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E. Rajagopalan Chettiar And Another v. Sina Ana Ishack Rowther And Others.
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal concerns whether the provisions of Section 9-A of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1938 (Madras Act IV of 1938) can be applied to a mortgagee's claim for payment out of compensation deposited when an inam estate was taken over by the Government under the Abolition Act (Act XXVI of 1948).
Facts (as stated in the opinion):
- The inam estate of Kusavarungulam was notified and taken over by the Government on 3 January 1951, and an advance compensation of Rs. 11,031 was deposited with the Tribunal.
- Appellants claimed under an othi executed on 2 November 1941 in favour of Nambi Narayana Chettiar (by the 1st Respondent) in respect of a 1/3 share in the inam estate, and applied for payment of the sum reserved under the mortgage (Rs. 3,500).
- The 1st Respondent also applied for payment of his 1/3 share of the compensation less what was payable to the mortgagee, claiming entitlement to relief under Section 9-A of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act on the basis that the mortgagor was an agriculturist and that the mortgage debt stood partially discharged under that section.
- After execution of the othi, the mortgagor (1st Respondent) obtained a lease back of the properties and remained in possession as a tenant until 1 July 1946, when he surrendered possession. He claimed that during that tenancy he paid rent in excess of 5 1/2% per annum, and that the excess should be credited towards reduction of principal.
- The Tribunal accepted the respondent's contention: applying provisions of Section 9-A(9) and crediting excess rent towards principal produced a reduced debt of Rs. 3,045-8-0 as on 1 July 1946; after a further proportionate reduction for the period the mortgagees were in possession until the estate was taken over, the debt was ascertained at Rs. 2,113-13-8. The balance of the 1/3 share of compensation was directed to be paid to the 1st Respondent.
- The appellants appealed, contending that the mortgage debt was not liable to be scaled down and that the full Rs. 3,500 should be paid to them.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the provisions of Section 9-A of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1938 can be applied to a mortgagee-creditor's claim to be paid out of compensation deposited in respect of an estate taken over by the Government under the Abolition Act (Act XXVI of 1948).
- Whether Section 9-A (and, in particular, Section 9-A(3)) applies where the mortgagor has not tendered or deposited the reduced amount and the estate has been taken over by the Government, thereby converting rights over property into claims against compensation money.
- Whether an application to the Tribunal for payment out of compensation, after providing for scaled down payment to the mortgagee, can be treated as an exercise of the mortgagor's right of redemption (i.e., a deposit or tender sufficient to invoke Section 9-A).
- Whether Section 9-A applies only to usufructuary mortgages (or more broadly to anomalous mortgages), as contended by the appellants.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The mortgage debt is not liable to be scaled down under Section 9-A; the entire mortgage amount of Rs. 3,500 should have been directed to be paid to the mortgagees.
- Section 9-A applies only to usufructuary mortgages and cannot be invoked to scale down the debt due under an anomalous mortgage (relying on Thirumalpad v. Krishnan Nair).
1st Respondent's Arguments
- The 1st Respondent is an agriculturist entitled to the benefit of Act IV of 1938 and, by operation of Section 9-A, the debt covered by the othi stood partially discharged; therefore he was entitled to payment of his share after allowing for the scaled down mortgage debt.
- During his tenancy he paid rent in excess of 5 1/2% per annum and the excess should be credited in reduction of the principal amount due.
- When the mortgagor applied to the Tribunal for payment out after providing for payment of the mortgage amount as scaled down, that application should be treated as an exercise of the right to redeem (i.e., a deposit or tender), and hence Section 9-A should apply.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Thirumalpad v. Krishnan Nair | Relied upon for the contention that Section 9-A applies only to usufructuary mortgages (i.e., limits application to certain mortgage types). | The court declined to express an opinion on the correctness of this decision for purposes of the appeal and assumed, for present purposes, that the anomalous mortgage would come within the scope of Section 9-A. |
| Srinivasaraghava Aiyangar v. Narasimha Mudallar | Support for the view that Section 9-A is intended to apply only where the mortgagor seeks to redeem the mortgage. | The court cited this decision as part of a line of authorities accepting that Section 9-A is primarily concerned with suits for redemption by mortgagors. |
| Visalakshi Achi v. Mayalagu (1955) 68 L.W. 630 | Accepted the view that Section 9-A applies in the context of redemption claims by mortgagors (consistent with Srinivasaraghava Aiyangar). | The court relied on this decision as further confirmation that Section 9-A operates in the context of redemption and that its application to other proceedings is limited. |
| Appeal No. 462 of 1950 (referred in the opinion) | Held that Section 9-A cannot be availed of by a defendant when a mortgagee brings a suit for sale; the section is applicable only to a suit for redemption by the mortgagor. | The court cited this appeal to support the proposition that Section 9-A requires a suit by the mortgagor to redeem and is not available as a defence in a mortgagee's suit for sale or realisation. |
| Thirupathi v. Rajagopala Naidu | In a composite mortgage where the mortgagee sued for realisation the court held that Section 9-A could not be applied; Section 9-A comes into play only where the mortgagor seeks to redeem. | The opinion used this authority to reinforce the rule that mere pleadings or assertion without tender/deposit do not amount to exercising the right of redemption under Section 9-A. |
| Barhamdeo Prasad v. Tara Chand (1913) 26 M.L.J. 243; L.R. 41 I.A. 45; I.L.R. 41 Cal. 654 | Held that surplus sale proceeds lying in Court after paying earlier mortgagees represented the security which the subsequent mortgagee had under the mortgage (i.e., sale proceeds can be treated as substituted security). | The court cited this Privy Council decision by analogy to the proposition that compensation/deposited money may represent substituted security for mortgagee's rights, but used it to distinguish redemption of property from a claim to a money sum against compensation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's reasoning proceeded in a step-by-step manner, applying statutory text and precedent as follows (summary limited strictly to the content of the opinion):
- Characterisation of the central statutory provisions:
- Section 9-A(5) of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act provides that if a mortgagee has been in possession for 30 years or more the mortgage debt shall be deemed wholly discharged from the expiry of that period. That rule did not apply because the mortgage arose in 1941 (less than 30 years).
- Section 9-A(3) addresses mortgages less than thirty years old and prescribes a formula under which a mortgagor may redeem by paying a reduced amount bearing to the principal the same proportion as the period of mortgagee's possession bears to thirty years (the court quoted the material portion).
- Interpretation of Section 9-A:
- The court emphasised that the language of Section 9-A(3) enables the mortgagor to redeem by paying a proportionately reduced amount; it does not statutorily declare that the mortgage is discharged absent redemption. In other words, the statutory benefit requires an active exercise of the right to redeem.
- This interpretative conclusion aligns with a series of earlier decisions which treated Section 9-A as applicable in the context of redemption suits brought by mortgagors.
- Application of precedent and the requirement of redemption by tender or deposit:
- The court relied on earlier authority (including Srinivasaraghava Aiyangar, Visalakshi Achi, Appeal No. 462 of 1950 and Thirupathi v. Rajagopala Naidu) for the proposition that the necessary pre-requisite for application of Section 9-A is a suit by the mortgagor to redeem and that redemption is to be effected by tendering the money or depositing it in Court (cf. Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act).
- Thus, a mere written allegation that the mortgagor is entitled to scale down the amount under Section 9-A does not constitute exercising the right of redemption; tender or deposit is required.
- Application to the facts:
- On the facts, there had been no tender or deposit of the mortgage money before the estate was taken over by the Government; the mortgage remained subsisting at the time of taking over.
- When land is taken over by the State under the Abolition Act, Section 3 vests the property on notification in the Government free of all encumbrances; the rights of owners and encumbrancers are converted into rights against the compensation money deposited.
- The court treated compensation money as creating a monetary right for the mortgagee (i.e., a claim to a sum), not as leaving open the in rem mortgage right that could be redeemed in the sense of buying back the property.
- Statutory provisions in the Abolition Act (Section 41(1)(b)(2) permitting deduction for mortgage amounts and Section 42 enabling creditors to apply for payment out) create a mechanism in which the mortgagee's right is to a sum of money from the deposited compensation; in that situation the procedural and substantive preconditions for invoking Section 9-A(3) (i.e., a mortgagor's suit for redemption with tender/deposit before takeover) are not present.
- Rejection of alternate arguments:
- The court rejected the respondent's contention that an application to the Tribunal for payment out, made after providing for scaled down payment to the mortgagee, should be treated as a deposit/tender amounting to redemption. The court emphasised the conceptual distinction between redeeming the property and making a claim to a money sum arising from statutory takeover.
- The court also rejected reliance on Order 34, Rule 5 (setting aside a court-sale before confirmation to enable redemption), observing that Order 34, Rule 5 is a specific statutory device applicable in the context of court sales and mortgage-decree sales and cannot be analogised to a situation where the State has taken over the property under statutory provisions. The statutory setting for State takeover operates differently from a court sale and the consequences of payment under Order 34, Rule 5 (discharge of a mortgage decree) do not translate to the takeover context.
- Conclusion:
- Because no redemption (by tender or deposit) occurred prior to the taking over, and because the Abolition Act vested the property in the Government free of encumbrances while creating monetary claims against the compensation fund, Section 9-A(3) could not be applied to scale down the mortgage debt in the circumstances of this case.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED — The appellants are entitled to be paid the full mortgage amount of Rs. 3,500; the Tribunal's scaling down of the mortgage debt under Section 9-A is reversed.
Implications (as stated or necessarily limited by the opinion):
- Direct effect on the parties: The appellants (mortgagees) are to receive the full mortgage sum of Rs. 3,500 from the compensation deposited; the 1st Respondent is not entitled to have the mortgage debt scaled down under Section 9-A in the circumstances of this case.
- The court's decision rests on a textual and precedential view that Section 9-A operates in the context of redemption by a mortgagor (which requires tender or deposit) and cannot be invoked to reduce a mortgagee's claim for payment out of compensation after the State's statutory takeover when no redemption was effected before takeover.
- The opinion does not purport to set out any broad new principle beyond applying existing statutory interpretation and precedent to the facts; it does not explicitly state that a new precedent is being laid down. The result is a reversal of the Tribunal's order and allowance of the appeal with costs.
Note: This summary strictly follows the statements and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what the opinion itself states.
1. This appeal raises the question, whether the provisions of Section 9-A of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1938 (Madras Act IV of 1938) could be applied to the claim by a mortgagee-creditor to be paid out of the compensation amount deposited in respect of an estate taken over by the Government under the provisions of Act XXVI of 1948 (Abolition Act).
2. The inam estate of Kusavarungulam was notified and taken over by the Government on 3rd January, 1951, and an advance compensation of Rs. 11,031 was deposited with the Tribunal. The appellants, claiming under an Qthi executed on 2nd November, 1941, in favour of one Nambi Narayana Chettiar by the 1st Respondent in respect of i/3rd share in the inam estate, applied for payment out of the sum reserved under the mortgage, namely, Rs. 3,500. The 1st Respondent also applied for payment of his 1 /3rd share in the compensation amount less what was payable to the mortgagee. He claimed that he was an agriculturist, entitled to the benefit of Act IV of 1938, that, by the operation of Section 9-A of the Act, the debt covered by the othi stood partially discharged, and that he was entitled to be paid out the amount.
3. Immediately after the othi was executed, the mortgagor, namely, the 1st respondent, obtained a lease of the mortgage properties from the appellant, and was in possession as a tenant till 1st July. 1946, when he surrendered possession of the properties. The 1st respondent claimed that during the period he was in possession as tenant he had paid a certain amount by way of rent which was in excess of 5 1/2 per cent, per annum, on the amount lent and that the excess payment should be taken in reduction of the principal amount due. The Tribunal accepted the contentions of the respondent, and held that, by applying the provisions of section 9-a (9) and crediting the rent in excess of 5 1/2 per cent, per annum towards the principal, the debt due on 1st July, 1946 was only Rs. 3,045-8-0, and that, as the mortgagees were in possession of the properties thereafter till the estate was taken over by the Government, there should be a proportionate reduction of the debt. That was ascertained to be Rs. 2,113-13-8. The balance of 1/3rd share of the compensation amount was directed to be paid over to the 1st respondent. The appellants have appealed against the order of the Tribunal, claiming that the mortgage debt is not liable to be scaled down, and that the entire mortgage amount, namely, Rs. 3,500 should have been directed to be paid over to them.
4. It is not disputed that the 1st respondent is an agriculturist. But it is contended that Section 9-A of Act IV of 1938 would apply only to usufructuary mortgages, and its provisions cannot be invoked to scale down the debt due under an anomalous mortgage. Reliance was placed for the contention on Thlrumalpad v. Krhhnan Nair . The correctness of that decision was challenged on behalf of the 1st respondent. It is unnecessary, in the view we are taking, to express any opinion about the correctness or otherwise of the decision in Thlrumalpad v. Krlshnan Nair . We shall assume that the mortgage in question, though an anomalous one, would come within the scope of Section 9-A of the Act.
5. Section 9-A (5) states that, if a mortgagee has been in possession of mortgaged property for a period of 30 years or more, the mortgage debt shall be deemed to have been wholly discharged with effect from the expiry of the period of thirty years. The mortgage in the instant case came into existence in I941, and that rule cannot apply. section 9-a (3) deals with cases, where a mortgage is less than 30 years old, and it runs:
Where the mortgagee has been in possession of the whole of the property mortgaged to him for an aggregate period of less than thirty years, the mortgagor shall not be entitled to redeem the mortgage, unless he pays to the mortgagee:
(1) the difference between the principal amount secured by the mortgage and an amount bearing to principal amount the same proportion as the period during which the mortgagee has been in possession bears to thirty years." (Rest of the section omitted as unnecessary).
The terms of the section set out above only enable the debtor to redeem the mortgaged property by paying an amount reduced in proportion to the period during which the mortgagee had been in possession and enjoyment of the property. The language employed is not similar to the one in Section 7, which statutorily declared all outstanding interest discharged. If, therefore, the mortgagor does not redeem, the mortgage does not stand discharged. That is possibly for the reason that in an usufructuary mortgage, where the mortgagee is entitled to remain in possession till the entire debt is paid off, a provision for a partial discharge before redemption is unnecessary. This view of the section has been accepted in a series of decisions. In Srinivasaraghava Aiyangar v. Narasimha Mudallar , Subba Rao, J., (as he then was) observed that Section 9-A was intended to apply only to a case where the mortgagor seeks to redeem the mortgage. This view was accepted in Visalakshi Achi v. Mayalagu (1955) 68 L.W. 630. The decisions in those cases are sought to be distinguished on the ground that they related to a claim for scaling down the rent payable to an usufructuary mortgagee who had granted lease back of the properties to the mortgagor. It is true that the question raised in those cases was with reference to Section 9-A (9) of the Act, but we are unable to see any distinction either in principle or in the language employed by the learned Judges, between a case where the benefit is claimed by way of reduction of rent payable or for redemption. In both cases the claim or benefit could be sustained only under Section 9-A, and it was necessary to consider to which type of mortgage the section would apply. It is, however, unnecessary to dilate on this aspect of the matter, as that view has been accepted even in cases where no question of payment of rent arose. In Appeal No. 462 of 1950, the suit was laid for recovery of the amount due on an anomalous mortgage, while the mortgagee was in possession. The mortgagor was let into possession under a lease from the mortgagee, but that fact is of no significance, as the claim was for the mortgage money. The mortgagor pleaded that the debt should be scaled down by the application of Section 9-A of the Act. The learned Judges held that it was not open to the mortgagor to plead, by way of defence in a suit for sale under Section 9-A, that the debt had been discharged partially. In the course of the judgment, Govinda Menon, J., observed:
The appeal can be disposed of on a preliminary question, namely, that Section 9-A cannot be availed of by the defendant when a mortgagee brings a suit for sale because the section expressly states that it is applicable only to a suit for redemption by a mortgagor. In a recent case decided by us (A.S. No. 422 of 1950) the question has beerfconsidered at some length and we held that the necessary pre-requisite for the application of Section 9-A is a suit by the mortgagor to redeem and not by the mortgagee for realisation of the monies by sale.
The learned Judges proceeded to refer to a number of earlier judgments of this Court, taking the same view. Govinda Menon, J., had to consider the matter again in Thirupathi v. Rajagopala Naidu , where he held that in a composite mortgage (simple and usufructuary), where the mortgagee sued for realisation of the amount due by sale on the covenant by the mortgagor to pay the sum, Section 9-A of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act could not be applied, and that that section could come into play only where in the case of a usufructuary mortgage the mortgagor sought to redeem. In that case, the lower Court had applied the provision of section 9-a in respect of the mortgage and passed a decree for the reduced amount. In the course of the Judgment, the learned Judge observed:
In these circumstances what we have to consider is whether it is open to the mortgagor by a written statement, without filing a fresh suit, to invoke the provisions of section 9-a for the amount being scaled down. In my view, unless the mortgagor tenders the money or deposits the sum in Court, he is not exercising the right to redeem. A mere allegation in a written statement that under Section 9-A of the Act the mortgagor is entitled to scale down the amount would not amount to the exercising, of the right of redemption. Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act states that the right conferred under the section is called " a right to redeem " and a suit to enforce it is called " a suit for redemption." The right of redemption can be exercised by the mortgagor only by tendering the money or by depositing it under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.
6. In the present case, there has been no tender or deposit of the mortgage money before the estate was taken over, that is, the mortgage was subsisting on the property.
7. But even so, it is contended for the respondent, that, when the mortgagor applied to the Tribunal for payment out after providing for payment of the mortgage amount as scaled down, it should be held that he applied for redemption, and that Section 9-A would be attracted. The observations of Govinda Menon, J., to which we referred just now, were relied on to show that redemption could be effected by tender or payment, and that when the mortgagor was agreeable to the mortgagee taking the scaled down amount from the compensation money, it should be deemed to be a deposit.
8. Redemption means buying back the mortgage estate by payment of the money due. Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act declares the right of the mortgagor to redeem. The right of redemption is an incident to a subsisting mortgage and could exist only so long as the mortgage on the property remains. In a case where the mortgage property had been taken over by the Government, no question of redemption of the mortgage property can arise. Section 3 of the Abolition Act (XXVI of ig48) vests the property on notification in the Government free of all encumbrances. The right of the owner as well as that of the encumbrancer would thereafter be transferred to the compensation money paid under the provisions of the Act. The learned Counsel for the respondent argued that the compensation amount should be deemed to be substituted security, and that an application for payment out of the amount would amount to redemption. In Barhamdeo Prasad v. Tara Chand (1913) 26 M.L.J. 243 : L.R. 41 I.A. 45 : I L..R. 41 Cal. 654, the Privy Council held that, where the mortgage property was sold by a Court in proceedings to which the subsequent mortgagee was a party, the right of such mortgagee would only be against surplus sale proceeds lying in Court after paying the earlier mortgagee. It was held that the surplus sale proceeds represented security which the mortgagee had under the mortgage.
9. Section 41(1)(b)(2) of the Abolition Act enables the Government to deduct from the amount deposited any amount due in respect of a mortgage created before the notified date. Section 42 enables the creditors of the owner of an estate to apply for payment out of the compesation monies, the amount due to them. The right created in favour of the mortgagee is for a certain sum of money, and no question of redemption in the sense of buying back of the mortgage property can at all arise. The provision of Section 9-A (3) of Act IV of ig38, which applies only to suits for redemption, cannot obviously apply when the mortgagor has not chosen to exercise his right of redemption before the estate was taken over. On the taking over of the estate, the mortgage stood wiped out by operation of Section 3 of the Abolition Act and fresh rights were created in favour of the mortgagee.
10. The learned Counsel sought to argue, on the analogy of Order 34, Rule 5, which permits a Court-sale under a mortgage decree being set aside before confirmation thereof thus enabling a redemption, that the mortgage should be deemed to subsist; even when the compensation money had been deposited by the Government. Order 34, Rule 5, is a specific statutory provision enabling a setting aside a Court-sale on certain terms being complied with. The effect of payment under that rule is a discharge of the mortgage decree. That rule or any principle on which it is based cannot apply to a case where the mortgage property has been taken over by the State. Therefore, when an erstwhile mortgagor applies for payment out of the compensation amount after making provision for payment to the mortgagee of the estate, no case of redemption can arise. section 9-a (3) could not be applied where there is no occasion for redemption. The appellant would, therefore, be entitled to be paid out the full amount of Rs 3,500. The appeal is allowed with costs.
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