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Secretary, Multi-Purpose Co-Operative Society v. Labour Court, Madurai, And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The second respondent was employed as a clerk by the petitioner co-operative society at a monthly salary of Rs. 95. During an inspection in May 1972, the District Co-operative Society's Executive Officer discovered that the society had collected Rs. 4,485 from various members without issuing receipts in many cases, and some of the moneys realised were not reflected in the society's accounts. The Executive Officer concluded that the second respondent was responsible for these irregularities and suspected temporary misappropriation. He wrote to the Society's President proposing disciplinary action.
On 13 July 1972 the Society's President suspended the second respondent pending investigation/enquiry. No charges were framed and no enquiry was conducted. After waiting for over a year and observing persistent suspension without enquiry, the second respondent filed a petition under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Court, Madurai, claiming wages for the suspension period from 13 July 1972 to 13 June 1973 amounting to Rs. 1,045. He also claimed a bonus of Rs. 140 for 1969-70 said to be due pursuant to the Board and General Body decision.
The Society filed objections and contested the claim both on legal grounds and on merits, asserting a right to suspend and denying any entitlement to wages for the suspension period. The Labour Court concluded that no domestic enquiry had been held despite the lapse of two years, that the suspension was illegal and not bona fide, and that the second respondent was entitled to salary for the suspension period and to the bonus. The Labour Court computed benefits at Rs. 1,185. The Society challenged that decision by filing the present writ petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court has jurisdiction to determine the legality or validity of a suspension order when the employee seeks computation of money or benefits payable for the period of suspension.
- Whether a suspension pending enquiry, when followed by dismissal or termination made retrospective to the date of suspension, merges with that dismissal so as to preclude a separate claim for wages for the suspension period under Section 33C(2).
- Whether, where no domestic enquiry is conducted and the employee is kept under suspension indefinitely (or contrary to by-law limits), the employee can invoke Section 33C(2) to claim wages for the suspension period.
- Whether suspension under the society's by-law, which permitted suspension only for three months at a time, becomes illegal in the absence of fresh suspension orders at each three-month interval.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (Society's) Arguments
- Learned counsel for the petitioner (Mr. Somayaji) argued that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to pronounce the suspension illegal in proceedings under Section 33C(2); validity of suspension, he contended, would constitute the basis of an industrial dispute and not a matter for Section 33C(2) computation proceedings.
- The Society raised unspecified legal objections in its counter-claim and challenged the claim on merits, asserting it had the right to keep the second respondent under suspension and that the second respondent had no right to claim wages for the suspension period.
Second Respondent's Arguments
- The second respondent asserted entitlement to wages for the period of suspension from 13-7-1972 to 13-6-1973 (claimed Rs. 1,045) on the ground that he was kept under suspension indefinitely without charges or enquiry.
- He also claimed a bonus of Rs. 140 for 1969-70 as per the decision of the Board and General Body of the society.
- Implicitly, his position was that in the absence of any enquiry and with the suspension continuing indefinitely, the Labour Court could determine his right to money under Section 33C(2).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| General Provinces Transport Service Ltd. v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan (1957-I L.L.J. 27) | An individual dispute concerning the rights of a single workman is not, per se, an "industrial dispute" unless taken up by the union or a number of workmen; interpretation of Section 2(k). | Used to explain the scope of "industrial dispute" under Section 2(k) and to frame the question whether an individual claim for money under Section 33C(2) is a matter for industrial adjudication. |
| V. Raju v. President, M.D.C. Co-op. Bank (1975-II L.L.J. 240) | Where suspension pending enquiry is followed by dismissal which takes effect from the date of suspension and becomes final, the period of suspension merges with dismissal and cannot be claimed separately as wages under Section 33C(2). | The court agreed with Ismail, J.'s view and applied this principle to reject the notion that a separate claim for wages for the suspension period is maintainable when dismissal has merged with suspension. |
| Udipi Hindu Restaurant, Madurai v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai (1970-II L.L.J. 492) | Contains observations on suspension and Section 33C(2); in the context of that case the suspension was followed by dismissal. | The court treated this and a companion case as instances where suspension was followed by dismissal and therefore Section 33C(2) was inapplicable in those facts. |
| New Cinema, Main Guard Square, Madurai v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai (1970-II L.L.J. 452) | Similar observations as above concerning suspension followed by dismissal. | Likewise treated as a case where suspension was followed by dismissal; not controlling for cases where suspension is not followed by dismissal. |
| Madurai District Co-operative Supply and Marketing Society Ltd. v. Veerannan (1972-I L.L.J. 20) | Held that despite dismissal taking effect from date of suspension, the right to claim salary for the suspension period could be treated separately and Section 33C(2) entertained such a claim. | The court expressly rejected this view as contrary to V. Raju and held it not acceptable. |
| New Taj Mahal Cafe P. Ltd., Labour Court, Hubli (1970-II L.L.J. 51) | Where suspended workmen were later recalled and reinstated and no enquiry had been held, the Labour Court had jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) to determine entitlement to wages for the suspension period. | Adopted as the ratio that where suspension is not followed by dismissal and the right to wages is premised on existing contractual/conditions of service, the Labour Court may decide the existence of the right and compute the amount. |
| Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar and Ors. (1968-I L.L.J. 6) | Decision indicating that a determination of monetary benefits may require a preliminary inquiry into the existence of the claimed right. | Referred to for the proposition that enquiry into existence of the right is incidental to the Labour Court's function under Section 33C(2). |
| Central Bank of India v. P.S. Rajagopalan; Chief Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar and Ramakrishna Ramanath v. Presiding Officer, Nagpur (1970-II L.L.J. 306) | Held that claims under Section 33C(2) may require an enquiry into whether the right to the claimed money exists; such enquiry is incidental to the Labour Court's power to compute monetary benefits. | Relied upon to support the proposition that the Labour Court may determine the legality of suspension where necessary to compute the monetary entitlement under Section 33C(2). |
| B. Kalyanasundaram v. Labour Court, Madras (29 Factories Journal Reports, 214) | Single-judge view that suspension amounts to non-employment and can be taken up as an industrial dispute by a workers' union. | The court noted this authority but distinguished it because the case involved a union raising non-employment as an industrial dispute; it was not authority for the proposition that every suspension is an industrial dispute. |
| Palani Co-op. Sales Society v. Presiding Officer (Full Bench) | Where a by-law permitted suspension for three months at a time, a fresh suspension order was required for each three-month period; failure to issue fresh orders rendered the suspension illegal. | Applied to the society's by-law: because there was no evidence of fresh suspension orders every three months, the suspension was illegal and Labour Court was correct in so holding. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by identifying the central statutory provisions: the definition of "industrial dispute" in Section 2(k), the deemed industrial-dispute provision introduced by Section 2A (making disputes arising out of dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, or termination by an employer in respect of an individual workman into industrial disputes), and the scope of Section 33C(2) which empowers a Labour Court to determine questions as to the amount of money or benefits payable to a workman where such amounts are capable of being computed in terms of money.
The court analysed the interplay of these provisions and prior decisions to delineate distinct factual categories and the Labour Court's competence in each:
- Suspension followed by dismissal or termination: the court relied on the settled proposition (as stated in V. Raju) that when a suspension pending enquiry is followed by dismissal which takes effect from the date of suspension and that dismissal becomes final, the period of suspension merges into the dismissal. In such cases the period of suspension does not subsist as a separate entity and a separate claim for wages for that period by way of Section 33C(2) is not maintainable; relief for the entire period (including the period of suspension) must be sought and determined as part of the industrial dispute concerning dismissal (Section 2A mechanism).
- Suspension followed by acquittal and reinstatement: where an employee under suspension is later recalled and reinstated (i.e., suspension was not followed by dismissal), the Supreme Court's decisions (for example New Taj Mahal) support that the claim for wages for the suspension period can properly be presented under Section 33C(2). The Labour Court has jurisdiction to decide not only the amount but also, if necessary, whether the workman had the right to that amount — an inquiry into the existence of the right is incidental to computing the monetary benefit.
- Suspension without any enquiry and indefinite suspension: the court emphasised that when no enquiry is pending at all and the employee is kept suspended indefinitely, the employee is entitled to invoke Section 33C(2) for determination of the monetary amount payable for the suspension period. The court acknowledged that if an enquiry was pending, ordinarily the employee would have to await the outcome of that enquiry (or alternatively seek mandamus to expedite the enquiry), but where no enquiry has been initiated or carried out, reliance on Section 33C(2) is appropriate.
Applying these principles to the facts, the court observed that here no enquiry had been held for more than one year after suspension and no charges were framed; the suspension was therefore indefinite. Consequently, the Labour Court's exercise of jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) to examine the legality of the suspension and compute the monetary entitlement was maintainable.
In addition, the court considered the society's by-laws which allowed suspension only for three months at a time. The management conceded that suspension under the by-laws could only be for three months at a time, but there was no evidence of fresh suspension orders for successive three-month periods. The court referred to the Full Bench decision in Palani Co-op. Sales Society to conclude that absence of fresh orders rendered the suspension illegal. Because the power to suspend was contingent on an enquiry being pending and no enquiry was held, even the initial three-month suspension effectively amounted to substantive punishment and entitled the employee to salary for that period.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition filed by the Society fails and is DISMISSED. The High Court upheld the Labour Court's finding that the suspension was illegal and that the second respondent was entitled to the monetary benefits as computed by the Labour Court (Rs. 1,185 as claimed by the workman in the Labour Court proceedings).
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The Labour Court's order in favour of the second respondent stands; the society's challenge has been dismissed and the Labour Court's computation of benefits is upheld. The court discharged the rule nisi. Because the second respondent did not appear, there was no order as to costs.
- On legal principles: The court reaffirmed that where suspension is followed by dismissal which operates from the date of suspension, the suspension period merges and separate Section 33C(2) claims for that period are not maintainable (following V. Raju). Conversely, where there is no dismissal or where the employee is reinstated (and where no enquiry has been held), the Labour Court can determine both the existence of the right to monetary benefit and compute the amount under Section 33C(2). The court also held that in the absence of fresh suspension orders required by by-laws (three-month limit here), the suspension is illegal.
- The court expressly rejected the contrary view in Madurai District Co-operative Supply and Marketing Society Ltd. v. Veerannan to the extent that it treated the suspension period as separable for Section 33C(2) claims despite dismissal taking effect from the date of suspension.
Note: This summary is prepared strictly from the statements and materials contained in the provided opinion. No facts, outcomes or reasoning beyond those expressed in that text have been added or inferred.
1. In this writ petition an important question relating to the scope and applicability of Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) is involved. The second respondent was impleaded as a clerk under the petitioner-co-operative society on a monthly pay of Rs. 95. The Executive Officer of the District Co-operative Society who is an inspecting authority, during inspection in May, 1972 noticed a collection of a sum of Rs. 4,485 by the Society from various members without actually issuing receipts. In certain cases, the moneys realised were not also brought into accounts maintained by the Society. The Executive Officer considered that the second respondent was responsible for these irregularities and there was a temporary misappropriations. The Executive Officer appears to have written a letter to the President of the registered Society asking him to take appropriate disciplinary action against him. On 13-7-1972, the President of the Society suspended the second respondent from service pending further investigation and enquiry. But no further action was taken either to frame charges against the second respondent or to conduct an enquiry into the alleged irregularities and temporary misappropriation. The second respondent waited for more than a year and ultimately finding that the petitioner has indefinitely suspended him from service and is not taking any action on the proposed investigation and enquiry, filed an application before the Labour Court, Madurai under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act claiming that he be paid wages for the period of his suspension between 13-7-1972 to 13-6-1973 when he filed the petition amounting to Rs. 1,045. He alwo claimed in that petition that he is entitled to bonus for 1969-70 in the sum of Rs.140 as per the decision of the Board and General Body of the petitioner-Society. The Society filed a counter to this claim petition raising certain legal objections in addition to challenging the claim on merits. It was contended by the Society that it had a right to keep the second respondent under suspension and that the second respondent has no right to claim wages for the period of suspension. The Labour Court held that though two years had lapsed, no domestic enquiry was held in respect of the alleged misappropriation and that, therefore, the suspension was illegal and not bona fide. The Labour Court also held that the workman is entitled to be paid salary at the rates claimed by him for the period for which he was kept under suspension. Since there was no dispute that in the General Body, the Board's recommendation relating to payment of bonus was accepted, the second respondent was also held to be entitled to bonus. Accordingly the Labour Court computed the value of the benefits due to the second respondent at Rs. 1,185 as claimed. It is against this order the Society has filed this writ petition.
2. Mr. Somayaji, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to hold the suspension as illegal and the question whether the suspension is legal or not would only be a basis of an industrial dispute and could not be decided in an application under Section 33C(2) of the Act. In this connection he cited a number of decisions.
3. "Industrial dispute" is defined in Section 2(k) of the Act. It has been held by the Supreme Court in General Provinces Transport Service Ltd. v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan 1957-I L.L.J. 27; that a dispute which concerns the right of individual workers cannot be held to be an industrial dispute per se but it may become one if it is taken up by the union or a number of workers. In the words of the Supreme Court:
Notwithstanding that the language of Section 2(k) is wide enough to cover a dispute between an employer and a single employee the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act does appear to contemplate that the machinery provided therein should be set in motion to settle only dispute which involve the rights of workmen as a class and that a dispute touching the individual rights of a workman was not intended to be the subject of an adjudication under the Act, when the same had not been taken up by the union or a number of workmen.
The Act was amended by introducing Section 2A. Under this provision, where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman any dispute or difference between the workman and his employer connected with or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute not withstanding that no other workman for any union of workmen is a party to the dispute. Thus an individual dispute between an employer and an employee relating to discharge, dismissal, retrenetment or other termination of the service of the individual has now been made an industrial dispute by the deemed provision in Section 2A. Under Section 33C(2) where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and any question arises as to the amount of the benefit to be computed in terms of money, the question may be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government. Thus the provision contemplates a right in the workman to receive from the employer any money or benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. The question for consideration is whether any dispute relating to the legality or validity, of the suspension order can be decided by the Labour Court in an application filed by the workman for computing the money payable for the period during which he was under suspension. Number of decisions have come up for consideration. It is only necessary to note a few of the decision which dealt with different aspects of this matter. Before dealing with these specific cases, it may be pointed out that in a number of decisions the Supreme Court has held that when a suspension pending enquiry is followed by a dismissal or termination of service in pursuance of an order made in the enquiry, the suspension order merges with the order of dismissal. It has also been held that if an employee was suspended pending an enquiry the order of dismissal could be given retrospective effect from the date of suspension but not otherwise. In view of these settled propositions, Ismail J., in V. Raju v. President, M.D.C. Co-op. Bank 1975-II L.L.J 240, held, that when an order of dismissal followed a suspension pending enquiry the dismissed employee cannot file a petition under Section 33C(2) claiming wages for the period of suspension as if the period of suspension stood separately, without getting itself merged in the order of dismissal. In the words of the learned Judge:
I have taken the view that once the order of dismissal takes effect from the date of suspension and that order has become final, there is no question of the suspension period susbsequently subsisting as an independent entity or separately and. therefore, there is no question of the employee claiming any wages separately for the period of suspension.
In view of the new provision Section 2A the dismissed workman can raise a dispute relating to the dismissal or termination of service as an industrial dispute. When such question is referred to the decision of the appropriate authority under Section 10 the said authority should not only decide as to whether the dismissal was wrongful or legal and even if the dismissal is wrongful. Whether the workman is entitled to be paid back wages including the amount to be paid for the period during which he was under suspension. In other words, when a dispute relating to the non-employment by reason of the dismissal is questioned as an industrial dispute, the entire dispute from the date of suspension till the date of dismissal forms the subject-matter of the dispute and the appropriate authority would have jurisdiction to decide not only the question whether the dismissal is wrongful or legal but also as to what relief he would be entitled to including the relief relating to the period of suspension as back wages or any other allowance. Therefore, when an order of suspension is merged in an order of dismissal or termination of service any relief relating to the period of suspension could only be raised as an industrial dispute and not otherwise. This is also the ratio of the judgment in V. Raju v. President, M.D.C. Co-op. Bank 1975-II L.L.J. 240, with which we respectfully agree.
4. In the two decisions of this Court in The Management, Udipi Hindu Restaurant, Madurai v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai 1970-II L.LJ. 492 and The Management of New Cinema, Main Guard Square, Madurai v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai 1970-II L.L.J. 452, there are certain observations which are susceptible to a wider interpretation. But having regard to the facts in those two cases, we are of the view that they will have to be treated as cases where the suspension is followed by an order of dismissal and the decision that Section 33C(2) is not applicable is only in consonance with the principle that if there is an order of dismissal, the period of suspension cannot be treated separately. To the extent the decision in Madurai District Co-operative Supply and Marketing Society Limited, Madurai v. Veerannan and Anr. 1972-I L.L.J. 20, held that in spite of the order of dismissal taking effect from the date of suspension the right of the employee to claim salary for the period of suspension is not affected and that period could be treated separately and a claim petition under Section 33C(2) could be entertained, we are of the view is contrary to the decision in V. Raju v. President, M.D.C.C.op. Bank 1975-II L.L.J. 240, We are of the view that this view in Madurai District Co-operative Supply and Marketing Society Ltd.. Madurai V. Veerannan and another (supra), is not acceptable and we are in respectful agreement with Ismail, J., in V. Raju v. The President M.D.C. Co-op, Bank,(supra),
5. The next category of cases are those in which though an employee concerned was under suspension pending an enquiry ultimately after enquiry he was acquitted and reinstated in service. To such a case, since he could not raise the question of suspension pending enquiry as an industrial dispute under Section 2A if he is entitled to be paid any amount for the period of suspension, he should claim it by way of a petition under Section 33C(2) before the Labour Court . In our view this was the ration of the judgment of the Supreme Court in New Taj Mahal Cafe P. Ltd., Labour Court, Hubli 1970-II L.L.J. 51. In that case five workmen were suspended by the management on different dates by different orders pending domestic enquiry to be held against them for misconduct. The domestic enquiry was not held in any of those cases and the management recalled the order of suspension and called upon those workmen to resume duty. This, however, happened after the presentation of the application under Section 33C(2) of the Act before the Labour Court. In the application the workmen claimed that they were entitled to full wages from the date of suspension upto the date of filing of the application on the ground that the orders of suspension were illegal and unauthorised. It was contended on behalf of the management that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is confined to be determined the amount claimed by workman and it does not extend to decide the existence of the right the workman to claim the amount in case the right is denied by the employer. After referring to an earlier decision reported in Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd., Dhanbad v. Rameshwar and Ors. 1968-I L.L.J. 6, the Supreme Court held:
This decision plainly lays down that if the money or the benefit is claimed by a workman on the basis that the right already exists and the existence of that right is denied, it is competent for the Labour Court in proceedings under Section 33C(2) to decide whether the right does or does not exist. In the presnet case the amount that was claimed by the five workmen was based on their admitted contract of employment and on the further plea that their suspension being unjustified, they were entitled to their wages in accordance with their conditions of service. It was not a case where the workman wanted a right to be granted to them by the Labour Court which is a relief that cannot be claimed in proceedings under Section 33C(2) and may be claimed by raising an industrial dispute. The Labour Court, in these circumstances was competent to arrive at the finding that the suspension of these five workmen did not extinguish their right to receive their wages for the period of suspension because of the conditions of service, and thereafter, compute the amount claimed by them, It is, therefore, clear that merely because the right claimed in the petition is denied by the employer, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is not taken away and in a matter which could not from the subject-matter of an industrial dispute the Labour Court will have jurisdiction to decide the right of the employee as well. The scope of Section 33C(2) came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the decisions Central Bank of India v. P.S. Rajagopalan , reported in Chief Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar and Ramakrishna Ramanath v. Presideing Officer, Nagpur 1970-II L.L.J. 306, It was held in these cases that the claim under Section 33C(2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by Sub-section (2). The question whether the suspension was illegal or without jurisdiction could, therefore, also be gone into by the Labour Court in an application under Section 33C(2) in all cases where the suspension was not followed by a punishment of discharge, dismissal or termination.
6. At this stage we may note a decision of this Court reported in B. Kalyanasundaram v. Labour Court, Madras, (29) Factories Journal Reports, 214. where a single Judge of this Court held that even a suspension of a workman amounts to non-employment of the workman and an industrial dispute can be raised in regard to such a non-employment which is alleged to be devoid of any valid reasons. But that is a case where the non-employment was taken up as an industrial dispute by the workers' union and, therefore, is no authority for the position that every case of suspension pending an enquiry amounts to non-employment of the workman and an industrial disputes within the meaning of the Section 2(k) of the Act. In the instant case, though the suspension order purported to be one pending an enquiry, no charges were framed, no enquiry was held and the second respondent was held in suspension for an indefinite period. Normally if there is an enquiry pending and the suspension is pending such an enquiry, the employee concerned may not be in a position to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33C(2) as he will have to await the decision in the enquiry. Even if the enquiry is delayed his only remedy would be to file a petition for mandamus to direct the completion of the enquiry at an earlier date and cannot invoke jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) but when no enquiry is pending and the employee is kept in suspension indefinitely, certainly he will be entitled to invoke the provisions of section 33c(2) for determination of the amount payable to him for the period of suspension.
7. In the result, we are of the view that on the facts and circumstances of this case, in view of the fact that there was no enquiry at all till the date when the application was filed, for more than one year from the date of suspension the application before the Labour Court was maintainable and the Labour Court was right in going into the question as part of the enquiry, of determination of the amount payable of the legality of the suspension itself.
8. On facts it was conceded by the witness for the management that the suspension contemplated under the by-laws of the Society pending disciplinary enquiry could only be for a period of three months at a time. There is no evidence to show that for every period of three months there was an order of suspension. A Full Bench of this Court in Palani Co-op. Sales Society v. Presiding Officer , construing a provision similar to the one of the by-laws of this Society, held that for every three months there should be a fresh order of suspension otherwise the suspension order will be illegal. The Labour Court was, therefore, right holding that the suspension order in the instant case was illegal. Even for the first three months, the second respondent will be entitled to salary as the power is to suspend pending an enquiry but no enquiry is held, in effect the suspension for the period of the first three months would amount to a substantative punishment and, therefore, even for the first three months he is entitled to salary as claimed. The order of the Labour Court is, therefore, not liable to be interfered with.
9. The writ petition accordingly fails and it is dismissed. Rule nisi is discharged. Since the second respondent has not appeared either in person or by counsel there will be no order as to consts.
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