Thota Seshayya And Others v. Madabhushi Vedanta Narasimhacharyulu .

1. These are 14 connected second appeals, filed by the tenants against the judgment and decrees of the Subordinate Judge, Tenali, dismissing their appeals from the judgments and decrees of the District Munsif, Tenaii, in the suits for ejectment and arrears of rent and for mesne profits, filed by the land-holders against them, in respect of the lands in Vaddimukkala agraharam. The learned District Munsif had decreed the suits for ejectment, after overruling all the contentions raised by these appellants. But he had held some discharges to be true. The learned Subordinate Judge, in appeal, had overruled all their contentions and confirmed the judgments and decrees of the lower court, both as regards ejectment and as regards arrears of rent and mesne profits. The memoranda of cross-objections related to the few points held by the courts below in favour of the appellants.

2. The facts were briefly these: The suit lands were covered by a judgment and decree obtained by the plaintiffs land-holders in O.S No. 3 of 1919 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Gungur, Exs. A-1 and A-2, except as regards two items, with which we are not concerned in these appeals but only in the memorandum of cross-objections in S.A No. 299 of 1950. The landholders thereafter let out those lands to these appellants on lease for a period of five years in the year 1941. After the expiry of that lease, they granted another lease to the appellants for one year. That lease expired in March 1947. After March, 1947, the appellants were holding over without any lease in their favour and did not quit the lands in spite of notices to quit. Hence the suits were filed by the land-holders for ejectment and arrears of rent, and for future mesne profits.

3. The appellants had contended that the suit lands were ryoti lands in an estate even before the 1936 amendment of the Madras Estates Land Act. That contention was negatived by both the courts below. They had contended further that these suit lands became ryoti lands in an estate at least by virtue of the 1936 amendment to the Madras Estates Land Act. Both the courts below held that was so, but upheld the contention of the land-holders that by virtue of Section 8(5) of the Madras Estates Land Act, as the landholders had obtained, in respect of these lands, a final decree of a competent civil court, under Exs. A-1 and A-2, establishing that the tenants had no occupancy rights in these lands, and as none of these appellants had acquired any occupancy rights in such lands independently of the Act before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, the land-holders could, notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, for a period of 12 years from the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, admit any person to the possession of such lands on such terms as might be agreed upon between them, and that the appellants would not come under the category of such persons.

4. Relying on the judgment of Horwill, J. in — ‘Mummina Demudu v. Batla Pappayaraju Garu’, AIR 1944 Mad 136 (A), they held that Section 8(5) of the Madras Estates Land Act, as amended by Act 18 of 1936, was intended to be an exception to the general rule enunciated in Section 6(1) of the Act, read with Explanation 2, and would defer for a period of 12 years from the commencement of the Act the application of S. 6 under the circumstances stated therein. The Third Amendment came into operation admittedly on 31-10-1936, and the 12 years' period would, therefore, expire only on 31-10-1948, within which period these suits had been brought. So, both the courts below held that the fact that the appellants were in possession of these lands, which would have been otherwise ryoti lands, would not give them any occupancy rights as ryoti tenants.

5. Both the courts below also held against the appellants' contention that the suits in ejectment would lie only in the revenue courts, and not in the civil courts, as there was nothing in the Estates Land Act to prevent such suits being filed in the civil courts, the normal forum. Both the courts held that regarding the two items not covered by the decrees, occupancy rights were acquired by the tenant, and dismissed the land-holders' suit regarding those items. This is one of the items covered toy the memoranda of cross-objections which also attack some items of discharge held to be true by the lower court.

6. During the hearing of these second appeals to this court, a point was raised by the learned counsel for these appellants that the appellants continued in possession of these lands even after 31-10-1948, and, so, would be entitled to occupancy rights as ryoti tenants, despite the provisions of S. 8(5), even if they overrode the provisions of S. 6(1) read with explanation 2. The learned counsel for the landholders urged that would not be so, because these appellants had been deprived of their possession of these lands from 27-10-1948 when the trial court appointed them receivers of these ‘properties’ at the instance of the plaintiffs, and, as receivers, were in possession as officers of court, even though they had been themselves appointed as receivers. Thereupon, the learned counsel for these appellants raised two contentions: firstly, that the receivers were appointed only after 31-10-1948 in most of the cases and not on 27-10-1948, as contended by the land-holders; and secondly, that these appellants themselves were appointed receivers, and were not divested of their possession and were not directed to deliver their previous possession to the receivers or made to do any other act except pay the makthas or rents into court, which ‘makthas’ also had been taken away by the landholders, who were thus estopped by their act from disputing the continued possession and therefore the occupancy rights of these appellants.

7. Owing to the certified copies produced by the parties bearing different dates, we passed an order on 7-4-1954, asking the District Judge, Guntur, to send up the records regarding the appointment of the receivers, including the petitions, affidavits, counters and orders, and these records have been received, and they show that the appointment of the appellants as receivers was on 27-10-1948 in all the cases that is before the 12 years expired. The appointment was as receivers of “the suit property”. There was no direction to the appellants to hand over possession to themselves as receivers. The receivers appointed were only directed to pay the ‘makthas’ into court, and there was a dispute whether these ‘makthas’ put into court were drawn out by the plaintiffs-landholders. So, we called for a report regarding this matter, and it has been reported to us that all these ‘makhtas’ put into court were drawn out by the landholders. The legal result of this will be considered later on in our judgment.

8. In the course of the argument, it was also discovered that the certified copies of the Register of inams of Vaddimukkala village granted to the rival parties differed in some respects. So, we passed an order on 23-4-1954, directing the District Collector to send the original register of inams in the village of Vaddamukkala, and he has done so and both parties have been given inspection of it.

9. We have perused the entire records and heard the learned counsel on both sides. The points for determination in these appeals are:

1. Whether the lands covered by these second appeals were ryoti lands in an estate even before the Third amendment to the Estates Land Act, 1936?

2. Whether they became ryoti lands in an estate by virtue of the third amendment of the Estates Land Act, 1936, or whether the said amendment did not apply, as the grant was not of the whole village, but the grantor had reserved to himself a portion of the village at the time of the grant?

3. Whether, in case the lands covered by these second appeals became ryoti lands by virtue of the Third Amendment to the Estates Land Act, 1936, these appellants got occupancy rights under Section 6(1) of the Act read with explanation 2?

4. Whether in case Section 8(5) of the Act is an exception to Section 6(1) of the Act read with Explanation 2, and the landholders could rely on the judgment and decree in Exs. A-1 and A-2, and prevent the occupancy rights accruing to the tenants till 31-10-1948, their right to do so is defeated.

(a) by the tenants continuing in possession even after 31-10-1948, by receivers not being appointed in some of the cases till after 31-10-1948.

(b) by the appointment of receivers, even if it is held to be on 27-10-1948 in all the cases, not making any difference to possession of these lands by these appellants in the circumstances, as they were not made to hand over possession to themselves as receivers, and as they were not directed to do anything as receivers except deposit the admitted rents into court;

(c) by the landholders being estopped from questioning the occupancy rights of these appellants by taking out of Court the rents deposited by them for these lands even after 31-10-1948.

5. Whether Section 8(5) of the Estates Land Act is repugnant to the provisions of Arts. 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India, as amounting to a denial of equality before the law and equal protection of laws, and unlawful discrimination between ryots against whom no decree has been obtained by the landholder before 1-11-1933 and ryots against whom such decree has been obtained? (this was a new point taken before us in these second appeals, and we allowed it to be raised because it was a pure question of law and arose out of the Constitution of India which came into operation only on 26-1-1950 and could not be, therefore, raised before the lower appellate court, whose judgment was delivered on 23-11-1949).

6. Whether the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain these suits for ejectment and arrears of rent?

10. We shall deal with the varoius points ‘seriatim’.

11. Point No. 1: On going through the entire evidence, we are satisfied that both the lower courts were right in holding that the lands covered by these second appeals were not ryoti lands in an estate before the Third Amendment of 1936 to the Estates Land Act. Vaddimukkala Agraharam, wherein these lands are situated, was only an inam village, not falling within the definition of an “estate” till the Third Amendment to the Estates Land Act was passed in 1936. In three suits, viz., O.S No. 839 of 1912, on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Bapatla, O.S No. 3 of 1919, on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Guntur, and O.S No. 42 of 1920, on the file of the Sub-Court, Bapatla, the landholders of Vaddimukkala Agraharam had sued certain tenants, who had set up permanent occupancy rights as ryoti tenants on the ground that Vaddimukkala Agraharam was an estate under the Estates Land Act and that the ‘agraharamdars’ had only the ‘melwaram’ and not the ‘kudiwaram’, and these claims had been found against. The oral and documentary evidence on record also shows that both the ‘warams’ were granted to the ‘agraharamdars’ and not merely the ‘melwaram’.

12. Coming to point 2, we have no doubt whatever that the lands in Vaddimukkala Agraharam would normally become ryoti lands in an estate by virtue of the Third Amendment in 1936. We reject the contention of the learned counsel for the landholder that the whole village was not granted. Ex. A-34 is the certified copy of the original grant of the inam by the zamindar in the year 1778. That shows clearly that what was granted was the whole village and that no portion, of the village was excluded from the grant. The inam title deed, Ex. A-38, granted in the year 1860, also acknowledged the title of the grantees to the entire agraharam village of Vaddimukkala. The phrase “exclusive of poromboke” used therein, will not mean that the extent of poromboke was excluded from the grant. It would only mean, that the figure “328.28” mentioned in the inam title deed did not include the poromboke lands, which measured 34 acres 70 cents. There were also minor inams to the extent of 41 acres 2, cents.

13. There is nothing also in the Inam Pair Register, Ex. A-31, which goes to show that any portion of the village was ever excluded from the grant. Though the two extracts, Exs. A-30 and A-31 from the Register of Inams in the village of Vaddimukkala, differed to some extent, and we, therefore, called for the original Register of Inam in that village from the Collector, nothing, to the advantage of these appellants has accrued by the summoning of the original register. No doubt, some minor inams covered by inam title deeds 932 to 935 had been granted before the grant of the village to these landholders. Explanation 1 to S. 3, Cl. (2) will apply here. It says that when the grant is expressed to be of a named village, the area of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate, notwithstanding that certain lands granted on service or any other tenure were not included in the grant. The three inams covered by the title deeds Nos. 932’ to 934 were ‘bhattavarthi’ inams granted on service tenure. So far as the inam covered by the title deed No. 935 is concerned, it was granted for ‘purohitam’ service.

14. It was urged that it was granted after the village in 1778, and that shows that the grantor reserved with him small extent granted for ‘purohitam’ service, and the whole village was not granted, and, so, it would not become an estate even under the Third Amendment. The argument is unconvincing. Ex. A-30 dated 20-12-1860, showed that this ‘purohitam’ service inam was granted “about 80 years before” then. The figure ‘80’ is given in the original Register of Inams, called for by us, clearly and beyond all doubt. It was urged by the learned counsel for the landholders that as Ex. A-30 is dated 1860, the ‘purohitam’ service inam was granted in 1780, that is, two years after the grant of the village to these landholders, who were, therefore, not granted the entire village. The argument is unconvincing. “About 80 years” will not mean exactly 80 years. The very grant of a separate title deed No. 935 to the grantee of the ‘purohitam’ service inam, like the title deeds Nos. 932, 933 and 934 to the other inamdars, would show that it too was an inam granted before the grant of the village to the landholders. That this inam was not entered in Rams Register will not also prove that it was granted after 1802.

15. Even if this ‘purohitam’ service inam was granted shortly after the grant of this village to these landholders, it will not show that the entire village had not been granted to them, as it may be that they themselves granted the ‘purohitam’ service inam two years after they got the entire village. It is unnecessary to rely on this last argument, as we are satisfied that the ‘purohitam’ service inam had been granted before the grant of the village to the plaintiffs' predecessors in title, and so the entire village of Vaddimukkala, less the service inams etc. has been granted to them and it would Become an “estate” under the Third Amendment and the appellants could claim sccupancy rights in the lands therein as ryoti tenants but for S. 8(5). The learned counsel for the plaintiffs cannot, therefore, rely on the ruling of the Supreme Court in —‘District Board of Tanjore v. Noor Mohamed Rowther’, AIR 1953 SC 446 (B), because, in this case, the grant was of a named village, and not the grant of a definite specified area only as in that case, and the area excluded had already been granted on service or other tenure, or had been reserved for communal purposes, and these appellants had discharged the burden which lay on them of proving that these lands in Vaddimukkala would constitute an estate under the Third Amendment, but for the operation of S. 8(5). The ruling applicable to the facts of this case is ‘Narayanswami Naidu v. Subrahmanyam’, AIR 1916 Mad 263 (C), where a whole inam village, though containing minor inams, was held to be an estate within the meaning of Section 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act.

16. Point 3: The learned Counsel for the appellants contended that Section 6(1) of the Estates Land Act, read with explanation 2 would take precedence over S. 8(5), and that S. 8(5) cannot, even if it is valid, be held to be an exception to the general rule laid down in S. (6)(1), especially as the object of the third Amendment was to confer on tenants, who did not have occupancy rights before, security of tenure by giving them occupancy rights. It was contended that the lower court was wrong in relying on the judgment of Horwill, J., in AIR 1944 Mad 136 (A), and that it should have relied on the later ruling of Viswanatha Sastri, J. in —‘Atchanna v. Seetharaswami’, AIR 1950 Mad 387 (D), wherein the learned Judge did not follow the ruling of Horwill, J., above quoted, and held that to claim the benefit of S. 8(5) in respect of land other than his private land, the landholder has to prove not only a final decree of a competent court, before 1-11-1933, obtained by him, but also that no tenant had acquired the right of occupancy in the land under S. 6(1) before the commencement of the Amending Act 18 of 1936 or subsequently.

17. In other words, it was contended that Horwill, J. was wrong in holding that the Legislature intended to exempt from the general operation of S. 6(1) all cases where the landholder had obtained a decree prior to 1-11-1933, unless the tenant, subsequent to the passing of the final decree, had acquired occupancy rights ‘independently of the Act’, and that the mere fact that the tenant was in possession on 30-6-1934, or later would not save him from the application of Section 8(5) of the Act.

18. This very point came up for decision before a Bench of this court, consisting of Rajamannar C.J, and Balakrishna Aiyar, J. in — ‘Chukka Annam Naidu v. Kolachala Apparao’, AIR 1951 Mad 231 (E), in view of the conflicting views of Horwill, J., and Viswanatha Sastri, J., in the above two cases. The Bench agreed with the view of Horwill, J., and dissented from the view of Viswanatha Sastri, J., which, they held to be erroneous. Viswanatha Sastri, J., had held that the effect of S. 6(1) read with explanation (2), was to confer permanent occupancy rights on tenants admitted into possession on 30-6-1934, or any later date. That view was held to be erroneous by the Bench. We are bound by the decision of the Bench. We may add, with respect, that we entirely agree with the view of the Bench even on merits.

19. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on various rules of interpretation given by authorities on the subject in order to show that the specific exception under S. 8(5) cannot govern the general provisions of S. 6(1) and explanation 2, especially as to the object of the third amendment was to favour tenants. We cannot agree. Section 8(5) has been interpreted by Horwill, J., and by the Bench referred to above, as an exception to the provisions of S. 6(1) read with explanation 2. The rule in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 31, page 484, para 604, will not help the appellants. That paragraph runs as follows:

“Where two co-ordinate sections are apparently inconsistent, an effort must be made to reconcile them. If this is impossible, the latter will generally override the earlier; but a particular enactment, wherever found, must be construed strictly as against a general provision.”

20. Here, in the present case, in our opinion, the provisions of S. 6(1) read with explanation 2 and of S. 8(5) are not even apparently inconsistent. They are consistent with each other, and even an effort to reconcile them is unnecessary, as the provision under S. 8(5) is an exception to the general provision under S. 6(1) read with explanation 2. The same observation will apply to the rules regarding interpretation by the other learned authors cited before us, and there is no need, therefore, to discuss them separately.

21. We may add also that it is wrong to assume that the Legislature intended only to favour the tenants in enacting the third Amendment. No legislature ever intends to favour one section of the population against the others. Its ostensible and proclaimed intention is always that it is doing justice between the various sections of the population, and justice is in the preamble of the Constitution of India. We cannot say why when granting occupancy rights under the third Amendment to thousands of tenants, who never had them before, a few landholders should not be given by the same legislature the very restricted privilege under S. 8(5).

22. So, on point 3, we hold that these appellants had not got occupancy rights, in the lands now under dispute in these appeals under Section 6(1) of the Act read with explanation 2, and that Section 8(5) of the Act is an exception to Section 6 of the Act, and the plaintiffs could rely on the judgment and decree in Exs. A. 1 and A. 2, and prevent the occupancy rights in these lands accruing to the tenants till 31-10-1948. The ruling of me Privy Council in — ‘Yerlagadda Mallikarjuna Prasada Naidu v. Somayya’, AIR 1918 PC 182 (P) will not help the appellants in the circumstances, as S. 8(5) was enacted only in the Amending Act of 1936 long after the Privy Council's judgment in question and the effect of that section could not, of course, have been considered by the Privy Council.

23. Point 4(a): It is clear from the records called for by us during the hearing of these appeals that the appellants as tenants did not continue in possession even after 31-10-1948 in their own capacity in any of the cases, and that they were all appointed receivers in respect of these lands on 27-10-1948 before the expiry of the 12 years' period mentioned in S. 8(5), that 12 years' period having ended only on 31-10-1948. None of the appellants claimed to have acquired occupancy rights to these lands independently of the third Amendment; they were only claiming under S. 6(1) read with explanation 2.

24. Point 4(b): Their appointment as receivers on 27-10-1948 did in our opinion, deprive them of possession of these lands by transferring possession from them as tenants to them as receivers of court. The fact that as receivers they were not made to hand over possession to themselves (a rather meaningless procedure) will be of no avail to them. The passage in Kerr on the Law and Practice as to Receivers at p. 155, relied on by the appellant, will not help them. The learned author observes:

“The appointment of a receiver does not of itself effect a change in the possession of land, nor does a receiver of rents and profits of land take possession unless the order directs him to do so.”

25. Obviously, the learned author is referring to the case of a third party receiver and not of the party himself being made a receiver, as in his case, when there will be no question of directing him to take possession from himself. Nor will the fact, that these appellants, who were appointed as receivers of the property under O. 40, R. 1 of the CPC at the instance of the plaintiffs with their consent, and not merely as receivers of the ‘mukthas’, were not directed to do anything more than put the ‘mukthas' into court, make them receivers who need not take possession. A receiver may be asked to do various things by a court. There may be cases, where the receiver does every conceivable things, and there may be cases where he does only a very few things. But, in every case, where he is appointed as general receiver under O. 40, R. 1, he is a receiver and officer of court in respect of the ‘property’, and when possession is passed to him either physically, or legally, by operation of law, as where the party himself is made receiver, it is obvious that the possession is no longer with the original party. In other words, all these tenants ceased to have possession of the lands in dispute in these appeals, ‘as tenants’, on 27-10-1948, and, so, S. 8(5) will apply in full. The order dated 27-10-1948, appointing them as receiver, runs as follows:

“As per the joint endorsement made by both sides today, defendants are appointed Receivers for the suit property under O. 40, R. 1 of the CPC They should deposit the ‘maktha’ into court by the due date.”

26. Obviously, the Receivers were asked to deposit only the ‘maktha’ into court, because the balance of the produce was intended to be given by the receivers to the tenants (though themselves) as their share of the produce. It will be noted that the appointment of the receivers was as regards the suit ‘property’ and not merely as regards the ‘maktha’. So, they had to take possession, unlike mere receivers of rents and profits, and must be deemed to have taken possession.

27. Point 4-C: Nor will the fact of the landholders' taking out the rents deposited in court by the receivers estop them from questioning the occupancy rights of the tenants, even though the tenants themselves have been made receivers. They had not accepted the rents from the tenants but only from the court. They had not accepted the money from the tenants, though the monies were deposited by the receivers, who happened to be the same persons physically as the tenants. The law will not always go by identity of physical personality. Thus, a man may have his own private property and also property as trustee. He will have one capacity as trustee, and another as himself. So, too, when the tenants deposited money as receivers, they were not depositing it as tenants, and the landholders were not accepting it as rent from them as tenants. So, this objection also will be of no avail.

28. Point 5: We are also satisfied that Section 8(5) of the Estates Land Act is not repugnant to the provisions of either Art. 14 or Art. 15 of the Constitution, and will not, therefore, be null and void. In — ‘Harnam Singh v. R.T.A Calcutta Region’, AIR 1954 SC 190 (G), the Supreme Court has held that, in construing Art. 14, courts should not adopt a doctrinaire approach which might well choke all beneficial legislation and that a legislation which is based on a rational classification is permissible. A law applying to a class is held to be constitutional if there is sufficient basis or reason for it. Thus, a statutory discrimination cannot be set aside as the denial of equal protection of the laws, if any state of facts may reasonably be conceived to justify it.

29. Here, there was ample ground in sense and common sense, law and equity to justify the enactment of S. 8(5) and the conferment of the limited privileges therein on landholders who had obtained decrees against tenants before 1-11-1933 regarding their having no occupancy rights in the land. No question of denial of equality before the law or equal protection of laws can ever arise because of the provision. The landholders who had spent much time, money and energy in obtaining such decrees, and fighting out their cases, deserved such small concessions in law and equity, and the denial of these concessions would have led to grave discontent which a State is bound to guard against. It was a legitimate and intelligible classification of landholders who had obtained decrees at great expense of time, money and energy, and landholders who had not obtained such decrees, and the privileges conferred on the landholders who had obtained decrees did not extend to complete denial of occupancy rights to the tenants for ever and for ever, but only for a limited period of 12 years, entitling the landholder to admit any persons to the possession of that land within that period, on such terms as might be agreed upon between them. It was, therefore, a very limited and reasonable concession not offending Art. 14 of the Constitution at all.

30. Nor was Art. 15 of the Constitution offended by unjust and unlawful discrimination against tenants regarding whom there were decrees and landholders in favour of whom there were no decrees. Here too it was a reasonable and intelligible classification. In — ‘State of Bombay v. F.N Balsara’, AIR 1951 SC 318 (H), the Supreme Court has laid down the principles to be applied when construing Arts. 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India. Fazl Ali, J. has laid down seven principles as follows:

1. The presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of the enactment, since it must be assumed that the Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and its discriminations are based on adequate grounds.

2. The presumption may be rebutted in certain cases by showing that on the face of the statute, there is no classification at all and no difference peculiar to any individual or class and not applicable to any other individual or class, and yet the law hits only a particular individual or class.

3. The principle of equality does not mean that every law must have universal application for all persons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position, and the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment.

4. The principle does not take away from the State the power of classifying persons for legitimate purposes.

5. Every classification is in some degree likely to produce some inequality, and mere production of inequality is not enough.

6. If a law deals equally with members of a well-defined class, it is not obnoxious and it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons.

7. While reasonable classification is permissible, such classification must be based upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be attained, and the classification cannot be made arbitrarily and without any substantial basis.

31. The principles enunciated by Fazl Ali, J., have been referred to with approval by the Supreme Court in — ‘State Of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar,’, AIR 1952 SC 75 (I). We are satisfied that S. 8(5) is giving some limited privileges for a limited period to the landholders who have obtained decrees before 1-11-1933, has acted on a classification based on some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be attained, and that the classification cannot be called arbitrary or without any substantial basis, and must be upheld as perfectly valid and not impinging in the least on Art. 14 or 15 of the Constitution of India. We may add that tenants who have been given new occupancy rights under the third Amendment, where they had none before, cannot reasonably complain of the restrictions put on the acquisition, of such new occupancy rights in a few cases where justice requires such restrictions, as in S. 8(5). The tenants acquired the right only under those conditions and cannot very well complain about them:.

“This rule was applied by Subba Rao, J. in — ‘Dr. K.C Nambiar v. State of Madras’, AIR 1953 Mad 351 (J), and by a Bench of this Court to which I too was a party, in — ‘Globe Theatres Ltd. v. State Of Madras’, AIR 1954 Mad 690 (K), when considering the validity of Section 13 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act.

32. Point 6: We have no doubt, whatever that the civil courts' jurisdiction to entertain these suits is undoubted and that both the lower courts were right in upholding it. The decision of the Full Bench of this court in — ‘Govinda Naidu v. Chengalraya Mudali’, AIR 1925 Mad 22 (L), will show it, if authorities were necessary for this point. The general rule is that a civil court has jurisdiction in all such cases of ejectment and arrears of rent, unless it is ousted.

33. All the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants have failed. There is no question of absence of notices to quit also, as it is-admitted that notices to quit were given in all these cases.

34. All these second appeals deserve to be and are hereby dismissed with the costs of the contesting respondents (one set in each appeal).

35. We see no substance also in the memoranda of cross-objections. The courts below were-right in believing the discharges accepted by them. These are questions of ‘fact’ and cannot be even raised in these second appeals, in view of the concurrent findings of both the courts below.

36. The other points raised, regarding the grant being not of the entire village and so the village not forming an estate, etc., have already been rejected by us.

37. All these three memoranda of cross-objections are dismissed with the costs of the contesting respondents.

D.R.R

38. Order accordingly.