- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
M. Janakiram Naidu v. T.R Arumuga Mudaliar
Legal Opinion Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
This revision was filed by the tenant against an eviction order passed by the Rent Controller, Madras under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and confirmed on appeal. The eviction related to premises No. 78, Karaneeswarar Koil Street, Mylapore, Madras. The landlord sought eviction on the ground that he bona fide required the premises for his own use and occupation, alleging he had no other premises in Madras and had purchased the property with a view to occupy it. The tenant contested (a) that there was no landlord-tenant relationship between himself and the respondent (asserting his tenancy was with the former owner) and (b) that there was no notice terminating the tenancy.
The Rent Controller found: (i) there was a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties, (ii) the landlord bona fide required the premises for his own use, and (iii) a valid notice terminating the tenancy had been served as provided under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act; accordingly the Rent Controller ordered eviction. The appellate authority affirmed these findings, additionally holding that the tenant had attorned to the respondent after purchase and that Exhibits P-2 (copy of notice) and P-3 (postal acknowledgment) were sufficient to enable eviction even if notice were required.
In this revision the only question pressed before the revisional Court was whether the requirement as to notice terminating the tenancy prior to filing the eviction petition was satisfied. The tenant did not challenge the factual findings that the landlord required the premises bona fide and that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between the parties.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the requirement of serving a notice terminating the tenancy prior to filing an eviction petition (as contemplated by Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act) was satisfied in the present case by Exhibits P-2 (notice) and P-3 (postal acknowledgment).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner argued there was no valid service of the notice because the postal acknowledgment (Exhibit P-3) was signed by one "Shanmugam" who was not shown to be an inmate, servant, agent or family member of the petitioner.
- Before the Rent Controller no evidence was adduced by the respondent to show that Shanmugam was an inmate or had authority to acknowledge the notice; therefore the Court should not assume that the notice was served on the petitioner.
- The respondent failed to examine the postman to establish the circumstances under which the letter was handed over to Shanmugam.
- Exhibit P-3 lacks the petitioner's initial or address and does not purport to be signed on behalf of anyone else; thus the acknowledgment should not be treated as valid service on the petitioner.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent contended that Exhibits P-2 and P-3 show a notice as contemplated by Section 106 was sent to the petitioner's address and received by a person at that address, and should therefore be deemed proper service on the petitioner.
- Counsel for the respondent relied on precedent holding that there is no obligation on a lessor to prove actual service if a notice is sent by registered post properly addressed, invoking Section 27 of the General Clauses Act.
- The respondent relied on the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act (as applied in prior cases) that delivery of a registered letter at the lessee's address and acknowledgment by a person there gives rise to a presumption that the addressee was aware of that person; the burden to rebut that presumption lies on the addressee.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Saligram Bai Chunilal Bahadur & Co. v. Abdul Gani, A.I.R. 1953 Assam 206 | Expressed that a lessor is not obliged to prove actual service of notice on the lessee if the lessor sends the notice by registered post properly addressed. | Used to support the view that sending a notice by registered post properly addressed attracts the deeming provision in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and suffices to establish service unless rebutted. |
| Balgovind v. Bhargava School Book Depot, A.I.R. 1958 All. 369 | Where notice was received by somebody signing on behalf of the addressee, the Court invoked the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that the lessee must have been in the know of that person; burden lies on lessee to prove that person was not servant/agent/family. | Relied upon to justify invoking Section 114 presumption in the present case and to place the onus on the petitioner to rebut that presumption (for example by examining the postman). |
| Sushil Kumar v. Ganesh Chandra | Held that once a letter containing a notice to quit is properly addressed, prepaid and sent by registered post, service shall be deemed effected under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act; the deeming results in a presumption which, unless rebutted, proves service. | Applied to support the conclusion that the registered dispatch of Exhibits P-2 and P-3 gives rise to a presumption of service which the petitioner failed to rebut. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court focused on whether the statutory requirement as to notice (Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act) had been satisfied. The documents in issue were Exhibit P-2 (office copy of the notice dated 31 January 1967, terminating the tenancy and calling for vacant possession) and Exhibit P-3 (postal acknowledgment showing that one T. Shanmugam had acknowledged receipt).
The Court examined the combined operation of:
- Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (as amended in 1929), which permits termination of tenancy by a notice in writing that either be sent by post or be delivered personally or to one of the lessee's family or servants; and
- Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, which deems service by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post to have been effected at the time the letter would ordinarily be delivered, unless a contrary intention appears.
The Court noted that Exhibit P-2 was properly addressed and Exhibit P-3 showed the registered letter had been prepaid and acknowledged by Shanmugam. Although Exhibit P-3 did not state that Shanmugam signed on behalf of the petitioner, nor did it contain the petitioner's initial or address in the acknowledgment form, the Court concluded that these omissions did not establish that the letter had been delivered to a different address.
The Court reasoned that once the letter containing the notice was properly addressed and sent by registered post, the deeming provision of Section 27 applied. The critical question then became whether the petitioner had produced contrary evidence sufficient to rebut the deeming/presumption. The Court observed that the petitioner could have rebutted the presumption by adducing evidence — for example, by examining the postman to show the circumstances of delivery — or otherwise proving that Shanmugam had no authority and was not an inmate, servant, agent or family member. The petitioner did not produce such rebuttal evidence.
The Court also invoked the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act (as illustrated in Balgovind) that where a registered letter is delivered at the lessee's address and acknowledged by a person there, it is presumed the lessee must have been aware of that person, and that this is within the exclusive knowledge of the lessee to rebut. The Court held that a mere statement on oath by the petitioner that he did not receive the notice was insufficient to rebut the combined presumption arising from Section 27 and Section 114.
Finally, the Court observed that the 1929 amendment to Section 106 made service by post an alternative mode and that the requirement of delivery personally to the lessee or to a family member/servant did not apply to notices sent by post. Given that the notice had been sent as required under Section 27 and that no effective rebuttal was produced, the Court concluded that the notice (Exhibit P-2) should be treated as served under Section 106.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The revision is dismissed. The Court held that the notice (original of Exhibit P-2) was served under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act by virtue of the deeming provision in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, and the petitioner failed to rebut those presumptions.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The eviction order confirmed by the appellate authority stands; the revision by the tenant is dismissed and the tenant was given three months' time to vacate. The dismissal was ordered without costs.
- Broader implications: The opinion applies established statutory deeming and evidentiary presumptions (Sections 27 and 114) to hold that registered-post service of a termination notice, properly addressed and prepaid, is to be deemed effective unless convincingly rebutted. The opinion does not purport to set a new legal principle beyond applying these provisions and cited case authority to the facts of this matter.
1. This revision has been filed by the tenant against the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, Madras under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and confirmed by the appellate authority, in respect of premises No. 78, Karaneeswarar Koil Street, Mylapore, Madras. Eviction was sought on the ground that the respondent (landlord) required the premises bona fide for his own use and occupation as he had no other premises of his own in the City of Madras and that he had purchased the premises in question only with a view to occupy the same. The petitioner contested the petition on the ground that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant as between himself and the respondent that his tenancy was only with the former owner and that in any event there was no notice terminating the tenancy. The Rent Controller found that there was the relationship of landlord and tenant as between the petitioner and the respondent, that the respondent bona fide required the premises for his own use and occupation and that there has been a valid notice terminating the tenancy as provided under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and hence ordered eviction of the petitioner. On appeal, the appellate authority also held that there was an attornment by the petitioner in favour of the respondent after his purchase and that the respondent required the premises bona fide for his own use and occupation as he had purchased the property only with a view to occupy the same. On the question of notice, the appellate authority held that no notice terminating the tenancy is necessary but that even assuming that such a notice is necessary, he was satisfied that Exhibits P-2 and P-3, copy of the notice and the postal acknowledgment thereof, were sufficient to enable the respondent to seek eviction of the petitioner. In this revision by the tenant the only question that was pressed before me was as to whether the requirement as to notice terminating the tenancy prior to the filing of the eviction petition was satisfied. The learned Counsel for the petitioner did not challenge the findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below that the respondent required the premises bona fide for his own use and occupation and that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the respondent.
2. As regards the question of notice, the Rent Controller referred to Exhibit P-2 the office copy of the notice dated 31st January, 1967, sent by the Counsel for the respondent terminating the tenancy of the petitioner ending with 28th February, 1967 and calling upon the petitioner to deliver vacant possession by 1st March, 1967 and Exhibit P-3 the postal acknowledgment showing that one T. Shanmugam had acknowledged the receipt of the notice on nth February, 1967 and expressed that it was probable that, in the absence of the petitioner, some of his inmates might have received the original of Exhibit P-2. On the assumption that Shanmugam who has signed the acknowledgment, Exhibit P-3 was an inmate in the house of the petitioner the Rent Controller held that a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was in fact issued to the petitioner. The appellate authority also refers to Exhibits P-2 and P-3 and takes the acknowledgment signed by Shanmugam as an acknowledgment made on behalf of the petitioner as it is of the view that unless the appellant (petitioner) had authorised somebody to receive letters on his behalf Shanmugam could not have received the letter addressed to the petitioner. On that view it held that the petitioner should be deemed to have received the original of Exhibit P-2 and that there had been a valid notice terminating the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contends before me that, while the Rent Controller proceeds on the basis that Shanmugam who is said to have acknowledged the original of Exhibit P-2 under Exhibit P-3 was an inmate of the petitioner's house, the appellate authority has proceeded on the basis that T. Shanmugam had the requisite authority from the petitioner to acknowledge the notice, the original of Exhibit P-2. It is pointed out that before the Rent Controller no evidence was adduced on the part of the respondent to show that Shanmugam was an inmate of the petitioner's house or that he had the requisite authority to acknowledge and that in the absence of any evidence it was not open to the Court, to assume that Shanmugam was an inmate of petitioner's house or that Shanmugam had the requisite authority to receive the notice addressed to the petitioner. It is said that the respondent has not examined the postman who delivered the notice to show under what circumstances the letter was handed over to Shanmugam. It is also said that there is none with the name Shanmugam in the petitioners' house and that the acknowledgment by the said Shanmugam should not be treated as a valid service of notice on the petitioner.
4. Exhibit P-2 is a typed copy of the notice said to have been addressed and sent to the petitioner at No. 78, Karaneeswarar Koil Street and Exhibit P-3 is the acknowledgment signed by one Shanmugham. Exhibit P-3 does not contain either the initial of the petitioner or his address. The recipient is shown as Shanmugam and it does not purport to have been signed on behalf of anyone else. On these facts the learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the alleged notice not having been served on the petitioner, that notice is not sufficient to terminate the tenancy, and that the present eviction petition has to be dismissed as not maintainable.
5. The learned Counsel for the respondent (landlord) however contends that Exhibits P-2 and P-3 show that a notice as contemplated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was sent to the address of the petitioner, that it has been received by a person in that address and that it should be deemed to be a proper service on the petitioner. Reference was made to the decision in Saligram Bai Chunilal Bahadur & Co. v. Abdul Gani A.I.R. 1953 Assam. 206, wherein it was expressed that there was no obligation upon a lessor to prove service of notice upon the lessee, if he sends a notice by registered post properly addressed. The learned Judges relied on Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and took the view that by virtue of that section unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document and it should be deemed that the service was effected at a time when the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. Balgovind v. Bhargava School Book Depit. , was also referred to. There the notice was received by somebody signing on behalf of the addressee and the Court invoked the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and held that the lessee must have been in the know of the person who signed the notice when it was delivered at the lessee's address, and this being exclusively within his knowledge, it was his duty to prove that this person who signed on behalf of the lessee was neither his servant nor agent nor a member of his family and that in the absence of proof on this point the presumption arising out of the registered letter being delivered at the lessee's shop could not be rebutted. Reliance was also placed on Sushil Kumar v. Ganesh Chandra , wherein also it was held that as soon as it is proved that a letter containing a notice to quit is properly addressed, pre-paid and sent by registered post, service shall, under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, be deemed to have been effected. According to the learned Judges in that case " deeming" amounts to a presumption which, unless rebutted,, would prove the fact of service. In that case the notice was said to have been refused by the addressee and the Court held that even if the actual refusal by the addressee is not proved, service of the notice may well be held to have been proved.
6. In this case the copy of the notice Exhibit P-2 shows that it has been properly-addressed and the postal acknowledgment, Exhibit P-3 shows that the registered' letter has been pre-paid. Though Exhibit P-2 does not contain the address of the' petitioner, it gives the name of the petitioner and one can presume that the form of acknowledgment was appended to the registered notice said to have been sent and that the acknowledgment was taken from one Shanmugam at the address given in the registered letter. The fact that Shanmugam does not purport to have received the letter on behalf of the addressee will not show that the letter was delivered to a person in a different address. Having regard to the fact that the letter gave definite and specific particulars, the service should be deemed to have been made at the address shown. In view of the fact that the letter has been duly addressed and prepaid the provisions of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act is attracted.
7. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act says:
Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression " serve" or either of the expressions " give" or " send" or any other expression is used, then unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document and unless the contrary is proved to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.
8. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act enables the lessor to determine the tenancy by a notice to quit and the relevant part of Section 106 as amended in 1929 is as follows:
Every notice under this section must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants, at his residence, of (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property.
As per the " deeming" provided in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, the service shall be deemed to have been effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post a letter containing the notice. The question is whether anything contrary has been proved to ignore that deeming provision. In this case the fact that Shanmugam has not purported to have signed on behalf of the petitioner and the non-furnishing of details of particulars in Exhibit P-3 are relied on to show that the requirements contemplated under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act have not been complied with. In this case a notice has been sent by the Counsel for the landlord and the acknowledgment, Exhibit P-3 was received in token of receipt of that letter. Though the petitioner says that there is no person by name, Shanmugam in his household, he must have let in sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption contained in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act by proving that Shanmugham had no requisite authority to acknowledge that letter and that there is no valid service on him. This he could have done by examining the postman who is said to have effected the service. In the absence of any rebuttal evidence by the petitioner the deeming provision in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act has to be given effect to. It is also possible to invoke, in the circumstances of this case, the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. As pointed out in Balgovind v. Bhargava School Book Depot. A.I.R. 1958 All. 369, the purpose of the amendment of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act by the amending Act XX of 1929 evidently, was to make service by post an alternative provision for giving the notice under Section 106. The words requiring the delivery or tender of notice to the lessee '' personally or to one of his family or servants " did not apply to a notice sent by post. Hence the petitioner's complaint that neither he nor anyone of his family members was personally served and that the petition cannot be maintained without such personal service cannot be accepted for, under the provisions of section 106 as amended it is not necessary that a notice sent by registered post should be delivered personally to the lessee or to one of his family or servant. Service by post being an alternative mode and the respondent having sent the notice as required under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, it has to be deemed that the service has been duly effected. The mere statement on oath by the petitioner that notice had not been received by him will not rebut the presumption contained in Section 114 of the Evidence Act and the deeming provision in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. In this case notice should be presumed to have been served at the address given in the letter and in the absence of proof that the person who acknowledge that letter was neither a servant nor an agent nor a member of his family, the presumption of due service has to be invoked. I am therefore of the view that the notice, original of Exhibit P-2 should be held to have been served under Section 106 and the main contention raised by the petitioner in this revision should be over-ruled. The revision is therefore dismissed ; but, in the circumstances, without costs. Time for vacating three months.
Alert