by the Corporation. With reference to those notices of demand a representation was made by the petitioner on 27-1-1967 pointing out that the electricity tax at the rate of 3/4 paise per unit in respect of the energy consumed in its Caustic Soda Plant instead of 1/3 Paise per unit was excessive. This letter was replied to by the Assistant Engineer (MR) of the Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking of the Corporation on 20-3-1967 (copy of which, subject to certain errors is Annexure ‘J’ to the rejoinder). By the said letter the petitioner was asked to furnish (1) month-wise breakup of the energy generated utilised for electro-chemical purpose and for other purposes, (2) source of bifurcation of energy consumed under two heads, (3) whether the data had been supplied in detail every month concerning such information, and (4) whether the points of higher rate was ever represented to the Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking. The petitioner replied (vide its letter dated 4-4-1967, copy of which is Annexure K to the rejoinder) stating that the High Court had already been moved (on 30-1-67 in C.W 104, of 1967) challenging the levy of electricity tax without prejudice to those contentions the information sought for was given as follows.
(1) Month-wise break-up of the energy generated and utilised for electrochemical purpose (Caustic Soda) and for other purposes during the period from 1-7-59 to 31-3-66 given a separate annexure.
(2) They had separate feeders for electrochemical plant (Caustic Soda) and other plants and separate meters were provided for purposes of ascertaining the power consumed in each plant. The units consumed in a particular month were being allocated on the basis of the meter readings.
(3) The data had been supplied to the D.E.S.U in detail every month while submitting the statistical information return to D.E.S.U
(4) Right from the beginning and even now they have been contesting the validity of this levy and this fact had been brought to the notice of D.E.S.U time and again.
4. Since the petitioner got no reply the D.E.S.U was reminded by their letter, dated 12-4-1967 (copy of which is Annexure L to the rejoinder) with the request that the demand may be corrected. Not having heard from the D.E.S.U the present Writ Petition was filed, as noticed already, on 9-5-1967.
5. is necessary to notice at this stage that C.W 104 of 1967, filed on 30-1-67, had challenged the validity of the Validation Act and as a result to quash the arrears of tax of electricity for the period 1-7-1959 to 31-3-1966. No ground had been taken therein concerning the fact that the rate of tax for electricity consumed for the Caustic Soda plant was excessive, as noticed above. Even earlier to the said writ Petition C.W 291-D of 1960 had been filed by the petitioner challenging in the Punjab High Court the resolution of the Corporation, dated 23-6-1959 which was dismissed by the learned single Judge on 27-2-1963, but the L.P.A against the same was allowed by a Division Bench on 10-2-1964. The Validation Act came earlier the present petition was filed (on 9-5-1967). The earlier Writ Petition (C.W 586-D of 1960) challenging the constitutional validity of Section 150 of the Act was filed on grounds of excessive delegation; the same had been filed as early as on 18-7-66 and had not been disposed of.
6. By an application (CM. 3106 of 1967) in this Writ Petition a request was made that Civil Writ Petition No. 104 of 1967, which had been listed along with C.W 563-D of 1966 should be heard along with this Writ Petition because in all of them the constitutional validity of the portion of the Municipal Corporation Act had been challenged. This application was presented on behalf of the petitioner on 13-7-1967 but by order, dated 14-7-1967 a Division Bench of this Court held that the cases which were ready must be heard without delay and that C.W 503 of 1967 should be heard as soon at it became ready and hence it need not be tacked on to the earlier cases. It was against the common judgment in C.W 104 of 1967 and C.W 563-D of 1966 that the appeal was preferred by the Corporation and the Supreme Court held, by a majority, that the Validation Act validly imposed taxes on consumption of sale of electricity till 31-3-1966; the appeals were accordingly allowed.
7. Before noticing the various grounds on which the present petition has been resisted it is necessary to clear the ground concerning the manner in which the readings have been taken by the D.E.S.U and the returns, if any, submitted by the petitioner. While hearing arguments on 21-1-1975 it was debated whether there was a single meter at the Chemical Works or whether there were other meters or sub-meters recording consumption of electrical energy separately for the Caustic Soda Plant. Mr. D.D Chawla, learned counsel for the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, suggested that a person might be appointed by this Court who should proceed to the factory premises without loss of time to find out the actual position. Mr. V.M Tarkunde, learned counsel for the petitioner, agreed to this course almost immediately after taking instructions. Mr. R.C Beri, Advocate who was present in Court and was willing to be appointed as Commissioner for this purpose, was appointed and his fee (Rs. 500/-) directed to be paid by the petitioner with a direction that it would be costs in the case. Mr. D.D Chawla also handed over at about the same time the meter reading books of the D.E.S.U for connection No. OG/8 (said to be the current-meter of the connection concerned). I found on perusing them that there was a slip posted on one of them on the page where the entries for July, 1961 had been made containing the following words:
“For Caustic 3983058
Other plant 1951202”
followed by the words indicating that the total mill generation was 4914080, which was seen to tally with the figures which had been submitted with the return by the petitioner for the concerned period.
8. The Commissioner inspected the factory premises on the same day in the presence of representatives of both sides and submitted a report explaining the position based on the statements made to him by the representatives of the petitioner and the D.E.S.U He had asked for the system of generation, distribution and internal meter reading arrangement to be explained to him. These meters have been tested in July 1960 by Shri S.K Basu, the present Additional Chief Engineer, D.E.S.U The plant had one generator of 10,000 KW capacity and one small generator of 2500 KW capacity. The power is generated and fed into a 11,000 Volts Distribution Busbar from which separate main feeding lines at 11,000 Volts are going to various plants like Vanaspati, Caustic Soda, Fertiliser, Chemicals, Power Plant Auxiliary and factory lighting. Caustic Soda being a bulk load (7 MW. out of total generation out of 12 MW.) there were three feeders running for the entire Caustic Soda Plant. The main Distribution Feeders had their own individual KWH. meters. The reading of these meters was taken every 8 hours and at the end of the day the same was tallied with the sum total of the distributed KWH to the generated KWH. The production efficiency of every product was worked out on the basis of units consumed by the respective plants. Separate registers were maintained wherein all the meter readings as well as units supplied to every plant were recorded. At the end of every month a statement was sent to D.E.S.U in Form D.1 Those meters were not sealed by D.E.S.U but it was explained by the petitioner's representative Shri Dattaroy that even though the meters were not sealed the DESU was accepting their statements submitted every month. It was pointed out by Shri Ahuja, Assistant Engineer of DESU, that only those meters being sealed by DESU, were checked and approved by DESU, the Inspector noting the meter readings of both the meters and comparison of statements submitted by the consumers with those of units generated and noted by the Inspector etc. These were explained to him as mentioned in the report. There were more than one meter (which was sealed by DESU). Statements were made by the petitioner concerning the various readings; in case of discrepancy the consumer was asked to re-examine the statement and amend the same. The DESU was not taking meter readings at all earlier; this practice started only for the past two years.
9. A petition had been filed by the petitioner (C.M 63-W of 1975) for taking on record the photostat copies which had been filed along with C.M 1604 of 1974 etc. They have not been made available to the petitioner by the DESU for inspection. The photostat copies pertain to the monthly statements sent by the petitioner to DESU showing separately, inter alia, the distribution of electricity to the Caustic Soda Plant and the other plants separately and giving the total of the two plus the electricity purchased from the DESU etc. The DESU was supplied the necessary statistics in Form D-1 (for instance annexure XIV) along with a covering letter (for instance annexure XIII); it is needless to refer to others. Every one of those statements was sent along with a covering letter (all the annexures with their covering letters have been marked as Annexures XIII to L. The covering letters stated that the statements were in form D-1).
10. It is instructive to notice the following details pertaining to the submission of those returns which go to show that the returns were being sent regularly; if any of them had not been sent in time the DESU was asking for it. Annexure 1 (at p. 213 of the record) is a letter dated 24-4-1962 addressed from the DESU to the DCM Chemical Works (a unit of the petitioner company) stating that in order to assess the energy generated for taxation it is obligatory for the petitioner to supply to DESU office the information on Form D.1 regularly and within 15 days of the close of the month; there was a further assertion that the statements in respect of March and April 1962 had not been received in their office and that if the same were not received within 10 days of the receipt of the said communication it would be treated as an offence under section 465 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. The next important communication is Annexure II dated 30-8-1962 (at page 214 of the record) from the DESU to the petitioner referring to the fact of the monthly statistics of generation in Form D.1 not having been sent for the period July 1962 which indicates that by that time in pursuance of the earlier communication referred to above the returns of March 1962 to April 1962 had been sent probably by May and June 1962 also. This would be clear from Annexure III the reply thereto by the petitioner to the DESU enclosing the statement for the month of June 1963.
11. On the basis of these Annexures which have not been seriously controverted by Shri D.D Chawla before me (except to say that the record of the DESU was not available) it is a fair inference that the petitioner had been disclosing separately the consumption for the Caustic Soda Plant separately and the other consumption of electricity separately out of what was generated by the petitioner during the period in question.
12. Since it was not admitted to start with that the Caustic Soda Plant was an electro chemical industry the learned counsel for the petitioner referred me to the following works on the subject. In the “Encyclopaedia of Electro Chemistry” edited by Hampel published by Reinhold Publishing Corporation, New York, on page 172, it is mentioned as follows:
“Chlorine industry, also called the chloralkali or chlorine — caustic industry, produces the two greatest tonnage products of the electro chemical industry, chlorine and caustic soda (sodium hydroxide or NaOH) “.
13. In the book entitled “electrochemistry”, Vol. II, 2nd Edition, published by John Willey & Sons, Inc., New York there is the following Chapter X entitled the “Electrolysis of Alkali Halides” at page 275:
“All the alkali halides can be decomposed by the electrolysis of their aqueous solutions or of then fused salts, but only the electrolysis of sodium chloride and to a much lesser extent of potassium chloride has attained commercial importance. The electrolysis of sodium chloride is a very important electro-chemical industry.”
14. In the book entitled “The chemical Process Industries” by R. Norris Shreve published by Mc. Graw Mills Book Company Omc. 1945 Edition, on page 300 in table 2 comprising of “chemicals and Metals Made Electrochemically” it is clearly stated that caustic soda is produced electro-chemically, making it abundantly clear that caustic soda-chlorine production is an electrochemical industry. Similarly in the book entitled ‘Industrial Electro-chemistry’ by C.L Mental Ph. D., 2nd Ed. 7th impression published by McGraw Hill Book Company Ltd., New York 1940 on page 613 in table LXXIV entitled “Energy consumption of Electrochemical Products”, caustic soda is mentioned as an electrochemical product. It, therefore, follows that manufacture of caustic soda is an electro-chemical industry.
15. In the light of such overwhelming literature indicating that caustic soda plant is electrochemical industry. Mr. D.D Chawla could not being himself to dispute this fact seriously.
16. The facts which are thus fairly clear are that the consumption of electricity by the elector chemical industry of the petitioner, out of electricity generated by it, is liable to tax only at a rate of 1/3 Paise per unit as distinguished from 3/4 Paise per unit for the electricity consumed by other plants and that the petitioner had been sending these returns regularly during the period in question to the DESU on Form D-1 and that whenever there was some delay in sending the same the DESU had been enforcing submission of such returns on pain of prosecution.
17. In the affidavit which was filed on behalf of MCD by Shri Basu Dev on 17-1-1975 in reply to C.M 63-W of 1975 it was stated that the disputed documents (of which photostat copies have been filed) were not received in the Corporation office.
18. The respondents put the petitioner to proof of documents which they want to be now placed on record on the ground that the original of those documents were not received. By a further affidavit of the same date Shri Basu Dev stated that he had brought to the Court all the files, describing the files, of which inspection was given to the counsel of the petitioner. There was a further statement that there was no other file/record with the respondents relating to the above. There is no prohibition in the matter of going into even disputed questions of fact especially in a case especially where true facts can be ascertained without much difficulty in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Even a bare narration, like what has been admitted above of what happened in this case, is sufficient to indicate that during the relevant period the petitioners had been submitting the returns in the prescribed Form D.1 and that no objection at all had been taken throughout to the correctness of the figures regarding consumption of electricity given separately for the Caustic Soda plant and the other plants for which there are two different tarrifs as noticed above. The figures were being supplied by the petitioners and were being accepted by the DESU. It does not behove them to say, at this late stage, that the petitioners should prove strictly the amount of electric energy consumed, out of what was generated by them, separately for the Caustic Soda Plant as well as the other plants. The entire course of conduct of both sides shows that there can be hardly any doubt about the petitioners having separately shown the figures of the electric energy consumed for the Caustic Soda plant separately. The procedure which has been explained to him by the persons concerned without any exception being taken to it either or before him, is that the reading of the concerned meters is taken every 8 hours and tallied with the sum total of electricity generated. The production efficiency was being worked out on the basis of units consumed by the respective plants. For the Caustic Soda plant electricity is a raw material; cost-accounting would, therefore, involve separate measurement of energy consumed by the Caustic Soda plant. It is unfortunate that the respondents should have taken such a stand with reference to this aspect instead of fairly conceding, as it seems to me they should have done in all fairness, that the Writ Petition would have to be disposed of only on legal contentions put forward by them after conceding the above factual position. It does not seem to admit of doubt that the petitioner has consumed the amount of energy, which it states, it had consumed separately for the Caustic Soda plant. The petitioner, as soon as it received the impugned notices of demand dated 31-12-1966, did represent to the DESU on 27-1-1967 regarding the excessive assessment as aforesaid in response to which the DESU required break-up of energy consumed for “electro-chemical purposes”. Unfortunately there was no further inquiry into this question. Because of there being no such inquiry the present Writ Petition was filed attacking the demands on the ground of excessive assessment the respondents had chosen to repudiate the petitioner's allegation concerning excessive assessment.
19. It is no doubt true that there appears to be no express provision in Chapter VIII of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 providing specifically for an inquiry before making the demand in the case of an optional tax like the one on the consumption, sale or supply of electricity [Section 113 (2) (d)]. Section 150 (1) gives the power to the Corporation to pass a resolution for levy of taxes specified under sub-section (2) of Section 113 defining the maximum rate of tax to be levied, the class or classes of persons or descriptions of articles and properties to be taxed, the system of assessment to be adopted and exemptions, if any, to be granted. The other sub-sections (2) to (4) which prescribe the further procedure are silent about the hearing to be given to the assessee. Section 153 enables the Commissioner to present to the persons liable for the payment of any tax, when it has become due, a bill for the amount due — such a bill not being necessary in the case of (a) tax on vehicles and animals, (b) a theatre-tax, and (e) a tax on advertisement. Section 153 (2) required that the bills should specify the tax and the period for which the charge is made. Section 154 provides that if the amount of the tax for which a bill has been presented under Section 153 is not paid within fifteen days from the presentation thereof, or if the tax on vehicles and animals or the theatre-tax or the tax on advertisements is not paid after it has become due, the Commissioner may cause to be served upon the person liable for the payment of the same a notice of demand in the form set forth, in the Seventh Schedule. The prescribed form of notice of demand, in the same Schedule, only provides for the amount demanded and on which account it is demanded being mentioned indicating the period for which the same was liable to be paid. If within thirty days of the said notice the amount demanded is not paid and sufficient cause for non-payment of the same not shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner he can issue a warrant of distress for the recovery of the same with costs. Section 155 provides for a penalty in case of default of payment of taxes. Section 156 provides for the recovery of the tax; Sections 157 and 158 deal with distress and disposal of distrained property etc. Section 160 enables the sum due on account of a tax to be recovered from a defaulter by a suit instead of proceeding against him by distress and sale. Section 169 provides for an appeal against the levy of assessment of any tax under the Act to the Court of the District Judge of Delhi coupled with a provision for the District Judge making a reference of any question of law etc. to the High Court. The conditions of the right of appeal are provided in Section 170 which reads as follows:
“no appeal shall be heard or determined under section 169 unless —
(a) the appeal is, in the case of a property tax, brought within thirty days next after the date of authentication of the assessment list under section 124 (exclusive of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the relevant entries therein) or, as the case may be, within thirty days of the date on which an amendment is finally made under section 126, and, in the case of any other tax, within thirty days next after the date of the receipt of the notice of assessment or of alteration of assessment or, if no notice has been given, within thirty days after the date of the presentation of the first bill or, as the case may be, the first notice of demand in respect thereof:
Provided that an appeal may be admitted after the expiration of the period prescribed therefor by this section if the appellant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within that period;
(b) the amount, if any, in dispute in the appeal has been deposited by the appellant in the office of the Corporation.”
20. Even though no specific opportunity has been provided giving an opportunity to the assessee, from whom tax has been demanded, it would still be possible to read into the statute the requirement of audi alteram partem when there is nothing in the statute to actually prohibit the giving of an opportunity to be heard. On the other hand from the nature of the statutory duty imposed itself an obligation to hear before deciding seems possible to infer. This is me view which has been expressed by Alagiriswami, J., speaking for the Supreme Court in The Government of Mysore v. J.V Bhat and others decided on 14-10-1974, since reported in 1975 1 S.C.C 111 (2). Alagiriswamy, J. explained that decision in King v. Electricity Commissioner (1924 1 K.B 171) (3) was not really a departure from the general principles laid down in Cooper v. Board of Works for the Wandsworth District (14 CB (NS) 180) (4) but was an attempt to formulate the conditions under which the general principle was laid down by Erle, C.J in Cooper, who quoted the Biblical story of how even God Himself had given Adam an opportunity of answering why he had eaten the forbidden fruit before expelling him from paradise. In later cases, Alagiriswamy, J. explained, emphasis was more on the needs of justice and fairness rather than upon the distinction between judicial and administrative action.
21. It seems, therefore, that when the petitioner wanted the respondents to go into the question of excessive assessment and made representations in this regard it was their duty to have done so. Not only did they fail to do so and give the resultant benefit, if any, accruing out of such inquiry to the petitioner they have even without making any such inquiry chosen to resist the petitioner's claim in this Writ Petition, by going the length of (1) denying the fact of such returns having been sent in the prescribed form by the petitioner to the DESU, and (2) contending that the Caustic Soda plant is not “electro-chemical plant” to which the benefit of lesser tariff would apply. The petitioner had itself prayed not only for quashing the demands but for relief (c) in the alternative, in this Writ Petition. This would have been so normally, but it seems to me that the respondents have by their own conduct in resisting this Writ Petition on the aforesaid ground, on the basis of their not having any of the records which the petitioner stated had been sent to DESU by way of monthly returns in the prescribed form D.1, disentitled themselves to even adjudicate upon this issue as to whether they were so sent or not. They cannot be expected to adjudicate this matter fairly, when they have chosen to deny even the fact, which seems patent, that not only were the necessary returns sent but that the Caustic Soda plant is an electro-chemical industry. The only feasible and fair course in the circumstances seems to be that as requested by the petitioners the notices of demand should be quashed.
22. In the result I have only to deal with the legal contentions which have been urged on behalf of the respondents.
23. The first contention is that without filing an appeal against the impugned demands, as it could have been filed under Sections 169 and 170 of the Act, this Writ Petition is not maintainable. I am afraid there is no substance in this contention for the following reasons:
(1) C.W 104 of 1967 had been filed on 30-1-1967 challenging the validity of the Validation Act and, as a result, to quash the arrears of tax on electricity for the period 1-7-1959 to 31-3-1966; even earlier C.W 563-D of 1966 had been filed questioning the validity of Section 150 of the Act. In these circumstances it was not unjustifiable — not to prefer any appeal.
(2) A representation had been made even on 27-1-1967 that the assessment was excessive. Such a representation was permissible; yet there was no enquiry into it, which led to the filing of the present Writ Petition on 9-5-1967.
(3) On 10-12-1964 the said tax itself had been declared invalid by an order of the Appellate Bench of the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court in L.P.A 47-D of 1963 arising out of C.W 291-D of 1960; therefore, there could be no recovery of tax till the coming into force of the Validation Act of 1966 on 3-12-1966. Previously the entire recovery of the electricity tax was stayed by the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court pending disposal of C.W 291-D of 1960. Recovery was stayed during the pendency of the L.P.A also.
(4) The petitioner was advised that such bills and notices of demand in respect of electricity tax not complying with the aforesaid resolution were illegal and could not be enforced. When such contentions were open to the petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution without filing an appeal, they cannot be denied relief specially in view of the fact that Section 170-B requires that the amount in dispute should be deposited along with the appeal; this is an onerous condition. The following observations of Shah, J. (as he then was), speaking for the Supreme Court, in Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. D.P Dube (A.I.R 1967 S.C 549 at p. 552) (5) may be usefully set out:
“It is true that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 is extensive, but normally the High Court does not exercise that jurisdiction by entertaining petitions against the order of taxing authorities, when the statute under which tax is sought to be levied provides a remedy by way of an appeal or other proceeding to a party aggrieved and thereby by-pass the statutory machinery. That is not to say that the High Court will never entertain a petition against the order of the Taxing Officer. The High Court has undoubtedly jurisdiction to decide whether a statute under which a tax is sought to be levied is within the legislative competence of the legislature enacting it or whether the statute defies constitutional restrictions or infringes any fundamental rights, or whether taxing authority has arrogated to himself power which he does not possess, or has committed a serious error of procedure which has affected the validity of his conclusion or even where the taxing authority threatens to recover tax on an interpretation of the statute which is erroneous. The High Court may also in appropriate cases determine the eligibility to tax of transaction the nature of which is admitted” etc.
(emphasis supplied)
My attention has also been drawn to the decision of Rajindar Sachar, J. in New Delhi Holy Family Hospital Society v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi etc., decided on 12-12-1973 (in C.W 1114/71) (6), which refers to the well-known principle that the question of alternative remedy is only a question of discretion but not of jurisdiction and that the Court has to see in each case whether it should decline to exercise jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution on the ground that alternative remedy is available. It was pointed out by Sachar, J. with specific reference to Section 169, and the conditions imposed by Section 170, that there was a condition precedent to the right of appeal of a deposit of the amount in dispute by the petitioner. Relying upon Himatlal Hiralal Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (A.I.R 1954 S.C 403) (7) he pointed out that the condition being onerous and the tax involved being substantial recourse to Article 226 without filing an appeal in such circumstances could not be interdicted. The present case is even strong because of the other features present in this case. The entire levy had been assailed successfully at least at one stage, till the Supreme Court held against it. In these circumstances this does not seem to be a case where the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could be dismissed on the ground that no appeal (s) had been filed.
(5) On a reading of the provisions relating to appeal and the presentment of the bill it seems that thirty days time has to be reckoned from the presentation of the bill. It does not seem that in respect of the very same subject matter the petitioner would be entitled to file an appeal within thirty days of the notice of demand (as per the Form set out in Schedule VII) which is issued for enabling cause being shown against the issue of a warrant of distress or attachment; it does not seem to be against the original levy itself by way of presentation of the bill. The notice of demand, therefore, is irrelevant in the case of an electric-bill which is usually made by only presenting it on the basis of the meter-reading. If there is any error in the reading the person concerned will undoubtedly have an opportunity of making a representation to those concerned about the correctness of the bill and this would have to be inquired into.
(6) The limitations in the matter of exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution being self-imposed there could be interference in proper cases even when there was no appeal and the right of appeal even when it exists but has become barred in order to meet with the ends of justice (a number of cases bearing on this question have been discussed by me in Desh Bandhu Gupta & Co. v. Judge Small Cause Courts C.M (M) No. 161/72 decided on 31-10-1973 (8).
24. The second objection is on the ground of res judicata, but no plea of res judicata has been raised in the return. It was only in the further reply affidavit dated 29-4-1974 filed by N.K Gupta, Commercial Officer of the DESU, said to be in reply to the rejoinder filed by the petitioner, that the contention was put forward for the first time that the present writ petition is barred by reason of there having been no challenge in C.W 104 of 1967 concerning the two notices of demand for the period 1-7-1959 to 31-3-1966 on the ground of assessment being excessive. In paragraphs 3 and 4 of the said affidavit the above contentions were raised and the principle of constructive res judicata was specifically invoked in paragraph 4. In the further reply which the respondents filed they could, if at all, only controvert any fact stated for the first time in the petitioners' rejoinder; in no event could they be permitted to raise a plea of this kind in this manner. Besides, there seems to be no scope for such a contention being raised in this Writ Petition specially on account of the application having been made, as already noticed, in this very Writ Petition that it may be heard along with C.W 104/67 (which in turn had been listed along with C.W 563-D of 1966). The reason (expressed) for not hearing them together was that the cases which were ready should be heard without delay. If, as requested by the petitioner, this case also had been listed along with C.W 104/67 there should have been no impediment to the hearing of this Writ Petition which raised the question of excessive assessment. But it was not found feasible to hear this petition along with C.W 104/67 on account of the latter alone being then ready for hearing.
25. It does not also stand to reason why the principle of constructive res judicata should be invoked in this case, even if could (otherwise) be invoked. In Daryao v. State of U.P and others (A.I.R 1961 S.C 1457) (9) Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) wondered whether a technical requirement prescribed in Section 11 like the competence of the first court to try the subsequent suit is an essential part of the general rule of res judicata: there was, however, no difficulty felt in invoking the general principle of res judicata in the matter of a petition field under Article 226 of the Constitution. The object underlying the principle of res judicata is two-fold (1) minimising litigation; (2) avoiding unnecessary harassment to parties. As pointed out by Lawrence Jenkins in Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramnandan Singh (43 I.A 91 at pp. 98-99) (10) the rule of res judicata, therefore while it is founded on ancient precedent, is also dictated by a wisdom, which is for all time. Vijnaneswara and Nilakantha were cited, in addition to the text of Katyayana, regarding this plea “of former judgment” also proceeded to enquire whether the doctrine of res judicata is based on some public policy; it is in the interest of the public that a finality should be attached to a binding decision pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction. So far as fundamental rights, which were sought to be enforced in Writ Petitions are concerned it was noticed that a court would naturally refuse to circumscribe them or to curtial them except as provided by the Constitution itself (p. 1461).
26. Daryao was followed by Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P (A.I.R 1962 S.C 1621) (11), Naresh v. State of Maharashtra (A.I.R 1967 S.C 1) (12) etc. In the former the Supreme Court, by a majority, postulated that the determination of a quasijudicial authority acting under intra vires statute not infringing any fundamental right. In the latter case it was observed that it would be singularly inappropriate to assume that a judicial decision pronounced by a Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him for adjudication can affect the fundamental rights of the citizens.
27. In a subsequent decision (vide Ghulam Sarwar v. Union of India (A.I.R 1967 S.C 1335) (13) the Supreme Court distinguished Daryao on the ground that the High Court had dismissed the petition, in that case, under Article 226 of the Constitution after hearing the matter on merits, on the ground that no fundamental right was proved or contravened (p. 1336). The petitioner, in Ghulam Sarwar, was detained in a case of conspiracy to smuggle gold under the Customs Act and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for nine months. Before the expiry of the term he filed a habeas corpus petition in the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi. The petition was dismissed on merits but the constitutional validity of. Section 3 (2) (g) of the Foreigners Act, 1946 was not canvassed. In a subsequent petition Subba Rao, C.J had to appreciate the Indian constitutional position in order to repeal a contention based on res judicata and observed:
“The order of the High Court is not res judicata as held by the English and American Courts either because it is not a judgment or because the principle of res judicata is not applicable to a fundamentally lawless order.”
There seems to have been a fear that the automatic application of constructive res judicata might narrow considerably the scope of liberty of an individual.
28. There are passages in Daryao itself suggesting that if the petition is dismissed in limine without a speaking order it could not be treated as creating a bar of res judicata (p. 1465). In the absence of a speaking order it may not be easy to decide what factors weighed in the mind of the Court making it difficult and unsafe later to hold that such a summary dismissal was one on the merits and constitutes a bar of res judicata against a similar petition filed under Article 32. These observations in Daryao were later explained by Wanchoo, C.J, speaking for the Supreme Court, in Virudhunagar Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. v. The Government of Madras (A.I.R 1968 S.C 1196) (14). It was not necessary that notice should have gone in the earlier Writ Petition before it was dismissed even a dismissal in limine would have that effect, depending on the nature of that order, viz., whether it was a speaking order disposing of the petition on merits.
29. The Supreme Court expressed the view in Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. Janapada Sabha Chhindwara and others (A.I.R 1964 S.C 1013) (15) that the principle of constructive res judicata is a special and artificial form of res judicata and that it should not apply to Writ Petitions. But a different conclusion seems to have been reached in Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer (A.I.R 1965 S.C 1150) (16). In the latter case the validity of the order of assessment under the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950 was challenged on the ground of invalid delegation under Section 19 of the Act and the assessment being wrong; in the subsequent Writ Petition there was a challenge, again, of the same order of assessment for the same period, but on two grounds, which had not been permitted to be raised by the Supreme Court in an appeal arising from the decision in the earlier Writ Petition. Gajendragadkar, C.J conceded the technical or artificial nature of the rule of res judicata but refused to entertain the said grounds stating that if the principle of constructive res judicata was not applied to such writ proceedings a party can file as many Writ Petitions as he likes and take one or two points alone every time. Gajendragadkar, C.J, was also a party to Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd., but he distinguished it on the ground that the order in that case was in relation to a different period and not for the same period as was covered by an earlier petition.
30. In the Union Of India v. Nanak Singh (A.I.R 1968 S.C 1370) (17) there was a further extension of the principle of res judicata being applied in a suit by reason of “express decision” in a previous Writ Petition. The ground of “express decision” may not cover the case of “constructive res judicata”, based on the principle of “might” and “ought”.
31. Devilal only establishes that an assessment of a taxing authority for the same period cannot be attacked in successive Writ Petitions. Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd., was only distinguished but not disapproved in Devilal; the position would well be different in the case of Writ Petitions relating to tax assessments for successive periods. Even where the assessment for the same period is concerned the rationale behind invoking the principle of constructive res judicata in such a context is the prevention of parties from taking one or two points alone each time and successively.
32. This is certainly not the position here in the present case. C.W 104/67 was filed a few days after representations had been made on the ground that the assessment was excessive; what led to the present Writ Petition was the omission of the respondents even to consider the objections raised by the petitioners on the ground of the assessment being excessive. Not merely that: even after filing the present Writ Petition the petitioner applied for all the Writ Petitions being decided together — a request which was negatived.
33. The plea of constructive res-judicata would certainly not be available to the respondents in the circumstances of the present case. It was perhaps for this reason that this plea was not even raised earlier; it has been lugged in, among other pleas, in the above said further affidavit filed after the petitioners had filed their rejoinder probably on account of a feeling that there is hardly any tenable defence to this Writ Petition.
34. The attack in Civil Writ (No. 104 of 1967) that there was no valid power to tax is quite different from and even opposed to the present attack which concedes the power to tax but is concerned with showing that the power to tax was exercised in an excessive manner.
35. These not being suits, to which the provision of Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C would apply, the only ground of constructive res judicata, if it could be raised at all, would be on the basis of Explanation IV to Section 11 C.P.C, which reads as follows:
“Any matter which might and ought to have made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.”
(emphasis supplied)
On the language of Explanation IV to Section 11 it seems difficult to contend that the ground of excessive assessment ought to have been coupled with an attack on the want of power to tax, even if it could be said that it might have been possible. The words employed — might and ought — are cumulative; they are not in the alternative. It is a well-established rule that any plea which if taken would have been inconsistent with or destructive of the title in the earlier suit is not a matter which ought to be raised therein because even though it might also have been raised in the alternative. This aspect was explained by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Kameswar Pershad v. Rajkumari Ruttan Koer and others (I.L.R 20 Calcutta 79 at p. 85) (18). The possibility of merely raising it as a ground of attack or defence, at least in the alternative, is alone not sufficient; the test is one which is more compulsive, namely, that the said plea “ought” to have been taken as a ground of attack or defence. These features would of course depend upon the particular facts of each case. It seems difficult to say in the present case that the petitioner ought to have raised the ground of excessive assessment in the Writ Petition (C.W 104 of 1967) which they filed challenging the constitutionality of the statute which empowered the tax to be imposed.
36. Since in the present case the petitioner who had made representations regarding the excessive assessment, even before it filed C.W 104 of 1967, were obliged to file the present Writ Petition later on only because no action was taken on such representations, and had also applied for this Petition being heard along with C.W 104 of 1967, there is no question of any consideration of public policy being involved here; nor was the petitioner seeking to violate public policy. Judged by whatever principle — “finality of decisions” based on “public policy considerations”, “express decision” or “might and ought” — the present Writ Petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of excessive demand not having been raised in C.W 104 of 1967, even assuming that such a plea could be gone into despite the same not being raised in the return itself.
37. In the result the Writ Petition is accepted and the impugned demands (copies of which are Annexures E & F to the Writ Petition) are quashed to the extent of the same being in excess of what is admitted by the petitioner. The respondents and their agents are restrained from collecting any tax at a rate higher than 1/3 Paise per Kwhr for the energy generated by it and consumed in the Caustic Soda plant, as stated by the petitioner. The petitioner will be entitled to costs as well. Counsel fee Rs. 500 (Rupees Five Hundred only).
Petition accepted.
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