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M.Ganesa Reddiar v. C.Krishnasamy Raju

Madras High Court
Apr 22, 2008
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Factual and Procedural Background

This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 23.08.2005 in A.S.No.11 of 2004 (Subordinate Judge, Ponneri), which confirmed the judgment and decree dated 30.01.2004 in O.S.No.403 of 1993 (District Munsif, Ponneri). The plaintiff (appellant in this second appeal) originally filed O.S.No.403 of 1993 seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of 1.65 acres (S. No.8/3 and 8/4) in Marambedu village, alleging title by registered sale deed dated 11.04.1977 (Ex.A-1) and/or by prescription through adverse possession.

The defendant disputed the plaintiff's title and asserted that the vendors under Ex.A-1 had no title to convey and that the defendant's father and the defendant had been in long possession and paying kist. The defendant also relied on a prior suit, O.S.No.929 of 1973 (filed by Kanniah Raju), in which the sale deed dated 04.11.1957 (underlying Ex.A-1 chain) had been held not valid with a finding that the vendor had no title to convey (judgment marked as Ex.B-3).

At trial the Court framed issues on ownership, declaration of title, permanent injunction and reliefs. Evidence included one PW and two DWs with several documentary exhibits. The trial Court dismissed the suit holding (a) the plaintiff could not derive title from Ex.A-1 because that sale deed had been held invalid in the earlier suit, and (b) the plaintiff had not sufficiently proved adverse possession and had not admitted the defendant's title (a pre-condition the trial Court required to sustain a plea of adverse possession). The First Appellate Court (A.S.No.11 of 2004) confirmed the trial Court's judgment and decree on 23.08.2005. The present second appeal (S.A.No.933 of 2006) was admitted on two substantial questions of law and was heard by this Court, which dismissed the second appeal on 22.04.2008.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Courts below were correct in concluding that by virtue of the earlier judgment (Ex.B-3) the appellant's claim is barred by res judicata.
  2. Whether the findings of the Courts below that the appellant has not perfected title by adverse possession are sustainable where the appellant contends he has proved possession and enjoyment for over the statutory period.
  3. For completeness (issues framed at trial): Whether the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit properties; whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaration of title; whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction; and to what relief the plaintiff is entitled.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as recorded)

  • The earlier suit O.S.No.929 of 1973 filed by Kanniah Raju related to different properties and did not concern the particular suit property; therefore res judicata should not apply.
  • Even if Ex.A-1 (sale deed dated 11.04.1977) was held to be invalid in relation to some properties, it was not declared invalid in relation to the suit property; the plaintiff could still claim title under Ex.A-1 for the suit land.
  • Alternatively, the plaintiff had perfected title by adverse possession having been in long, open and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment, supported by entries in revenue records and payment of kist.
  • The plea of res judicata was not sufficiently pleaded or raised by the defendant in the written statement (only a vague reference in para 5), and the courts below did not frame issues specifically on res judicata; the earlier suit's pleadings and connected documents must be marked to decide res judicata.
  • Relied on several authorities for the proposition that res judicata depends on identity of title and the issues decided in the earlier litigation.

Respondent/Defendant's Arguments (as recorded)

  • The sale deed in the earlier litigation (under which Kanniah Raju claimed title) was held invalid; hence the same question cannot be reopened and the plaintiff cannot derive title under Ex.A-1 — plea of res judicata applies.
  • The plaintiff cannot pursue two inconsistent pleas (title through Ex.A-1 and title by adverse possession); having elected to press adverse possession in the first appeal, the plaintiff waived his other plea and cannot now reopen it.
  • The adverse possession plea was raised belatedly (the plaint was originally for injunction; amendment to plead adverse possession was allowed in 2001) and the plaintiff pursued adverse possession alone in the first appeal.
  • Relied on authorities on election/waiver, abandonment of rights and on the requirements for establishing adverse possession (including the necessity to plead and prove that a particular person is the true owner against whom possession is adverse).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For (as recorded in the opinion) Application by the Court (as recorded in the opinion)
Shri Jai Kishan Dass and others v. Smt. Nirmala Devi and others (AIR 1984 SC 589) Principle that res judicata applies if issues had been decided in earlier litigations between the parties and/or their predecessors. The decision was cited by the appellant; the Court considered the res judicata principle and concluded the Courts below were right in holding the claim hit by res judicata.
Srimati Raj Lakshmi Dasi and others v. Banamali Sen and others (AIR 1953 SC 33) Test of res judicata is identity of title in the two litigations and not identity of the actual property. Cited by the appellant; the Court's conclusion on res judicata took into account the identity-of-title principle reflected in the authorities considered.
Mahalingeshwara Devaru v. Seetharama Bhatta (AIR 1978 Karnataka 213) "The primary test of res judicata depends upon the identity of title in the two litigations and not the identity of the actual property involved." Referred to in arguments and considered by the Court in assessing whether res judicata barred the plaintiff's claim; the Court affirmed the bar of res judicata.
Kadapurath Illam Khalid v. Beemapura Palamkakkada Sulekha (AIR 1986 Kerala 251) Pleads that parties to both suits being the same (or their names being on record) is enough to press res judicata/estoppel by record. Cited in submissions; the Court applied the general res judicata principles in dismissing the plaintiff's suit as barred by the earlier decision.
Ram Gobinda Daw and others v. Smt. H. Bhakta Bala Dassi (AIR 1971 SC 664) Identity of title test; previous decision on title, if final, operates as res judicata even if subject-matter value was trifling. Considered among authorities on res judicata; the Court concluded the earlier decision operated to bar relitigation of the sale-deed issue.
Kunhayammed & others v. State of Kerala & another (AIR 2000 SC 2587) Doctrine of merger: appellate decree becomes the final operative decree; nature of jurisdiction of superior forum relevant. Cited in the list of authorities; the opinion recited the doctrine while considering procedural finality of earlier judgments/appeals in context of res judicata principles.
Bhavani Amma and others v. Narayana Acharya and others (AIR 1963 Mysore 120) When a trial Court's decree is appealed, the appellate decree supersedes and grounds of decision operate for res judicata; superseded judgments cannot be pleaded in bar. Referred to in authorities considered; the Court examined finality of prior proceedings and concluded that the relevant earlier finding invalidating the deed operated to bar the present claim.
Venkateswarlu v. Venkata Narasimham and others (AIR 1957 AP 557) Where matter went up on appeal, the appellate judgment supersedes the trial Court's judgment for res judicata purposes. Noted in the list of precedents; the Court evaluated earlier adjudications and their finality in holding that Ex.A-1's validity had been conclusively decided earlier.
Munshi Mohammad Abdul Aziz v. Gulam Julani (AIR 1937 Madras 709) If the trial Court decided an issue but the appellate Court refrained from deciding it, the issue is not finally decided and can be raised later. The Court listed this principle among authorities; the opinion does not record that this precedent changed the Court's conclusion that res judicata applied in the present facts.
Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa (AIR 1976 SC 1569) Conditions for res judicata: (1) same parties, (2) identical subject-matter, (3) matter finally decided, and (4) Court of competent jurisdiction. Referred to in submissions and considered by the Court in assessing whether res judicata conditions were satisfied; the Court concluded that the earlier decision met the requirements to bar the suit.
A.M.K. Mariam Bibi and others v. M.A. Abdul Rahim and others (2000 AIHC 661) When only a judgment (without pleadings) is filed, res judicata cannot be decided since pleadings cannot be proved merely by recitals in a judgment. Cited by the appellant to argue that res judicata could not be decided on limited documents alone; however, the Court nonetheless found on the record that the sale deed issue had been finally decided earlier and barred the claim.
Kuppusamy Gounder and others v. Kannammal and others (2001 3 L.W 483) To urge res judicata, filing a final decree alone is not sufficient; necessary ingredients such as identity of properties, issues, pleadings must be shown and marked. Relied on in appellant's submissions; the Court considered the contention but concluded that the earlier adjudication on the sale deed sufficiently barred the present claim.
Shantaben Naranbhai Dalvadi and others v. Vadilal Kacharabhai Prajapati (2000 AIHC 717) When substantial differences exist between properties in the earlier and subsequent suits, res judicata will not apply. Cited by the appellant to deny applicability of res judicata here; the Court, after examining facts and documents, concluded res judicata did apply on the basis of identity of title considerations.
R. Samudra Vijayam Chettiar v. Srinivasa Alwar and others (AIR 1956 Madras 301) Doctrine of election: where a person entitled to one of two inconsistent rights makes an unequivocal choice, he cannot afterwards pursue the other. Cited by the respondent for the proposition that the plaintiff, having pursued adverse possession in the first appeal, could not later revive the alternative plea; the Court accepted that the plaintiff had effectively elected and waived the sale-deed claim at the first appeal stage.
Union of India v. Bharat Fire & General Insurance Ltd. (AIR 1961 Punjab 157) Where a person has choice of two rights and adopts one, he cannot afterwards assert the other. Cited in support of the election/waiver argument; the Court noted that the plaintiff had opted to press only adverse possession earlier and had thereby waived the alternate plea.
P. Dasa Muni Reddy v. P. Appa Rao (AIR 1974 SC 2089) Abandonment/waiver is more than mere acquiescence; waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Considered in relation to the finding that the plaintiff had waived the Ex.A-1 title claim during the first appeal; the Court recorded that the plaintiff had chosen inconsistent pleas and thereby waived one.
M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. (AIR 1979 SC 621) Waiver means abandonment of a right; it may be express or implied and requires intentional act with knowledge. Referenced in support of the waiver/election analysis; the Court found the plaintiff had waived the sale-deed claim by pursuing adverse-possession grounds on appeal.
M/s. Marisami Brothers v. M/s. Bluemount Switchgears Associates (1969 (I) MLJ 573) The plaintiff had ample opportunity to raise res judicata earlier and cannot raise it for the first time in the second appeal. Respondent relied on this authority to argue procedural bar; the Court noted procedural posture and nonetheless concluded that res judicata and lack of proof of adverse possession warranted dismissal.
Washdev Singh Biji v. Union of India (AIR 1970 Delhi 85) Plea of res judicata not agitated in first appellate court ordinarily should not be allowed in second appeal. Referred to among authorities on procedural bars; the Court observed the procedural history and noted that the plaintiff had pursued only adverse possession on first appeal, contributing to the finding of waiver.
Manak Lal v. Dr. Premchand Singhvi (AIR 1957 SC 425) Deliberate failure to raise an objection at an earlier stage can create a bar of waiver. Cited by respondent; the Court accepted that the plaintiff's choice to pursue adverse possession in the first appeal amounted to waiver of the sale-deed claim.
Seth Ghasiram Seth Dalchand Palliwal v. Mt. Kundambai (AIR 1940 Nagpur 163) New plea of res judicata not raised in Court below cannot be allowed in second appeal; plea is not a pure question of law and cannot be raised for first time in second appeal. Referenced in defendant's submissions about procedural propriety; the Court observed the record and nevertheless dismissed the second appeal on the merits (res judicata/adverse possession/waiver).
P.S.M. Ahamed Abdul Khader v. T.K. Mohammed Abubucker (AIR 2002 Madras 213) To prove adverse possession one must plead and prove that a particular person is the true owner and that he is being held in adverse possession openly. Cited to underline the evidentiary requirement for adverse possession; the Court agreed that plaintiff's proof was insufficient to establish adverse possession.
Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil & others v. Balwant alias Balasaheb Patil (AIR 1995 SC 895) Possession referable to lawful title cannot be treated as adverse; one who enters under lawful title cannot later say possession was hostile. Considered in relation to the nature of the plaintiff's possession and whether it was hostile; the Court found that the plaintiff had not sufficiently established the adverse character of possession.
M/s. Ram Mohan & Co. rep. by R. Renuka v. Ganesar Ginning Co. P. Ltd. (1999 (III) CTC 40) Order 43 Rule 1, CPC: no appeal can be filed against a finding in whose favour the proceedings have ended (illustration on re-litigating character of a deed). Cited in submissions on finality of findings; the Court relied on finality of earlier adjudication of the sale deed's character to hold that the plaintiff could not re-open the issue.
Illustration from (AIR Civil Court, Manual 451) Illustration that a finding that a deed is fictitious in a former suit will bar subsequent suits based on the same deed. Used by respondents in argument; the Court's decision echoed the illustrative principle — earlier finding on the deed's character barred the later suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded by examining the record of the trial and first appellate courts, the pleadings, the evidence and the authorities cited by the parties. The central strands of reasoning recorded in the opinion are:

  1. The trial Court had found that the sale deed under which the plaintiff claimed (Ex.A-1, dated 11.04.1977) could not confer title because the earlier suit filed by Kanniah Raju (O.S.No.929 of 1973) had determined that the antecedent sale deed (dated 04.11.1957) was not valid and that Kanniah Raju had no title to convey. That earlier decision was placed before the trial Court as Ex.B-3 and led the trial Court to hold the plaintiff could not derive title under Ex.A-1.
  2. The plaintiff asserted an alternative title by adverse possession. The trial Court examined the claim and held that (a) to successfully claim adverse possession the plaintiff needed to have accepted the true title of the defendant (i.e., admitted defendant's title) so that the possession could be shown to be adverse; (b) the plaintiff had not made such an admission; and (c) the evidence — including revenue entries relied upon by the plaintiff — was not sufficient to prove long, open and uninterrupted adverse possession for the statutory period. The First Appellate Court affirmed these findings.
  3. The appellant argued before this Court that the earlier suit concerned different properties and therefore the earlier invalidation of the sale deed did not operate as res judicata in relation to the suit property. He further argued that res judicata could not be decided without marking the pleadings and connected documents from the earlier suit. The Court recorded these contentions and the authorities relied upon by the appellant.
  4. The respondent argued, and the Court accepted, that the earlier adjudication on the sale deed's validity was final and that the plaintiff could not re-open that issue; further, the plaintiff had pursued alternative inconsistent pleas and, having elected to pursue adverse possession on appeal, had effectively waived the sale-deed based claim. The Court relied on the principles of res judicata, identity of title (not necessarily identity of exact parcel), the doctrine of election/waiver, and the settled requirements for proving adverse possession.
  5. After reviewing the authorities and the record, the Court concluded that the Courts below had correctly applied the law: the plaintiff's title claim based on Ex.A-1 was barred by res judicata in view of the earlier decision, the plaintiff had not proved adverse possession to the required standard, and the plaintiff had waived his sale-deed claim by electing to press adverse-possession grounds on appeal. The Court therefore found no sufficient cause to set aside the judgments below.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED — The second appeal is dismissed.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The judgments and decrees of the trial Court (dated 30.01.2004 in O.S.No.403 of 1993) and the First Appellate Court (dated 23.08.2005 in A.S.No.11 of 2004) stand affirmed.
  • The plaintiff's suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction in O.S.No.403 of 1993 remains dismissed; the plaintiff cannot derive title under Ex.A-1 in view of the earlier adjudication and did not satisfactorily prove adverse possession.
  • The Court recorded that the plaintiff had waived the sale-deed based claim by electing to pursue adverse possession in the first appeal; the second appeal does not reopen those inconsistent pleas.

Broader implications: The opinion does not purport to lay down any new legal precedent; it applies established principles of res judicata, identity of title, election/waiver and the evidentiary requirements for adverse possession to the facts before it.

Costs: No costs were awarded.

Show all summary ...

This second appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 23.08.2005, made in A.S.No.11 of 2004, on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Ponneri, confirming the judgment and decree, dated 30.01.2004, made in O.S.No.403 of 1993, on the file of the District Munsif, Ponneri.

2. For the sake of convenience the parties in the appeal are referred to as they have been arrayed in the suit in O.S.No.403 of 1993.

3. The plaintiff, who is the appellant in the present second appeal has filed the suit in O.S.No.403 of 1993, on the file of the District Munsif, Ponneri, praying for the relief of declaration of title and for permanent injunction. Since the appellant had died during the pendency of the present second appeal, his legal representatives have been brought on record by an order of this Court, dated 11.02.2008, made in M.P.No.1 of 2008 in S.A.No.933 of 2006.

4. The brief facts of the case, as stated by the plaintiff in the plaint, are as follows:

a) The plaintiff is the absolute owner of an extent of 1.65 acres of agricultural land situate in Marambedu village of Ponneri Taluk comprised in S.No.8/3 (45 cents) and in S.No. 8/4 (1.20 cents). The plaintiff had purchased the lands from one V.Kanniah Raju, his wife and son, by a registered sale deed, dated 11.04.1977, registered as Document No.676/1977 at the Sub Registrar's Office, Ponneri. The said property described in the schedule to the plaint, referred to as the suit property, was purchased by the vendor of the plaintiff from one Munusamy Raju by a sale deed, dated 4.11.1957, registered as Document No.3828/1957, in the office of the District Registrar, North Madras, among other properties. The said Munusamy Raju had purchased the suit property in S.No.8/4 by a sale deed, dated 9.11.1953, from one Gajapathy Naidu and the other suit property with an extent of 45 cents was purchased by Munusamy Raju from one Venugopal Naidu, under a sale deed, dated 30.01.1954.

b) The vendor of the plaintiff, namely, Kanniah Raju, was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property from the time of its purchase in the year 1957. The vendor had leased out the property along with other properties to one Bakthavachalu Budhur Kandigai by a lease agreement, dated 14.10.1970. Thus, the vendor of the plaintiff was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property till it was conveyed to the plaintiff in the year 1977. From the date of his purchase, the plaintiff had continued to enjoy the property without any hindrance from anyone. The patta of the suit property had been transferred in the plaintiff's name and he had paid the kist for the suit property. Therefore, no other person excepting the plaintiff has exclusive title over the suit property.

c) The defendant, who is a resident of the same village as that of the plaintiff, wanted to purchase the suit property and since the plaintiff had refused to sell the property to the defendant, he had attempted to trespass in the suit property to commit acts of waste. Since the defendant had denied the title of the plaintiff in his written statement, the plaintiff had filed an amended plaint praying for the relief of declaration of title to the suit property, along with the earlier relief of permanent injunction as sought for, initially. It is also the case of the plaintiff that he has prescribed title to the suit property, by adverse possession, as he has been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the suit property for more than the required statutory period.

5) The defendant had filed a written statement denying the claims made by the plaintiff. The defendant had stated that the sale deed, dated 11.04.1977, said to have been executed by Kanniah Raju, his wife and son, in favour of the plaintiff is not binding on the defendant, since the vendors in the said sale deed had no title over the suit property to convey the same to the plaintiff. The vendors of the plaintiff had not been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property at any point of time and they had no right to sell the said property in favour of the plaintiff. It was also stated that Munusamy Raju, is not the owner of the property. Munusamy Raju, who is the brother-in-law of Chinnaswamy Raju, the father of the defendant, was living with the defendant and his father and he was cultivating the suit lands for their benefit. The property mentioned in the plaint schedule was acquired by the defendant's father, Chinnaswamy Raju, with his own funds and he has been in possession and enjoyment of the same for a very long time. The defendant and his father have been paying the kist for the land and they have been deriving the benefits from the land for nearly five decades.

6) Kanniah Raju S/o Duraiswamy Raju, the vendor of the plaintiff had conspired to obtain a sham conveyance as though Munusamy Raju was entitled to the property. Kanniah Raju had filed a suit in O.S.No.929 of 1973 before the District Munsif Court, Tiruvallur, with regard to the house site in S.No.1/2 in the Marambedu village. However, he had not taken any steps with regard to the suit property. The sale deed, dated 4.11.1957, by Munusamy Raju and the vendor of the plaintiff is not valid and Munusamy Raju had no right to the property. The defendant had also denied that Kanniah Raju was not in possession and enjoyment of the property from the date of his purchase. The alleged lease in favour of Bakthavachalu, on 14.10.1970, is also denied as false. The plaintiff had no right in the suit property and he has not been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property at any point of time.

7. It has been further stated that the suit in O.S.No.929 of 1973 on the file of the District Munsif, Tiruvallur, filed by Kanniah Raju and his wife Saradammal, who was added subsequently as the legal heir, seeking for the declaration of title and possession against the Munusamy Chetty and the defendant in the present suit, had been dismissed. The appeal filed against the judgment and decree of the trial Court had also been dismissed and the sale deed, dated 4.11.1975, was declared as not valid, holding that he had no title to convey. It was also held that the defendant is the owner of the property. Supressing the said fact the plaintiff had filed the present suit with the ulterior motive of dispossessing the defendant from the suit property.

8. Considering the rival claims of the plaintiff, as well as the defendant and after the amendment of the plaint by the plaintiff and based on the additional written statement filed on behalf of the defendant, the following issues were framed by the trial Court for consideration:

i) Whether the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the suit properties?

ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaration of his title to the suit properties?

iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunction as prayed for?

iv) To what relief is the plaintiff entitled?

9. Eight documents were marked as exhibits and one witness was examined in favour of the plaintiff and 13 exhibits were marked and two witnesses were examined on behalf of the defendant.

10. The plaintiff's son, who was examined as P.W.1, had stated in his evidence that the plaintiff had purchased the suit properties under Ex.A-1, sale deed, dated 11.4.1977, executed by Kanniah Raju and others in favour of the plaintiff Ganesa Reddiar. Kanniah Raju had purchased the properties from Munusamy Raju, who in turn had purchased the suit properties, under Ex.A-2 and three other sale deeds. Kanniah Raju was in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and he had leased out the said property to Bakthavachalu under Ex.A-4 lease deed. The decree in the suit filed by Kanniah Raju was not against the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff has been in long, open and uninterrupted possession of the suit properties, he has prescribed title by adverse possession.

11. The defendant was examined as D.W.1. He had stated that the vendors of the plaintiff had no title to convey Ex.A-2, sale deed was neither true nor valid. The suit property belonged to the defendant's father and Munuswamy Raju was assisting his father in cultivating the lands. Taking advantage of the illness of his father, Ex.A-2 sale deed had been obtained. In the suit filed by Munusamy Raju, in O.S.No.929 of 1973, it was held that Munusamy Raju has no title. The trial Court had found that P.W.1, examined on behalf of the plaintiff, had admitted in his evidence that the vendor of the plaintiff, Kanniah Raju, had filed a suit against the defendant and another in O.S.No.929 of 1973 in respect of the suit property.

12. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff had also conceded that the said suit related to the sale deed under which Kanniah Raju had purchased the suit property and under the said sale deed, some other properties had also been purchased. The judgment made in O.S.No.929 of 1973 was marked by the defendant as Ex.B.3. In the said judgment, the District Munsif, Tiruvallur, had held that the plaintiff's vendor had purchased the said property involved in the present suit, under the sale deed, dated 04.11.1957, and the said sale deed was true but not valid.

13. It was contended before the trial Court by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant that the sale deed, under which Kanniah Raju, the vendor of the plaintiff had purchased the suit property, was held to be invalid and that the person who had sold the property to Kanniah Raju had no title to convey the same. Therefore, the plaintiff could not derive any title to the suit property. It had also been contended that the suit was barred by the principle of resjudicata. Even though the earlier suit was in relation to some other properties the sale deed, under which the suit property was said to have been purchased was held to be invalid.

14) The trial Court after considering the various decisions placed before it had come to the conclusion that since the sale deed, under the which the vendor of the plaintiff is said to have purchased the suit property, was held to be invalid, the plaintiff could not have acquired any title to the suit property. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim any ownership of the suit property based on Ex.A-1 sale deed.

15) The contention raised on behalf of the plaintiff that even if it was found that the plaintiff could not have derived title over the suit property under Ex.A-1 sale deed, the plaintiff had clear title by prescription as he had been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property for more than the statutory period. However, the trial Court had declined to accept the said contention by holding that in order to claim adverse possession, the plaintiff ought to have admitted the title of the defendant in the suit property. Since the plaintiff had not admitted the title of the defendant with regard to the suit property, he cannot claim adverse possession.

16) The trial Court had held that the claim of adverse possession by the plaintiff was not sufficiently proved even though there were some entries in the revenue records in favour of the plaintiff. Thus, the trial Court had dismissed the suit holding that it was hit by the principle of resjudicata and for the reason that the plaintiff had not successfully proved that he had prescribed title in the suit property by adverse possession.

17) Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, dated 30.01.2004, made in O.S.No.403 of 1993, the plaintiff had filed an appeal in A.S.No.11 of 2004, on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Ponneri.

18) The only point for consideration framed by the First Appellate Court is whether the appeal is to be allowed.

19) Considering the evidence on record and the contentions raised on behalf of the plaintiff as well as the defendant, the First Appellate Court had confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court, holding that the trial Court had come to the right conclusion that the suit was barred by the principle of resjudicata holding that once the sale deed, dated 11.4.1977, marked as Ex.A-1, was held to be invalid, the plaintiff cannot derive title relying on it. It was further held that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim adverse possession, since he had not accepted the title of the defendant in the suit property. Further, it was held that the plaintiff had not given sufficient details both in the plaint, as originally filed and in the amended plaint, with regard to his adverse possession of the suit property. The exhibits marked in favour of the plaintiff do not sufficiently support the claims made by the plaintiff with regard his long, open, uninterrupted possession of the suit property. In such circumstances, the First Appellate Court had confirmed the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court by its judgment and decree, dated 23.08.2005, made in A.S.No.11 of 2004. In such circumstances, the plaintiff in the suit in O.S.No.403 of 1993, had filed the present second appeal.

20. The second appeal had been admitted on the following substantial questions of law:

1) Whether the Courts below are correct in coming to the conclusion that by virtue of Ex.B-3, the Appellant's claim is barred by resjudicata.

2) Whether the findings given by the Courts below that the appellant has not perfected title by adverse possession is sustainable when he has proved his possession and enjoyment of the property for over the statutory period.

21) The learned counsel Mr.V.Selvaraj, appearing on behalf of the appellant had contended that the earlier suit filed by Kanniah Raju in O.S.NO.929 of 1973, before the District Munsif, Tiruvallur, was in respect of a different property and it did not relate to the suit property. Even if the sale deed, dated 11.04.1977, marked as Ex.A-1, was held to be invalid, it was held to be so only in relation to some other properties and it was not declared to be invalid in so far as the suit property is concerned. Thus the principle of resjudicata cannot apply to the present case. Even if the sale deed, dated 11.04.1977, was held to be invalid, the suit ought to have been decreed in favour of the plaintiff, based on the plea of adverse possession. Since the issue in the earlier suit was relating to a particular property, title derived by the plaintiff in the suit property through the sale deed, dated 11.04.1977, cannot be held to be invalid or non existent.

22. The learned counsel Mr.N.R.Gopalan had submitted that since, in the earlier suit in O.S.No.929 of 1973 filed by Kanniah Raju, it had been held that Ex.A-1 sale deed, dated 11.04.1977, was invalid, the same issue cannot be reopened again by the plaintiff by claiming that he had got the title to the suit property through the said sale deed. Further, the plaintiff cannot prove both the pleas claiming title over the suit property through the sale deed, dated 11.4.1977, as well as the claim of adverse possession.

23) If the plaintiff could rely on the claim of title through adverse possession, he has to necessarily accept the title of the defendant in the suit property. Since he had not done so, his claim of title by adverse possession cannot be accepted. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant that the plaintiff had opted to pursue his claim of adverse possession alone, during the first appeal in A.S.No.11 of 2004.

24. All the grounds raised in the first appeal by the plaintiff were relating to his claim of adverse possession. Since the plaintiff had not accepted the title of the defendant to claim title by adverse possession, both the Courts below have rightly held that he is not entitled to such a relief. Further, the Courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that the suit filed by the plaintiff, in O.S.No.403 of 1993, was hit by the principle of resjudicata as the issue relating to Ex.A-1 sale deed, dated 11.04.1977, had already been decided conclusively in the suit filed by Kanniah Raju in O.S.No.929 of 1973, on the file of the District Munsif, Tiruvallur. While so, it is not open to the plaintiff to reopen the same issue once again in the present suit.

25. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/appellant had submitted that the plea of resjudicata had not been raised by the defendant in the written statement filed by the defendant, except for vague reference made in paragraph-5 of the said written statement. Further, no issues had been framed by the Courts below with regard to the issue of resjudicata. The issue of resjudicata could be decided only if all the connected documents, including the pleadings and evidence in the earlier suit, in O.S.No.929 of 1973, had been marked in the present suit. The issue of resjudicata cannot be decided only based on the three documents, namely Ex.B-3, dated 29.11.1978, which is the judgment in O.S.NO.929 of 1973, Ex.A-8, dated 28.02.1981, the judgment in A.S.No.47 of 1979, and Ex.B-4, dated 12.02.1993, the judgment and decree in S.A.No.1037 of 1982.

26. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff had relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions:

26.1 In the decision reported in Shri Jai Kishan Dass and others V. Smt.Nirmala Devi and others (AIR 1984 SC 589) it has been held that the principle of res judicata would apply if the issues had been decided in earlier litigations between the parties and or their predecessors.

26.2 In the decision reported in Srimati Raj Lakshmi Dasi and others V. Banamali Sen and others (AIR 1953 SC 33) it has been held that the test of res judicata is the identity of title in the two litigations and not the identity of the actual property involved in the two cases.

26.3 In the decision reported in Mahalingeshwara Devaru and another V. Seetharama Bhatta and another (AIR 1978 Karnataka 213), it has been held as follows:

"The primary test of res judicata depends upon the identity of title in the two litigations and not the identity of the actual property involved in the two cases. Therefore, even if the property involved in the previous suit was different, that cannot be an impediment to invoke the principles of res judicata."

26.4 In the decision reported in Kadapurath Illam Khalid V. Beemapura Palamkakkada Sulekha and others (AIR 1986 Kerala 251) it has been held as follows:

"To press into service the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel by record it is enough if the party concerned shows that the parties to both the suits were the same, and are persons whose names are on the record at the time of the decision, even if a party may be a person who got intervened in the suit."

26.5 In the decision reported in Ram Gobinda Daw and others V. Smt.H.Bhakta Bala Dassi etc., (AIR 1971 SC 664) it has been held as follows:

"The test of res judicata is the identity of title in the two litigations and not the identity of the actual property involved in the two cases but the previous decision must be one on a title in respect of which a dispute has been raised and which dispute was heard and finally decided by the Court. Once the decision on question of title becomes final it operates as resjudicata even if the value of the subject matter on which the former decision was pronounced was comparatively very trifling. When the decision was given by trial Court after contest it operates as res judicata even if appeal therefrom might have been dismissed on some preliminary grounds like limitation."

26.6 In the decision reported in Kunhayammed and others V. State of Kerala and another (AIR 2000 SC 2587) it has been held as follows :

"The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. When a decree or order passed by inferior Court, tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, through the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective and binding nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior Court has disposed of the lis before it either way Whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior Court, tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the Court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Art.136. of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not the latter."

26.7 In the decision reported in Bhavani Amma and others V. Narayana Acharya and others (AIR 1963 Mysore 120) it has been held as follows:

"When the judgment and decree of a Court are appealed against, the decree of the Court of first instance is merged in the decree of the appellate Court though the appellate Court may affirm the decree of the trial Court. What operates as res judicata is not only the decision but the grounds on which the decision is based. Where a judgment has been superseded by the decree and judgment made in the appeal, the former judgment cannot be pleaded in bar of res judicata."

26.8 In the decision reported in Venkateswarlu V. Venkata Narasimham and others (AIR 1957 AP 557) it has been held as follows:

"Where the matter went up on appeal the appeal destroyed the finality of the judgment of the trial Court and the appellate, judgment superseded that of the trial Court. It is the appellate judgment that has to be looked to determine the question of res judicata."

26.9 In the decision reported in Munshi Mohammad Abdul Aziz V. Gulam Julani (AIR 1937 Madras 709) it has been held as follows:

"Where in a former suit between the same parties an issue was decided by the trial Court but the appellate Court refrained from deciding it, the issue cannot be deemed to have been finally decided and it can be raised in a subsequent suit between the same parties."

26.10 In the decision reported in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai (Dead) by L.Rs and others V. Mohd. Hanifa (Dead) by L.Rs. And others (AIR 1976 SC 1569) it has been held as follows:

"Before a plea of res judicata can be given effect, the following conditions must be proved-

(1) that the litigating parties must be the same. (2) that the subject-matter of the suit also must be identical; (3) that the matter must be finally decided between the parties and (4) that the suit must be decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction."

26.11 1n the decision reported in A.M.K.Mariam Bibi and others V. M.A.Abdul Rahim and others (2000 AIHC 661) it has been held that where pleadings in the suit between the same parties have not been filed and when only a judgment was filed, the question of res judicata cannot be decided since pleadings cannot be proved merely by recitals of allegations mentioned in the judgment.

26.12 In the decision reported in Kuppusamy Gounder and others V. Kannammal and others (2001 3 L.W 483) it has been held that for urging a plea of res judicata merely filing of a final decree in the earlier suit is not sufficient, since necessary ingredients such as identity of the properties, issues etc. have to be shown. The pleadings and the judgment in the earlier suit have to be marked in the trial Court.

26.13 In the decision reported in Shantaben Naranbhai Dalvadi and others V.Vadilal Kacharabhai Prajapati (2000 AIHC 717) it has been held that when there is a substantial difference between the nature of the property, extent of the property and distribution of the property amongst the various floors in the earlier suit and the subsequent suit and since the identity of the property cannot be urged to be the same, the bar of res judicata will not apply.

27. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent had submitted that the plea of adverse possession was raised by the plaintiff, belatedly, only after eight years. While the plaint in O.S.No.403 of 1993 had been filed on 20.04.1993, praying for the relief of permanent injunction, the amendment was made as per the order in I.A.No.773 of 2001, dated 12.09.2001. The plaintiff had pursued only the plea of adverse possession at the stage of the first appeal. The First Appellate Court had considered all the issues relating to the matter and had come to the right conclusion of confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court.

28. The learned counsel appearing for the defendant had relied on the following decisions in support of his contentions:

28.1 In the decision reported in R.Samudra Vijayam Chettiar V. Srinivsa Alwar and others (AIR 1956 Madras 301) it has been held as follows:

"Where a man is entitled to one of two inconsistent rights and he has with full knowledge done an unequivocal act indicating his choice of the one he cannot afterwards pursue the other which after the first choice is by reason of the inconsistency no longer open to him. Such cases do not require detriment to the other party as foundation for their application."

28.2 In the decision reported in Union of India V. Bharat Fire and General Insurance Ltd. New Delhi (AIR 1961 Punjab 157) it has been held as follows:

"Where a person concerned has the choice of two rights, either of which he is at liberty to adopt, but not both, and he adopts the one he cannot afterwards assert the other."

28.3 In the decision reported in P.Dasa Muni Reddy V. P.Appa Rao (AIR 1974 SC 2089) it has been held as follows:

"Abandonment of right is much more than mere waiver, acquiescence or laches. The decision of the High Court in the present case is that the appellant has waived the right to evict the respondent. Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage, benefit, claim or privilege which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed."

28.4 In the decision reported in M/s.Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd., V. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others (AIR 1979 SC 621) it has been held as follows:

"Waiver means abandonment of a right and it may be either express or implied from conduct, but is basic requirement is that it must be an intentional act with knowledge."

28.5 In the decision reported in M/s.Marisami Brothers by its Managing Partner M.Marisami V. M/s.Bluemount Switchgears Assocaites (Pte.) Ltd., represented by its Managing Director S.Palaniswami and others (1969 (I) MLJ 573) it has been held as follows:

"As a matter of fact, it is significant that the defendants have raised the question of res judicata with regard to the maintainability of the suit itself on the basis of the decision in the earlier suit. The plaintiff had ample opportunity to put forward any such plea of res judicata in relation to the genuineness of Exhibit A-1, and they did not do so. Under these circumstances, I am of the view that they cannot be permitted to raise the question for the first time in this second appeal."

28.6 In the decision reported in Washdev Singh Biji V. Union of India and another (AIR 1970 Delhi 85), it has been held as follows:

"Plea of res judicata Plea negatived by trial Court Plea not agitated in first appellate Court Plea not allowed to be raised in second appeal, more particularly when the suit itself is held to be incompetent."

28.7 In the decision reported in Manak Lal V. Dr.Premchand Singhvi and others (AIR 1957 SC 425) it has been held as follows:

"Held that on the facts and circumstances of the case the appellant knew the material facts and must be deemed to have been conscious of his legal rights in that matter and therefore his deliberate failure to raise the objection.......... at the earlier stage of the proceedings created an effective bar of waiver against him and he was precluded from raising it before the High Court for the first time."

28.8 In the decision reported in Seth Ghasiram Seth Dalchand Palliwal V. Mt.Kundambai W/o.Rameshwar Shukul and others (AIR 1940 Nagpur 163) it has been held as follows:

"New plea Plea of res judicata not raised in Court below cannot be allowed in second appeal.

The plea of res judicata is not a pure plea of law and if it was not pleaded or raised in the lower Court, it cannot be agitated in second appeal."

28.9 In the decision reported in P.S.M.Ahamed Abdul Khader V. T.K.Mohammed Abubucker and others (AIR 2002 Madras 213) it has been held that to prove adverse possession, one has to plead and prove that a particular person is the true owner and he is holding the property in adverse possession openly.

28.10 In the decision reported in Annasaheb Bapusahep Patil and others V. Balwant alias Balasaheb Babusaheb Patil (dead) by LRs and heirs etc., (AIR 1995 SC 895) it has been held as follows:

"Where possession could be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another's title..... Therefore, a person who enters into possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that title by pretending that he had no title at all."

28.11 In the decision reported in Kadapurath Illam Khalid V. Beemapura Palamkakkada Sulekha and others (AIR 1986 Kerala 251) it has been held as follows:

"Resjudicata Test Identity of title in both earlier and subsequent suits is to be proved and not identity of actual properties involved."

28.12 In the decision reported in Mahalingeshwara Devaru and another V. Seetharama Bhatta and another (AIR 1978 Karnataka 213) it has been held as follows:

""The primary test of res judicata depends upon the identity of title in the two litigations and not the identity of the actual property involved in the two cases. Therefore, even if the property involved in the previous suit was different, that cannot be an impediment to invoke the principles of res judicata."

28.13 In the decision reported in M/s.Ram Mohan & Co rep. by its Proprietrix R.Renuka and another Vs. Ganesar Ginning Co. P. Ltd., Coimbatore and twelve others (1999(III) CTC 40) it has been held as follows:

"Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order 43, Rule 1 Appeal - No appeal can be filed against a finding by party in whose favour the proceedings have ended.

28.14 In (AIR Civil Court, Manual 451) the following illustration has been shown:

A sues B for possession of certain properties on the basis of a sale deed in his favour. B impugns the deed as fictitiuous. It is held that the deed is fictitious and the suit is dismissed. A subsequently brings another suit against B for certain other properties on the basis of the same sale deed. The suit is barred, as the issue about the character of the deed was actually in issue in the former suit directly and substantially."

29. Considering the contentions raised on behalf of the parties concerned and in view of the records available before this Court, it is clear that the Courts below have come to the right conclusion in dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff as he has not been in a position to substantiate his claim of title in the suit property. Both the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court had rejected his claim of title in the suit property, since the sale deed, dated 11.04.1977, marked as Ex.A-1, had been found to be invalid in the suit in O.S.No.929 of 1973, filed by Kanniah Raju. Thus, it was rightly held by the Courts below that the claim of title in the suit property by the plaintiff is hit by the principle of resjudicata. Further, the plaintiff has not been in a position to prove his claim of title in the suit property by adverse possession. It is clear that unless the plaintiff had accepted the title of the defendant in the suit property, it was not open to him to claim title by adverse possession. It is also seen that the plaintiff had waived his claim for title through the sale deed, dated 11.04.1977, marked as Ex.A-1, at the stage of the first appeal. It is seen that all the grounds raised by the plaintiff in the first appeal relates only to the claim of adverse possession. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the defendant that once the plaintiff had opted to chose one of the pleas, between the two inconsistent pleas of title through the sale deed, dated 11.04.1977, and title by adverse possession, it is not open to the plaintiff to come before this Court by way of a second appeal, reopening both the pleas once again.

30. In such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the plaintiff in the suit in O.S.No.403 of 1993, who had come before this Court by way of the present second appeal, has not shown sufficient cause or reason to set aside the judgment and decree of the Courts below. In such circumstances, the second appeal stands dismissed. No costs.

Index:Yes/No 22-04-2008 Internet:Yes/No csh M.JAICHANDREN,J csh S.A.No.933 of 2006

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