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Srirangam Co-Operative Urban Bank, Ltd., Srirangam v. (1) Labour Court, Madurai

Madras High Court
Mar 15, 1996
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Court Opinion Summary: Srirangam Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd. v. Sri K. Nagarajan (Judgment delivered by Swami, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arises from the employment history of Sri K. Nagarajan. He was first appointed as a clerk in the bank from 1 April 1974 and paid Rs. 261 per month until his services were terminated on 31 May 1975. No challenge was taken then. He was re-employed on a daily-wage basis effective 1 August 1980 at the rate of Rs. 13 per day (paid monthly as Rs. 336) and continued to work until 27 April 1982, when he was removed by office communication issued pursuant to a review/report of the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies dated 9 April 1982.

The writ-petitioner (Nagarajan) raised an industrial dispute before the Labour Court under Industrial Dispute No. 248 of 1993 (points framed: (1) whether non-employment was justified and (2) computation of any monetary relief). The Labour Court (award dated 26 February 1985) rejected the contention of unfair labour practice and held petitioner not entitled to relief, observing that appointment required Registrar competence.

The petitioner challenged the Labour Court award by Writ Petition No. 7321 of 1985 seeking quashing of the award and directions for reinstatement with continuity of service, back-wages and attendant benefits. The Single Judge allowed the writ petition on the ground that Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act applied and that the statutory conditions for retrenchment were not complied with. The bank (Srirangam Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd.) appealed against the Single Judge’s order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act are attracted to the case in view of the contention that termination was due to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies not approving the appointment (i.e., petitioner lacked requisite qualification and appointment was without approval).
  2. Whether there was in law any termination of services where the original appointment itself was alleged to be void.
  3. Whether the question of termination does not arise because the petitioner’s services were not capable of continuation in view of his lack of requisite qualifications for appointment as clerk.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Bank) — Principal contentions

  • The appointment of the petitioner was void or irregular because he did not possess the qualifications prescribed by the special by-law for clerks and the appointment was made without approval of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies as per a circular; accordingly the appointment conferred no enforceable right.
  • Because the appointment was invalid, the termination/ removal effected pursuant to the Registrar's direction merely recognized that the appointment was void and did not amount to retrenchment attracting Section 25-F.
  • The bank relied upon a Kerala High Court decision (Eranalloor Sendee Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Labour Court) that had held Section 25-F inapplicable where appointment was ab initio void, and sought to distinguish other authorities relied upon by the respondent.

Respondent (Petitioner) / Writ-Petitioner — Principal contentions and relief sought

  • The petitioner had been in continuous service for over two years on daily-wage basis (thus exceeding one year) and therefore fell within the protection of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • The petitioner sought reinstatement with continuity of service, back-wages and attendant benefits, on the basis that retrenchment conditions were not complied with by the bank when removing him from service on 27 April 1982.
  • The Labour Court’s award rejecting unfair labour practice was challenged; the Single Judge granted relief under Section 25-F and the petitioner relied on that order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala [1980 (2) L.L.N 170] Interpreted definition and object of Ss. 25-F, 25-FF and 25-FFF: retrenchment compensation is to soften hardship of loss of employment; termination for non-confirmation still attracts Section 25-F. The court relied on this decision to support the proposition that termination of service for reasons other than the statutory exceptions still constitutes retrenchment and attracts the safeguards of Section 25-F.
Indian Hume Pipe Company Ltd. v. Workman [A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 251] (cited within Santosh Gupta) Explained the nature and object of retrenchment compensation — to provide partial protection to the retrenched employee and family. Used by the court (via Santosh Gupta) to underline the compensatory object of Sections dealing with retrenchment and to justify broad application of Section 25-F.
Punjab Land Development & Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Labour Court, Chandigarh [1990 (1) L.L.N 1054] Held that termination by employer for any reason whatsoever (except those explicitly excluded in S.2(oo)) attracts S.25-F; termination because appointing authority lacked power still required compliance with Section 25-F. The court relied on this Supreme Court decision to hold that invalidity or irregularity of appointment does not immunize the employer from complying with Section 25-F when terminating service.
Prabhu Dayal Jat v. Alwar Sahakar Bhumi Vikas Bank Ltd. [1991 (2) L.L.N 1042] Division Bench held that termination of a workman on ground that appointment was irregular still attracted S.25-F where retrenchment provisions were not complied with. Cited as supporting authority that invalidity of appointment is not an exception to statutory retrenchment protections.
Rajeshkumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1993 (1) L.L.N 1009] Held that an invalid appointment was not an exception under S.2(oo) and therefore termination required compliance with Section 25-F. Used by the court to further support the proposition that irregular or invalid appointment does not dispense with retrenchment obligations under Section 25-F.
Mithilesh Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar [1995 (1) L.L.N 1048] Observed that the idea of illegal or invalid appointments is foreign to the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act; termination for illegal appointment qualifies as retrenchment under S.2(oo). Cited to reinforce the court’s conclusion that invalid appointments do not fall within the exceptions to retrenchment and Section 25-F protections apply.
Eranalloor Sendee Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Labour Court [1986 (2) L.L.N 1132] Kerala High Court Single Judge held that Section 25-F did not apply where an appointment was ab initio void and thereby concluded reinstatement under Section 25-F was not warranted. The appellant relied on this case; the court reviewed it and expressly disagreed with its reasoning, concluding it was not consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court and other High Courts cited above.
Workmen of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton & Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. Bangalore Woollen Cotton & Silk Mills Co. Ltd. [A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1363] (cited in Eranalloor) Principle that a service must be capable of being continued to attract termination protections; referenced regarding whether an appointment was validly made and capable of being continued. Cited in the discussion of the contrary view (Eranalloor). The court considered these points but found Eranalloor’s reliance and interpretation distinguishable and not persuasive in the factual matrix of the present case.
State Bank of India, Kuzhithurai Branch v. Sundaramony (N.) [1976 (2) L.L.N 5] (referenced) Discussed idea that some act of volition by the employer to terminate service may be necessary to attract provisions like Section 25-F. Cited as part of the debate in Eranalloor and considered by the court; the present court did not accept Eranalloor’s application of this line of reasoning to deny Section 25-F protection.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the material facts and legal contentions and proceeded as follows.

  1. Admissibility of new pleas: The Court noted that certain contentions (for example, that the appointment was void because of non-approval by the Registrar and lack of qualification) were raised for the first time before the High Court rather than before the Labour Court; the Court nevertheless permitted those contentions to be urged and considered them together because they overlapped.
  2. Character of the appointment and continuous service: Although the petitioner had been appointed on a daily-wage basis, he worked for over two years. The Court treated that factual period as continuous service in excess of one year for purposes of the Industrial Disputes Act (specifically noting Section 257 and the concept of continuous service).
  3. Applicability of the by-law and Registrar's circular: The Court found the special by-law qualifications and the Registrar's circular inapplicable to the petitioner’s daily-wage appointment because the by-law’s qualifications related to regular appointments whereas the petitioner had been engaged on a daily-wage basis. The Court therefore rejected the bank’s submission that the by-law/circular rendered the appointment void for the purpose of avoiding retrenchment protections.
  4. Statutory interpretation of “retrenchment”: The Court relied on the definition of “retrenchment” in Section 2(oo) and the safeguards in Section 25-F. It emphasized that Section 2(oo) does not distinguish between kinds of appointments (regular, temporary, daily-wage) and that the relevant fact is the existence of employment/continuous service rather than the legality or formality of the appointment.
  5. Precedential support: The Court surveyed authorities — notably Santosh Gupta and Punjab Land Development Bank — to confirm that termination of service for reasons other than those explicitly excluded by S.2(oo) attracts the protections of S.25-F. The Court found similar holdings in several High Court decisions and rejected the contrary view taken in Eranalloor Sendee Co-operative Bank as inconsistent with Supreme Court authority and the majority of later decisions.
  6. Conclusion of law applied to facts: Applying those principles to the facts (a daily-wage appointment resulting in continuous service of more than one year and a termination order made without adherence to Section 25-F requirements), the Court concluded that the dismissal/termination amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of the Act and that the bank had failed to comply with statutory pre-conditions (notice/compensation).
  7. Relief and its scope: While agreeing with the Single Judge that Section 25-F applied and that the award of the Labour Court should be quashed, the Court varied the Single Judge’s grant of relief to make clear that reinstatement should be to the same nature of employment held on the date of termination (i.e., reinstatement as a daily-wage worker at the existing daily rate), and specified the amount of arrears calculated and procedures/timelines for payment and reporting.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The writ appeal is dismissed (subject to modification of the Single Judge’s order regarding the relief granted).

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The petitioner (Sri K. Nagarajan) is to be reinstated as a daily-wage workman at the rate of Rs. 13 per day — i.e., reinstatement to the same nature of employment he had on the date of termination. The Court clarified that any future increases applicable to daily-wage workers will be available as appropriate.
  • The arrears of wages from the date of termination until 31 March 1996 were calculated by the bank at Rs. 54,275 (at Rs. 13/day excluding Sundays). The Court directed payment of that sum (plus April 1996 wages) in a schedule: arrears up to 31 March 1996 to be paid on the date the workman reports for duty (which the Court directed to be 15 May 1996), and wages for April 1996 to be paid on or before the end of May 1996.
  • The petitioner is entitled to wages payable to a daily-wage worker as prevailing on the date he reports to duty and to other statutory benefits, if any, available to daily-wage workers.
  • Connected Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 2734 of 1996 was rejected. No costs were awarded.

Broader legal implication: The Court applied and reinforced established authority that the statutory protections of Section 25-F (and the definition of retrenchment in Section 2(oo)) are not defeated merely because an appointment may have been irregular or not approved by a statutory authority. The Court expressly disagreed with the contrary reasoning in Eranalloor Sendee Co-operative Bank Ltd. as being inconsistent with Supreme Court precedents. The opinion did not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying existing precedents to the facts of this case.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Swami, C.J:— This appeal is preferred by line Sriangam Co-operative Urban Bank Limited, Srirangam, Trichy (hereinafter referred to as the Bank) against the order, dated 28 October 1995 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 7321 of 1995. In the writ petition, the petitioner sought for quashing the award, dated 26 February 1985, passed by the Labour Court in Industrial Dispute No. 248 of 1993. That would came to be passed in the dispute raised on the following points:

(1) Whether the non-employment of Sri K. Nagarajan is justified, if not to what relief he is entitled?

(2) To compute the relief, if any awarded in terms of money if it can be so computed.

The facts which lead to the above said dispute are as follows:

The petitioner, Sri K. Nagarajan, was appointed in the bank as clerk, from 1 April 1974 and he was paid a total salary of Rs. 261 per month. He continued as such till 31 May 1975 when his services were terminated. He did not take any action with regard to his termination of services. However, he was re-employed on daily wages basis at the rate of Rs. 13 per day and paid monthly salary of Rs. 336 with effect from 1 August 1980. He continued in that position till 27 April 1982, on which date, he was removed from the services by the office communication, dated 27 April 1982, which reads as follows:

“PROCEEDINGS OF THE PRESIDENT, SRIRANGAM CO-OPERATIVE URBAN BANK, LTD., SRIRANGAM

Present: Sri K. Padmanaban

Sub: Urban Bank Srirangam Co-operative Urban Bank Removal of Sri K. Nagarajan and C. Mani from their services — Orders issued.

Ref: Review of the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Trichy Re. 14755/81-85 (i), dated 9 April 1982.

As per Joint Registrar's review in the reference cited, the following two employees who are working as daily wagers in the Srirangam Co-operative Urban Bank are hereby from their services of the bank.

1. Sri K. Nagarajan

2. Sri C. Mani

It is also hereby noted that Sri K. Nagarajan and Sri C. Mani are not to be allowed to report to the bank for any duly.

President.

Therefore, the writ-petitioner raised the dispute which was referred to the Labour Court, which by award, dated 26 February 1985, found that Registrar of Co-operative Societies alone was competent to make appointment and the bank, in defiance of the rules and regulations, appointed the petitioner as temporary clerk as the Board of Directors of the bank was very much interested in the petitioner and initiative was taken by the Board to get the appointment ratified. Hence, the petitioner's contention that the bank had adopted unfair labour practice was rejected by the Labour Court as fallacious. Accordingly, the Labour Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to any relief. Aggrieved by the aforesaid award, the petitioner preferred Writ Petition No. 7321 of 1985, challenging the award and further sought for a direction to reinstate him as clerk with continuity of service, back-wages and all other attendant benefits with costs. Learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition as prayed for on the ground that S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was attracted to the case and as the condition precedent to retrenchment of a workman was not complied with removal of the petitioner from the services was bad in law. The relevant portion of the order of the learned Single Judge is as follows:

“It is admitted fact by both sides that the writ-petitioner was initially appointed by the second respondent management and subsequently for want of vacancy his services were terminated. It is evident that as and when the retrenchment is going to be effected under the Industrial Law, the last entrant has to go. Applying the above said principle, the second respondent rightly terminated the services of the writ-petitioner for want of vacancy. Thereafter, when once another vacancy arose, the management look a right decision in reappointing the writ-petitioner and he was allowed to continue in service for a period of two years. This fad has not been disputed by the respondents. It is not a case where the workman did not work to the satisfaction of the management and it is not a case where the workman was appointed on daily wages and it is not a case where his services were terminated on a proof of misconduct. The writ-petitioner was allowed to continue to work for a period of two years. No doubt the second respondent is at liberty to terminate the services as and when retrenchment is going to be effected. But it is the duly of the management to satisfy the ingredients of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Ad. According to S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes; Act it is mandatory on the part of the appointing authority, viz., the second respondent herein to pay wages and also to pay the terminal benefits and it is the case where the second respondent has not even paid the terminal benefits. II is clear (hat the second respondent has not followed the ingredients of S. 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act. As such, the order of termination passed by the second respondent, without applying the conditions laid down under S. 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act cannot sustain under law and it is liable to be set aside.”

Hence, the bank has come up in appeal.

2. In the light of the contentions urged on both sides, the following points arise for consideration:

(i) Whether the provisions of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act are attracted to the case having regard to the contention that the termination was due to the fact that the Registrar of Cooperative Societies had not approved the appointment as the petitioner was not qualified?

(ii) Whether there was no termination of the services of the petitioner in the eye of law as the very appointment itself was void.

(iii) That the question of termination of services of the petitioner did not arise as the services of the petitioner was not capable of continuation having regard to the fact that the petitioner did not possess the requisite qualification for appointment as clerk.

3. We may point out at the outset that all these contentions, on the basis of which the aforesaid points are raised are urged for the first time before this Court. There was no such plea whatsoever raised before the Labour Court. However, we have allowed them to be urged. As the facts and contentions relating to all the three points overlap, we consider all the three points together.

4. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was re-employed in the bank on 1 July 1980 as the clerk on daily-wage basis. However, his wages were paid monthly, in a sum of Rs. 336. He continued to work as such till 27 April 1982 on which dale his services were terminated. Clause 2 (ii) of the special by-laws relating to the service conditions of the employees of the bank specifically provides that a clerk should possess the qualification of S.S.L.C and must have undergone a full course training in the Central Co-operative Institute, Madras or in any of the Mofussil Co-operative Training Institutes or in any of the Co-operative Training Colleges for intermediator senior personnel conducted by the National Council for Co-operative Training and a pass in the Government Technical Examinations book-keeping, banking and auditing or the examination on those subjects conducted by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission or the Examinations for Co-operative Supervisor's Training course conducted by the/Tamil Nadu Cooperative Union or the examination for Higher Diploma in Cooperation conducted by the Co-operative Training Colleges. Admittedly the petitioner did not possess the qualifications laid down in aforesaid by-law.

4A. The Registrar of Cooperative Societies had issued a circular directing that no appointment of any ineligible persons and no appointment in excess of the requirement should be made. If such appointment be made, it shall be subject to the approval of the Registrar. It is contended that as the petitioner did not possess the requisite qualifications and as he was appointed without the approval of the Registrar, the appointment itself was void and it did not confer any right upon the petitioner, therefore, his services did not even require to be terminated. The fact that his services were terminated could not by itself confer any right upon him to claim that termination of his services amounted to retrenchment. It is also further contended that the appointment being void, the petitioner could not have been continued therefore, there was no question of termination of services and the impugned order, dated 27 April 1982 issued by the president of the bank, removing the petitioner from service had no effect in the eye of law except indicating that his appointment was void.

5. We find it very difficult to accept these contentions. Firstly, the bank, which had appointed the petitioner, had taken his services and paid wages during the period he worked, cannot now be permitted to say that the appointment was bad in law, therefore, it was entitled to terminate the services without following the procedure prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act. The by-law referred to above, does not require that the appointment to be approved by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. Further, the petitioner was not appointed as regular employee. He was appointed only on daily-wage basis. The services contemplated under the bye-laws are the regular appointments, and not the appointments on daily-wage basis, therefore, the contentions based upon the special bye-law and the circular of the Registrar, which cannot be applied to the present case, as it is a pure and simple case of appointment on daily-wage basis, cannot be accepted. When once the workman is appointed on daily-wage basis and if he works for 240 days in a year, he must be said to be in continuous service as per S. 257 of the Act, as such he is entitled to be made permanent. However, we do not propose, to enter into this aspect of the matter and record any finding on this because it is not one of the points raised in the dispute referred to the Labour Court. The dispute referred to the Labour Court. The dispute referred to the Labour Court was only with regard to the non-employment of the petitioner and the computation of relief in term of money if it is held that the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement with back-wages. For the purpose of this case it is sufficient to point out that the writ-petitioner worked for over two years. Thus be was in continuous service for more than one year as such he was entitled to the benefit of S. 25-F of the Act. The expression “retrenchment” as per S. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act means the termination by the employer of service of a workman for any reason whatsoever otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action as long as such termination docs not fall within the category of the voluntary retirement of a workman or retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concernal contains a stipulation in that behalf. Thus, S. 2(oo) does not make any difference between regular appointment or temporary appointment or appointment on daily-wage basis or appointment of a person not possessing requisite qualification. Clause (bb) in S. 2(OO) came to be inserted only with effect from 18 August 1984, therefore the said provision is not applicable to the present case. The present case also does not fall under Cl. (c) because the services of the petitioner have not been terminated on the ground of continued ill-health. Similarly, S. 257 of the Act specifically provides that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until

(a) the workman has been given one months' notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice?

(b) the workman has been paid at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months.

This is a case in which the petitioner was in continuous service for more than one year under the bank irrespective of the fact whether the appointment made by the bank was valid one or not. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was temporarily appointed by the Board of the bank on 1 August 1980 as it is specifically stated in the counter filed by the bank before the Labour Court, Madurai, which reads thus:

“The Board of respondent bank decided on 25 July 1980 to appoint the petitioner temporarily with effect from 1 August 1980 on wages at Rs. 5 per day and to request the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies to exempt the case of appointment of the petitioner from the circular of the Registrar, dated 17 September 1977 as the appointment would be against that circular.”

It is also further stated in Para. 13 of the counter that the petitioner was to be confirmed on the date of termination of the employment, but the bank could not help terminating his employment instead of confirming him.

6. From the impugned order of termination of the petitioner, it is clear that the same has been done pursuant to the direction issued by the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Trichy, in the report made by him in Rc. No. 14755/81-85 (i), dated 9 April 1982. It may be pointed out have that even though the termination was made pursuant to the direction of the Joint Registrar, nevertheless such a termination was required to he made in accordance with the provisions contained in S. 25-F of the Act in as much as the said section does not make any difference whether the appointment has been made in accordance with law or not. The expression used in that section is, “workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer,” therefore the factum of employment is relevant and not the legality or otherwise of it.

7. In Santosh Gupta v. State Bank Of Patiala [1980 (2) L.L.N 170], the Supreme Court considered the case of retrenchment of a workman and also considered the definition of the expression “retrenchment” in S. 25-F of the Act and held thus, in Para. 6, at page 173:

‘In interpreting these provisions, i.e, Ss. 25-F, 25-FF and 25-FFF, one must not ignore their object. The manifest object of these provisions is to so compensate the workmen for loss of employment as to provide him the wherewithal to subsist until he finds fresh employment. The non-inclusion of Voluntary retirement of the workmen’ ‘retirement of workman on reaching the age of superannuation’ ‘termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued health’ in the definition of ‘retrenchment’ clearly indicate and emphasise what we have said about the true object of Ss. 25-F, 25-FF and 25-FFF and the nature of the compensation provided by these provisions. The nature of retrenchment compensation has been explained in Indian Hume Pipe Company Ltd. v. Workman [A.I.R 1960 S.C 251], as follows:

As the expression ‘retrenchment compensation’ indicates it is compensation paid to a workman on his retrenchment and it is intended to give him some relief and to soften the rigour of hardship which retrenchment inevitably anises. The retrenched workman is, suddenly and without his fault, thrown on the street and has to face the grim problem of unemployment. At the commencement of his employment a workman naturally expects and look forward to security of service spread over a long period; but retrenchment destroys his hopes and expectations. The object of retrenchment compensation is to give partial protection to the retrenched employee and his family to enable them to tide over the hard period of unemployment.’

Once the object of Ss. 25-F, 25-FF and 25-FFF is understood and the true nature of the compensation which those provisions provide is realised, it is difficult to make any distinction between termination of service for one reason and termination of service for another.”

In the above case, the discharge of the workman was made on the ground that she did not pass the test which would have enabled her to be confirmed. It was held that the fact that the workman was not entitled to be confirmed was not a ground to overcome the provisions contained in S. 25-F and S. 2(oo) of the Act.

8. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation, Ltd. v. Labour Court, Chandigarh [1990 (1) L.L.N 1054], the question of terminal ion of the workmen without following S. 2(oo) and S. 25-F of the Act was considered. In that case the services of the workmen were terminated on the ground that the Chairman had no power to appoint them. The Labour Court held that services of the workmen were terminated illegally without payment of retrenchment compensation under the Act and that they were entitled to reinstatement. The Supreme Court held that the termination by the employer of the services of the workmen for any reason whatsoever, other than those expressly excluded by the definition in S. 2(oo) of the Act would attract S. 25-F of the Act. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows, in Paras. 82 and 83, at pages 1082 and 1083:

“Applying the above reasonings, principles and precedents, to the definition in S. 2 (oo) of the Act, we hold, that ‘retrenchment’ means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever except those expressly excluded in (he section.

The result is that Civil Appeals Nos. 3241 - 48 of 1981, 686 (NL), 1817 and 1989, 3261, 1866 and 1868 of 1982, 8456 and 10828 and the appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 3149 of 1983 arc dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 3000 in each appeal. It is stated that in Civil Appeal No. 686 of 1982 the respondent has already been reinstated pursuant to the order, dated 24 October 1983, passed by this Court, having regard to the fact that he has served since 1983, he shall be considered for confirmation with effect from his due date according to rules, if he is not already confirmed by the Corporation.”

9. Similarly in Prabhu Dayal Jat v. Alwar Sahakar Bhumi Vikas Bank, Ltd. [1991 (2) L.L.N 1042], a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court considered the case of termination of the services of the workman on the ground that the appointment was irregular and its such the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur, issued the direction to terminate his services and in compliance of that direction, the Bank terminated the services without following S. 25-F of the Act the held that S. 25-F of the Act was attracted. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows, in Paras. 9 and 10, at page 1044:

“Admittedly, the provisions of S. 25-F of the Act were not complied with. Any retrenchment in violation of the provisions of S. 25-F of the Act is bad and non est. Such a retrenchment is invalid.

In the results, we allow the writ petition and quash the impugned order, dated 12 October 1987 Annexure 6. The respondents are directed to forthwith reinstate the petitioner on the post he was working on 12 October 1987. As regards the back-wages, the petitioner is advised to initiate the legal proceedings under S. 33-C(2) of the Act, because it is a disputed question whether he remained in gainful employment or not for the period from 13 October 1987 till today.”

10. A Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Rajeshkumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1993 (1) L.L.N 1009], has considered the case of termination of services of a workman on the ground that the appointment was invalid. The contention raised in that case, similar to the one raised before us, was that as the appointment itself was invalid, the services of workman could be terminated without complying with the provisions of S. 25-F of the Act It was held that an invalid appointment was not one of the exceptions found in S. 2(oo) of the Act; that any retrenchment not falling under in any one of the exception mentioned in S. (oo) of the Act would amount to retrenchment and for such termination conditions prescribed in S. 25-F of the Act were to be complied with, therefore the order of termination was held to be illegal and the workman was directed to be continued in the employment with all the benefits.

11. A learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court in Mithilesh Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar [1995 (1) L.L.N 1048], has considered the case of termination of the services of a workman on the ground that he was appointed illegally. The learned Single Judge has held that, in Para. 7, at page 1049:

“…The idea of illegal or invalid appointments is quite foreign to the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act. The termination of employment of a workman on the ground that his initial appointment was not legal and valid itself qualifies as retrenchment within the meaning of S. 2(oo) as termination for illegal and invalid appointment has not been made an exception to the definition of retrenchment…”

12. Thus it is clear from aforesaid decisions and more specially the two decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above that the nature of employment, viz., whether legally made or not or on irregular appointment or an appointment by a person not competent to appoint, would not be a ground to refuse to follow the provisions contained in S. 25-F of the Act. However, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a judgment of the Kerala High Court in Eranalloor Sendee Co-operative Bank, Ltd. v. Labour Court [1986 (2) L.L.N 1132]. That was a case wherein the workman while working as commission agent was appointed as salesman on a temporary basis, subject to the approval of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. At that time when he was appointed as salesman, he did not have the requisite qualification prescribed under the rules. His request for appointment as salesman was turned down by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, therefore, the bank resolved to terminate his services and accordingly terminated the services. The learned Single Judge held that the fact that the appointment was contrary to the rules the award passed by the Labour Court directing reinstatement on applying S. 25-F of the Act was not warranted as S. 25-F of the Act did not apply to such a case. The relevant portion of the judgment of the learned Single Judge is as follows, in Paras. 11 to 14, at pages 1134 and 1135:

11. “In order to appreciate this line of approach to the issue it is necessary to consider the scope of Ss. 25-F and 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 2(oo) suggests that the person who claims the benefit of S. 25-F must be one, validly appointed in the service of the employer. The service must be capable of being continued until any of the events envisaged under Cls. (a), (b) and (c) of S. 2(oo) happens. In short the person who claims the benefit of S. 25-F shall establish that he is in the service of the employer having been appointed validly. It should be remembered that it is the contract of service that is terminated. A service cannot be terminated unless it is capable of being continued. The Supreme Court has held so in Workmen of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton, and Silk Mills Company, Ltd. v. Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Company, Ltd. [A.I.R 1962 S.C 1363].

12. Having understood the law, thus, we will consider the scope of the expression capable of being continued in service, in S. 2(oo). ‘Capable of being continued’ suggests that the employee should have entered the service under a valid contract of service which cannot be terminated without complying with the provisions of S. 25-F. The workman in order to avail of the benefits of S. 25-F should, therefore, establish that he has the right to continue in service and that the said service has been terminated without complying with the provisions of S. 25-F.

13. It is in this backdrop the scope of the dictum of the Supreme Court in Santosh Gupta case [1980 (2) L.L.N 170] (vide supra), has to be considered. In the said decision the Supreme Court has referred to an earlier decision, in State Bank Of India, Kuzhithurai Branch v. Sundaramony (N.) [1976 (2) L.L.N 5], where the Supreme Court while considering the scope of S. 2(cc) has indicated that the order of termination which would attract the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act is the result of the exercise of volition by the employer. This is what the Supreme Court has said:

‘…True, the section speaks of retrenchment by the employer and it is urged that some act of volition by the employer to bring about the termination is essential to attract S. 25-F and automatic extinguishment of service by effluxtion of time cannot be sufficient…’

When I refer to this passage I shall not be understood to have said that the Supreme Court has finally spoken on this aspect. Whatever that be, it can be seen from Santosh Gupta case (vide supra) that the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the case of a workman whose appointment indisputably was void ab intio. The content of the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act positively indicate that the workman who is entitled to the benefits of the said enactment, must be one who came into, the service under a valid order of appointment. His service must be capable of being continued unless any of the events contemplated under Cls. (a) to (c) of S. 2(oo) east.

14. The facts available on record would show that the order appointing the petitioner as salesman was abinitic void and if that be so it cannot be said that the second respondent is a workman entitled to the benefits of S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The award directing reinstatement of the second respondent into service with back-wages ‘therefore’ is not sustainable in law. Exhibit P6 therefore is liable to be quashed. I accordingly quash Exhibit P6.”

The learned Single Judge has tried to distinguish the decision of the Supreme Court in Santosh Gupta case [1980 (2) L.L.N 170] (vide supra), which in our view is not correct, therefore we find it difficult to agreed with the view expressed in Eranalloor Co-operative Society case (vide supra) which is quite opposed to the ratio of the decisions in Santosh Gupta case (vide supra), and Punjab Land Development Bank case [1990 (1) L.L.N 1054] (vide supra).

13. Thus for the reasons stated above, all the three points raised for determination are to answered against the appellant. Consequently, the writ appeal has to be dismissed. However, it is noticed that the petitioner had prayed for quashing the award and further directing the second respondent to reinstate him as clerk with continuity of service, back-wages and all other attendant benefits. The learned Single Judge, on quashing the award, has allowed the writ petition as prayed for. We are of the view that it is necessary to modify the order of the learned Single Judge in so far as the said order grants the relief.

14. It is not in dispute that the writ-petitioner was working on daily-wage basis and he was being paid a sum of Rs. 13 per day, excluding Sundays, at the time when his services were terminated. In such a case when the termination has been made in violation of S. 25-F of the Act, the direction for reinstatement should be only to the effect that the workman should be reinstated in the same position and the same nature of employment which he was enjoying on the date of termination. The order passed by the learned Single Judge does not make that point clear, therefore, we modify the order of the learned Single Judge in so far as it directs reinstatement of the writ-petitioner with continuity of service, back-wages and all other attendant benefits in the following terms:

The second respondent-workman be reinstated as daily-wage workman at the rate of Rs. 13 per day. However, we make it clear that if on the daily wages, he would be entitled to such increase. As far as the arrears of wages from the dale of termination till 31 March 1996 is concerned it has been calculated at the rate of Rs. 13 per day, excluding Sundays, by the appellant-bank, amounting to Rs. 54,275. Sri K. Chandru, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent-workman submits that the workman accepts the said amount as arrears of wages subject to any statutory benefits, if available to the daily-wage workmen and subject to payment of the daily-wages as may be obtaining on the date of reinstatement. Learned counsel for the appellant-bank submits that the bank has no objection for payment of Rs. 54,275 as arrears of wages from the date of termination till the end of March 1996. We place these submissions on record and on the basis of those submissions, we issue further directions in addition to the one issued above:

(1) The second respondent-workman shall report to duty on 15 May 1996. On the date of reporting to duty the appellant-bank shall pay the arrears of wages up to 31 March 1996 amounting to Rs. 54,275 plus the wages for the month of April 1996 on or before the end of May 1996.

(2) The second respondent-workman is entitled to wages that are payable to a daily wage worker as obtaining on the date he reports to duty.

(3) The second respondent will be entitled to other statutory benefits, if any, available to a daily-wage worker.

15. In the result, subject to aforesaid modification and directions, the writ appeal is dismissed. Connected Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 2734 of 1996 is rejected. No costs.