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Rabinder Nath Maira v. Steelsons Pvt. Ltd., Delhi
Structured Summary of the Opinion (D.K. Kapur, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This matter arises from Company Petition No. 42 of 1973 instituted by Shri R.N. Maira and another against M/s. Steelsons (P.) Limited and others. During the pendency of the petition the first petitioner, Shri R.N. Maira, died and the second petitioner, Shri Jitender Nath Maira, decided not to prosecute the petition further. On 17 September 1973 no one appeared for the petitioners; counsel for the respondent urged consigning the petition to the record room and the Court ordered accordingly but indicated the petition had not been disposed of and that an application under Section 151 CPC might be made. The petition was again listed on 1 February 1974 and observed to lack a petitioner; subsequently the legal representatives of the first petitioner moved the present application seeking to be impleaded as parties. The respondents opposed the application and filed an additional application (C.A. No. 136 of 1974) to urge further grounds in support of the opposition.
Legal Issues Presented
- What procedure is to be applied when a petitioner to a company petition (here under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956) dies while the petition is pending?
- Whether the legal representatives (heirs) of a deceased petitioner are competent to continue or be impleaded in a pending company petition that the deceased had instituted.
- Whether a succession certificate is necessary before legal representatives can be impleaded as parties in such a petition (with reference to Sections 212, 213, 214 and 370 of the Indian Succession Act).
- Whether the original petition abated on the death of the petitioner or on the withdrawal of the surviving petitioner, or whether it could be prosecuted if a competent person appears to continue it.
- Whether any challenge to the competency of the original petitioner (for example, that the deceased was not a shareholder and thus had no right to institute the petition) prevents the heirs from being impleaded and prosecuting the petition.
Arguments of the Parties
Applicants' Arguments (Legal Representatives)
- Relying on Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the applicants argued that rights to prosecute existing actions or special proceedings survive to executors or administrators and, by extension, to legal heirs who succeed to the estate of the deceased.
- The applicants asserted they are the widow and children and, in the absence of other heirs or a will, they succeed to the deceased's estate including his right of action in the pending company petition.
Respondents' Arguments
- One objection was that the deceased first petitioner himself was not competent to institute the petition (e.g., he was not a shareholder), so his legal representatives cannot have a right to prosecute it.
- It was contended that legal representatives cannot be placed on record unless they first establish their status as legal representatives, and that under Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act a succession certificate is required before a decree can be passed in favour of a heir against a debtor; related provisions (Sections 212, 213, and 370) were also relied upon.
- An objection was also raised that the petition had been consigned to the record room and was no longer pending, which would affect the propriety of substitution/impleading.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| The Andhra Bank Ltd. v. R. Srinivasan, 1962 3 SCR 391 | Considered competency of the court to proceed with a suit where legal representatives of a deceased defendant did not submit to jurisdiction; held that initial competency of suit was not affected by representatives not submitting to jurisdiction. | The Court observed that this case concerned the competency of the court, not the competency of legal representatives to continue proceedings; therefore it had no bearing on the question before the Court. |
| Kedar Nath v. Ram Nath etc., 1972 Rajdhani L R 701 (Full Bench) | Held that a proceeding under the Rent Control Act did not become not maintainable by reason of the death of a statutory tenant where the heirs did not succeed to the tenancy. | The Court treated the decision as inapposite: it related to the competency or succession to a statutory tenancy, not to the competence of legal representatives generally to prosecute an action or petition; thus it did not govern the present question. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying that there is no specific procedure in the Companies Act or Company (Court) Rules expressly governing substitution on the death of a petitioner in a petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act. It compared the position to that of a winding-up petition and noted that Rule 101 and Rule 102 of the Company (Court) Rules allow substitution where petitioners withdraw, but there is no explicit rule for the petitioner's death.
The judge observed there were no reported cases found in which a petition under Sections 397 or 398, or a winding up petition, had abated on the death of a petitioner. The Court proceeded to consider statutory succession principles.
The Court examined Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, which provides that rights to prosecute or defend existing actions or special proceedings survive to and against executors or administrators, subject to certain exceptions. While the judge expressed a doubt about the literal applicability of this provision where the applicants were not executors or administrators, he found no practical distinction between the applicants' position (as heirs under Hindu law) and the beneficiaries contemplated by Section 306. Concluding that the applicants (widow and children, in absence of other heirs or a will) succeeded to the estate of the deceased, the Court held they succeed to any right of action the deceased possessed in relation to C.P. No. 42 of 1973.
Addressing the respondents' objection that the deceased was not competent to institute the petition (for example, not being a shareholder), the Court reasoned that the heirs succeed only to the rights that the deceased held at death. If the petition was incompetent as instituted by the deceased, the heirs obtain no greater right; the competency issue would remain and would have to be decided after proper adjudication. Thus the competency objection was noted but did not prevent impleading for the present.
On the question whether a succession certificate was required before impleading, the Court carefully analysed Sections 212, 213, 214 and 370 of the Indian Succession Act as they were invoked by respondents' counsel. The Court concluded:
- Section 214's prohibition relates to debts and the passing of a decree in favour of an heir against a debtor without a succession certificate; the Court held that the prohibitory part of Section 214 is restricted to debts and does not extend to claims in respect of securities as defined in Section 370.
- Sections 212 and 213 (probate/letters of administration) apply to certain estates; where those sections apply heirs must obtain probate or letters and cannot obtain a succession certificate. For Hindus, Sikhs, etc., probate or letters are not necessary, and a succession certificate may be obtained.
- The Court concluded that a succession certificate is not mandatory before legal representatives can be impleaded as parties to this petition; for non-debt claims and securities a succession certificate is not strictly necessary for impleading, though one may be obtained to avoid disputes.
Finally, responding to the objection that the petition had been consigned to the record room and was thus no longer pending, the Court reiterated its prior orders clarifying that the petition had not been disposed of but was consigned only because there was no petitioner before the Court. The Court held that if someone is impleaded and willing to prosecute the petition, there is no impediment to the petition being heard further.
Given these determinations, the Court allowed substitution/impleading of the applicants as legal representatives and permitted the petition to proceed, reserving any competency issues for adjudication in the main petition. The Court did not make any order as to costs, observing the novelty of the point.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition is allowed; the applicants (legal heirs of Shri R.N. Maira) are permitted to be impleaded as legal representatives in place of the deceased and the petition may proceed.
Implications and immediate consequences:
- The applicants (widow and children) are entitled to be brought on record as legal representatives of the deceased petitioner and to prosecute the pending Company Petition No. 42 of 1973.
- The Court held that no succession certificate is a precondition to being impleaded in this matter; the heirs succeed only to the rights the deceased possessed at his death, so any challenge to the original petitioner's competency remains open to be contested and decided in due course.
- The petition was not treated as disposed of despite being consigned to the record room; once the applicants are impleaded, there is no impediment to further hearing of the petition.
- As the point was described by the Court as novel, the Court made no order as to costs. The opinion does not announce any broader rule beyond the specific determinations made; the direct effect is the impleading of the applicants and continuation of the petition with competency issues reserved for adjudication.
Order pronounced: "Petition allowed."
D.K Kapur, J.:— This is an application under Order 1, Rule 10(2) read with Order 22, Rules 2 and 3 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure instituted by the legal heirs of Shri R.N Maira in respect of a Company Petition No. 42 of 1973, which has been instituted in this Court by Shri R.N Maira and another against M/s. Steelsons (P.) Limited and others. The said Company Petition was before this Court when Shri R.N Maira, the first petitioner died and the second petitioner therein, Shri Jitender Nath Maira, decided that he would not prosecute the petition any further. On 17th September, 1973, no one appeared on behalf of the petitioners. Mr. G.R Chopra, counsel for the respondent stated that the first petitioner had died and the petition was incomplete and, therefore, should be consigned to the record room. I ordered accordingly. Later on, on the same date Mr. Satish Chandra stated that the petition could go 6n even in the absence of the legal representatives of the first petitioner and I indicated that he might apply under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and I also made it clear that the petition had not been disposed of. Later, the petition was listed on 1st February, 1974. On that date again, I observed that the petition should be consigned back to the record room as there was no petitioner before the Court. Now, the legal representatives of the first petitioner have moved the present application for the purpose of being impleaded as parties to the case. This application has been contested by the respondents and another application has also been moved on behalf of the respondents, which is C.A No. 136 of 1974, in order to urga further grounds in support of the opposition.
2. The first question for consideration is what is the procedure to be applied in a case like the present one when the petitioner dies. I am stating this because the second petitioner has in any case decided not to prosecute the petition. The procedure prescribed for suits is set out in Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no particular procedure prescribed for other petitions. A petition like the present one, instituted under Section 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, is in the same position as a petition for winding up. In fact, the alternate prayer of the petition is that the company should be wound up. I, therefore, find that the position of the petition on the death of the first petitioner and the withdrawal of the second petitioner is exactly that of an ordinary winding up petition. It is provided in Rule 101 and Rule 102 of the Company (Court) Rules that even if the petitioners withdraw, a party can be substituted as a petitioner in an ordinary winding up petition There is, however, no Rule governing the case of a petitioner dying. In fact, neither the applicant nor the “counsel for the respondents has been able to bring any case to my notice in which a petition under Section 397 or 398 has abated nor have they been able to bring any case to my notice in which a winding up petition has abated. I am, therefore, of the view that. there is no reported case in The Law Reports of any case under Section 397 or 398 of the Companies Act having abated nor has any winding up petition abated. Such a petition might fail on account of there being none to prosecute it. But, if a party appears before the Court and is willing to prosecute the same, the only question which would remain to be seen would be whether the person concerned is competent to prosecute the same. For example, if a petitioning creditor in a winding up petition, based on non-payment of debts, dies, his legal heirs may very well claim to prosecute the same winding up petition on the ground that they inherited the claim of the deceased creditor. Similarly, another creditor might apply for substitution but he would not have to be a creditor. The main question to be considered in this case arises on account of the pecularity in the present case, which is that according to the counsel for the respondents the original petition itself was not competent. I will presently deal with this question. I first mention some authorities cited by learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the application. Reference has been made to the Supreme Court's judgment in “The Andhra Bank Ltd. v. R. Srinivasan . 1962 3 SCR 391”, and to a Full Bench decision of this court reported as “Kedar Nath v. Ram Nath etc . 1972 Rajdhain L R 701.” The first of these cases was concerned with the competency of the Hyderabad Court to proceed with a suit in which the legal representatives of the deceased defendant did not submit to the jurisdiction of the Hyderabad Court. It was held that the suit in the Hyderabad Court having been competent in the first instance, did not render the suit incompetent by reason of the legal representatives of the defendant not submitting to the jurisdiction. In the second of these cases, it was held by this Court that a proceeding under the Rent Control Act, brought by a landlord against this tenant did not become not maintainable by reason of the death of the tenant on account of the fact that his heirs did not succeed to the tenancy as the’ deceased tenant was a statutory tenant. These cases have no bearing at all on the question which I have to decide. It is not the competency of the court which is in question before me but the competency of the legal representatives to continue the proceedings. I have to decide whether there is any rule of law by which the legal representatives of a deceased petitioner can continue the proceedings.
3. Counsel for the applicant has referred to Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The said Section reads as follows:
“306. All demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease, survive to and against his executors or administrators; except causes of action for defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or other personal injuries not causing the death of the patty; and except also cases where, after the death of the party, the relief sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory.
Illustrations
(i) A collision takes place on a railway in consequence of some neglect or default of an official, and a passenger is severely hurt, but not so as to cause death. He afterwards dies without having brought any action. The cause of action does not survive.
(iii) A sues for divorce. Adies. The cause of action does not survive to his representatives.”
4. It will be seen from the Section that the estate of the deceased has a right to prosecute or defend any action or special proceedings existing in favour of the person. I have my doubts whether this applies to the case of the petitioners they not being in the position of Executors or Administrators but I see no difference between their position and the position of any other heir in Hindu Law. Whatever estate was available to the deceased, it is certainly available to the applicants as his legal heirs. The applicants are the widow and children of the deceased. In the absence of any other heirs or a will, they are the heirs who would succeed to all bis estate including his right of action in—respect of C.P No. 41 of 1973. I would, therefore, hold that as legal heirs they are competent to succeed to the estate of Shri R. N, Maira (deceased) and to prosecute any claim that he might have in Law against any one else. This is subject, of course, to the objections raised before me by counsel for the respondent, which I will deal with presently.
5. Having reached the conclusion that the legal heirs of the late Shri R.N Maira do succeed also to his right of action in respect of this pending petition under Section 397′and 398 and Section 433 of the Companies Act, I now proceed to deal with the questions or objections formulated by Mr. Chopra on behalf of the respondents.
6. The first objection is that on the death of Shri R.N Maira, the original first petitioner, the legal rppresentative's cannot have any right to prosecute the petition because Shri R.N Maira himself was not a share-holder of the company and had no right to prosecute the petition. I think the answer to this question is that the right of the late Shri R.N Maira, whatever it is, passes to the applicants. If the petition would have failed or might have failed because the late Shri R.N Maira was not competent to institute it, then this petition will still fail because the applicants do not succeed to anything more than the legal estate held by the late Shri R.N Maira at the time of his death. In. other words, the original petition will not become more competent by the applicants being impleaded. It will only mean that the question of competency will be decided after due trial. I, therefore, disregard this objection for the moment though it will still’ remain a question for controversy and judicial adjudication in the event of the applicants being substituted in the main petition.
7. I now turn to the next objection. This is that the petitioners cannot be brought on the record, unless they first established their claim as legal representatives. It is urged by learned counsel for the respondents that in the Indian Succession Act, there is Section 214 which prohibits the passing, of a decree in favour of a heir to a deceased person against a debtor of that person unless he has first obtained a succession certificate. He also refers to Section 370 wherein there are certain observations about the way in which a succession certificate can be obtained and there is restriction to getting a succession certificate if letters of administration or probate can be obtained under Section 212 or Section 213. The legal position seems to be that a succession certificate can be obtained not only for a debt but also for securities. This is so stated in Section 370 Mr. Chopra urges that the restriction contained in Section 214 also applies to. claims in respect of securities as defined in Section 370. 1 regret, I cannot accept this contention; the prohibitory part of Section 214 is restricted to debts alone and not to claims mentioned in Section 370. The legal position is as follows: if the estate of a deceased person is covered by section 212 or 213; then the heirs have to get either letters of administration or probate. The heirs cannot get a succession certificate. This is so provided in Section 370.
8. On the other hand, neither section 212 or 213 applies to Hindus and others such as Buddhists, Sikhs etc. This means that in case the deceased is a Hindu or Sikh or Mohammedan, then a probate or letters of administration is not necessary and a succession certificate may be obtained. In order to proceed in Court, the ‘legal heirs will have to get a succession certificate, if they are proceeding against a debtor. This is so provided in Section 214. On the other hand, in respect of other property even a succession certificate isy not necessary. But, in order to avoid disputes, it is sometimes necessary to obtain a succession certificate even in respect of securities.—It is not mandatory, under Section 214 but may be obtained under Section 370. I, therefore, come to the conclusion that no succession certificate is necessary before the applicants can be impleaded as legal representatives. I may point out that no case has been brought to my notice by counsel for the respondents showing that a succession certificate is necessary before the legal, representatives can be impleaded. My conclusion amounts to this that the applicants can be impleaded as legal representatives even though Order 22 does not apply because they, are entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased.
9. Another objection raised by Mr. Chopra is to the effect that the petition is no longer, pending and has been consigned to the record room. I have already made it clear, in my orders previously passed, that the petition is not disposed of and that the case was only consigned to the record room as there was no petitioner before the Court. Once somebody is impleaded, or some one wants to prosecute the petition, there is no impediment to the petition being heard further. In these circumstances, I see no reason why the petition for substitution should not be allowed. I accordingly permit the applicants to be impleaded as legal representatives and to be brought on record in place of the late Shri R.N Maira and proceed with the petition. As the point was quite a novel one, I did not make any order as to costs.
10. Petition allowed.
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