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M/S. National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mahadevayya And Others

Madras High Court
Feb 17, 1981
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Judgment Summary — Ramanujam, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

On 17-3-1975, Basavanniah was struck by an auto-rickshaw (Regn. No. TMZ 6631) owned by Mrs. Chandra and insured with the second respondent. He sustained head injuries, was taken to the General Hospital and died on 21-3-1975. The widow and children filed a claim petition (O.P. 284 of 1975) before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Madras, claiming Rs. 40,000.

The owner and the insurer opposed the claim. They contended the accident was caused by the deceased's sudden crossing and that the driver was not negligent; they further claimed the compensation was excessive. The insurer additionally defended on the ground that the driver did not possess a valid driving licence as required by S.3(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act and that the policy conditions were violated because an unauthorised person had been allowed to drive the vehicle as a public carrier.

The Tribunal framed three issues: (1) whether the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the auto-rickshaw; (2) the amount of compensation payable; and (3) whether the driver held a valid driving licence and, if not, whether the insurer was liable.

The Tribunal found (a) the accident was caused by the auto-rickshaw driver's rash and negligent driving, (b) total compensation of Rs. 15,600 was payable, and (c) the driver had a licence to drive a light motor vehicle and thus was taken to have a valid licence to drive the auto-rickshaw; accordingly it held the insurance company liable. The insurer appealed, challenging only the Tribunal's finding that the driver had a valid licence to drive the auto-rickshaw as a public carrier.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the driver of the auto-rickshaw involved in the accident possessed a valid driving licence to drive the vehicle (in particular, to drive it as a public carrier) at the time of the accident.
  2. Whether, given the licence point above, the insurance company is liable under the policy to pay the compensation awarded by the Tribunal.
  3. Ancillary factual issues framed by the tribunal: whether the accident was caused by rash and negligent driving and the quantum of compensation (these were decided by the Tribunal and are part of the record before the court).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Insurance Company) — Principal Contentions

  • The only contention before the court was that the driver who drove the auto-rickshaw at the time of the accident did not hold a valid licence to drive that vehicle as required by S. 3(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • If the driver did not have a valid licence, the insurer argued it could avoid liability under the policy because the policy covered only persons driving with the insured's permission and who "hold a licence to drive the vehicle or has held and is not disqualified for holding or obtaining such a licence."
  • The insurer relied on the absence of a produced licence (despite notice to produce) and submitted that this supported the conclusion that there was no special endorsement authorising the driver to operate the vehicle as a public carrier.

Respondents (Claimants / Owner) — Principal Contentions

  • The claimants (and the owner) maintained the accident resulted from the driver's rash and negligent driving and that compensation was due (Tribunal had so found).
  • The Tribunal and the claimants relied on the fact that the driver possessed a licence to drive a light motor vehicle and argued that an auto-rickshaw falls within the category of a light motor vehicle; therefore the licence was treated as valid for driving the auto-rickshaw.
  • The claimants' counsel argued that the Division Bench decision in National Insurance Co. v. Sugantha Kanthalambal required reconsideration and that undue emphasis had been placed in that decision on S.3 of the Motor Vehicles Act (i.e., they sought to challenge the requirement for a special endorsement to drive as a public carrier).
  • The claimants also argued, with respect to the policy wording, that a strict reading of the proviso under the head "driver" should lead to the conclusion that the driver should be taken to have a licence because he held a licence to drive a light motor vehicle (which includes an auto-rickshaw).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Srinivasa Roadways v. Saroja, (1974) 2 Mad LJ 364 : AIR 1975 Mad 26 That where a policy positively undertakes to cover liability caused by a person who, though not having an effective licence at the time, had not been disqualified, the insurer cannot fall back on S.3 to avoid liability contrary to its contract. The Tribunal relied on this decision to support the view that the insurer could not avoid liability despite a S.3 violation. The court found that this decision did not shed decisive light on the particular question before it.
Madras Motors General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Madathi Ammal, (1974) 2 Mad LJ 204 : AIR 1975 Mad 250 Interpreted the policy phrase "the person driving holds a licence... or has held and is not disqualified" as covering persons whose licence has expired but who are not disqualified to hold a licence (i.e., coverage of inadvertent lapse). The Tribunal had relied on this reasoning. The court held that the decision does not resolve the present question whether a licence to drive a light motor vehicle authorises driving an auto-rickshaw as a public carrier without a special endorsement under S.3.
Public Prosecutor v. M. Murugesan, 1955 Mad WN 312 : AIR 1955 Mad 627 Held that a person with a licence to drive a "light transport vehicle" could drive a bus that, by reference to its weight, fell within the definition of light transport vehicle. The court observed that that case turned on weight-based classification of the bus as a light transport vehicle and did not address whether a licence to drive a light transport vehicle authorises driving an auto-rickshaw as a public carrier.
National Insurance Co. v. Sugantha Kanthalambal, (1980) 2 Mad LJ 572 Held that a licence to drive a light transport vehicle does not, without a special endorsement, authorise driving such a vehicle as a public carrier; S.3 requires a special endorsement for driving a transport vehicle as a paid employee / public carrier. The court in the present appeal treated this Division Bench decision as directly applicable and agreed with its view that a special endorsement under S.3 is necessary for driving an auto-rickshaw as a public carrier.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from statutory definitions and the language of S.3(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. It examined the definitions in the Act:

  • S.2(5A) — definition of "driving licence" as a document authorising a person to drive a motor vehicle or a specified class of vehicle;
  • S.2(13) — definition of "light motor vehicle" (transport vehicle or omnibus with registered laden/unladen weight thresholds); and
  • S.2(33) — definition of "transport vehicle" as including a "public service vehicle" or a "goods vehicle".

From a combined reading of these definitions, the court concluded that a light transport vehicle may be used either as a public service vehicle (passenger carrier) or as a goods vehicle. S.3(1) imposes two distinct requirements:

  1. That a person should hold an effective driving licence authorising him to drive the vehicle in a public place; and
  2. That no person shall drive a motor vehicle as a paid employee or drive a transport vehicle unless his driving licence specially entitles him so to do.

The court reasoned that where a vehicle is being used as a public service vehicle (as was the auto-rickshaw at the time of the accident, carrying passengers), the driver needed, in addition to a general licence to drive a light motor vehicle, a special authorisation or endorsement to drive as a public carrier. The Tribunal had taken a cursory view, treating a licence for a light motor vehicle as sufficient without considering the separate requirement in S.3 for driving a transport vehicle as a paid employee/public carrier.

The court further relied on evidential circumstances: the driver's licence was never produced despite notice to produce, permitting an adverse inference that the licence lacked the special endorsement. The court also noted evidence (P.W.2) that the driver was prosecuted under S.112 of the Motor Vehicles Act for driving as a public carrier without a valid licence — a matter consistent with the conclusion that the requisite endorsement was absent.

On precedents, the court examined the decisions cited by the Tribunal and the parties. It held that the Srinivasa Roadways and Madras Motors decisions concerned different factual and legal questions (for example, lapse of licence or coverage when there was no disqualification) and did not decide the present question about endorsement for public carrier use. The Public Prosecutor v. M. Murugesan decision turned on classification of a bus by weight and likewise did not address the endorsement issue. By contrast, the Division Bench in National Insurance Co. v. Sugantha Kanthalambal had considered the precise question and held that an endorsement was necessary; the present court accepted that view and applied it to the facts before it.

Accordingly, the court concluded that the Tribunal was in error in holding the insurance company liable: the driver did not have the special authorisation required by S.3 to drive the auto-rickshaw as a public carrier, and therefore, under the terms of the policy, the insurance company could avoid liability.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPEAL ALLOWED; INSURANCE COMPANY NOT LIABLE TO PAY THE COMPENSATION AWARDED BY THE TRIBUNAL.

Direct consequences and practical effects (as stated by the court):

  • The award of the Tribunal is set aside insofar as it was made against the insurance company.
  • The liability of the owner of the auto-rickshaw (identified as the 6th respondent in the record) as declared by the Tribunal remains unaffected; the court declared that the compensation as computed by the Tribunal (Rs. 15,600) is payable by the owner.
  • The insurance company had, pending appeal, deposited Rs. 15,600 pursuant to an interim order; since the insurer is held not liable, it is entitled to withdraw that deposit.
  • There will be no order as to costs.

Broader legal impact: The court applied and reaffirmed the interpretation that, when a vehicle is used as a public service vehicle, S.3(1) requires a special endorsement for the licence to authorise driving the vehicle as a public carrier. The opinion does not expressly state that it creates a new precedent beyond the reasoning applied, but it adopts and follows the Division Bench view in National Insurance Co. v. Sugantha Kanthalambal on the endorsement requirement.

Show all summary ...

Ramanujam, J.:— This appeal has been filed by the insurer as against the award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Madras, in O.P 284 of 1975. On 17-3-1975, one Basavanniah along with some of his friends, was making some purchases in the Evening Bazar. At that time, an auto-rickshaw bearing registration No. TMZ 6631, belonging to one Mrs. Chandra and insured with the second respondent, came at a high speed and knocked him down. He sustained head injuries and became unconscious. Immediately he was removed to the General Hospital. Later he succumbed to the injuries on 21-3-1975. On the ground that the driver of the auto-rickshaw was rash and negligent and the accident had occurred due to that rash and negligent driving, the widow and the children of the deceased, filed a claim petition before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Madras, claiming compensation of Rs. 40,000.

2. The claim was opposed by the owner of the auto-rickshaw, the first respondent and the insurance company, the second respondent with which the auto-rickshaw was insured. The stand taken by them was that the accident occurred solely due to the negligence of the deceased in that he suddenly crossed the road without observing the traffic of the road, that the driver of the auto-rickshaw was not negligent at all and that therefore the respondents are hot liable to pay any compensation. They also contended that the compensation claimed was highly excessive. The second respondent insurance company raised a further defence that the driver of the auto-rickshaw did not possess a valid driving licence to drive the auto-rickshaw as required under S. 3(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, and there is violation of the policy conditions, in that, a person not authorised to drive the auto-rickshaw as a public carrier, had been allowed to drive the vehicle. Having regard to the defences taken, the following three points were set down for consideration by the tribunal

1. Whether accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the auto-rickshaw:

2. To what amount of compensation the petitioners would be entitled?

3. Whether the driver of the auto-rickshaw was holding a valid driving licence to drive that vehicle and if so whether the second respondent is liable to pay compensation?

3. After analysing the evidence adduced by both parties, the Tribunal held that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the auto-rickshaw by its driver and on the second point the Tribunal held that the compensation payable in respect of the accident was Rs. 15,600 in all. On the third point, namely, whether the driver of the auto-rickshaw was holding a valid licence to drive that vehicle, the tribunal took the view that as the driver of the auto-rickshaw has been shown to have possessed a licence for driving a light motor vehicle and the auto-rickshaw being a light motor vehicle, the driver should be taken to have possessed a valid driving licence to drive an auto-rickshaw. In this view, the tribunal held that the insurance company cannot avoid its liability under the policy for the accident in question. Aggrieved by the award of the Tribunal, the insurer has filed this appeal, wherein the only contention raised is, that the driver of the auto-rickshaw which caused the accident, had no valid driving licence to drive the vehicle and that the contrary finding given by the tribunal cannot be sustained in law. Thus the only question that has to be considered by us in this appeal is whether the driver of the auto-rickshaw which was involved in the accident had a valid licence to drive the vehicle. If the driver of the auto-rickshaw had no valid licence, to drive that vehicle, the Insurance Company can avoid its liability under the policy as the policy contemplates, (1) the vehicle being driven by ‘any person who is in the insured's employ and is driving on his order or with his permission’ and (2) ‘the person driving holds a licence to drive the vehicle or has held and is not disqualified for holding or obtaining such a licence.’

4. We are now concerned at this stage with the second condition set out above. The first half of the second contention is not material in this case. The first half refers to the expression ‘the person driving holds licence to drive the motor vehicle’. The tribunal appears to have taken a cursory view of the said clause and has held that as the motor vehicle in this case is an auto-rickshaw and as the driver had a licence to drive a light motor vehicle, which includes auto-rickshaw, the driver should be taken to have a valid licence for driving the vehicle. The tribunal has also relied on the following two decisions in support of its view that the insurance company cannot disown its liability under the policy merely on the ground that S. 3 of the M.V Act has been violated. In the first decision Srinivasa Roadways v. Saroja, (1974) 2 Mad LJ 364 : (AIR 1975 Mad 26) it has been observed that (at p. 129)—

“If, as is in this case, all the conditions laid down in the section are not reproduced in the policy and the policy positively undertakes to cover liability in respect of an accident caused by a person, who though not having an effective licence at the time of the accident, had not been disqualified to hold a licence, the company cannot, in disregard of its policy, fall back upon the section and say that despite the contract it has entered into to the contrary, it must be exonerated of liability.”

5. In Madras Motors General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Madathi Ammal, (1974) 2 Mad LJ 204 : (AIR 1975 Mad 250), Maharaian J. while dealing with the similar clauses of definition of a driver contained in a policy observed (at p. 252)—

“That the use of the expression “the person driving holds a licence to drive the motor vehicle or has held and is not disqualified for holding or obtaining such a licence” clearly contemplates a person who, although he had obtained a licence which expired prior to the accident, did not hold a valid licence on the date of the accident and yet was not disqualified for holding or obtaining such a licence. The Insurance Company with its great, business experience must have thought it right to cover an accident caused by a person who has had considerable driving experience, and yet due to inadvertence or absentmindedness, has not chosen to renew that licence during the period allowed by law and has been involved in an accident while he had not yet obtained a renewal of the licence. Evidently, the Insurance Company trusts the experienced drivers not to drive the vehicle rashly and negligently, this expectation resting upon their past performance rather than upon the technical but unimportant question whether they have been careful and alert enough to renew the licence within the period allowed by law.”

6. We do not see any light from the said two decisions on the points involved in the present appeal. The question which arises here did not come up for consideration in those two decisions referred to above. The petitioner has also referred to the decision reported in the Public Prosecutor… v. M. Murugesan…., (1955 Mad WN 312) : (AIR 1955 Mad 627) wherein, the driver having licence to drive a light transport vehicle had driven a bus. After referring to the definition of Light Transport Vehicle and Heavy Transport Vehicle, Balakrishna Ayyar, J. held that—

“As the definition of light transport vehicle in S. 2(13) stands, a bus or a taxi, whatever its weight may be, would be a light transport vehicle. Hence the owner permitting a person who had authority to drive only a light transport vehicle to drive the bus is not guilty under S. 5 Motor Vehicles Act.”

7. There also the present question did not arise. S. 2(9) of the Motor Vehicles Act says “Heavy Transport Vehicle” means a transport vehicle the registered axle weight of which exceeds 10,600 pounds or the registered laden weight of which exceeds 14,400 pounds. S. 2(13) of the Act says — ‘Light Transport Vehicle’ means any public service vehicle other than a motor cab, or any goods vehicle other than a heavy transport vehicle or a delivery van”. In that case, the bus involved was found to be not a heavy transport vehicle with reference to its actual weight, either laden or unladen. Therefore, it was rightly held that the person having a licence to drive a light motor vehicle was authorised to drive a bus which had fallen within the definition of a light transport vehicle with reference to its weight. This decision also does not touch the point in question whether a person having licence to drive a light transport vehicle is authorised to drive an auto-rickshaw as a public carrier.

8. This question had come up for consideration before the Division Bench of this court, to which one of us was a party in the National Insurance Co. v. Sugantha Kanthalambal, (1980) 2 Mad LJ 572. In that case also, the vehicle involved was an auto-rickshaw. The driver who drove the auto-rickshaw at the time of the accident had a licence to drive a light transport vehicle. The question arose as to whether on the basis of a licence to drive a light transport vehicle, he is authorised to drive an auto-rickshaw as a public carrier. After referring to the definition of a light transport vehicle and also the provisions of S. 3, read with Sec. 2(13) of the M.V Act, the court has taken the view that even though the driver had a licence to drive a light transport vehicle, he had to obtain a special endorsement to drive such a vehicle as a public carrier as contemplated under S. 3 of the M.V Act and so long as the licence to drive a light motor vehicle does not contain an endorsement authorising the user of the vehicle as public carrier, the driver cannot be said to have a valid licence to drive the auto-rickshaw as a public carrier. Though the said decision applies to the facts of the present case, the learned counsel for the claimants (respondents 1 to 5) contends that in that decision the court has not given due consideration and weight to the definition of a light transport vehicle and that it had given an unnecessary emphasis on S. 3 of the M.V Act and therefore, it requires reconsideration.

9. In this case, the licence possessed by the driver of the vehicle had not been produced. Even though the appellant has called upon the driver as well as the owner of the vehicle, which was involved in the accident to produce the driver's licence by a notice to produce, the licence has not been produced. Therefore, the non-production of the actual licence can lead to an adverse inference that the licence, if produced, would indicate that there has been no endorsement, authorising the licensee to drive the auto-rickshaw as a public carrier. Neither before the tribunal nor before this court, any of the respondents is in a position to assert that the licence in fact contained any such endorsement. We have to therefore proceed on the basis that the licence possessed by the driver of the auto-rickshaw did not contain any endorsement authorising him to drive the auto-rickshaw as a public carrier. It is in this light we have to determine the legal position as to whether the driver of the auto-rickshaw had a licence to drive the vehicle as a public carrier.

10. Section 2(5A) defines a ‘driving licence’ as a document issued by a competent authority under Chap. II authorising the person specified therein to drive a motor vehicle or a motor vehicle of any specified class or description. S. 2(9) of the Act says that ‘heavy motor vehicle’ means ‘a transport vehicle or omnibus the registered laden weight of which or a motor car or tractor the unladen weight of which, exceeds 11,000 kilograms’. S. 2(13) of the Act defines ‘light motor vehicle’ means a transport vehicle or omnibus the registered laden weight of which, or a motor car or tractor the unladen weight of which, does not exceed 4000 kilograms. Section 2(18) defines, ‘motor vehicle’ means any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or internal source and includes a chassis to which a body has not been attached and a trailer; but does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises. A ‘transport vehicle’ has been defined under Sec. 2(33) of the Act as a public service vehicle or a goods vehicle. Therefore a conjoint reading of Sections 2(13) and 2(33) shows that there are two classes of light transport vehicles used as a public service vehicle and a light transport vehicle which is used as a goods vehicle. It is in this light we have to construe Sec. 3 which imposes the necessity for taking a driving licence in respect of all kinds of motor vehicles. Section 3(1) says that—

“No person shall drive a motor vehicle in any public place unless he holds an effective driving licence issued to himself authorising him to drive the vehicle and no person shall so drive a motor vehicle as a paid employee or shall so drive a transport vehicle unless his driving licence specially entitles him so to do.”

11. The above section prescribes two requirements— (1) A person should hold an effective driving licence authorising him to drive the vehicle in any public place. (2) No person is permitted to drive a motor vehicle as a paid employee or a transport vehicle unless his driving licence specially entitles him to do so. We have already noted the definition of a transport vehicle which includes a public service vehicle or a goods vehicle. Admittedly in this case, the vehicle has been used as a public service vehicle. As a matter of fact, at the time of the accident, the vehicle was found carrying passengers. Therefore, in addition to the usual licence for driving a motor vehicle in a public place, there should be a further authorisation to the driver to drive the auto rickshaw which falls admittedly under the definition of light motor vehicle as a public service vehicle or a passenger vehicle.

12. The Tribunal has not referred to the definition of the transport vehicle though it refers to the definition of the light motor vehicle, as also the special requirements under Section 3 for getting authorisation to drive the auto rickshaw as a public service vehicle. If we read the definition of transport vehicle in Section 2(33) into Section 3, it will clearly indicate that the mere licence to drive the light motor vehicle, which includes an auto rickshaw, will not enable the holder of that licence to drive an auto rickshaw as a public carrier, for, that requires a special authorisation under the later half of Section 3. Therefore, we are not inclined to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the decision rendered in (1980) 2 Mad LJ 572 requires reconsideration. In our view, therefore the Tribunal in this case is not right in holding that the driver of the auto rickshaw can drive the auto-rickshaw as a public carrier without a special authorisation as contemplated by Section 3 of the Act. In this case the evidence of P.W 2, who has examined by the claimant, itself clearly indicates, that the driver of the auto rickshaw was prosecuted under Sec. 112 of the M.V Act for having driven the auto rickshaw as a public carrier without a valid licence. From this also it is possible to conclude that the driver of the auto rickshaw, did not have the requisite licence to drive the auto rickshaw as a public carrier.

13. Having regard to the terms of the policy, the learned counsel for the claimants would say that the strict interpretation of the proviso contained in the policy under the head ‘driver’ the driver of the auto rickshaw in this case should be taken to have a licence as he had a licence to drive a light motor vehicle which includes auto rickshaw. But we, are of the view that the expression ‘the motor vehicle’ can only be construed as the motor vehicle which is used as a passenger vehicle. As a matter of fact the policy itself contemplates user of the vehicle as a contract carriage. Therefore the expression ‘the motor vehicle’ should have reference only to the vehicle which is expected to be used as a contract carrier. Unless the driver of the auto rickshaw is shown to have had a licence to drive a contract carriage, he cannot be taken to have a valid licence to drive the vehicle which is insured as a contract carriage. In our view, therefore, the tribunal in so far as it had passed an award as against the insurance company, is in error.

14. The appeal is therefore allowed and the award, so far as the Insurance company is concerned is set aside. There will be no order as to costs. The fact that this appeal filed by the insurance company had been allowed will not affect the liability of the owner of the auto rickshaw as declared by the tribunal. To make the position clear we declare that the compensation as computed by the tribunal is payable by the owner of the auto rickshaw, the 6th respondent. The learned counsel for the appellants represents that pending this appeal, a sum of Rs. 15,600 has been deposited by the Insurance company, in view of the interim order passed by this court. Now as it is held that the insurance company is not liable to pay any compensation in respect of the accident, the insurance company is entitled to withdraw the same.

15. Appeal allowed.